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ABSTllACT 
This is a study of the ori.;in and devolo~xnent of lTni;ione.1 Socialis::1 
in a predominantly industrialised province containinG both Catl'lolicG and 
Protestants in rou.:;hly equal nunbers. 
Followirli; a description of the province of 1;les·t'Jlw.lia, the initial 
emphasis is placed on providirli; the settin;; in vlhic11 Nazis';! o:)(?ra/;odo 
Thus the revolution of I9IS and its political conscqu(ll1COS D-re dealt r;i tIl, 
as well as the political and econo . .ri.c situation of tho ninetecn-tnentios. 
The strength of the left-win.; parties and of the Centre Pc"rty in ',';os"/;')l:a-
lia is stressed-
The e;nphasis switches to t1:e USDAP. Its early history is outlined, 
especially its connection with diverse radical rieht-winc ;love:Jents ",.hic:1 
helped to prepare the Vlay for Nazism. The proble'as of the nasce:1t :~SDAP, 
its restriction to urban centres of the Rl.lhr, its li,nited il'?tlct due to 
the socio-relibious composition of the population, end the weal~ess of the 
regional party organisation are exaIllned. The f~.g;:Jentation of the re-
Sional v~lkisch-l~ational Socialist movement after the failure of the EH-
ler Pu'l;sch of 1923 is analysed. 
The re-for:nation of the HSDAP and the Westphalian reaction to ~,1Ullich 
developments provide the basis for an account of the construction, fOQ~~ed 
011 the iiilple:nentatioll of the Ftt.'lJ.rernrinziry, of the reGional orwnnication. 
Al thou.,:;h support dwindled by 1927 as !loli tical and econo;m.c Cil·CUlls·CD.,nce s 
became ;nore settled, the iaportru1ce of the develop::wnts of the yea:rr:. 1926 
to 1929 is em.?hasized since this is the period during which the lJazis ,er-
feoted their or~anisatiol1 and propO{,'1?.l1d.a techniques and extended their 
o~erations - especially, after 1923, into the rural areaso l'he build-up 
of the re~ional party allowed the Nazis to eX910it the political ruld oco-
nOlnic difi'icul ties created by the econo-:rl.c crisis after 1929. 
The increasing success of the Vlestphalia..."1. ITSDAP, as reflected i:1 the 
expansion of party IJEUlbership and grow~ electoral sup!,ort betil'een 1930 
and 1932 is noted. An analysis of the developments in the Gau ad::tinistra-
tion, the emphasis on s,)ecie.list orGn.nisations ane: their li':.i toG. Gi.1.cceCG, 
is followed by 8...'1 eX8.-llnation of the l;SDAP's failure to .1."1.~:e r~l~· GcriouG 
i:apression on the left-ainc vote and the Catholic votei:ri t:w c::'cc·~io;~c 
of 1;)32. A revie,v of the history of the :C:SDAP in ':;ost"haliu co,"cluc:os the 
study. 
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:cm.lODUCTIO~I 
Regional and local studies on Hazisl:a have ?rocluced a ._111Cb. ':lore 
detailed l:nowled..:,79 of the history of the rSDA,'O in its r['.T1fsei t '1: lase , 
and have throm1 ::ruch light on the orcanisc:tiol1 of the ,arty, it:::: i)rO'1a-
ganda techniques, and the nu:nerous ft'.cto::;,s influencir..; itG ,:;rcr:rtll. For 
some years Heberle's study on the NSDA.'P in Schles1'Ti c-Eolstein ITets the 
I) 
sole e:x:a;nple of the 're.::;ional approach'. His si;u.cly, hoy:eve~', d03.1s 
prL1la.rily with the social and econo:nic factors which favoured tho rise 
of nazism, and ~s little about tbe orGenisation of tl:e r:lOVo8:mt. In 
the nineteen-sixties a number of works a:::r~eaxed on the ~tLlllich an2 :,",,[t"\'o.-
rian NSDAP, which COver the formative years of the razi ::lOve:,lcnt u') to 
2) 
the titne of the putsch in I923.·· Other reGional encl local studies 
were also published at the tLne, which are usefu.l in fillixl;; i;l e. i11l::1~er 
of gaps in our kll0\'Tled.o~.· 50;00 of these are collections of docu::lCnGS 
3) 
relatll1..Z to the enti~'e ~lcinnr l)e1'iod. Others deal with the history 
of the party for only' briefti;nes;:ans, but cenerally s-tar-!; ia IJ30 (by 
which tilile tl1e U8,zis had already established theaselves) and say little 
4) 
about the political situation·beforehand. There are also a nunber of 
studies on the Gleichsch~Yltunt'i at local and ~'eGional levels, but these 
deal priraarily with tho political 'sitUation and have little to SD~ on 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
I) R. Eebel'le, Fron I:EF!l.OCracy to lTa:3is'1, :raton RoUt:.,'"9, I945; cf. 11is lc;ter 
work Landbevl:nl~run{'; und tationc.lsozialis!:IUs. Eine soziolo;,ische Un-
te1'suchlUl'': der noli tisc!len '.VillensbildU!J,ij in Schleswir;-T~olstein, 
stuttgart, 1:)63. A supple:-oontary study of the region is provided by 
G • Stoltenberg, Poli tische str":tUll":en i:11 schleswi,,,;-holsteinischen 
La.c"1.dvolk I9I8-I932, DUsseldorf, 1962. . _ .... . ,...._. 
2) H.H. Rofr.aann, Del' Eitler'"lutsch. YxisenjMre der deutschcn Geschichte 
I920-I924, !:!ullich, 196I; G. Fra.'1z-'i'iillinG, :Die EitlorboYlB,':u..'l,";. :Jer Ur-
ST)run,:; I919-1922, IIa.nburg, I962; W. Maser, :Die Frt111r;eochichte <lcr 
HSD.A? l~i tlers i'.'er; bis 1924, Frankfurt, 1965. 
3) E.g- Vi. Jochmann, 1,;a.tionalsozie.lisI'lUs u.'1d Revolution. U1'snrunc; lli1d 
Geschichte del' NSDAP in Ee.mbu1'i'i I92?-1933· !)Oku:nente, Franh:furt, 1963. 
4) ::J.';. E-A. Roloff, Bttr7~rtum lLYld l'e.tionalsozialis:!lLls 1930-1933. 3rmm-
schwei{';s \",'e;; ins :!)ritte :~eich, Hanover, 1::;61; Ii.S.Allen, The ~;e_zi 
Seizure of _~O\'Ter. 'I'he Eme1'ience of'a Sin;'~le Ger:~n Tovm 1930-1935, 
London, 1900. 
5) II 
general party develo?ucnt. 
Recently several re0 iona1 studies have a9:?eared 'I7hioll a...'1.n,~r:c tIle 
for:nation and crOWtll of the HSDAP in a oO:31)rohensive fa:::hion. '].'110 of 
these, by noakes end 8ch"n, concentrate on areas pri:':mrily c~Tari2Jl in 
nature and havin-::; a predominantly Protestant pO:'lUlationo Pri(l.b_3.r:1'n ol;udy 
deals with the e:~pansion of the liSDAP in :Javaria after i-I;s re-for,_n-i;io,1. 
in 1925. Here again the ocono::1ic structure is basically acrf'.ria..'1., but 
in this case the re.:;ion has a predo;nin.antly Catholic po~)ulation. AHll0U.:;l1 
all three regions, eS'.1Ccially Schun's E'-rea, contain roc::ets of inclustria-
lism, the rural, small town vote detor:'lined the relative stren.:;;ths of 
the political parties. Finally, a recent work by Levine exa;-.unes t;1e 
r::-sDAP in the Free city of Dru1zi.; - an interestin,; study of an ~_rea in 
which unique factors were at play. 
7) 
The above studies are of Great iraportance because they indicate 
different historical, socio-religious conditions in which the ITSDAP 0)0-
rated. GeriilSll history provides much scope for the tregional studyt be-
cause of Germanyts regional diversity. There is still sco~ for further 
studies. For example, there are, as yet, no e:ca:ninations of ::Serlin, a 
stronchold of left-wi~ parties during the Weimar period, or wnrtteuber~, 
with its stront; liberal tradition. The Catholic Rhineland, too, h1'''s been 
8) 
barely touched upon. 
The present study deals with the rise of l{azis;n in V'lestphalia. It 
is not merely an atte;npt to cover unworl~d territory. It is a st-u.dy 
which examines Uazis;n as it operated in a predo:ninantly industrial, urban 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
5) E.g. II. Timpke (ed.), Doku:nente zt.1.r Gleichschl?ltun--:; des Lano.es f"a::l-
bur,;, Frankfurt, 1964; H. llehber.ger, Die Gleichschalttmr': des Landes 
Baden. 1932/33, Heidelberg, 1966. 
6) J. Noakes,. 'rhe Nezi Party in Lower Saxony 192I-I 932., O.U .P., I97I; 
E. SchUn, Die Entstehun..1 des lIationalsozialis!;!tts in !Tessen, tieiserihei;n 
am GIan, 1~72; G. Pridham, Eitler' s ~{ise to Power. 'l'he Nazi r!ove1"1ent 
in Bavaria 1923-I933, London, 1973-
7) H.S. Levine, Eitler's Free City. A History of the Fazi Party in D~.nzi;; 
1925-1939, London, 1973. 
8) G. Plum, Gesellschaftsstruktur und noli tisches P.omtsstsein in oiner 
:2. holischen Pec··ion Ie "'8-1 ~. Untersuchu..11:-:on am. :r3eisniel des Ro/""ie 
bezirks Aachen, stuttGart, 1972. 
12 
re~iol1. Des~i te tho !:' • .:;ricul tural hinterland of oC11"Gr£1.1 .s..r,-cl C8.C;-GCl'::: 'c::t'-':'~a­
lia, the yolitics of tllO province ViC,S deter:nned b;,r tho urbC21, L1clust::.'ir:.::' 
voter. It is also a rosion in which the Catholic cl'ld Protoct[C:1"0 :;.'oli-
gioas wero of equal stren,,--;th. The stucly thus allo'l[s an DJ.k'll;rsis of "1;110 
im})aet of Hational Socialism on an area the re..;ional ehs.raeter D1.1.U (livorse 
poli tical loyal ties of which provided the ~arty with ;nany proble'7ls. It 
is a reGion in which the I;SDAP failed to ;ilD1:e the pro,;re DS it recorded 
elsevlhere. Westphalia provided the nazis vrith so;ne of their '"Tors"!; electoral-
results_ 
Al though the oajor part of this study deals with tIle :~S:r;AP, the ini-
tial chapters deal wi tIl the revolution of 1918 end tho :mjor yoU tice.1 
and economic developments of thc decade 1918-1928. These chapters are do-
si.;ned to provide an understanding of the environment in which tho rSDA? 
operated. 
13 
Chapter 1. THE PROVL"1CE OF WESTPHALIA. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The province of Westphalia was fonned in 1815 through the amalgamation 
of a variet.y of territories acquired by Prussia follOWing the deliberations 
1) 
at the Congress of Vienna. The Hohenzo1lern presence in the Westphalian 
region can be traced back to 1614- and. the Treaty of Xanten at which the 
Brandenburg-Prus sian state acquired Mark and. Ravensberg. In the course of 
the next tNo centuries piecemeal acquisitions by the Hohenz ollern dynasty 
punctuated the history of the region. At the Peace of Westphalia the lands 
of the Archbishopric of Minden fell to Brandenburg-Prussia. The eighteenth 
century brought small gains in the shape of Lingen in 1702 and Tecklenburg 
in 1707. The most dramatic changes occurred <1lring, and immediately after, 
the Napoleonic era. Under the !?:eichsdeputationshauptsch1uss of 1803 Prussia 
secured the eastern half of the Archbishoprio of MUnster and the whole of 
the Archbishopric of Paderborn, along with Herford and Huckarde, all as 
compensation for Prussian losses to the FrenCh west of the Rhine. These 
gains, alone with the other Westphalian territories of the Hohenzollerns, 
were lost following the reduction of Prussia under the provisions of the 
Peace of Tilsit in 1807. From 1807 onwards the bulk of the Westphalian 
region fonned the core of a French satellite kingdom, the "Kingdom of 
Westphalia", under the oontrol of J~r~me Bonaparte. The collapse of Frenoh 
hegemony in 'Germany' saw a revival of Prussian power in the region. As one 
of the partiCipants in the defeat of France the Prussian state regained not 
only its former territories in Westphalia, but acquired further lands in the 
area. In 1815 the western section of the Archbishopric of MUnster fell to 
Prussia, along with a number of smaller territories, those of Siegen, 
Wittgenstein, Limburg, Dortmund, Recklinghausen, Gemen, Anholt, Steinfurt, 
Rheda, Reokenberg, Rietberg and Korvey. In 1816 the Dukedom of Westphalia 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) For the following see ~. Engel, Politische Geschichte Westfalens, 
Cologne, 1968, pp.175 ff •• 
14. 
was added. These territories were fUsed with the gains of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries to form one of the ten provinces of Prussia: Westphalia. 
Final~, in 1850 the small enclave of Lippstadt was absorbed into the province. 
The province provided the Prussian authorities with the ve~ real problems 
of territorial particularism and religious division. The former was re1ative~ 
successfu1~ overcome through the construction of an efficient and honest civil 
administration. A deep cleavage remained, however, on the religious side. In 
the late nineteenth oentu~ the distrust and antagonism between the Catholic 
population and their Protestant ruler was revived in the so-oalled 'Kulturkampf', 
2) 
which was espeoial~ hard-fought in the provinoe. The awakening of the 
po1itioa1 consoiousness of the Catholio population engendered by the Church-
State confliot was refleoted in the strong support mobilised by the Catholio 
Centre Party during the Seoond~, a feature of Westphalian politics which 
was also present in the Weimar period. 
Tremendous changes ooourred in Westphalia as a result of the economio 
developments whiCh affected large parts of the provinoe in the course of the 
nineteenth and. ear~ twentieth oenturies. 3) In -the first half of the nine-
teenth centu~ the provinoe was predominant~ agrarian in character. 4.) The 
only outcrops of industrial activity were the iron-finishing industries in the 
Sauerland concentrated in the Ennepe, Volme and Lenne vall~s, and the iron-ore 
mining am smelting industry in the Siegerland. The Ruhr vall~ itself oon-
tained a few coal mines servicing the needs of the metal industries to the 
south. The economic structure of the region was altered by the eoonomio growth 
whioh inoreaSingly affected the province from around 184.0, stimUlated by the 
administrative rationalisation oarried through by the Prussian authorities, 
the expansion of the internal market with -the construotion of the ZOllverein 
--=~==, 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
2) Engel, Ope oit., pp.262-265. 
3) On the economio development <bring this period see N.J.G. Pounds The Ruhr. 
A Study in Historical and. Economio Geography, New York, 1968. ' -.;.;----;:.::. 
4) G. Droege, Deutsche Wi rt schafts- und Sozialgeschiohte, Frankfurt, 1972, 
p. 169. 
15 
the improvement in communications, especially the construction of railways 
in the 1840's and 1850's, and the discovery of the enormous ooal deposits 
in fue Ruhr and Lippe valleys. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards 
coal-mining was of increasing importance, with mines scattered thick~ along 
both banks of the Ruhr from Kettwig up to Witten, and in a broad belt from 
Witten eastwards as far as Uona. 5) The presence of cheap power attracted 
the smelting industry, the combination of coal and iron transforming the face 
of the Ruhr in the latter half of the nineteenth oentury. Coal-mining expan-
ded dramatically, both in terms of output and in the number of people employed 
in the industry. 6) On the foundation of coal rested an extensive iron and 
steel industry. By 1900 factory industry dominated the entire Ruhr region, 
which had by then become the economic poweIhouse of the Second~. 7) Hal;f 
of the canplex 1a,y within the boundaries of the province of Westphalia. 
The extensive industrialisation had a profound impact on the province. 
It was acoompanied by a prooess of urbanisation which affected espeoially the 
"inner" belt of the Ruhr region. By the twentieth centuty the lahour needed 
to fuel and sustain the eoonomic expansion had produoed a series of urban 
sprawls. Cities had emerged out of small towns within the spaoe of a few 
generations. 8) The vast labour requirements were met ~ the migration of 
workers into the Ruhr from the highlands on both banks of the Rhine, from 
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s) Pounds, OPe cit., p.6S. 
6) Statistics of the Oberbergamt of Dortmund show the tremendous expansion: 
1850 
1900 
1913 
Tonnage mined 
1,665,662 
59,618,900 
110,765,495 
Number employed 
12,741 
226,902 
397,339 
From D. Baedeker, (ed.1 Jahrbuch des Oberbergamtes Dortmund. Essen, 1923. 
p.804. 
7) Pounds, op. cit., pp. 97 ff •• 
8) E.g. BoChum's Population grew from 2,000 in 1800 to 15,000 by 1867; 53,842 
by 1895; 136,931 by 1910. Dortmund grew even faster: 1811 - 4,800; 1880 _ 
66,500; 1910 - 260,000. 
On the problems produced by rapid urbanisation in the Ruhr see H.G. Steinber 
'Zur Verwaltungsgeschichte des Ruhrgebiets' in W. FBrst (ed.) Po1itik und g 
Landschaft, Cologne, 1969, pp.179-2l5. 
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Saxony, Silesia, East Prussia, Poland and the lands of the Austrian Empire. 
The migration introduced a new statistic into Westphalian demography, a 
sizeable Polish minori~. 9) 
The province of Westphalia survived the collapse of the "old" ld.ngdom 
of Prussia in 1918. The administrative pattern established in the course 
of the nineteenth century also survived, though the introduction of a new 
Prussian constitution in November 1920 democratised the communal and provin-
cial electoral system by sweeping away the old three-class franchise. The 
province continued to be controlled by an Oberpr!sidium situated in MUnster. 10) 
Under it were the three Regierungsbezirke into which WestphaJia was divided: 
those of Arnsberg, Minden an d MUnster. Each Regierungsbezirk was in turn 
divided into urban and rural counties. 
The 1925 census recorded a population of 4,783,858 in the province. This 
was unequally distributed among the three Rederungsbezirke, with Arnsberg 
containing 2,514,167, Mlinster 1,463,090, Sl d Minden 806,601. 11) The distri-
bution of the population varied ccnsiderably. The degree of urbanisation, 
and hence the highest population density, was at its greatest in the Ruhr, 
which was the most densely populated part of Germaru. 12) In the counties 
of Bochum and Dortmund the average population density stood at 727 people 
per square kilometre. The next most populous zones were those of the counties 
of Hattingen and Hl!Irde, where the average was 383. The industrial parts of 
the Bielefeld region were also heavily populated. The average for the coun-
ties of Bielefeld and Herford was 269 persons per square kilometre. The 
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9) The numbers involved are difficult to determine. ACCOrding to figures 
compiled by the Oberprlsidium of Westphalia there were 162,578 Poles in 
the province in 1902, a number which rose to 284,718 by 1908. These 
figures have to be treated with reservation. On the whole question of 
the Polish presence in the province see 'Die Polen im Ruhrgebiet' in 
H-U. Wehler, Krisenherde des Kaisserreichs 1871-1918, G~ttingen, 1970, 
pp.2l9 ff •• 
10) During the Weimar period the post of Oberprlsident was held by Bernhard 
WUrmeling from 1918 to 1922, and Johannes Gronowski from 1922 to 1933. 
The fOllll~ proved unequal to '!he tasks facing the province in the post-war 
period, am was assisted by Carl Severing frcm April 1919. Gronowski lost 
his post at the time of the Nazi 'Gleichschaltung' in 1933. 
11) S. Reekers/J. Schulz, Die Bevl'>lkerunp; in den Gemeinden Westfalens 1818-1950 
Dortmund, 1952, pp.2-6. =-, 
12) For the following see A. Milatz, Wlhler una Wahlen in der Weimarer Republik, 
Bonn, 1965, pp.66 ff •• 
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predominantly agrarian parts of Westphalia had a much lower density. In the 
MUnsterland. the average lay between 60 and. 70. County Wittgenstein was the 
least populous part. It was one of the poorest agrarian counties not only 
of Westphalia, but of Prussia as a whole. 
The economic structure of Westphalia is heterogeneous. The province 
can be divided into several zones characterised by distinct industrial acti-
vit'j.13) Of primary importance was the heavy industxy zooe of t.l}e Ruhr, 
which dominates the Gelsenkirchen-Recklinc;hausen-Dortmund-Bochum region, with 
off-shoots towards Hagen to the south and. Hamm to the east. The Westphalian 
sector of the Ruhr was especially important for coal production. In 1928 it 
produced 53 per cent of the coal and 64.5 per cent of the coke output of 
Germany. Coal fuelled the iron and. steel industry, which in turn fed materials 
to innumerable engineering and metal-using firms manufacturing a great variety 
of products. Important als 0 was the chemical industry, especially in Witten, 
Castrop-Rauxel., Bochum-Gerthe, Kamen and Dortmund. Dortmund waS also noted 
for its brewing indust~, boasting the third largest concentration of brewine 
concerns in GermaI\Y next to Berlin and. Munich. The industrial towns of the 
Ruhr were each dominated by one or tHo ve~ large concerns, employing the 
majority of the local labour force. In general the large concerns were sur-
rounded by a swarm of smaller works, overshadowed by the giants, upon which 
th~ depended in va~ing degrees for the supply of materials. 14) 
The Ruhr concerns dcminated not only the economic activity of the "inner" 
Ruhr, but also had strong ccnnections with the industrial c anplexes of the 
Sauerland and the Siegerland. The metallurgical industries of the Sauerland 
were the heirs of the long tradition of iron-working which had grown up in 
the area during the Middle Ages. By the twentieth century the survival of 
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13) On the nature of the Westphalian economy in the tnrly twentieth centuxy 
see B. Kuske's article 'DerWirtschaftsraum' in H. Aubin/O. Btthler/ 
B. Kusk~A. Schulte, Der Raum Westfalen, Berlin, 1931, pp.75 ff •• 
Pounds, Ope cit., p.118. 
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the small-scale unit of production, which characterised such centres as 
Iserlohn, Altena, Werdohl and LUdenscheid, depended on the skill of the 
local labour and the capital invested in local plant and equipment. These 
factors justified the transport of iron and coal from the Ruhr region for 
fabrication in the Sauerland. IS) Of importance too, as an employer of 
labour, were the many chalk pits of the Lenne and Henne valleys, which sup-
plied the bulk of the 2M. tons annually required for re-lignine the smeltine-
Ovens of the Ruhr. 16) Closely tied to Ruhr industry was the iron-ore mining 
zone of the Siegerland. The bulk of the are mined (circa 2m. tons per annum) 
17) 
went to the Ruhr, primarily to the Dortmund region. The native metal-
processing indust~ was dependent, as in the Sauerland region, on traditional 
skill and high quality production. 
Beyond the predominantly coal-mining and metal-working areas, Westphalia 
contained three further "industrial zones" in the early twentieth century: the 
IbbenbUren region, the textile industry of the MUnsterland, and the mixed-
indust~ of the Minden-Ravensberg region. 18) The IbbenbUren region, situated 
in the county of Tecklenburg, was based on a geological freak, an outcrop of 
coal, an offshoot of the Ruhr coalfield. The output per annum was on~ 600,000 
tons in the 1920' 8 and 1930' 5, but this provided suffici ent power for a small 
metal-working industry in the IbbenbUren-Osnabrttck region. Radically different 
in character was the textile industry situated in the western counties of the 
MUnsterland along the Dutch border. This was the chief employer of labour in 
the counties of Ste1nfurt, Ahaus, Borken and Coesfeld. The area was the major 
centre of the German woollen and linen industry. 19) The development of the 
industry was close~ tied to the agrarian nature of the counties, and the 
tradition of textile manufacture as a cottage industry. Textile manufacturing 
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15) Pounds, Ope cit., p.119. 
16) Kuske, Ope cit., p.82. 
17) Ibid., pp.92 ft •• 
18) Ibid., pp.96 ff •• 
19) Westphalia had 54.,000 units of produotion, as a.gainst the 24.,000 of the 
Rhineland and 17 ,000 of' Saxony. 
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also figured in the "mixed" inClustrial z ale represented by the Minden-Ravensberg 
area, especiallY in the Bielefeld region. The presence of the textile industry 
in this area had given rise to 1:he marufacture of textile machinery, and this 
in turn had produced a small- scale metal w orki~ industry. Of importance in 
the area. was also the toba.cco industry, especiallY cigar-making. By the twen-
tieth century the latter was primarily a roral industry, heir to the old linen 
industry of the nineteenth century, which had not been able to compete with 
mechanised production. Hence the switch to cigar-making, which dominated 
especiallY the county of Herford where half of the total labour force was 
engaged in the industry. It was also a major employer in the counties of 
Lflbbecke and Minden. The Minden-Ravensberg region was also a centre of a 
varied consumer industry, the brewing and dairy industries having special 
significance. 
Despite the predominance of industry, Westphalia also contained a broad 
agricultural belt which stretched eastward from the county of Mf1nster to the 
county of Hexter, with a southern off-shoot which included the counties of 
Bnren, Brilon, Meschede and Wittgenstein. Arable and dairy farming remained 
an important aspect of the economy, stimulated by the close proximity of the 
urban centres of the Ruhr. The units of production were 5IIlall and medium 
sized, with mixed agriculture the norm. 20) In the southern counties of 
Brilon and Wittgenstein the main pursuit was forestry rather than agriculture. 21.) 
Within the predominantly agrarian counties there were numerous industrial con-
cerns. These were widely dispersed, generally small-scaled, involving light-
industry such as glass-making, pottery, the manufacture of leather goods, 
saw-mills, chalk-pits, cement works and so on. 
Given the economic structure, the working population was chiefly engaged 
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20) Typical is the breakdown of the size of farms in the county of Wiedenbrf1ck: 
to 5 ha. 2,569 units 61 per cent 
5 to 20 ha. 1,799 units 30.7 per cent 
20 to 100 ha. 362 units 7.9 per cent 
over 100 ha. 16 uni ts 0.4- ger cent 
Figures for 1933, from W. Herb 0 rt/W. Lenz/I. Heilan~G. Willner, Der Land-
~eis Wiedenbrttck, Cologne, 1969, p.119. 
21) Some 55 per cent of the Sauerland was woodland and forest, double the 
Reich average. 
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in industry. Wi -thin Germany as a whole, Westphalia had the highest percentage 
22) 
of people employed in the industrial sector. The available statistics 
(for 1928) break dONn as follows: 
Reg. Bez. MUnster 
Minden 
Arnsberg 
Westphalia 
Reich 
Agriculture & Forestry 
23.1,;[, 
34.4% 
11.5% 
19.8% 
30.5% 
Industry 
52.2% 
44.a;~ 
60.7% 
54.8~~ 
41.4% 
Bu siness & Trade 
12.3~~ 
11.8;~ 
16.35; 
14.2"% 
16.5% 23) 
The statistics relating to industrial employment hide interesting and signi-
ficant features. One aspect -they do not reflect is 'the fact that certain 
areas of Westphalia were dominated almost entirely by a single branch of 
industrial activity. Thus in the towns of Gelsenkirchen (with a popUlation 
of 208,000) and Osterfeld, 85 percent of the working population were engaged 
in coal-mining. In the counties of RecklinBhausen, HallJll and LUdinghausen the 
percentage employed in coal-mining was also very high, running at 76 per cent, 
66 per cent and 62.5 per cent respectively. 24) In the textile centres a 
slight~ less unbalanced employment situation prevailed. The percentage of 
those employed in the textile industry was 62.4 per cent in county Steinfurt, 
58.4 per cent in county Ahaus, and. 51 per cent in county Borlcen. 25) A similar 
situation existed in the maqy towns of the Ruhr In d Sauerla.nd dependent on the 
metallurgical industry. The overall pattern of employment was made very unfa.-
vourable by the dependence of many t:>wns and whole regions on one industrial 
activity, a feature much regretted by the authorities. A report by the 
Landesarbeitsamt of Westphalia-Lippe noted 'the unfavourable structure of the 
industrial pattern in which there were only 'a few, but large branches of pro-
duction, in which the large industrial unit predominates'. It was pointed out 
that for Westphalia as a whole some 85 per cent of those employed depended on 
the coal, iron and textile industries. A further handicap noted in the report 
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22) Milatz, op. cit., p.84. 
23) F.J. Gieselmann/B. Ordemann!E. Mangels, Der Haum Westfalen: Untersuchuneen 
UberWirtschaft, Verkehr und Arbeitsmarkt, Berlin, 1932, p.14. 
24) Kuske, op. cit., p.77. 
25) Ibid., p.96. 
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was the poor geographic distribution of industry, the heavy concentration 
in western Westphalia containing 'many canmunities a]most solely dependent 
26) 
on the iron and steel industry'. The problem this created is obvious. 
In times of recession the situation of the population was catastrophic since 
there was little alternative employment. Another significant feature was 
the low number employed in the trade handicrafts in the Ruhr towns compared 
with those in other parts of the province. 27) The explanation for this fea-
ture must be sought in the nature of "the economic development of "the Ruhr. 
The rapid population expansion in the old Ruhr towns in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries swamped the local handicrafts Which were unable 
to adjust to, and compete with, modern factory production methods. The 'new' 
Ruhr towns, on the other hand, mushroomed in basically rural settings. Capi-
talist modes of production existed from the very start, and handicrafts failed 
to develop. A further explanation for the under-representation of artisans 
in the Ruhr may be the "proletarian" nature of the population and their low 
requirement for craft services. 28) 
Despite the preponderance of industry, parts of Westphalia were very 
agrarian, and agriculture continued to play an important role as an employer, 
especially in the Resierun6sbezirke of MUnster and Minden. In the counties 
of Warendorf, Halle, L6.bbecke and BUren, between 50 ani 60 per cent of the 
popUlation depended On agriculture for l1eir livelihood. In a number of coun_ 
ties indust:ry and agriculture were of ~ual importaooe, namely in Tecklenburg, 
MUnster, Borken, Paderborn, Warburg and Hexter. 29) In the case of the last 
county agriculture was marginally the "chief employer" with 43 per oent. 30) 
Even in the Regierunssbezirk of Arnsberg agriculture continued to be of signi-
ficance in the eastern counties of Brilon and Wittgenstein, where agriculture 
and f'orest:ry employed as marv people as did industry. 31) In the adjOining 
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26) 
27) 
28) 
29) 
30) 
31) 
"Bericht des Arbei tsamtes Westfalen und Lippe", n.d. (it covers the 
period 1 April 1926 to 31 March 1927): TNA K2/181. 
Kuske, Ope cit., p.88. 
Kuske, Ope cit., p.89. 
Aubin, et. al., Ope cit., Appendix, 19. 
W. Lescher/P. Schubert, Heimatchronik des Kreises H~xter, Cologne, 1966, 
p.23l 
Aubin, et. al., Ope cit., Appendix, 19. 
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county Siegen, with its numerous mining and industrial concerns, sane 23.7 
per cent of the g3.inf'ully employed depended on agriculture and. forestry for 
32) their livelihood. The economic structure of such agrarian oounties as 
BUren, Warendorf, LUbbecke, Halle, Brilon and so on, was markedly different 
from those of the industrialised counties of the Ruhr. Economic and social 
patterns were a world apart despite the ~ographic proximity. The political 
behaviour of the population was to reflect the differences. 
Also important in determining political behaviour was the religiou s 
composition of the population. During the Weimar period Catholicism and 
. t . 33) N' th Protestantism were rough~ equal in strength ~n he prov~nce. e~ er 
had an absolute majority, though the former (4-9.8 per cent) was fractionally 
ahead of the latter (4-7.3 per cent). Of the three Regierungsbezirke, MUnster 
was predomina.nt~ Catholic (74-.6 per cent), while Arnsberg had a very small 
(52.3 per cent) and Minden a much larger Protestant m~jori~ (6,.8 per cent). 
The distribution of the tHo faiths within the province was strongly conditioned. 
by the history of the various elements Which were joined together to form the 
province in 1815-1816. The counties situated in the lands formerly belonging 
to the Archbishoprics of Mtlnster and. Paderbom, am the old Dukedom of Westphalia 
(tied to the Archbishopric of Cologne) were strongly Catholic, and retained 
their Catholicism in the post-IBIS period. In the nineteen-twenties two-
thirds of the Westphalian Catholics lived in these areas. Several oounties 
were virtual~ 100 per cent Catholio, such as MUnster (50,000 Catholios to 
1,000 Protestants), BUren (40,000 to 1,000), Warendorf (35,000 to 1,000), 
Borken (4-8,000 to 2,000), Brilon (4-5,000 to 2,000), and Meschede (4-4-,000 to 
2,000). Within the compaot Catholio regions there were a few Protestant enclav'es,. 
"historioal oddities" such as the town of Gronau (independent for centuries) in 
the predominantly Catholic county of Ahaus (55,000 to 9.000) with its small 
Protestant majori~ of 53.2 per cent. Gdtersloh, with a similar history of 
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32) Gieselmann, et. al., OPe cit., p.lo6. 
33) For the following see Mllatz, op. cit., pp.74-75. Further Aubin, et. a1 .. , 
OPe cit., Appendix, 47. 
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civic independence, had an even larger Protestant majority or 77 per cent, 
though the county to which it belonged, VliedenbrUck, had a Catholic majority 
or 89.~ per cent. 
In the "old" Prussian territories or Mark, Ravensberg and Minden, the 
Protestant raith predominated. The towns and counties in which the Protestants 
had a majori~ do not, however, present a ~ographically compact region on the 
Catholic lines. In the Regierun~sbezirk or MUnster there was only one county 
in which the Protestants had a majori~, namely Tecklenburg (38,000 Protestants 
to 30,000 Catholics). Soli~ Protestant were the northern counties of the 
Regierunesbezirk of Minden: Bielefeld (79,000 to ~,OOO), Halle (32,000 to 1,000), 
Herford (102,000 to 2,000) and Minden (116,000 to 5,000). In the county of 
LUbbecke (population or 55,000) there were virtual~ no Catholics, giving it 
a Protestant majority of 98.7 per cent. Almost 'purely' Protestant were the 
former independent territo~ of Wittgenstein (26,000 to 1,000), and the old 
Nassau territo~ of Siegen (73,000 to 15,000). 
More solidly Protestant in the Regierungsbezirk of Arnsberg were the COun-
ties comprising Mark and the former Imperial free city of Dortmund. In this 
region, as is true of the Ruhr area in general, the religious composition of 
the oounties was less static, and strongly influenced by the industrialisation 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The influx of large numbers 
of workers rrom outside Westphalia modified the picture. 3~) In part, as in 
the towns of Bochum (105,000 to 98,000), Ge1senkirchen (101,000 to 97,000), 
Herne (33,000 to 32,000), and H~rde (17,000 to 16,000), the Protestant majori-
ties of the nineteenth centu~ were changed from absolute to relative ones by 
the twentieth century. In several counties the Protestant percentage no longer 
exceeded 60 per cent, and within these there were large Catholic commUnities. 
The situation produced variable ocnfessiona1 patterns. Thus the urban county 
of Herde, with its parity between the two faiths, was markedly different in 
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3~) On the local level, the policies pursued by industrial tycoons had some 
significance. Thus the Lutherans Kirdorf and Grillo (GelSenkirchen) tended 
to take fueir workers frCtll East Prussia; the CathOlic KlBckner (Hagen) more 
often engaged Catholics frcm West Prussia and Poland. See Pounds, Ope cit., 
p.130. 
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this respect from the rural county, in which the Protestants were in an abso-
lute majority (79,000 to 34,000). The urban coun~ of Hamm had a Catholic 
majori~ (29,000 to 20,000) whereas the administrative area to which it 
belonged, the county of Unna, had a Protestant majority (81,000 to 41,000). 
Conversely, in the adjacent coun~ Soest, the town of Soest had a Protestant 
majori~, whereas the county was predominantly Catholic (40,000 to 27,000). 
It was only in the southern counties of Mark that the Protestant faith retained 
its old dominance, namely in Hattingen (48,000 to 25,000), Hagen (62,000 to 
23,000), Schwelm (62,000 to 10,000) and Altena (78,000 to 15,000). 
The political traditions of Westphalia in the twentieth centur.y reflect 
to a large degree the influence of the social and religious composition of the 
population. In the late nineteenth centur.y the emergence of political Catholi_ 
cism in the shape of the Centre Party introduced a new force in Westphalian 
politics, which became the dominant political constellation by the end of the 
century. Parallel to this was the development of socialism in the shape of 
the SPD, based on and supported by the increasing working class population 
which concentrated in the region as the industrialisation of the Ruhr area 
accelerated. The latter force tended to gain at the expense of the strong 
liberal tradition acquired in the mid-nineteenth century. By the time of the 
1912 election the Centre Party and SPD dominated the political arena: 
DK RP Anti-Semites Centre NL FVP SPD 
1903 Westphalia 3,5% O,9;i 4,2% 4-0,410 19,2% 4,7% 24,7% 1912 Westphalia 2,9% 0,9% 5,5% 34,0-% 14,3~ 7,($ 28,8% 1912 Reich 9,2% 3,a{o 2,9-'fo 16,4% 13,6 12,3% 34,8% 35) 
The strength of the Centre Party rested on the sizeable Catholic popUlation 
and an efficient organisation which harnessed support dating back to the 1 
1870's. 36) As a consequence of the 'religious tie' between Catholics and 
the party, the Centre was able to bridge the diverging economio interests of 
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35) 
36) 
J. Bertram, Die Wahlen zum Deutsohen Reichstag Tom Jahre 1912. Parte1en 
und Verb!nde in der Innenpolitik des Wilhelminischen Reiches, Dnsseldorf, 
1964, pp.206-207. 
On the development of the Westphalian Centre Party see R. Morsey, 'Die 
Zentrumspartei im Rheinland und Westfalen', in W. F~rst (ed.), Politik 
und Landschaft, OPe cit., pp.ll ff •• 
25 
its supporters and to overcome the discrepancy between its clerical-hierarchic 
structure and the class divisions associated with modern industrial society. 37) 
In the light of the strong influence of the Catholic clergy, numerous electoral 
districts in Westphalia, both in the rural and urban areas, were so safe for 
Centre Party candidates that virtually no electioneering was needed to retain 
the seats. 38) The complacency which this situation created was increasingly 
undermined from around 1890 by the difficulty which the party encountered in 
retaining its working class votes in face of the SPD challenge, which by the 
turn of the century began to make inroads in the Centre's working class 
vote. 39) By the early twentieth centu~ the Centre also found that the 
religious tie was no longer as potent a factor in rallYing support as it had 
been at the time of the Ku1turkampf. At 'the height of this church/state con-
flict some 80 per cent of Germany's Catholic popUlation had voted for the 
Centre Party. 40) ~ the time of the 1912 election the party had lost consi-
derable ground. On the national level it was supported by only 54.6 per cent 
of the voting (nominal) Catholics. In Westphalia the slump was not so severe. 
In the electoral districts of the Regierunesbezirke MUnster and Minden the 
average return for the 1903, 1907 and 1912 elections stood at 83.2 per cent 
and 72.6 per cent respectively. 41) In the province as a whole, however, the 
Centre Party suffered a relative decline in its share of the vote. In the 
election of 1903 the party had secured 40.4 per cent of the poll, gaining 
229,037 votes out of the total of 567,769. ~ 1912 the share of the poll had 
dropped to 34.0 per cent, with 261,645 votes out of 770,701. 42) The party 
clearly failed to attract a significant number of the many Catholics in the 
increased electorate. Many Catholics were sufficiently emancipated by 1912 
to determine their own political choice, a development viewed with concern by 
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37) 
38) 
39) 
40) 
41) 
42) 
Ibid., p.17. 
Ibid., p.16. 
Ibid., p.18. 
Ibid., p.23. 
R. Morsey, Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei 1917-192~, Dnsseldorf, 1966, p.43. 
Bertram, Ope cit., pp.206-207. 
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the leaders of the party and Catholic Church alike. Despite the drop, the 
Centre Party of Westphalia still enjoyed considerable support, roughly double 
the national average of 16.4 per cent. 
The strength of the SPD, the seoond most important party by the turn of 
the century, did not as yet, given th~ concentration of industry in central 
and western westphalia, adequately reflect the support it might theoretically 
expeot. Despite the large working class population concentrated in the pro-
vince by the twentieth centu~, the SPD could only secure 28.8 per cent of 
the vote in 1912, some six per cent lower than the national average of 34.8 
per cent. The reasons for its relatively poor performance lay in the rapidity 
of the industrialisation which made it more difficult to orS~nise the expanding 
workine class. The presence of a strong Centre Party also had its effect. 
As in the case of the Centre Party, the socialist movement of the early 
twentieth century could look back on a long history of struggle within Westphali~. 
The first organisational activity dated back to the 1860's, during which 
Lasallean supporters had established a series of party cells in western 
Westphalia. 43) The early socialist movement lacked organisational strength 
and suffered particularly from the anti-socialist legislation of the 1880' 8. lj-ll-) 
It was only from the 1890' s onwards, with the removal of the restrictive legis_ 
lation, ths.t the SPD could create an orga.nisational framework and develop a 
more centralised party structure in the province. It was only then that the 
party could effectively challenge the dominance of the Centre Party and make 
inroads on the resilient liberal vote. Regional peculiarities mitigated the 
success of the socialists. The mining areas of the Ruhr saw the influx of 
much new labour, the bulk of which was not only Catholic, but a130 Polish, 
which created problems for the party's propaganda machine. 45) Support was 
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43) 
44) 
4-5) 
H. Lademacher, 'Vom Arbeiterverein zur Massenpartei', in F5rst (ed.), 
Politik und Landsch,aft., oJ.cit., Pl1.53 ff .. 
The anti-socialist legislation led to a noticeable decline in the SPD's 
electoral support in the Hagen area; see H. Lambers, Die Revolutionszeit 
in Hae;en. Die politische Entwick1ung ven 1917 bis 1924- in Hagen und HasEe, 
Hagen, 1963, p.12. --
Lademacher, in F~rst, Ope cit., p.80. 
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spread. very unevenly within the province. The socialists were strong only 
in the urban centres. Agitation in the rural areas had little success due 
to the lack of' an agrarian programme. The major impact was restricted to 
the growing conurbations of' the Ruhr region, where sizeable branches were 
organised in the 1890 to 1914 period. 46) It was only in these areas that 
the SPD secured. large-scale support. 47) 
The third major f'orce in Westphalian politics in the pre-war period was 
liberalism, the full potential of' vmich was blunted. in the late nineteenth 
century by the f'ragmentation of' tile liberal vote be~Neen the National Liberal 
Party and the Progressive Liberal Party. Combined, the liberals by 1912 still 
commanded 21.3 per cent of' the Westphalian vote, roughly on a par with the 
national average of' 25.8 per cent. ~be National Liberals failed to attract 
new support in the e9.rly twentieth century. With a poll of 108,673 in 1903 
and 110,301 in 1912, the overall share of the NLP declined fran 19,2 per cent 
to 14.3 per cent. Detrimental to the party's fortune waS the defection of 
important industrial interests in the province tocanservative forces of the 
Right. Westphalian industrialists became increasingly disenchanted with the 
National Liberals. The belief that the NLP was f'ailing to represent their 
economic interests led. to the transfer of the bulk of their support to the 
Reichspartei in the post-1907 period. 48) The Progressive Liberal Party fared. 
a little better, though its support was relatively low in comparison to that 
of the NLP. Be~Reen the elections of 1903 and 1912 the Progressive Liberals 
were able to almost double their support, 'from 27,245 votes in 1903 (4,7 per 
cent) to 53,738 votes in 1912 (7 per cent). Despite the increase, the position 
of the party deteriorated due to the challenge of the SPD in the urban centres, 
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46) 
47) 
48) 
Dortmund, BoChum, Reck1inghausen and Hagen all had sizeable SPD branches 
reflecting the high d.egree of working class elements concentrated. in these 
towns - R. Lfttzenkirchen, Der sozialdemokratische Verein fUr den Reichstaes_ 
wahlkreis Dortmund-Herde, Dortmund, 1970, p.136. 
In the 1912 election the highest SPD returns in Westl'halia were secured. in 
Hagen (46.2 per cent), Dortmund-Herda (44.8 per cent), and. Bochum (36.8 per 
cent); Lntzenkirch~ op. cit., p.135. 
Bertram, op. cit., pp.29-30. 
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and the loss of what had been safe seats to the latter. 49) 
Political conservatism was onlY poorlY supported in Westphalia in the 
pre-1914 period. The conservative vote was fragmented by the existence of 
three parties, the DKP, the RP, and the Anti-Semites. Unlike the Centre 
Par~, the SPD, and the Liberals, which were supported more evenlY throughout 
the province, the DKP and RP were onlY of some significance in the Protestant, 
rural areas of north-eastern Westphalia. 50) The combined vote of the two 
parties did not reach 5 per cent in the 1903, 1907 and 1912 elections. Of 
greater significance were the Anti-Semites, aided by the support of the 
Christlich-Soziale Partei. 51) The Anti-Semites increased their support bet-
ween 1903 and 1912, polling twice as many votes in 1912 as the DKP and RP 
combined. The existence of the influential Christlich-Soziale Partei in parts 
of the province, primarilY the Siegen area, which enjoyed the backing of the 
Protestant clergy, explains the support. 52) The party was large~ confined 
to Westphalia, and played an important role in southern and north-eastern 
Westphalia. 53) Initially dominated by worldng class members, it became an 
expression of middle class discontent by the tum of the centulj', with excep-
tionallY strong support in the circles of Non-conformism in the Siegerland. 
Beyond Siegen itself, the predominantlY Protestant towns of Bielefeld, Herford 
and. Minden were the only urban centres in Germany in which the party found arw 
support. 
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50) 
5ll 52 
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This occurred in the electoral district of Hagen-Schwelm, which was held 
by the Progressive Liberals in all the elections between 1871 and 1907; 
in 1912 the SPD secured the seat. Lambers, Ope cit., pp.11-13. 
In the electoral district of Mdnster-Minden the DKP and RP polled 15 per 
cent of 'the vote in the 1912 election - W. Hartenstein, Die Anf!l.nge der 
Deutschen Volkspartei 1918-1920, DUsseldorf, 1962, p.70. 
Bertram, OPe cit., p.212. 
Bertram, Ope cit., p.195. 
For thi s and the following see W. Liebe, Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei 
1918-1924, D6sseldorf, 1956, p.16. Further K. Buchheim, ~eschichte der 
Christlichen Parteien in Deutschland, Munich, 1953, pp.261 ff •• 
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Chapter 2. THE REVOLUTION IN WESTPHALIA 1918 TO 1919. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Outbreak of the Revolution and. the Formation of the Councils. 1) 
Until 8 November 1918 the revolutiona~ movement in Germany which 
emanated fran liel and spread rapidly to the ports of Hamburg, Bremen and 
Wilhelmshaven, symbolised by the appearance of soldiers' and workers' coun-
cils, did not affect Westphalia, despite the appearance of similar councils 
by 7 November in Cologne to "the west, and Hanover to the north. 2) Even the 
Ruhr region was relatively peaceful, and work continued, unaffeoted by the 
events so close by. This was surprising in view of the history of unrest 
in the industrial areas of the province, with "the strikes of 1917, and January 
and August 1918. 3) There were also the wage struggles of the pre-war era, 
especially the strike of 1912, which had left bitter memories in the minds 
of the workers. Despite the concentration of working class masses in the 
Ruhr complex, the revolutionary movement was stimulated to a large degree by 
the actions of elements from outside the province, who initiated the process 
by which Westphalia, too, followed the developments occurring elsewhere. 
The impact of the revolutionary movement, once it made its appearance, 
varied. Though revolutionary centres formed in the Ruhr, especially in 
Gelsenkirchen, Dortmund and Hagen, and in the garrison towns, especially 
MUnster, the tone of the hastily formed workers' arrl soldiers' councils was 
moderate, the most constant appeal by these revolutionary organs reminded 
the population to maintain 'Law and Order'. In some areas, "the revolution 
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1) Among the extensive literature dealing with the German Revolution see 
especially the works ~ F.L. Carsten, Revolution in Central Europe 1918-
l212., London, 1972; A.J. Ryder, The German Hevolution of 1918. A Study 
of German Socialism in War and Revolt, Cambridge, 1967; w. Tormin, 
Zwischen RAtediktatur und sozialer Demokratie. Die Geschichte der R!te-
beweguA~ in der deutschen Revolution 1918/1919, DUsseldorf, 1954. Speci-
fic aspects of the revolution are dealt with by E. Kolb, Die Arbeiterr!te 
in der deutschen Innenpolittk 1918-1919, D6sseldorf, 1962; p. von Oertzen, 
Betriebsr!tte in der N"ovemberrevolution, OOsseldorf, 1963. 
2) Carsten, Revolution ••• , Ope cit., pp.32-49. 
3) H. Spethmann, ZwBlf Jahre Ruhrbersbau, Band I, Aufstand una Ausstand bis 
zum z~eiten Generalstreik April 1919, Berlin, 1928, pp.84 ff •• 
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at the outset made hardly any impact at all. In coun~ Siegen, for example, 
the major concern of the L?JldrRt was that the costs for the locally produced 
placards with the Chancellor Max von Baden's 'Appeal to ti1e German Nation' 
should be met by the state. 4) Of aqr lo~l revolutionary movement there 
is no mention. 
The first workers' and soldiers' councils in Westphalia were generallY 
formed through the actions of revolutionary elements from outside the pro-
vince, supported by local groups or individuals from the ranks of the MSPD 
and the USPD. In Hagen the revolution was set in motion by a train-load of 
soldiers and sailors, who on 8 November occupied the railway station, and 
forced the local army guard to give up their arms and remove their cockades. 5) 
On the morning of the following day a group of thirty 'appeared before the 
mayor, who was informed of the intention of organising a workers' council. 
This was to take over the administration of the town jointlY with the existing 
town authorities, who were to ftlnction as before, with the one important 
difference that in future the measures and actions of the town authorities 
were to be subject to the approval of the workers' council. At the meeting 
it was decided that the workers' council was to be elected by the working 
population of Hagen: the factories were to close and the workers were to 
elect the council at a public meeting. It was also agreed that the workers' 
council was to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order in con-
junction with the existing police authorities. The police were to be given 
red armbands, inscribed with the words "Workers' Council"; each policeman 
was also to be accompanied by a worker. Transgressions against property, 
especiallY lootine, were to be severelY punished. 6) 
The events WhiCh occurred in Hagen were not uncommon in the first phase 
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4) Report qy the rqyal (sic) Landrat, Siegen, 12 November 1918: SAM I pAl 
342. 
5) The situation in the Hagen area has been ana~sed by H. Lambers, Ope cit., 
pp.46 ff.. . 
6) Report by the Oberbnrge~neister, Hagen, 9 November 1918: SAM OberprRsidium 
Nr. 58~. Hagener Zeitunp" 9 November 1918. 
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of the revolution in ~estphalia. Outside influences were also at work in 
Recklinehausen, where the revolution was triggered off by a train-load of 
milita~ personnel, mainly sailors, coming from the direction of Coloene. 
Here 'excesses' were committed during the night f'rOIIl 8 to 9 November. The 
guards of the railway station were overpowered and prisoners released, before 
the group moved off in the direction of Hamm. 7) In MUnster too the revolu-
tion was partially guided by forces from outside the province. Here the 
army took the initiative, as army units garrisoned in Westphalia were to do 
elsewhere. The command of the Seventh Army Corps at MUnster took the lead 
on 8 November by approaching the chairman of the local trade union council. 
Concerned about 'saving the situation', th~ urged him to form a soldiers' 
council. 8) In the evening of 8 November a deputation from the soldiers' 
council of Kiel arrived in the town, presumably to set things in motion. 
The group joined some 400 soldiers stationed in the town in a street demonstra-
tion, which led to the release by the assembled mob of 300 a~ deserters 
from the military prison camp, as well as the release of some 60 prisoners 
from the local jail, including a number of oaneerous criminals, whose recap-
ture was authorised by the workers' and soldiers' council constituted on 9 
November. 9) In Paderborn the local garrison mutinied on 9 November, disarmed 
the officers, released prisoners and robbed the prison safe. 10) Peace 
returned to 'the town after the formation of a workers' and soldiers' coun-
cil. 11) In Minden and Bielefeld the soldiers' councils were formed peace-
fully, the commanders of the garrisons retaining control of the troops. The 
soldiers' councils organised in the two towns quickly made contact with the 
soldiers' council of the Seventh Army Corps at MUnster. The reason of the 
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7) Report by the Regierungspr!!.sident, MUnster, 14 November 1918: SAM 
Oberpr!sidium Nr. 5844. 
8
9
) Carsten, Revolution • • ., OPe cit., p.48. 
) Report by the Regierungspr!sident, MUnster, 14 November 1918: SAM 
Oberpr!sidium Nr. 5844. 
10) Police report, Paderborn, 9 November 1918: SAD MI IP/562. 
11) Report by the Landrat, Paderborn, 10 November 1918: SAD MI IP/562. 
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soldiers' discontent was simply their desire to 'see an end to war'. In both 
towns the soldiers were quietened by the intervention of trade unionists, 
'actively calming the troops in the barracks and in the streets'. 12) In 
Bielefeld these efforts met with success, judging from a contempora~ news-
paper report. Describing the events of the 'night of the revolution', the 
Westf!lische Zeitunr. was able to report that 'not a drop of blood flowed and 
law ani order were not endangered: the theatres and cinemas remained open. 
On Saturday 9 November - a remarkable fact in these difficult days - the 
attendance at the cinemas was more lively than usual. Even the tram service 
was not subjected to allY interruptions. On Saturday not one facto~ was idle 
in Bielefeld.' 13) In Halle i/W. the soldiers' council was also formed in a 
peaceful fashion. 14) On 9 November members of the locally 8tationed Infant~ 
Regiment 55 asked their commanding officer if 'they could form a council. He 
discussed the idea with his officers, and then agreed to 'the request. At a 
meeting attended by the whole battalion a soldiers' council was elected, which 
was composed of three officers (including the commanding officer by a unani-
mous vote), three non-commissioned officers and nine other ranks. The meetine 
decided that no weapons were to be carried, that 'the officers' mess was to 
close, and that compulso~ milita~ saluting was to end, though the officers 
were to retain their badges of rank. 15) 
The events which took place in Warburg are of special significance in 
that the situation there demonstrates the confusion of the first few days of 
the revolution: power could be seized, albeit only temporarily, by anyone 
possessing sufficient nerve. Here the revolution was set in motion by an 
individual called Alt ermann, who, dressed in an officers' uniform, appeared 
alone in Warburg on 9 November. Basing his 'authority' on the workers' and 
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12) Report by the Regierungspr!sident, Minden, 9 November 1918: SAD MI IP!562. 
13j Westf!lische ZeitunR, 11 November 1918. 
14 Telegram, Landrat, Halle i/W. to Minden, 9 November 1918: SAD MI IP!S62. 
15 Report by the Landrat, Halle i/W., 21 November 1918: SAD MI IP!562. 
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soldiers' council of Cassel, he disarmed ten officers and thirty men of the 
Hofgeismaer Dragoons. took over the control of the troops guarding the IOGal 
railway station, set up his own guard, and authorised the creation of a workers' 
and soldiers' council. The detachmelt of troops allowed this to occur because 
Altermann stated that in the afternoon more members of the soldiers' council 
of Cassel would appear in the town. When it was pointed out to him that 
Warburg belonged to the RegierunBsbezirk of Minden, Westphalia. and not of 
Cassel, Altermann replied that such boundaries no longer existed. On 12 
November, representatives of the workers' and. soldiers' council of Cassel 
d.id. ind.eed. appear in the town, but only to arrest Altermann, who was accused. 
of a number of 'excesses'~ After this episod.e, the town community set up its 
own elected. workers' and. soldiers' council at a public meeting on the evening 
of 12 November. It was conservative in composition, formed. of five represen-
tatives of the soldiers and workers, and ten from the 'bourgeois circles' of 
the town. 16) 
In the adjoining County Bnren the revolution evolved. more hesitant~. 
Until 10 November no unusual events occurred, though, as the Lannrat stated, 
'the events in nearby Paderborn. and the formation of councils in Lippstadt. 
created. unrest in the population'. The signal for revolutionary developments 
came from the military, 'soldiers returning on leave removing the badges and 
cockades of their unsuspecting comrades'. The command.er of the army oamp in 
- the nearby village of Holthausen anticipated trouble. He asked the civilian 
authorities to take over the contents of the camp to prevent the looting of 
army property. On 10 November the soldiers of the Holthausen camp formed a 
provisional soldiers' oouncil, which immediate~ contacted the Inspectorate of 
Prison Camps at Mnnster to find. out what exact~ should happen. The MUnster 
authorities stated that the process of olosing the camp should be reversed. 
and. the existing administration be retained. This proved. somewhat difficult, 
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16) Report by the royal (si~) Land.rat, warburg, 22 November 1918: SAD MI 
IP1562. 
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'since on~ a limited number of troops had remained, a large seotion of the 
troops having "gone on holiday", partly without permission, and partly with 
leave granted by the troops to themselves'. 17) 
The appearance of workers' and soldiers' councils in the first few days 
of the revolution was a spontaneous reaction by the population to the events 
of Kiel and elsewhere. In Westphalia the council system rapidly appeared 
once the lead had been given by a few towns. Councils mushroomed everywhere, 
all but the smallest communities being affected by the development in the 
course of November. There was no specific pattern characterising the movement, 
b~ond its spontaneous nature, and no centralised direction; indeed, the absence 
of organisation in general is the most notable feature. Hence the variety of 
responses, with different forces at work, though the influence of the Majority 
Socialists predominated, even in the industrial centres. 18) On~ in rare 
oases did the Independent Socialists rominate the canposition and polioy of 
workers' and soldiers' councils, namely in Hagen, where the USPD retained sole 
control over the council, and in Recklinghausen, where the Independent Socialists 
had a two-thirds majority over the Majority Socialists. 19) Generally the 
workers' and soldiers' oounoils were based on the support of that part of the 
population which believed in socialism. This did not mean in practice that 
th~ ignored the wishes of the rest of the population or confined their appeal 
strict~ to the working class. The workers' and soldiers' oouncil of Dortmund_ 
H~rde, for example, though composed of delegates from the unions, MSPD, USPD, 
and the army, tried to make contact with moderate opinion in general, and 
appealed to the 'whole population of the Wahlkreis Dortmund-Herde'. 20) In 
several towns the workers' and soldiers' councils from the start even included 
non-socialist elements. In Bottrop and Buer the workers' and soldiers' oouncil 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17) 
18) 
19) 
20) 
Report by the royal (sic) L~ndrat, Baren, 13 November 1918: SAD 141 IP/565. 
Carsten, Revolution ••• , Ope cit., p.1S3. 
Lambers, Ope cit., P.4.9i Polioe report, Gelsenkirchen, 9 April 1919: 
SAM I PA/34.2. 
"Aufruf des Arbeiter- und Soldatenrats Dortmund", Novernber 1918: re-
printed in Spethmann, Ope cit., pp.367-368. 
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included from the beginning representatives of the Christian tr.~de unions 
and. the Centre Party. 21) In the snall town of "Narburg middle class influence 
prevailed fran the outset, ten of the fifteen strong workers' and soldiers' 
council being drawn from the 'bourgeois circles' of the town. 22) In Bielefeld 
the composition of the peoples' council quickly altered to include middle class 
representatives. Initially the peoples' council was composed of members who 
received their mandates from the leaders of the SPD end the trade unions, with 
the proviso that the representation would be broadened once the 'new situation 
was clarified'. By the 13 November an appeal by the peoples' oouncil stated 
that 'the situation has now been clarified and it is necessary that all who 
want to help should be called upon for support'. Thus 'the provisional council 
suggested that the new peoples' council should be elected from 'representatives 
of the SPD, the trade unions, and the other profeSSional, economic and political 
groups in the tcnm and the county of Bielefeld, who are prepared actively to 
support the democratic and social re-construotion of Germa~'. 23) 
The moderation of the Bielefeld Socialists also influenced the events of 
the adjacent county of Halle. At a public meeting in Halle illi. on 12 November 
the Majority Socialist SchreCk addressed a crowd 'representing all elements of 
the community', and advocated the setting up of peoples' councils in the county. 
The local Landrat approached him after the meeting, and the two decided that 
within the county every Amt should elect a peoples' council, which in turn 
should send delegates to a peoples' council for the whole county. These councils, 
it was agreed, were to be composed of representatives from all the professions. 
The existing bureaucratic machinery then took over to implement the agreed 
measures. On 13 November the Landrat presided over a meeting attended by the 
local Amtm!!nner in order to discuss the situation. At the meetine he found 
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21) Kolb, Ope cit., p.9l. 
22) Report by the royal (sic) Landrat, iVarburg, 22 November 1918: S.t\D M1 
1P7562. 
23) Pamphlet - "Zur Wahl des Volksrates im Stadt- und Landkreis Bielefeld", 
13 November 1918: SAD MI IP/562. 
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that in the Bergholzhausen ~ there was already a movement afoot designed to 
elect a peoples' council. At the meeting it was decided to hold elections in 
each Amt, which were to take place between the 16 and 18 November. In Halle 
i/w. itself, the public meeting at which the c011ncil was to be elected was 
called and controlled by the soldiers' council of the town, and proved to be 
a live~, though peaceful affair. The meeting agreed with the line taken 
earlier on 13 November, namely, that the peoples' council was to be composed 
of members drawn from the various occupations. The elections in the county 
produced a number of broadly based peoples' councils, with a membership of 
between ten and fifteen. In the Amt Halle the elected body balanced diverse 
interests and was composed of four workers, four representatives 'of the town' 
(a factory owner, a civil servant, a businessman, and an artisan), and four 
representatives of agrarian interests (a landowner, a small-holder, a hired 
agricultural worker, and a farmhand). In Halle and Werther the chairmen of 
the local peoples' councils were workers, in contrast to Versmold and Bergholz-
hausen, where a teacher and a small factor,y owner respectively headed the c011ncils. 
In each A!!!i the Amtmann also belonged to '\he council, in 'an advisory capacity'. 
These small local councils in turn eleoted a peoples' and soldiers' council for 
the county, the conposition of which also showed a mixture of broad interests. 
Eight of the fifteen members were 'workers', the rest represented agrarian, 
industrial, commercial ~d professional interests. 24) 
The developments in Bielefeld and Halle, which led rapi~ towardla wider 
representation of society within the councils, were not unusual. One can see 
especial~ in the smaller towns a much more active participation of non-working-
class elements in the council movement. In the small industrial town of IserlOhn 
the workers' and soldiers' council, dominated by the Majority Socialists, within 
the first week of the revolution showed its willingness to share its powers with 
the middle class element of the town by including bourgeois representatives in 
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24) Report ~ the Landrat, Halle i/W., 21 November 1918: SAD MI IP/562. 
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an expanded workers', soldiers' and peoples' council. 25) In nearby Menden 
a peoples' council operated from the ve~ beginning, as happened also in 
Lippstadt to tile east. 26) In County H~xter the term "peoples ' council" was 
the norm. A report on one of these, that of Steinheim, specifica~\y noted 
that "bfo of its thirteen members were wcmen - the only reference to female 
participation in the numerous reports on the council movement in Westphalia. 27) 
A variety of terms was used to desoribe the councils which appeared eve~-
where in the urban areas, the name given to them reflecting diverse situations 
and attitudes in the localities. The counoil movement also affected the rural 
communities, farmers and farm labourers coming together in the numerous peasant 
councils which appeared in November 1918. In County BUren, for example, there 
were 54 peasant councils or peasants' and peoples' councils, most of which were 
ve~ small, with a membership of ten or less. 28) In County Halle the 37 
peasant councils, or peasants', peoples' and workers' counoils, or peasants' 
and ~ricultural workers' councils far outnumbered the six workers', soldiers' 
and peoples' councils of the county. 29) In County Hamm, 65 of the 74 communi-
ties (Gemeinden) had peasant councils: in 31 of the villages peasant councils 
were the on~ revo1utiona~ organisations. 30) In County Warburg all but two 
of the 46 communities which organised councils had peasants' and farm workers' 
councils, compared with on~ two workers' and soldiers' councils. 31) The 
great majority of the peasant councils in Westphalia had a small membership, 
each canmunity organising itself, Cften in isolation fraQ developments in the 
surrounding area. There were exceptions to the fragmented organisational form. 
In County Bielefeld there were on~ eight peasant counoils, but each represented 
a number of villages, which accounted for the large membership of each council, 
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25) Iserlohner Kreisanzelger und Zei tung, 16 November 1918. 
26) "Zusammenstellung der Arbeiter- und Soldaten- und Bauernr1!te"; Report 
drawn up ~ the Regierungspr!sident, Arnsberg, 24 Janua~ 1919: SAM I 
pA/342. 
27) Report by the Landrat, H~xter, 4 January 1919: SAD MI IP/562. 
28) Report ~ the Landrat, Bftren, 28 Janua~ 1919: SAD MI IP/562. 
29) Report ~ the Landrat, Halle i/VI., 6 February 1919: SAD MI IP/662. 
30) "Zusammenstellung • •• ", Regierungspr!sident, Arnsberg, 24 January 1919: 
SAM I PA/342. 
31) Report by the Landrat, Warburg, 4 Jamary 1919: SAD MI IP/562. 
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32) 
ranging fran 32 to 52. One must also note that in some counties, stronGly 
agrarian in character, such as Brilon, where one would expect peasant councils 
to have been organised, there were none, while there were same in highly 
industrialised areas, such as the Bochu~ region, where one would not expect 
to find aqy separate peasant councils. 33) 
The variations in the council movement of Westphalia reflect the lack of 
any centralised organisation on the regional or even coun~ level. The move-
ment depended very much on local initiative: local conditions and leadership 
influenced the shape and nature of developments. Here one finds one of the 
major weaknesses of the movement, that is, its failure to develop cohesion at 
the outset of, and in the months following, the revolution. The lack of any 
uniform or centralised organisational structure of the councils is shown clearly 
in an analysis of the workers', s oldi ers' and peasants' council s in the 
Regierungsbezirk Arnsberg, drawn up in January 1919. 34) Thus in County Siegen 
one finds a flYstematic, pyramid form of org3.nisation, all the workers', soldiers' 
and peasants' councils in each of the ten lbter recognising the soldiers' 
council of the Eighteenth Army Corps. In the adjoining County Olpe, on the 
other hand, only two of the 'borenty workers', soldiers' and peasants' councils 
recognised aru superior authori 1u": one workers' and soldiers' council subordi-
nated itself to the workers' and soldiers' council of Frankfurt-on-Main, and 
one workers' council to the soldiers' council of Siegen. In County Al tena 
there was more variation still in that the majority of the workers', soldiers' 
and peasants' councils recognised the soldiers' council of Arnsberg as their 
immediate superior authority, a few looked towards the soldiers' council of 
the Eighteenth ~ Corps, and several accepted no 81perior organisation at 
all, especially the rural workers', soldiers' and peasants' council s. The 
peasant councils were especially prone to pursue their existence in isolation. 
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32) Report by the royal (sic) Landrat, Bielefeld, 9 January 1919: SAD MI 
IP1562. 
33) "Zusammenstellung ••• ", Regierungspr!sident, Arnsberg, 24 January 1919: 
SAll I PA/342. 
34) For the following see "Zusammenstellung ••• ", RegierungsprAsident, 
Arnsberg, 24 Jamary 1919: SAM I PA/342. 
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In County Bochum, for exanple, the great majority of the workers' and soldiers' 
councils recognised the workers' and soldiers' cooncil for County Bochum, 
whereas none of the peasant councils subordinated themselves to this or a~ 
other regional council. A similar situation existed in County Schwelm, where 
none of the peasant councils attached themselves to aqy superior body. 
Thus the lack of contact of many of the numerous local councils, espe-
cially those in the rural areas, with the more powerful ~unty or provincial 
councils was a common feature in the Arnsberg Regierungsbezirk. The reason 
may well lie in the relative unimportance of many of the small councils which 
appeared in 1918, which more often than not had only limited aspirations beyond 
the preservation of 'law and order'. Some of the councils were much too email 
to have been effective on even the local level. In County Hamm, for example, 
the VlOrkers' council of Herringen calsisted of but one individual as did the 
soldiers' ccuncil. Herringen is an exception, it is true, but few of the !rUral 
councils had a membership extending b~ond a dozen. 
If one looks at the more important workers' and soldiers' council s of the 
major t01/'ns an entirely different picture emerges.. These were often the focus 
of organisation on the county level, had much wider connections with the regional 
councils, and collectively played a dominant role in the council movement of 
Westphalia. With the exception of Lfldenscheid and Hamm, the workers' and 
soldiers' councils of the province - Bielefeld, Bochum, Dortmund, Geleenkirchen. 
Hagen, Minden, and M!1nster - acknowledged as their Slperior authority the 
moderate SOldiers' council of the Seventh Army Corps at MUnster. A framework 
of contact existed at this level, which coold have been built up to orga.nise 
and co-ordinate the work of the ~uncils of the important urban centres. But 
very little was accomplished in. this direction by the end of 1918. The council 
movement in Westphalia as a Whole remained fragmented until it gradually vanished 
in a piecemeal fashion in the spring of 1919. 
The Purpose and Aims of the Westphalian Cmlncils. 
Local conditions and personalities determined to a large degree the nature 
of the revolution in Westphalia; this accounts for the variations in organisation, 
---------- -----_ ... _-
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attitude and response. The moderation shown by the workers' and soldiers' 
councils in Westphalia as a mole, incJJ.lding those in the Ruhr area, wa.s 
remarkable in the first few months of the revolution; this was undoubtedly 
due to the fact that a:lJnost everywhere Majority Socialist and trade union 
influence predominated.. Their moderation shaped the movement which, r9.ther 
than being used as a revolutionary instrument to seize political power and 
democratize the administration and society in general, emerged to protect 
the limited, though important, gains of November, name~ the democratization 
of the political system for mich the Socialists had ~rked in the pre-war 
period. The realization of thi s objective constituted a revolution in the 
minds of IDaI\Y supporters and party officials of the },jSPD, and the major 
concern of maI\Y became stabilisation, not revolution. That is w~ the councils 
were primarily concerned to see that law and order prevailed. Even the few 
councils controlled by t.~e Independent Socialists shared this atti illde. The 
first proclamation of the USPD controlled sOldiers' and workers' council of 
Hagen emphasized the need to preserve law and order and even threatened publi-
cans with a general prohibition of ine sale of alcohol if they sold' excessive 
amounts' to the general public. 35) 
B~ond the general objective of preserving 'law and order', there was 
much ccni'usion as to the role the cameils should or could play. The movement 
was after all spontaneous and. unorganised. The si illation on the national level 
was initia~ unclear, and the events and opportunities the situation presented 
were open to different interpretations. On the local and provincial level this 
led to the drafting of programmes by the individuals in charge, reacting to 
the conditions of the area. Different councils stressed different points. In 
the industrialised areas the workers' and soldiers' councils tended to be more 
aggressive in their demands, often including far-reaching assertions as to 
their function and power within the framework of the newly created. Republican 
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35) Proclamation "Arbeiter! Barger!", issued by the Workers' and Soldiers' 
Council and Stadtverwaltung of Hagen, dated 9 Noveooer 1918 - reprinted 
in Lambers, op. cit., Appendix, p.4. 
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system. In the Ruhr towns economic demands relating to working conditions, 
pay, and the nationalisation of basic industries were voiced, which, naturally 
enough, did not figure in the programmes of the councils in rural areas. There 
was consensus of opinion on one point, however, and that related to authority. 
All the more important and. effective councils secured diverse controlling 
functions over the authorities in their sphere of operation. 
Typical of the appeals made to -the population by the councils is that of 
the workers' and soldiers' council of Dortmund-Herde. This proolaimed its 
desire to 'strive for political and social changes in the name of democracy 
and socialism'. This vaguely phrased task was to be realised and accomplished 
without 'disturbances and economic chaos', in partnership with the 'existing 
authorities'. The counoil demanded wide powers and control over the military 
personnel in the Dortmund area, control over industrial concerns, banks, and 
the means of communication, as well as the introduction of the eight-hour day. 
The council also demanded the recognition of its authority and power, which, 
it stated, were vested in it 'by the trust of the people'. These demands were 
made to the Dortmund town council in the first instance, which agreed to them, 
acknowledged the existenoe of the council and provided it with office facili-
ties in the town hall. 36) In the months following, Dortmund was administered 
by the existing bureauoracy in conjunction with the workers' and soldiers' 
council, a compromise solution to the problem of wh<:Lt status the new councils 
were to have in the new state, which was to be discussed at national level 
in the months following. It is worth noting that the cooncils did not claim 
total authority, but onJs' the right of joint control with the ex:isting autho-
rities. This indicates that there was little desire to seize total power, as 
advocated by some radical elements at a later stage, for the opportmni ty was 
there in November. 
Joint control was the common form of government in Westphalia following 
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36) "An die gesamte Bev5lkerung im Wahlkreis Dortmund-HBrde" - pamphlet 
issued by the workers' and. soldiers' council of Dortmund,-HBrde; full 
text in Spethmann, OPe cit., pp.367-368. 
the emergence of the councils. In Hagen, the m~or agreed to the workers' 
and soldiers' council's claim to parity at "the outset of the revolution 
because he desired to prevent bloodshed and disorder. 37) In maqy towns 
agreement between local councils and the administration was reached on a 
frien~ basis. In Husen, near Hagen, the local officials came to an amicable 
settlem ent with -the workers' and soldiers' counoil and both parties agreed to 
the joint administration of the affairs of the community. 38) In Bielefeld 
too a peaceful and harmonious situation existed between the town's officials 
and the peoples' and soldiers' oouncil. Here the co-operation of' the two 
bodies was 'orderly and wi thou t friotion'. In aocordance with "the provisions 
of an agreement reaohed at the formation of the soldiers' counoil, the Landrat 
of the count,y and the m~or of the town attended all the important sessions 
of the counoil in an advisory capacity. 39) In County Dortmund the soldiers' 
council allowed the authorities to retain the initiative in that it only met 
to discuss the problems of the county with "the heads of the administrative 
departments at the invitation of the Landrat. 4-0) In sruthern Westphalia aU 
the councils, without exception, co-operated with local offioialdom in the 
maqy tasks faoing the region in the crucial months following November. 41) 
Nowhere in the province did the olaims of the counoils extend to the right of 
full or sole centrol, as they did in Dllsseldorf in the western section of the 
Ruhr. 42) The working relationship with the higher bureauoracy on the 
Regierunesbezirk level was also generally harmonious. The ReGierunespr!sident 
of Minden was able to report to his superior at MUnster that he had the impres-
sion that the workers' and soldiers' orunoil of Minden was very interested in 
maintaining a smooth and frictionless relationship with him. 43) 
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37) Report by the OberbUrgermeister, Hagen, 9 November 1918: SAM Ober-
prRsidium Nr. 584-4-; Lambers, Ope cit., p.4-7. 38j Spethmann, Ope cit., p.l04-. 
39 Report by the Landrat, Bielefeld, 19 November 1918: SAD MI IP!S62. 
4-0 "Zusammenstellung • •• ", Regierungsprlsident, Arnsberg, 24 Janu~ 1919: 
SA.\{ I P A/342. 
41) Ibid •• 
42) Carsten, Revolution • •• , Ope cit., p.1S3. 
43) Report by the Regierungsprlsident, Minden, 23 November 1918: SAM I PA/342. 
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The workers' and. soldiers' councils were in many ways forced to reach 
agreement with the existing local and regional bureaucrats. The problems 
facing the towns and the region were very grave, and the difficulties could 
on~ be overcome without creating chaos if the existing machinery was allowed 
to continue to function. And chaos and disorder were the last thing that all 
but a few extremists wanted. This accounts for the fact that. although there 
existed friction between the councils and the old bureaucracy. the ma~ civil 
servants of the province were left at their posts. There are few instances 
of councils removing officials, and even where there were such attempts, these 
were not always successfUl, especia~ if a senior official was involved. The 
recorded cases of dismissals or attempted dismissals are not very numerous. 
The largest number affected by a purge authorised by a council occurred in 
Bottrop, where the local workers' and soldiers' council prevented seven police-
men fran fUlfilling their duties. In Buer the worlcers' and. soldiers' council 
suspended a police inspector and four other members of the force. 44) In Eickel 
near Gelsenkircben, friction also arose between the workers' council and. the 
police. Here the council on its formation in November declared that all offi-
cials should continue to fulfil their dlties as before, provided that they 
accepted the authority of the council. Though all officials made this declara-
tion, one policeman was suspended because 'he was not particularly liked by 
the members of the workers' and soldiers' council', who accused him of not 
carrying out their orders. 45) There is reoord. of only one instance in which 
a higher official met with 'the opposition of a council. This happened in 
Herford, where the deputy mayor was removed by the workers' and soldiers' 
council because he objected to orders issued by the council concerning security. 
But even he was reinstated after the intervention of the mayor, though the 
latter was forced to take over the control of the police at the insistence 
of the workers' and soldiers' council. 46) 
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Report ~ the Oberpr!sident. Minden, 26 December 1918: SAM Oberpr!sidium 
Nr. 5844. 
Report ~ the Landrat, Gelsenkirchen, 10 Deoember 1918: SAM I P~342. 
Report by the Oberbflrgermeister, Herford, 13 November 1918: SAM I PA/S62. 
In general the bureaucraqy of Westphalia bent with the wind and quiet~ 
continued to function side by side with tile revolutionary organs produced 
by the upheaval of 1918, regardless of the sentiments which they most certainly 
harboured against these organs. The officials sat tight and survived a8 an 
intact force until the situation changed and the councils disappeared as 
political organisations in the course of 1919. The moderation of the Majori~ 
Socialists undoubtedly contributed to the fact tilat the administration was not 
imbued with a socialist spirit by appointing officials who believed in the 
new13 emerging democraqy. 47) One can understand the hesitancy of the 80cia-
lists, which allowed the old machinery to survive, even if one criticises 
their lack of confidence in their own abili~. From the beginning the councils 
were in a difficult position, given the problems facing them and the lack of 
any clear idea as to what their function should be in the general confusion 
of November. This uncertainty over shtus was only gradually removed by the 
PrOvisional Government. In November 1918 the great emphasis was on stabili~ 
in view of the shock of defeat and the problems which beset a Germany exhaus-
ted by the demands of war and peace. In the light of the problems of the 
control and. distribution of raw materials for industry and food 'for the popu-
lation, of demobilisation, and the servicing of the intricate machinery of a 
highly developed state, the retention of the existing military and civil 
authorities and their expertise was considered a necessity by the bulk of 
the forces engaged in the revolution. The fact that the cruncil movement was 
spontaneous and unorganised, caught the socialist parties unaware, a situation 
which led to much confusion. In Westphalia moderation prevailed; the councils 
sought at most the right to supervise authorities within their sphere of 
activity. On the national level the situation was also unclear, with crnfUct-
ing interpretations as to the function of the councils in relation to those of 
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47) At the party conference of the SPD in June 1919 it was pointed out that 
only one party member had been appointed ReBi erungsprllsident, and only 
one as Landrat (out of a total of 36 and 470 respective~). Carsten, 
Revolution ••• , Ope cit., p.131. 
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the Provisional Government. 1m attempt to resolve the problem led to a pro-
clamation by the Executive Committee of t..l1e German workers' and soldiers' 
oounoils on 23 November 1918, which defined their functions and power. 48) 
The limitations of the councils were clearly defined following a dispute 
in the Rep;ierunesbezirk of Minden over the extent of tile powers wielded by 
the wcrkers' and. soldiers' councils. In a letter from the Ministry of Finance 
the limitations of the councils to interfere with financial matters were stated 
precisely: 'Workers', soldiers' and peasants' camcils are only pennitted to 
. exercise a continuous control alonr,side the administration; but they are not 
permitted to interfere in the a ministration of finance nor in judicial matters; 
they cannot demand administrative measures which contra.vene the existing laws 
h ' h 'cf 1 bin' 49) Th t or w J.C would prevent the timely conclusJ.on nonna us esS. a 
such statements were necessa~ as late as the end of December reflects the 
fact that variou s agreements reached at the national level, such as that of 
23 November, were too vague. It did not neoessarily follow that the national 
agreement'S would be accepted by all the councils, now cruld they curtail the 
activism of some workers' councils led by more radical elanents; the situation 
on the local level was determined largely by the personalities of the leaders 
of the councils. 
There are only a few examples of councils pursuing arbitrary actions 
which were abnormal in relation to general cauncil activity in the province. 
In Hagen the USPD controlled workers' and soldiers' cauncil exceeded its autho-
Ii. ty fran time to time, though usually it co-operated with the town administra-
tion and rarely intervened in administrative matters. 50) Of interest is the 
attempt by the workers' and soldiers' council to exercise ju dicial power 
through the formation of a tSt~dgerichtt. Created on 30 November, the court 
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48) For the definition of the oouncils' powers and the conflicting views 
between the Executive Committee (representing the views of the workers' 
and soldiers' councils of Berlin) and the Provisional Government see 
Carsten, Revolution •• • , Ope cit., pp.128-130. 
49) Letter from the Finanzministerium (FMI 14758), Berlin, 31 December 1918: 
SAD MI IP/562. 
50) Lambers, OPe cit., p.50. 
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was never used. If it had been the decisions wculd not have been ~ul any-
way. 51) At t:iJnes the 'I'D rkers' and soldiers' council of Hagen walld also 
react to criticisms by an arbitrary use of power. Thus a teacher was removed 
for agitating against tile council. The chief editor of the W'estflilisches 
Taeebh tt was imprisoned for a few days and hi s paper prohibited because of 
his attacks in several leaders on the workers' and soldiers' council. 52) 
These developments alarmed the town's bourgeois circles and led to protest 
and resentment, as did the council's authorisation of searches in the homes 
of the richer citizens of the town. 53) In nearby Altena too house searches 
caused tile bourgeois element some concern. Here the leaders of the workers' 
and soldiers' council arbitrari~ decided to 'carry out searches in homes 
occupied by those with a taxed income of over 10,000 ~'. 54) In Iserlobn 
a deputation from the local workers' and soldiers' council appeared in the 
office of the town's police inspector and removed 22 confidential files con-
taining reports on political activities of local individuals drawn up prior 
to the revolution. But even here orier was observed, a receipt being given 
for the files before their removal. 55) A more serious instance of harassment 
of officials was the arrest of the Landrat of Hamm by a deputation fran the 
soldiers' council of Hamburg. This turned up in Hamm to investigate the affairs 
of "the local workers' and soldiers' council End its supposed laxity and. lack 
of vigour. No reason was given for the Landrat's arrest, nor, as it turned out, 
did the members of the Hamburg deputation have the authority to act in this 
manner. The Landrat was released after the intercession of the mayor of the 
town. In his report to the RegierungsprliSident, the Landrat asked for steps 
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51) 
52) 
53) 
54) 
55) 
The Reich government was very concerned. with '!he retention of full res-
ponsibili~ for law and control of the judiciary in face of council claims _ 
see "Anordnung des Rates der Volksbeauftragten", 5 December 1918: SAM I 
pA/371. 
Freie Presse, 30 January 1919. 
See, for example, the complaint by Rechtsanwalt Schemm, Hagen, 2 January 
1919: SAM I PA/'542. 
See the letter of complaint to the Landrat, Altena, 21 December 1918; 
similar~, letter of protest to the RegierungsprRsident of Arnsberg, Altena, 
18 December 1918: SAM I pA/342. 
POlice report, Iserlohn, 2 Jaruary 1919: SAM: I PA!342. 
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to be taken to protect the authorities ~rom such molestations. 56) 
Such instances of 'over-enthusiasm' of councils were rare. Far ~rom 
disturbing the peace in the unsettled months following the events of November, 
the existence of the numerous councils did much to prevent unrest and excesses. 
They were indeed a major stabilisiIl8 factor in the post-November period. The 
leaders of the councils were not revolutionaries in the true sense of the word 
and their moderation guided and controlled the more radical elements of the 
popula tion. The trust of the bllk of the working population in the councils, 
which were seen as their creations and protectors of their interests, more 
often than not led by Socialists or Trade Unionists of standing in the locali~, 
is one of the chief reasons for the relatively peaceful nature of the revolu-
tiona:ry period. In c cnjunction wi th the local administra. tion, these bodies 
engaged in a great variety of tasks which had little to do with aI\Y implementa-
tion of pre-conceived political ideas or plans of aotion designed to seoure 
total power for aI\Y specific section o~ society. The tasks the councils set 
themselves in the months following the revolution were determined largely by 
the problems of the time: control over and distribution of food supplies, 
clothing, ~uel and raw materialsj protection of propert,yj supervision of demo-
bilisationj stamping out of the black market and profiteering in general. 
These problems were tackled jointly by the authorities and the councils, mutual 
interests drawing the two 'sides' together. There were few variations fran 
this pattern •. The councils were also active in the enforcement of order, even 
if this meant a conflict with the more radical elements from the ranks of the 
working class. The determination to protect the peace was ve~ real. The 
Soldiers' council of Recklinghausen, for example, moved qpickly at the outset 
of the revolution against 'bands of Poles and radical elements of the Left' 
which prevented the miners of Bottrop ~d Gladbeck fran working. Not only 
did forces organised by the cruneil quell the disturbances, but they also 
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56) Report by the Landrat, Hamm, 8 December 1918: SAM I PA!342. 
armed the miners of the affected pits to prevent further unrest. 57) The 
soldiers' council of Minden also 'did its utmost to keep order', its members 
moving against radical elements which caused temporary unrest. 58) 
The councils active in Westphalia quickly placed themselves behind the 
Provisional Government, supporting the moderate line taken ~ the Majori~ 
Socialists even after the split wi th the Independents. Typical of the posi-
tion taken by the councils is that of the influential soldiers' council of the 
Fourth Army at MUnster. In November the council backed the Majority Socialist 
line on the need for elections to a National Assembly and issued a proclamation 
calling for the election in order that 'the will of the Whole of the German 
people can be ascertained'. In a warning to the radical Left, the soldiers' 
council stated that 'we have not thrown off the old shackles in order to 
subject ourselves to a new, extreme dictatorship of a small minori~ (Bol-
shevik)'. 59) A few weeks later the same coxncil issued another general pro-
clamation designed to quieten the fears of the population, clgrifying the 
attitude and intentions of the council movement in general. The pamphlet 
pointed out that the councils were not 'unfriendly forces. Our programme is 
your programme and that of the People's Representatives: peace, work and bread. 
We have placed ourselves behind the government bec~use it wants the best ~or 
all of us'. 60) Similar expressions of support for tile Provision9-1 Government 
and its policies came from other councils. Thus t..~e Minden soldiers' council 
on 26 November called for the meeting of a National Assembly. 61) The workers' 
and soldiers' council at Hattingen declared as one of its main objectives 
'the safeguardine of the attainments of the revolution, especially in relation 
to the Spartacists and hence support for 1;he SPD governllent'. 62) Even small, 
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57) Report by the Regierungsprl1sident, MUnster, 20 November 1918: SAM 
Oberprl1sidium Nr. 5844. 
58) Report by the Regierungsprl1sident, Minden, 27 November 1918: S~4 
Oberprl1sidium Nr. 5844. 
59) Pamphlet issued by the Soldiers' Council of the Fourth Army, MUnster, 
November 1918: SAM I PA/342. 
60) "Zur Frage der Arbeiter- und Solclatenr!ite", issued by the SOldiers' 
Council of the Fourth Army, MUnster, 5 December 1918: SAM I PA/342. 
61) Report by the Regierungspr!sident, Minden, 27 November 1918: s&~ 
Oberprl1sidium Nr. 5844. 
62) "Zusammenste11ung ••• n, Regierungspr!isident, Arnsberg, 24 January 1919: 
SAl\{ I pAl 342. 
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relatively insignificant councils, for example the Alt~nbochum workers' and 
soldiers' council in County Boclum, stated their intention to 'prevent counter-
revolutiona~ attempts from the Right and the Left'. The workers' and soldiers' 
council of StBrmede in County Lippstaiit saw its special duty as 'co-operating 
in the development of a democratic constitution', while 'f'ighting ag:;tinst 
eve~ attempt ~ a minority to replace the democratic system of government 
by a one-sided dictatorship'. 63) The United Worlcers', Peoples' and SOldiers' 
Council of the county of Herford went so far as to issue an appeal to the 
local population to join the 'Free Corps of the Government', to 'safeguard 
Germa~ from incursions in the east' and protect the population from the 
'terror of the Spartacists'. 64) 
The Rural Councils. 
If the councils of the urban and industrialised regions of Westphalia 
distinguished themselves by their moderate political outlook, the numerous 
councils in the rural areas were positively conservative. In a political 
sense they played no role; their function in the province, as elsewhere with 
the exception of Bavaria, was primarily economic. 65) The conservative nature 
of the peasant councils is related to their origin and the generally conserve.-
tive attitude of the rural population. Unlike the workers' and. soldiers' coun-
cils, the peasant oouncils were not spontaneous creations; if we exclude Bavaria, 
peasant councils in general appeared hesitantly. 66) Moreover, the first initia-
tive behind the creation of special organs to protect agricultural interests 
came from the conservative WYar Committee of German Agriculture", which was 
strongly influenced ~ the Bund der Land'.virte. 67) At the beginning of 
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63j 64 
65 
66) 
67) 
Ibid •• 
Report by the Landrat, Herford, 5 February 1919: SAD MI IP/562. 
For the role of the peasant councils outside Bava.ria see Carsten, 
Revolution • •• , op. cit., pp.204-209; also H. Muth, 'Die Entstehung 
der Bauern- und Landarbeiterrl!te im November 1918 und die Politik des 
Bundes der Landvlirte', Vierte1jahrshefte ff1r Zei t,~eschlchte, 21, 197.3. 
Muth, op. cit., p • .3, cites the case of the peasants' council of MBnchen-
gladbach. 
Muth, op. cit., pp.5 ff •• 
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November 1918, immediately before the military collapse, the "War Committee", 
without reference to the government, formulated the idea of authorising the 
formation of rural committees designed to protect fanners fron unrest, to 
ensure a continued supply of foodstuffs to the towns, and to combat profiteer-
ing and the black market. These rural Ct:lmmittees were envisaged as represen-
tations not only of agrarian interests, but of the population as a whole. 
The proclamation by the ",Var Committee" on 9 November, calling on the population 
to farm rural committees, was overtaken by the events of the revolution. On 
12 November the new Provisional Government also proclaimed the need for 
'peasant councils', which Scheidemann thought would be roughly the same as 
the committees called for by the "War Coromi ttee". 68) A further proclamation 
fOllowed on 25 November, which called for the creation of camcils in which 
both farmers and agricultural labourers were to be represented. Thi s appeal 
was in response to pressures exerted by the unions of agricultural labourers, 
which wanted their membership to be represented in the rural c~cils; to this 
idea the government responded with an amended proclamation designed to give 
pari ty on the councils bet-.veen enployers and employees. 69) 
The various appeals created confusion in the general uncertainty of the 
time and led to variable results. Important here is that neither of the 
Provisional Government proclamations of 12 and 25 November specifically can-
celled the independent action of the "War Committee" of 9 November. Thus 
peasant councils appeared as a result of the initiative of the "War Committee" 
acting through its regional organs, and as a consequence of the proclamations 
of the new government. If the response waS 1x> the latter, tvo types of Coun-
cils emerged: before 25 November "peasants' councilS", and after 25 November 
"peasants' and farm labourers' councils". In Westphalia the KrieBswirtschafts_ 
~ of the prOvince issued the proclamation of the "War Committee" through its 
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68) Ibid., p.12. 
69) Carsten, Revolution • •• , p.203j Muth, OPe cit., p.15. 
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subordinate organisations attached to the Land.r::ltsamt, and asked for a speedy 
implementation of its recommendations. 70) At about the same time the Regier-
unespr~sident of Minden also instructed the Landr~te to form 'local committees 
according to the Slggestions of the "War Committee", which woold best be 
described as peasants' councils'. He suggested further that on their formation 
th~ should in turn form "Coun~ peasants' councils", which should establish 
contact with the workers' and soldiers' councils of the area. 71) 
The initiative from the side of the conservative interests of the "War 
Committee" produced peasants' councils in Westphalia whose composition was in 
line with the idea that the widest interests were to be represented. In Coun~ 
Lndinghausen the peasants' councils of the 18 rural districts comprising the 
county were composed of 40 farmers, 38 gentlemen farmers, 27 KBtter, 19 
agricultural labourers, 15 artisans, 5 leaseholders, 3 miners, 2 civil servants, 
a station master, a blilding ccntractor, a teacher, a nightwatcbnan, and a 
foreman. 72) Peasants' cooncils in the area were not always what they appeared 
to be. 
The bulk: of the Westphalian rural councils emerged before the second 
government proclamation of 25 November introduced a new pattern 1n the form 
of peasants' and. agricultural labourers' councils. Thus the 135 peasants' 
councils noted in the Regierungsbezirk Arnsberg far outnumbered the peasants' 
and agricultural workers' councils. Only in County HalDU was there a numerio 
balance of the wo forms. 73) That the majority of the agrarian oouncils were 
conservative in their attitude is underlined by their Slbsequent histo~. 
Their c alserva tism is related to their origins and to the fact 1:ha t in Westphalia 
the conservative agricultural organisations were exceptionally strong and used 
their influence to moderate and control the rural developments. Their influence 
and moderation was furthered by the Westphalian L'l.ndwirtschaftskrunmer, which 
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SAM Kreis SteinfUrt, Landratsamt/626, Bl.196 - Muth, oPe cit., p.2l. 
RundverfOgung, 14 November 1918: SAM Regierung Arnsberg, I 15/14, B1.3 _ 
Muth, Ope cit., p.2l. 
SAM Kreis Lndingbausen, Landratsamt/383 - Muth, OPe cit., p.20. 
"Zusammenstellung • •• ", RegierungsprRsident, Arnsberg, 24 Janua~ 1919: 
SAM I PA!342. 
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urged the agrarian organisations active~ to involve themselves in the rural 
moveme nt. 74-) 
The conservative nature of the aerarian councils is refleoted in their 
general non-involvement in the political developments of the period. The 
peasants' councils and the peasants' and. agricultural workers' councils were 
active primari~ in the supervision of the collection of s..xrplus foodstuffs, 
the allocation of the delivery quotas to the farms, the Slppression of the 
black market, and the protection of the general interests of the tarmin~ 
communi ty. In persuading the farmers to fulfil their chief tole, namely 
supplyi~ the needs of the towns, the peuant councils exercised some influence. 
Certa:inly they were called upon by the authorl. ties to exhort the rural popula-
tion to make greater efforts in times of acute shortage. 75) The interests 
of the rural population mobilised ~ the peasant council system involved above 
all protection of the agrarian interests in a period of uncertainty. The 
farmers were afraid of the attention given to the rural areas by the urban 
population at a time of :£bod shortage. The olose prOXimity of "!he Ruhr con-
urbation and the restlessness shown by the urban population reinforced their 
anxiety. They banded together to PIQtect their farms and villages against 
outSiders, using the council system as the organisational form. Very few of 
these councils developed ~ political interest. Nor were they encouraged to 
do so by their urban camterparts, far the workers' and soldiers' council"!'!' did 
not envisage the peasants' councils as equal partners in an order based on 
the council system. This attitude adopted by the urban councils did not escape 
the notice of the leaders of the peasant councils, as was made clear at a con-
ference of 'the peasants' and. agricul'blral labourers' ccuncils of Westphalia 
held at Hamm in March 1919. Here the leaders of the IUral councils voiced 
their discontent. Al though the conference deoided to form a provincial peasant 
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council, it declined to involve itself in the elections to the second national 
congress of the workers', soldiers' and peasants' cameils because "the workers' 
and soldiers' councils 'have so far excluded the coun~ population from poli-
tical life and have as best they could hindered the development of the peasants' 
and labourers' councils. 76) Antagonism also developed between the two groups 
because the peasant councils could not see eye "b:> eye with the urban councils 
concerning the issues of food supplies and black marketeering. 77) 
The conflict between town and country undermined the unity of the council 
movement in general. The apathy of tile roral population in Westphalia in the 
revolutiona~ period was not inevitable, for there were isolated instances of 
peasant partiCipation in revolutionar,y activity which indicate that the peasants 
too had grievances and could be mobilised. In County Wittgenstein, the poorest 
county in the province, the rural population on the estates of Prince Richard 
von Sayn-Wittgenstein-Berleburg and of Prince August von Sayn-Wittgenstein-
Hohenstein, was mobilised qy the demands for agrarian changes made by the 
workers' and soldiers' council of Berleburg. In a proclamation on 2 December 
the council demanded the immediate expropriation of the princes and the end of 
their 'crown rights', and called for the distribution o~ their 'crown estates' 
among the local canrnunity. There were also cla:iJns for cOOlpensation 'for damages 
to '\he roads of "the area caused by estate traffic'. 78) The claims 'Nere 
declared unlawful by the Ministry of Justice. In a telegram to the local 
Landrat it was stated that 'forest and other lands of the princes in the area 
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are their legally protected property. The workers' and soldiers' council is 
not permitted to sequestrate or distribute the land'. 79) The intervention 
of the Lanarat calmed cl.own the situation in the area, though the continued 
unrest and demonstrations by the peasantry on the estates of Pr:ince August 
of Sayn-~ittgenstein-Hohenstein were only quelled after the prince had placed 
his castle and estates in ~itteenstein under the protection of the more con-
servative workers' and soldiers' council of Laasphe. 80) Involved in the 
demands for agraria.n refoll11 in the area were above all the smallholders of 
the region who were especially affected by landhunger. Their problems were 
largely of their own making, accordinz to the Landrat, the consequence of too 
maqy cattle on their holdings, the resulting overgrazing leading to a desire 
to extend their fams. It was this section of the rural population which was 
inVOlved in -the unrest and backed the remands of the Berleburg workers' and 
soldiers' council, which in turn acted as a mouth-piece for their desire for 
agrarian reform. 81) 
A similar situation developed in Coun~ BUren in 1919, where a movement 
was organised in the Fllrstenberg community designed to acquire lands belonging 
to the Count of Westphalia.. In FIlrstenberg the peasantry were mobilised by 
Weiss, a former sailor fran Essen, who organised and headed a 10CRl committee 
"For the Recovery of Lost Rights". The agitation by 'Neiss and his supporters 
caused fears by the Landrat that t one day the count's castle and the estate 
bUildings will go up in flames'. To back up their claim for more land, the 
Commi ttee was able to induce the workers and. employees workine on the count's 
estates to withdraw their labour. The report by the Landrat pointed out that 
'similar events had. taken place in Fllrstenberg in 1848, when similar demands 
had been made and. the castle had. been stormed. and. sacked in ord.er to achieve 
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th ' 82) t d t em • The movement 8l. so attemp e 0 put pressure on the government to 
intervene on behalf of the rural population. A new organisation led. by 'Neiss, 
calling itself the "United Farmers of FUrstenberg" threatened to stop delive-
ries of meat, unless their demands were met. 83) 
The events in the counties of Wittgenstein and BUren indicate that the 
rural population could be mobilised by a progralllJlle of agrarian reform. Had the 
peasants' councils produced a programme appealing to the self-interest of the 
rural population the response would have been there. But no such refom plans 
were formulated, and it was left to a few isolated movements to demonstrate 
the possibilities present in the countryside for radical action. The efforts 
of a small minority were too weak to have much impact in the £ace of opposition 
by the government and local authorities, and nothing came of them. 
The Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. 
Demands for economic and social reform moved the urban masses to a much 
greater degree than the question of political reform. The workers' and 
soldiers' councils were generally quite satisfied with the initial gains of 
the revolution, especially the introduction of a democratic system of govern-
ment. This important advance satisfied the majority; there was little support 
from the councils and the working class in general for a fiYstem of government 
based on the council ~stem. There were ma~, however, who felt a deep desire 
for economic reform, a desire a cknowled.ged by socialists of all shades and 
opinion, including the leaders of the MSPD and the trade unions. The latter, 
though moderate in their political outlook, were forced to retain a radical 
stance on the question of s ooial and economic reforms in order to retain con-
trol over their supporters, especial~ those of the Ruhr industrial centres. 
The great emotional issue was 'that of socialisation, with the demand for the 
nationalisation of the mining industry being expressed constant~. Accompanying 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
82) Report by the Landrat, BUren, 5 Ju~ 1919: SAD MI IP/S63. 
83) Report by the Landrat, BUren, 23 Ju~ 1919: SAD MI IP/563. 
56 
this were deIIRnds for a shorter working day, more pay, and. the redress of old 
grievances, such as 'the payment of wages withheld by the employers dlrin8 
the strike movement of 1912. In the weeks following the poU tica.l upheaval 
of November the miners were granted certain concessions, such as the eight-hour 
day introduced from 1 Deoember, plus higher pay, but discontent among the rank 
and file continued. The gains made by the workin8 class were too small in view 
of the steep rise in the cost of living, which swallowed up the benefits 
derived from the pay increases. 84) Despite the appeals by the miners' unions 
to their members, exhorting them to continue work in order to avert a national 
economic collapse, widespread unrest and strikes occurred. 85) A general lack 
of will to work soon made itself noticeable, especia~ in the dramatic fall 
of 'the productive capacity man per shift, estimated at 75 per cent below the 
pre-war level. 86) Concessions to the miners whetted their appetite for more. 
Increasingly the working man was drawn toward.5'the more radical Independents 
and the Spartacists. These elements to the left of the Ma.jori~ Socialists 
used the discontent of the working class to further their position and influence. 
Radical economic demands were put forward by the Spartacists and sections of 
the USPD. Once these found a wider response the prograllllle of the radicals was 
widened, the major emphasis shifting to political demands. A sharp division 
quickly developed between the programme of the extreme Left and the more mode-
rate approach taken by the MSPD and the mallY' workers'. councils oontrolled by 
its supporters. :By the turn of 'the year fue split within the ranks of the 
Sooialist movement had deepened. As a result antagonism and hatred developed, 
which was to have tragic consequences for the labour movement in the nineteen-
twenties. 
The lack of progress on the nationalisation issued led to increasing 
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discontent among the workers of' the Ruh,.. 87) Their sense of' grievance was 
heightened by the decision in f'avour of immediate socialisation passed by the 
first national congress of the workers' and soldiers' councils in December 
1918. In Westphalia this caused the erratic strike movements to become more 
widespread and to assume a more political character. To ccnf'use the situation 
fUrther, radical elements of the Left attempted to emulate the Spartacist 
riSing in Berlin in Janu~ 1919. 88) The reaction to the Berlin developments 
was most serious in Dortmund. A local putsch by the Spartacists led to a 
series of skirmishes in the town between workers and the loca 1 police and 
the Sicherheitswehr. Yet beyond the occupation of 'the offices of the ~­
f!ilische Alleemeine Volkszeitunp, little was achieved by a mob of some 1,500, 
led, as it turned out, by the chairman of the Independent Socialist Party. 89) 
Another centre of unrest was Buer, where 'the 'Spartacists' declared a general 
strike and demanded the following: removal of the Ebert-Scheidemann government; 
the introduction of a sile-hour working day; the payment of wages wi thheld 
during the strike of 19l2 (with interest); a once only additional payment of 
200 Mark; plus 20 ~ per child for married men, 100 ~ for females over 
18 years of age, and 50 Marks for those under 18. This mixture attracted the 
support of • several thousand miners', who went on strike, while mobs occupied 
and partia~ plundered the town hall. 90) 
Such outbursts of violence and unrest were to occur only too often in 
the months following. The radicalism and activism of the workers was the 
result of economic hardship allied to increasing disenchantment with the 
government which was unable or unwilling to remedy the social and pOlitical 
ills of the day. 91) When all else failed, the workers took the law into 
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their OI7n hands to speed up the reforms which they considered essential. What 
particularly aroused their anger was the socialisation issue. On this the 
Provisional Government stalled continuous~ as the decision was to be left 
to ihe National Assembly. Before "the elections to 'this assemb~ were held, 
the workers' and soldiers' councils of the Rhenish-Westphalian region decided 
to take action. The lead was given by the workers' and soldiers' cooncil of 
Essen, which simp~ proclaimed the socialisation of the coa.l mining incbstry 
on 9 Jaruary 1919. The offices of the Coal Syndicate and the Mining Corporation 
were occupied on 11 January, and a Social Democratic judge, Ruben, was elected 
"peoples' co~~issar· to control the process, with assistants drawn from the 
SPD, USPD, and KPD. These actions and the election of Ruben and his "Committee 
of Nine" were endorsed by a meeting of the workers' and soldiers' councils of 
the Ruhr, which met at Essen on 13 January. 92) A circular issued by the 
Verband der Bergarbeiter Deutschl~ds stated that 'this decision has been 
reached becau se the maj ori ty a t the conference took the view the. t the pre sent 
State Government was not pressing energetica~ enough on this question'. 93) 
A pamphlet distributed by the workers' and soldiers' council of Essen viewed 
the decision arrived at by the ccnference as one of 'tremendous significance', 
since as a consequence 'the political revolution has become a social, an eco-
nomic revolution'. 9~) 
To formulate the policy of socialisation was easy; to implement it proved 
impossible. Since tile mines were Prussian state property, the Frussian autho-
ri ties were, naturally enough, strongly opposed to aqy scheme of nationalisation. i. 
p 
Opposition aho c~e fran 1:he central government, which rejected the demands 
of the "Committee of Nine". The lack of progress, and the negative attitude 
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of the government caused even more intensive and widespread strike action. 
This produced chaos in the oining areas of the Ruhr, ani unrest in the 
province as a whole as tile effects of t.he lack of coal hit the industrial 
centres of Westphalia. Attempts by the miners unions to ca:L"Il the workers 
proved futile in the face of the emotions aroused by the whole issue. 95) 
The situation became more explosive because the discontent was used by ele-
ments of ilie radical Left for their own political ends. Efforts by "lile police, 
acting in conjunction with the workers' and soldiers' councils and the 
SicherheitS':vehren controlled. by them, proved insufficient to quell all out-
breaks of extremism. In Hervest, Coun't' Recklinchausen, where the workers' 
council and the Sicherhei tswehr consisted primarily of "Spartacists" J law 
and order broke down, and appeals were made by the authorities to ilie regional 
government for the use of troops to restore order. 96) The appearance of 
troops in Hervest aggravated the situation even further, and led to the 
proClamation of a general strike on 16 Februa.ry. This act by the extremists 
6pli t the socialist movement and destroyed the precarious unity of the Left, 
which had become increasingly strained on a variety of political issues. The 
leadership of the trade unions and of the MSPD on 17 February dissociated 
themselves from the appeal for a general strike. The division of opinion in 
the ranks of ilie socialist parties, mirrored in the working class, became 
sharper. Reaction to the appeals of the moderates and radicals depended on 
the activism of the groups involved and their relative strength in the 100.a1i-
ties. Generally the workers' and soldiers' councils controlled by the Majority 
Socialists (i.e. the bulk of the counoi1s in Westphalia) dissociated themselves 
from the appeal for a general strike. The moderate workers' and soldiers' 
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COuncil of Dortmund-HBrde stronely condemned the strike movement, and denounced 
the efforts of 'a crazy bakers' dozen' who were tryine to prevent the miners 
from working. 97) 
For the "Spartacists" and their supporters much more than the issue of 
socialisation was at stake. Th~ wanted political power, especial~ control 
over the council movement. They used the occasion to remove the moderate 
councils and the Sicherheitswehren in those towns where th~ gained the upper 
hand. In Bottrop the workers' council, the majorl ty of the members of' the 
Sicherheitswehr and the police were imprisoned by the Independents and 
Communists after the latter had seized control of the town. 98) An attempt 
to repeat the same pattern in Gelsenkirchen was prevented by the soldiers' 
council and the Sicherheitswehr acting in unison with the police. Here the 
MSPD and the USPD had fallen out on 15 February follOwing an attempt by the 
Independents to seize control of' the Sicherhei tswehr. After this incident 
the Majority Socialists in the Sicherheitswehr joined the police in order to 
'resist an expected attack by the Spartacists', which finally materialised 
on 19 Febru~. 99) In Wanne the "Spartacists" were joined by the local 
soldiers' council, while in Bochum they received the assistance of the 
Sicherheitswehr, which joined the Spartacist movement as a unit. 100) 
In the strike movement of February the main effort by the Spartacists 
was confined to -the triangle Bochum-Dortmund-Recklinghausen. Despite their 
efforts, often involving intimidation and the use of force, a general strike 
did not develop and the scattered strike movement rapidly weakened in the 
last week of Februa.ry. By 25 February only nine per cent of the miners was 
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still involved, and many of these were not worldng on aoooun t of dIlmage to 
pit machine~ rather than because of vo1unta~ partioipation in the strike. 101) 
The tension remained, however, and local disputes could easily result in strikes 
and eruptions of violence and unrest. On 24 March a conf1iot between workers 
and looal seouri~ foroes in Witten, which cost seventeen lives, gave renewed 
vigour to the strike movement in the Dortmund-Witten-Bool1.lm region. 102) This 
blended in with the second maj or strike wave whi ch affected the ooal mining 
regions of Rhineland-Westphalia in April 1919. This proved a lengthy dispute, 
more politioal in character than the Febru~ struggle. The government reaoted 
vigorously almost from the outset, appointing Severing as Reichskommissar for 
Rhineland-Westphalia on 7 April and imposing a state of siege on the region. 
One of Severing's first acts was to ban private and public meetings of the 
Independents and the Communists, curbing "the :t'reedom of aotion of those whose 
prime objective was the overthrow of the government. The demands of the 
strikers, apart from oalling for the introduction of a six-hour working day, 
were almost solely political in nature. Typical of 1lle type of programme 
pursued was that of the miners in Castrop, who demanded the recognition of the 
workers' and soldiers' councils, the formation of a 'revolutionary workers' 
mili tia composed of class conscious workers', the disbandmEnt of the Free 
Corps, the establishment of relations with the Soviet government, and the 
103) disarmin~ of the polioe and the Sicherheitswehren in the industrial region. 
Although the strike lasted for most of April, reflecting the intensi ~ 
of feeling of sections of the working class, the government's vigorous action 
prevented a repetition of the chaos and disorder witnessed in the February 
strike. In one important aspect the situation in April was very different in 
that the supporters of the MSPD from the start aotive~ assisted the government 
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efforts to prevent unrest. In many Ruhr towns the Majority Socialists had 
already experienced rough treatment by the radicals where the latter seized 
control, and the moderates needed little persuasion to prevent a repetition. 
The various councils and Sicherhei tswehren coped more often than not with the 
threat posed by the radicals without recourse to military help, ~or working 
class moderates and radicals alike were united in their hostility towards 
the Reichswehr ~onnations. Securi ty ~orces organised by workers gained con-
siderable prestige in the Ruhr. In the Gelsenkirchen region, stronB~ affected 
~ the February unrest, a Volkswehr composed entire~ of Majority Socialists 
was in control, not on~ of the town of Gelsenkirchen, but of the Witten-
Castrop-Sodingen-Langendreer-Werne region. l~) According to a report drawn 
up ~ the Regierungspr~sident of !msberg, covering the region in which the 
strike found strong support in the districts of Bochum and Dortmund, on~ one 
major conflict developed cllring April, and that occurred not in a mining town, 
as one might expect, but in Iserlohn. 105) . Here the Spartacists were able to 
seize control in the middle of April before the Free Corps "Liohtschlag" 
restored the situation. 106) By the end of April the strike movement had 
petered out. The strikers had lost maI\}'" of their leaders who were imprisoned 
~ the military, including the members of the "Committee of Nine". The poli-
tical demands of the strikers were ignored by the government and the issue 
of socialisation lost its explosive character. The on~ gain resulting ~rom 
-"_ 107) the strike was the introduction of the seven-hour working ~y. 
The Collapse o~ the Council Movement. 
At the beginning of 1919, amid the uncertainty created by the industrial 
unrest, the council movement in westphalia lost momentum and gradually col-
lapsed. The split in the socialist ranks over the position of the councils 
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in the political order became increasingly obvious. The decline in the impor-
tance of the councils was not surprising in view of the attitude of the 
Majority Socialists. The MSPD had always rejected the idea that the council 
system should become the ultimate authority of the new republic, a concept 
supported by the radical Left, especially by the USPD. In the minds of the 
MajOrity Socialists the council issue posed a clear-cut choice between 
democra~ and Bolshevism, Bolshevism being equated with the council system. 108) 
At the first national Congress of the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils in 
December 1918 the Majority Socialist view concerning the position of the ooun-
cils carried the day. The congress rejected the motion proposed by the Inde-
pendents which called for the councils to be the '!:nsis of the constitution 
of a 'Socialist Republic'. 109) The congress also called for the election of 
a National Assembly, to be held in January 1919, a deoision which indirectlY 
determined the future of the council system. 
At the local level, as at the national level, the election of representa-
tive assemblies on the basis o~ a democratio franchise made the workers' and 
soldiers' councils superfluous, not on~, naturally enough, in the ~es of 
the authorities, but also in those of the Majority Socialists.. In :nany towns 
the workers' and sOldiers' councils did not see t.,l}emse1ves as permanent insti-
tu tions ar'llfWay. Even the Hagen council, totally cCl'ltrolled by the USPD, made 
it clear as early as 13 November 1918 that it would dissolve itself voluntarily 
as soon as the to',vn's population had elected a new local parliament. 110) In 
Westphalia the election of local representative assemblies triggered off a 
movement toward$ dissolution. It became increasinGly difficult to justify the 
continuation of the councils which were to control local parliaments with MSPD 
majorities. At a conference of the workers' councils of the Reeier~np.sbezirk 
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of Arnsberg a MSPD speaker stated that the 'election of local representative 
assemblies on the basis of the democratic fra.nchise' had placed. the workers' 
COuncils in an 'untenable position'. Not on~ did. the appeara.nce of local 
parliaments raise the difficult question of how the councils were to be fin~~,nced, 
it also resulted in 'the dissolution of the workers' councils in a large number 
of places in which the 1Iajori ty Socialists had. secured a maj ori ty' • The speaker 
went on to say that 'in other places a spirited desire had been voiced to dis-
solve the councils because one finds it stupid to exercise control over par-
liaments having socialist majorities'. 111) In several towns councils voted 
for their dissolution without waiting for the outcome of local elections. In 
Iser10hn the workers' council voted fifteen to three for its dissolution on 
18 February 1919, two weeks before the election of the town parliament. 112) 
Even the soldiers' council of the town, led by Communists and composed sole~ 
of "Spartacists", vacated its office in the town hall and dissolved. itself on 
12 March 1919. 113) The workers' and soldiers' council of War burg ended its 
lllj-) 
existence even earlier than the Iser10hn workers' council. 
In some localities the council movement collapsed since councils were 
ineffective. In Paderborn the peoples' council was particularly weak and 
ineffectual. The on~ evidence of its existence was a proclamation of its 
prospective tasks. A report by the Landrat in Februa~ 1919 noted that the 
coUncil had achieved nothing and that there had been no control on his actions 
at all. The report observed that 'the mellibers of the peoples' council are 
increaSingly recognising the fact that little or nothing can be achieved in 
the field of the supp~ of foodstuf'fs, the improvement of which it had. desig-
nated as an especially important aspect of its work'. The report also stated 
that in the county the peasants' councils tried to fulfil a few functions, but 
failed in fueir efforts. As f'or the Paderbom SOldiers' camcil, 'it had never 
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111) Report on the conference in the 71estf!!1ische Allp;emeine Zei tun.":, 1 Ju~ 
~~. -
112) Iserlohner Kreisanzeir.er und Zei tung, 19 February 1919. 
113) Police report, Iser10~, 27 March 1919: SAM I P~342. 
1),,4) Report by the Landrat, Warburg, 15 February 1919: SAD MI IP/562. 
developed any activity and disappeared quietly a fevl days after its formation 
in November 1918'. 115) In view of its shadow,y existence it is not surprising 
that the chairman of the peoples' council of Paderborn, at -the time of its 
voluntary dissolution on 23 February 1919, used the occasion to observe that 
his period of office' bad provided him with maqy disappointments'. 116) 
The peoples' council o.f Ltigde was even more of a nonentity. This elected body 
never met formal~ since it was never 'installed in office by the town admini-
stration~' 117) 
The stoppins of financial assistance to the councils, following the 
elections of local parliaments, caused the dissolution of many councils, for 
without financial means and office facilities the local councils were unable 
to ca~ on. Both the smaller, less influential councils, and the large and 
important ones were hit by this develOpment. In Hllckeswagen and Lnttringhausen 
it was the bourgeois majorities in the local parliaments which decided to 
refuse all funds to the VIOrkers' cooncil in April 1919. 118) In Gelsenkirchen, 
the important workers' council canplained to -the Central Council of the diffi-
cult position it found itself in after the local elections because its functions 
were very ill-defined and the -rown would no lonser recognise its right of 
control. 119) Here a meeting of the town parliament on 30 May 1919 decided 
by a majority of two to stop all further PlWments to the workers' council. In 
consequence of this the VIOrkers in several trade unions, with the support of 
the Majority Socia.lists am Independents, called for a general strike to force 
a reversal of th e decision. The a.ppeal met wi -th li ttl e response a.nd the 
council quiet~ folded up. 120) In Hagen an almost identical development 
Occurred. 121) 
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115l Report by the Landrat, Paderbom, 1 February 1919: SAD MI IP/562. 
116 Report ~ the Oberbnrgermeister, Paderborn, 1 March 1919: SAD MI IP/562. 
117 Report by the Landrat, H~xter, 4 January 1919: SAD MI IP/S62. 
118 Carsten, Revolution • •• , Ope cit., p.176. , 
119) Carsten, Revolution •• • , Ope cit., p.176. 
120) Report ~ the Police President, Ge1senkirchen, 31 May 1919: SAM I PA/342. 
121) Lambers, OPe cit., pp.88-89. 
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The strength of the council movement was fUrther weakened by the inter-
vention of the Seventh Axmy Command, which arbitrarily dissolved several 
soldiers' councils within the province. At the beginning of 1919 the soldiers' 
councils had become increasingly concerned about their position. At a con-
ference of fue district soldiers' councils of' North West Germarw, held at 
Hagen on 2 February 1919, at which the soldiers' councils of Milnster, Hagen, 
Minden, ~elsenkirchen, Soest, Dortmund, Bochum, Rheine, Recklinehausen, 
Bielefeld and Paderborn were all represented, there was much concern about 
the changes which had taken place since November. Protests were especially 
directed against the formation of Free Corps, and the 'progressive deprivation 
of the rights acquired in the revolutionary period'. 122) That the fears for 
the future expressed at the oonference were justified was seen within a fort-
night. The military authorities moved against the soldiers' council of the 
Seventh Army Corps on 11 February 1919. It was dissolved after it had refused 
to recognise a government decree of 19 January confirming the officers' power 
of command. 123) The dissolution of the General Soldiers' Council was followed 
by a re-organisation of the soldiers' councils in Westphalia under the direc-
tion of General von Watter, in the course of which the distriot soldiers' 
councils were broken up, and the rights of the soldiers' coonci1 s were pruned, 
especially their right to demand provisions and payment of expenses. 124) 
Within Westphalia. there was little reaction to the events in Milnster, and it 
was left to the workers' and 5G1diers' council of Essen to threaten a general 
strike in the Ruhr and armed opposition to the Free Corps if the MUnster 
soldiers' council was not reinstated and von Wa.tter was not punished. 125) 
The protest had no effect, and von Watter continued to dissolve soldiers' 
Councils which did not meet with his approval, as is witnessed by the fate 
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122) Volksstimme, 5 February 1919. 
123) Ryder, Ope oit., p.211j see also "Bekanntmachung", GeneraLkommando VII 
AK MUnster, 11 Februa:ry 1919: SAM I PA/342. . 
124) Proclamation by the Seventh Army Command, MUnster, 20 February 1919: 
SAD MI IP/562. 
125) Ryder, Ope cit., p.211. 
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of the 8oldiers' councils of Herford and LUbbecke, which were dissolved on 
8 March 1919. 126) Th ls· t f d . th t e army a 0 1n er ere W1 workers councils under 
the pretext of restoring order following the wave of strikes in the spring 
of 1919. The Free Corps "Lichtschlag", instrumental in the arrest of the 
bulk of the members of the SOldiers' council of MUnster in February, in May 
arrested JnaXW Independent members of the workers' council of Hagen and the 
neighbouring towns. There was no reason for the wave of arrests, since those 
affected were men who were moderate in their action and outlook, and opposed 
to a~ revolution or violent action. 127) 
Conflict and resultant division within the ranks of the socialist parties 
also contributed to the weakening of the council movement. Local conflicts 
between Majori~ Socialist supporters and Spartacists (a term applied indis-
criminate~ qy contemporaries to anyone to the left of the Majority Socialists) 
often led to 'the exclusion of the :m.dica1s from the "official" cooncils. These 
Slbsecpently faced the pressure applied by the authorities as well as the 
hostili ty of working class elements Slpporting more left-wing parties. The 
net result was a decline in the power and influence of -the councils. This 
is what happened in Gelsenkirchen as early as February 1919. Here the Majority 
Socialists controlled the Sicherheitswehr and the workers' council and enjoyed 
the support of "the bulk of the lo~l working class. 128) This did not prevent 
the Independents :f'rom attempting to seize control, a. putsch on 14 February 
resulting in the occupation of -the public buildings after the Independents 
had disarmed the Sicherheitswehr. The Majority Socialists reacted to the 
take-over by joining the police, and in a counter-coup disarmed the "Sparta-
eists". After the arrest of the Independent and Sparta.cist leaders, the 
Majority Socialists were left in total control of -the local workers' and 
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126) Report by the Seventh Army Command, Mdnster, 10 March 1919: SAD MI 
IP!562. - -
127) Carsten, Revolution ••• , Ope cit., p.67; Lambers, Ope cit., pp.91-92. 
128) In the local election to the National Assembly the MSPD secured 37,000 
votes as against the 4,000 USPD yotes. 
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soldiers t council and. the Sicherheitswehr. 129) A similar pattern evolTed 
in Ickern, County Dortmund. Here the workers t and. soldiers' council elected 
at the outset of the revolution enjoyed 'the trust of the overwhelmine majori"ti)r 
of the population'. A local putsch on 11 Jawary 1919 by -the InrJependents 
replaced the council with one dominated by the radical elements of the commu-
nity. This camcil WaS not elected, and. the views of the rulk of t..~e '.'lorkine 
Population, main~ miners, were not represented, indeed were ignored. The 
new cOlincil assumed wide powers, which led to much unrest, the 'embitterment 
of the population being based on the f'act that tile present workers' and sol-
diers' council has assumed rights which were neither granted to it throng", 
the revolution, nor authorised by t.'1epresent eovernment'. 130) The workers' 
and soldiers' council of County Dortmund, which investigated the matter, could 
do little about the situation. 131) The offending workers' a.nd so1diers t 
Council 'Nas removed in February by t.'1e Majori"tiY SociaJ.;i.st controlled Sicher-
heitswehr of Bochum, and a new workers' and soldiers' council was elected by 
the Majority Socialists. 132) 
The Majority Socialists used a variety of tactics to ~clude their rivals. 
There was a noticeable tendency in the spring of 1919 for MSPD controlled 
councils to prevent certain parties from participating in the elections for 
new councils. Though thi s practice discriminated against certain middle class 
interests, it is clear f'rom the Westphalian examples that the LlSPD primari~ 
aimed at exclud:ing the parties further to the Left. This occurred in Bochum, 
where the council elections were restricted to t SociaJ.;i. st Parties which support 
the democratic constitution of the present German Republic and will pledge 
themselves to oppose all counter-revolutionary attempts'. 133) The restrio-
tion to 'Socialist Parties' led to protests from non-socialist parties. 
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129) 
130) 
131) 
132) 
133) 
Police report, Gel senki rchen, 9 .April 1919: SAM I Bi./342. 
See the letter of complaint by the BU.rgervere:in, Ickern, to the Landrat 
for Dortmund County, 31 January 1919: also report by the Amtmann, Menge de, 
10 .April 1919: SAM I PA/342. . 
Dortlllund Workers' and Soldiers' Council to Landrat, Dortmund, 11 February 
1919: SAM I P.V342. . 
Report by the Landrat, Dortmund, 10 March 1919: SAM I PAI342. 
Report by the Police President, Bochum, 19 March 1919: SA':\{ I PA/342. 
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especially fran tile Centre Party, which could claim workinG class support. 
The reply to the objections made it clear ihat ihe MSPD tactic was designed 
primarily to exclude the USPD and KPD since these were viewed by the Majority 
Socialist controlled workers' council of Bocbum as 'opponents of the govelm-
ment and destroyers of the nations' economic life; as such they could no 
loneer be represented in workers' councils'. l3~) Similar motives were 
behind the restrictions imposed by the workers' and soldiers' council of 
Dortmund, which declared that the only persons who wruld be allowed to vote 
or be elected to tha council vrere those belonging 'to socialist parties which 
expressly give a declaration that th Elf support the constitution of the present 
German Republic, acknowledge the sovereignty of the National Assembly, and 
pledge themselves to oppose all counte~revolutionary movements'. 135) 
In the mal1V towns in which new council elections were carried. out in 
th e spring of 1919, the results produ oed often ended. -the 'socialist' dominance 
of these bodies. The elections, based on a democratic electoral system, pro-
duced seme striking results. In Hagen, for example, new elections produced 
a dramatic change in the composition of the workers' and soldiers' council 
in March 1919. Eligible to vote were all those who had reached the age of 
twenty and who did not receive an income of over 10,000 Marks per annum. 136) 
The results ended the jealously guarded monopol,y enjoyed by the USPD in the 
old council. The largest vote was gained by a "Bourgeois Unity List", which 
secured 16 of the 36 'seats' in the new council. The USPD list managed to 
obtain 14- representatives, and that of the MSPD 4, the rems.ining 2 seats 
f'alling to a "Railwl:\Y Employees Unity List". 137) Much of the radicalism 
and assertiveness of the old workers' and soldiers' council ended in conse-
quence of' this composi tion, and the new council was much more SUbservient 
to the authorities in the few months it existed. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
l.34.j Ibid •• 
135 Tremonia, 13 March 1919. 
136 Freie Presse, 22 March 1919. 
137) Lambers, op. cit., p.87. 
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Thus a variety of interrelated factors account for the proeressive col-
lapse of the ooundl movement in Westphalia. Not least in importance, of 
course, were the developments on the national level, which were mirrored 
in the events which unfolded in the province. The attitude of the councils 
was fundan entally determined by the fact that they did not see themselves as 
counter-forces to the gpvernment, but as props of the Provisional Government. 138) 
The Majority Socialists continuously backed the gpvernment, especially after 
the resignation of the USPD ministers at the ald of Deceniber 1918, when the 
Provisional Government was entirely in the hands of the MSPD. The position 
of the oouncils beca.m e more difficult after the wi thdrawal of the USPD from 
the government, for the MSPD line, determined by Ebert and his colleagues, was 
against the continuation of the councils. 139) In Westphalia the majority 
of the councils were in the hands of the MSPD, and. thus little opposition 
developed to the government atti mde. The councils were gradually pushed 
to the sidelines; the pcwfers which they had assumed in the revolutiona~ 
period were mittled away by the resurgence of the local authorities backed 
by a central government. In Westphalia there was little reaction to the 
lowering of the status of the councils. On the contrary, there was a tacit 
acceptance of the subordinate role they increasingly played in the spring of 
1919. At a conference of the workers' councils of southern Westphalia in 
June the opinion was voiced by many Majority Socialist delegates, who numeri-
ca~ dominated the meeting, that it was far more important to secure posts 
for party members in the higher administrative positions in town and IUral 
government than to argue about the V3.1ue of local workers' councils. As a 
concession to the supporters of the council principle it WaS emphasized that 
councils would cmtinue to function in places where it was thought that they 
were necessa~, at least until the local administration had been placed on a 
democratic basis. l4O) At the time of the conference, numerous councils had 
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138) Matthias, op. cit., p.120. 
139) Carsten, Revolution 0 • 0' op. cit., p.l~O. 
l~O) Westftllische Alleemeine Zei tune, 1 July 1919. 
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either disappeared or were in the process of dissolution. The idea of the 
council system survived, as the reaction to '!he Kapp Putsch was to show. 
A few councils did. ind.eed. survive to 1920, but they had oeased to be effective 
141) 
organisations by the summer of 1919. 
The fate of the councils in Westphalia, their decline and ultimate disa.po-
pearance is not surprising, given the national d.evelopments. Within the 
Westphalian context, the weaknesses of the council system are adequatelY 
reflected.. There was a lack of organisation, a lack of uniformity of objective; 
the majority of the councils pursued vague political aims. It was onlY on 
economic issues that unity of purpose rema.:ined. oonstant, ani here little was 
achieved. This unity of aim, with socialisation as the rallying point, sur-
vived the split in the working class ranks occasioned by cooi'licting attitudes 
about the political status and. functions of the councils. The Majority Socia-
list controlled councils were onJy too ready to relinquish their power in 
favour of a parliamentary democracy, in line with the decision taken at the 
first National Congress of the workers' and soldiers' councils in December 1918. 
Conclusion. 
The introduction of political and constitutional changes was the main, 
one can almost say the sole, gain of the revolution. If one can criticise 
th e Maj ori ty Socialist leaders on the national and regions. 1 level for failing 
through their own timiclity to fulfil the hopes of the working class for econo-
mic and social refonn, one camot deru the profound consequences the intro-
duction of a democratio political system had. on Germany. What it meant in 
practice in Westphalia, as elsewhere where the working class had been on the 
sidelines of the pOlitical arena in the pre-war period., one can deduce from an 
observation made by the Landrat of schwelm. Reporting on a clash between 
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141) That sane councils Slrvived is clear from reports by local authorities 
made in 1920, such as the report fran the Amt Langendreer, 26 April 
1920: "Der frfthere Arbeiterrat hat am 31 Januar 1920 seine T!tlgkeit 
eingestellt, jedoch war er nicht vellig aufgelest"; also report by the 
Landrat, Schwelm, 3 May 1920: "BeL dem hiesigen Landratsamt war seit cer i 
Revolution vom 9.11.1918 noch ein 3-gliedriger Kreisarbeiterrat t!tig": i 
SAM I PA/336. t 
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middle class and working class elements in Gevelsberg in 1923 he noted that 
'the deeper reason for the conflict lies in the strong differences between 
the bourgeoisie and the working class These differences have become 
eVen more acut e sinoe 'the war through the appearanoe of an MSPD maj ori ty in 
the tnwn parliament~ resulting in tile election of a worker, a Socialist trade 
union official MUller, to the position of mayor. The ruling circles of the 
town before the revolution have even now been unable to adjust to the change 
of things since 1918, and tileir indignation and resistance are directed 
especial~ against the town's chief official as the most visible and signi-
ficant sign of the change.' l42) 
Beyond the realisation of a parliamentary system of government ba.sed on 
an equal and direct franchise, for which -the Social Demoorats had been agitating 
for decades before the war, the revolution am ieved little in fulfilling the 
wider aims of 'democratisation' in the administrative, military and eoonomic 
spheres. 143) The officialdom ofWilhe]minian Germa~ ~emained intact in 
Westphalia and with it the conservative spirit which it eJllbodied. One sign 
of this can be seen in the :ftl.ct that mSllY' Landr!ite and police authorities con-
tinued to use the 'royal' prefix until well into 1919. The power of the 
bureaucraqy prevented any local council from removing obnOXious officials. 
A similar situation existed in the case of 171e army. The arbitraz:y interven-
tions of Freiherr von Watter of the Seventh Arary Command in the organisation 
of the soldiers' councils remained unchecked. Despite the awareness by the 
Majority Socialists of the reactionary nature of 171e ar~,.and especially the 
Free Corps forma tiona, there is evidence of at least one workers I and soldiers I 
council, that of Herford, actively engaging in the recruitment of volunteers 
for the Free Corps long after it had become clear that they had an internal 
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l42) Report by the Landra t, Schwelm, 5 March 1923: SAM Oberpr!!sidium Nr. 
6086. . 
~3) Carsten, Revolution ••• , Ope cit., pp.326 ff •• 
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fUnction antipathetic to the interests of the working class. 1'+4) The govern-
ment, for the purposes of establishing 'law and orner', was forced to use 
these forces against ma~ of its own supporters during the strike movements 
in the Ruhr in the first half of 1919. That was daJllR.ging enough in the eyes 
of m8.lliY socialists, but more galling still for them W'lS the freedom given to 
the military; this led to a situation such as existed in Hagen, where the 
COllllllander of the Free Corps "Lichtschlag" was able to forbid the May Day 
celebrations in 1919 - the firs t since the r evolu tion! 145) The consequence 
of Slch developments was further loss of support by the MSPD. 
The growth of the USPD and the KPD in Westphalia occurred in the course 
of 1919 and. 1920. It came too late in 1he case of the USPD to influence the 
course of events, for in the first few months following 'the revolution the 
MSPD was able to retain its dominant role as 'the vehicle for working class 
interests. This position reflected 1he strength of its highly organised 
bureaucratic party structure, and especially its large local organisations 
in 'lhe industrial areas of Westphalia. 146) The traditional SPD strongholds 
survived the crisis occasioned by SPD support for the war, a.nd fue party 
emerged basically intact; the dissidents organised in the USPD were relatively 
few in number by the time of 'the elections to the National Assembly in January 
1919. 147) The result of the election in the electoral district of Arnsberg 
------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
l44.) 
145) 
146) 
147) 
See the pamphlet issued by 'the MSPD "Bergleute des Ruhrgebiets", 18 
February 1919: "Wir wissen dass viele Offiziere und So1daten der Frei-
willigenkorps keine K1!mpfer fUr die Revolution sind. ••• dass viele 
Offiziere Leute alten Schlages sind"; full text in Spethmann, op. cit., 
pp.382-383. For the attitude of the Westphalian worker towards the 
Reichswehr see G. Colm, Beitrag zur Geschichte und Soziologte des Ruhr-
aufstandes, Essen, 1921, pp.13-14. 
Lambers, op. cit., p.9l. 
That "the SPD was well organised and able to find considerable support 
one can deduce from the membership of some of the local party organisa.-
tions (membership figures for mid-1914): Dortmund-H~rde - 18,544; 
Recklinghausen - 3,225; Bochum - 7,083; Hagen - 3,335; Hamm - 2,056. 
Figures fran R. Lfltzenkirchen, op. cit., p.136. 
In Dortmund, the SPD organisation was hardly affected. by the spl1 t. 
The USPD could only attract a small number of party functionaries by 
the time of tile January election s. The KPD made hartlly aI\V impaot a.t 
this stage; see H. G-raf, Die Entwicklung der Wahlen und politisc~U 
Parteien in G-ross-Dortmund, Frill kfurt, 1958, p.29. In scuthern West-
phalia the USPD was only of significance in Hagen; Lambers, OPe cit., 
pp.66-67. 
; 
J 
I 
74 
(which became electoral district 18: Westphalia.-South) reflects the strength 
and uni~ of the MSPD, which polled 40.6 per cent (Reich a.verage 37.9 per 
cent) as against the 4.7 per cent of the USPD (Reich average 7.6 per cent). 
Support for the Majori~ Socialists on such a scale accounts for their domi-
nance in -the council movement. Support fat' fue radicals who wanted to take 
the revolution further grew Slbsequently, following the deep disappointment 
of the working masses at the inability of the MSPD to protect their economio 
interests through s ocia.1isation. The fru stration of the MSPD supporters with 
the policy of their party benefited in the first instance tile USPD, which grew 
rapidly in the spring of 1919. 148) The growth of radicalism came too l.'tte 
to influence the revolution in Westphalia. The fate of the main revolutionary 
organ, the councils, had already been decided. 
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148) A report by the Seventh Army Command, Mtlnster, 12 June 1919, noted that 
the USPD membership was especially strong in the towns of Bochum and 
Hattingen. In the Bochum-Gelsenkirchen-Wattenscheid:-71itten_Hattin~en 
area the USPD membership WaS estimated at around 9,000: SAD MI IP!563. 
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Chapter 3. POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN WESTFHA.LIA, 1918 TO 1928. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major Political Trends. 
The revolution of 1918 ~eft a profound imprint on the minds of the West-
phalian population. It conditioned, to a significant degree, the actions of 
both the Left ani "!he Right in the nineteen-17l1enties. Their reactions to the 
revolution were radica~ly different. As far as the Left, especial~ the radi-
, cal Left, was concerned it was the failure of the fulfilment of the ideas which 
fired the minds of the people in the revolutionary period of 1918 which ga.ve 
rise to increasing frustration and greater radicalism. For the Right the 
revolution had been a. traumatic experience unlike~ to be forgotten. The emer-
gence of working class political power Was to be a permanent reminder to the 
upper and middle classes that their pre-1918 political supremacy had been 
eroded. 
The political outlook of the population was shaped by the political tradi-
tions of the pre-19l8 period which in turn were moulded by the sociological 
and religious composition of the region. The war and the revolution of 1918 
initially hardly affected the party system in any fundamental sense, and the 
post-war parties, despite a number of name changes, retained 'Ihe basic charac-
teristics of the pre-war parties on which they were based. 1) In Westphalia 
the social and religious structure of the population ccntinued to determine 
the strength of tile two daninant political farces of the province, the SPD 
and the Centre Par~. In the 1912 election the two parties had secured 62.8 
per cent of the Westphalian vote. 2) In the first post-war election their 
combined total increased to 71.1 per cent. 3) 
Most striking if' one compares t he Westphalian results returned in the 
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1) Cf. S. Neumann, Die Parteien del' Weimarer Republik, Stuttgart, 1970, 
(2nd ed.) p.27. 
2) The Centre secured 34.0 per cent and the SPD 28.8 per cent; Bertram, 
OPe cit., p.207. 
3) Centre Party: 35.2 per cent; SPD: 35.9 per cent: Milatz, op. cit., p.36. 
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election to the National Assembly and the fCllI' Reichstag el ections in the 
nineteen-twenties is the relative constancy of the votes polled by the socia-
list parties, the bourgeois parties and the Centre Party: 
1919 
Socialist Parties Westph.-N 32.7' (SPD, USPD, KPD) W'estph.-S 46.4' 
Reich 45.5' 
Bourgeois Parties Westph.-N" 25.1 (DDP, DVP, DNVP) Westph.-S 25.3 
Reich 33.3 
Centre Westph.-N 42.1 
lIestph.-S 28.3 
Reich 19.7'" 
Others Westph.-N 0.1 
Westph.-S 
Reich 1.5 
, excluding KPD 
" excluding USPD from 1924-(i) 
, 't excluding BVP 
1920 
31.4 
42.0 
41.6 
27.2 
27.3 
36.1 
39.6 
28.0 
13.6 
1.8 
2.7 
8.7 
1924(i) 1924(ii) 1928 
27.5' , 28.3 33.3 
38.0' , 36.8 4J..4 
33.1" 35.0 40.4 
27.8 29.4- 20.0 
28.6 30.7 23.5 
34-.4- 36.9 27.8 
35.8 38.1 31.5 
26.0 27.3 23.3 
13.4- 13.6 12.1 
8.9 4-.2 15.2 
7.4- 5.2 11.8 
19.1 14-.5 19.7 
The results of ine combined returns for the socialist and bourgeois parties 
hide important realignments which took place between the 1919 and 1924 elec-
tions. The maj or shifts occurred wi thin the socialist block with the rise of 
radical alternatives, initially that provided by the USPD, then that of the 
KPD. The reorientation was in line with the national developments, though 
it was muCh more drastic in the strongly indUstrialised electoral district 
of Westphalia-South: 
1919 
'N-N W-5 
SPD 30.6 4-1.3 
USPD 2.1 5.1 
KPD 
Reich W-N 
37.9 21.6 
7.6 8.0 
1.5 
1920 1924-(ii) 
11-5 Reich 1I-N W-5 Reich 1I-N 11-5 Reich 
20.8 21.6 17.8 16.1 20.5 21.9 24.7 26.0 
19.7 17.9 --
1.5 2.1 9.7 21.9 12.6 6.4 12.1 9.0 
Within the bourgeois block changes occurred in the degree of support 
enjoyed by the anti-Republican forces of the Right, which were more muted 
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4) The regional returns are taken from Mi1atz, Ope cit., p.36 and pp.86 ff.; 
the 1920 regio~~l returns were calculated from electoral returns given in 
HA ~539. National averages for the 1919-1928 period taken from H. Pross, 
Die Zerat~rung der deutachen Po1itik. Dokumente 1871-193i, Frankfurt, 1959, 
p.352. 
The same sources were used in all other tables given in this chapter. 
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than on the national level: 
1919 1920 1924(11) 
The combined strength of the anti-Republican forces of the Left and Right 
was also lower than far GermalTY as a vmole, though the regional and national 
trends were in line: 
Westph.-N Westph.-S Reich 
Nat. Assembly 17.4 20.4 22.3 
1920 32.0 43.4 47.8 
1924~i) 27.9 35.7 38.6 
5) 1924 ii) 23.9 25.8 32.5 
The broad similarities between the national and regional trends were 
caused by diverse factors. 6) The first years of the republic were bleak 
and uncertain. The adjustments required by the defeat in war, the economic 
difficul ties created by the adjustment of a wartime economy to the require-
ments of peace, and the hostility of much of post-war Europe to the new state 
gave rise to an increasing radicalism in the body politic. Within the Left 
embitterment at the failure of the new socialist-led government to realise 
the aspirations of wide sections of the working class gave rise to growing 
antagonism towards the democratic system. The left-wing putsches which punctua-
ted the 1919 to 1923 period, were put down with brutal force by governments in 
which the SPD was represented, a situation which alienated many socialist 
supporters and moved them further to the Left. The periodic outbreaks _ of 
working class unrest in turn frightened the middle class, which was still 
recovering from the experiences of the revolution of 1918. The Peace of 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
5) The support given to the v~lkisch-National Socialist movement is included 
in the calculations for the two 1924 elections. 
6) On the general pattern of developments see H. Heiber, Die Republik von 
Weimar, MUnich, 1966. For an anaJ;ysis of the factors influencing the 
Reichstag elections of 1920 ani 1924 see Milatz, OPe cit., pp.l~118; 
also S.L.W. Mellen, 'The German People and the Postwar World. A Study 
based on Election Statistics, 1871-1933', The American Political Science 
ReView, 37, 1943, pp.6~618. 
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Versailles, with its war-guilt clause and reparation demands, and the injus-
tice felt by many Germans at the way in which the new state was dealt with 
by the victorious powers provided ample propaganda material for the nationa-
list, revanchist right-wing forces. Economic factors such as food rationing, 
a housing shortage and rising prices, affected wide sections of the population. 
With the acceleration of inflation in 1922, and the total collapse of the 
currency in 1923, the chaotic economic situation gave rise to intense struggles 
between employer ani snployee, between the government and the individual. Life 
lost all meaning to the rising army of unemployed and 'b:> sections of the middle 
class proletarianised by the inflation. In their exasperation sizeable ele-
ments of the population responded to the appeal of radical movements on the 
left and right of the political spectrum. 
Westphalian politics were influenced not only by the general national 
situation, but by two specifically regional events which had a praf'ound impact 
on the voting habits of the province: the Ruhr uprising of March 1920 and the 
occupation of part of the province by French and Belgian troops in Ja.nua~ 1923. 
Both these events exacerbated the regional difficulties, in tensified the eco-
nomic problems, and undermined the democratio aggregation returned in the .1919 
poll for the National Assembly. The outbreak of left-wing putschisn in March 
1920 was occasioned qy a strong reaction by the working masses to the creation 
of the reactiona~ Kapp regime on 13 March. 7) In Westphalia the news of the 
right-wing putsch resulted in a spontaneous mobilisation of the working class 
in conjunction with, and sometimes independently of, the regional socialist 
parties and the trade union movement. The reaction, designed to demonstrate 
support for the Bauer government and to bring down the Kapp regime, took a 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
7) the detailed work by 
zur deutschen Innen-
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variety of forms. 8) The chief weapon used was the industrial one, the pro-
clamation of a general strike. This was actively supported not only by the 
industrial workers, but also white-collar workers and. civil servants. 9) The 
anti-Kapp front in Westphalia brought together a wide speotrum of opinion 
which reached from the Communists and Syndicalists to the DDP, the Christian 
trade unions and. part of the Centre Party. 10) Local action committees and 
revived workers' councils were formed which hastened to prepare a defence 
against any reactiona~ forces Which might raise their heads in the province. 
The first action of the newly formed workers' councils and action co~nit­
tees was to prevent the publication of any proclamations of the 'Kapp govern-
ment', an objective achieved in many towns by subjecting nelVspapers to cen-
sorship. 11) The socialist parties, whatever their political differences, 
were determined to counter the Kapp putsch with an active resistance if neces-
sa~. This was made clear fran the start as is evidenced by the creation of 
workers' militia, a development set in motion simultaneously with the procla-
mation of the general strLl<:e. 12) The su spicion tha t Reichswehr detachments 
stationed on the fringe of the inner Ruhr were on -the side of 'the Kapp regime 
led to the disarming of some units by the workers' militia. In Kamen the 
detachment van Manstein was disarmed 'in the first days of 'tile Kapp regime' 
and the officers 'locked up to protect them fran the fury of the mob'. 13) 
A similar fate befell marw of the predominantly middle class Einvl0hnerwehren 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8) The Westphalian reaction to fue Kapp Putsch and the ensuing revolutionary 
situation have been ana~sed by Colm, Ope cit., pp.25 ff.; cf. G. Eliasberg, 
Der Ruhrkrieg von 1920, Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 1974, pp.69 ff.; E. Lucas, 
M!l.rzrevolution im Ruhrgebiet. Vorn Generalstreik gegen den Milit!l.rputsch 
zum bewaffneten Arbei tera.ufstand. Mlirz-Apri1 1920, Band I, Frankfurt, 1970, 
pp.119 ff.. For the situation in Hagen see Lambers, OPe cit., pp.97 ff •• 
9) Colm, Ope cit., p.25; also Volkswacht, (Bielefeld edit.), 16 March 1920. 
10) Eliasberg, Ope cit., p.69. 
11) Cf. 'Bekanntmachung', Arbeiterrat, Minden, 15 March 1920. Copy in SAD MI 
IP/579. 
12) Colm, Ope cit., pp.27 ff.j Lambers, op. cit., p.99; see also reports by 
Landrat, A1tena, 29 April 1920; Amtmann, Amt Hordel, Bochum, 27 April 1920; 
Amtmann, Amt Bochum-Si1d, Altenbochum, 27 April 1920; SAM I PA/536. 
13) POlice report, Unna, 20 April 1920: SAM I PA/366; Lucas, Ope cit., pp.178-
179. 
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which were thought to be pro-Kapp in their outlook. 14) 
The suspicion of the workers and their leaders that the Reichswehr units 
stationed in the province were on -the side of Kapp was not unfounded. The 
response of units stationed in Remscheid, OsnabrUck, Bielefeld and MUlheim 
heightened the belief that the Reichswehr in the :region supported Kapp. 15) 
Fears were intensified by the ambiguous attitude adopted by the commander of 
Wehrkreis VI, GeneraJ. von Watter. Though he did not declare his support for 
Kapp, he refused on 16 March to give an oath of lqyal~ to the Bauer govern-
ment when urged to do so ~ the Westphalian Reichskommissqr Severing. 16) 
Von Watter' s determination to re-establish 'law and order', to move against 
'disturbances created by left-wing radicals', was seen as provocation by the 
supporters of the legitimate government. 17) The appearance of parts of the 
Freecorps "Lichtschlag" in Wetter on 15 March turned the latent hostility 
between workers and milita~ into open oonflict. Fierce fighting broke out 
between the freecorps and workers' militia, which hurried 'bJ the scene from 
aJ.l parts of central Westphalia. 18) The suocessful action of the workers 
against these forces,and repeat performances against further sections of the 
Same freecorps at Herdecke and Dortmund, strengthened the workers physically 
and psychologically. The acquisition of new military equipment taken from 
the freecorps, including heavy artillery, and 'the success against units of 
the professional army stimulated the workers' morale and improved their mili-
tary capacity. 
The collapse of fue Kapp regime on 17 March realised -the immediate objeo-
tives of the general strike. Conditions of normalcy did not return to the 
Ruhr. An appeal by fue government for a return to work wa.s ignored by the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
14-) 
15) 
16) 
17) 
18) 
Report by Kreisrat, Hamm, 22 April 1920j report by OberbUrgermeister, 
Hagen, 27 April 1920: SAM I PA7366. Further Lucas, op. cit., p.177. 
Lucas, op. cit., pp.lO~107. 
Erger, op. cit., p.186; Eliasberg, pp.73 ff.; more critical Lucas, op. 
Cit., pp.99 ff •• 
'Bekanntmachung', W'ehrkreiskommando VI, MUnster, 15 March 1920: copy in 
SA.\{ I PA!371. 
Eliasberg, op. cit., pp.82 ff.; Lucas, op. cit., pp.163 ff •• 
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majority of workers. 19) Already before the end of "the Kapp putsch voices 
had been raised in Rhineland-Westphalia calling for the implementation of a 
radica.l poll tica.l and social programme. The demands were reminiscent of those 
made in the revolutiona~ period of 1918. Although the three socialist par-
ties were agreed in their common opposition to the 'reactiona.~ forces' behind 
Kapp in the f:irst days of the putsch, the USPD and KPD leaders used the chaotic 
and uncertain situation at the time to call for the 'creation of' the dictator-
ship of the proletariat'. Th~ stressed the need to secure 'the victory of 
socialism based on the council system' and the 'immediate nationalisation of 
those industrial sectors ripe for such action'. 20) These demands became more 
prominent following the !Jlccess of the workers against the army. In t.l,.ose 
Ruhr tovms which had a radical tradition, towns in which the USPD and the KPD 
set the tone, 'council republics' were proclaimed. 21) The struggle against 
Kapp was incidental to the greater objective of turning the republio into a 
socialist state; it thus turned into a proletarian uprising, the most extensive 
revo]j; Germany had seen since the peasant wars of the sixteenth centuzy. 22) 
Within one week the fonnation of a workers' army, the so-called 'Red Army', 
secured military contro 1 of the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial region, forcing 
the Reichs'R'ehr to retreat from the area. 23) Attempts to end the confrontation 
between the government and the armed workers fai1ed because of the Slspicion 
with which both sides regarded each other. The MUnster and Bielefeld agree-
ments, attempts to meet the demands of the workers, could not be enforced. 
Within the Ruhr syndicalist and anarchist elements took the lead in the 'revo-
lution'. Their excesses horrified even KPD and USPD leaders. In the end the 
socialist-led government was forced to use the Reichswehr to crush the rising 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
19) 
20) 
21) 
22) 
23) 
Eliasberg, Ope cit., p.248. 
Lucas, Ope cit., p.127 and p.129. 
Thi s happened in Remscheid, Gelsenkirchen, Dui sburg, Mlilheim, Hamborn 
and Essen; Lambers, OPe cit., p.109. 
Eliasberg, Ope cit., p.259. 
On the 'Red Army' see E11asberg, Ope cit., p.103j on the retreat of what 
remained of the Reichswehr in the Ruhr see CoLn, Ope cit., pp.41 ff.; 
and Lucas, Ope cit., pp.294 ff •• 
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and re-establish authority. However reluctant~ this decision was taken, it 
was ultimately the on~ alternative open tp the government if the authority 
of the state was to remain intact. 
The day to day developments of the conflict are of secondary importance 
for the purposes of this anaJysis. 24) Of greater significance are the poli-
tical consequences, especially the impaot of the affair on Westphalia. For 
the regional SPD the whole episode was a disaster. The association of the 
sooialist-led government with the reactionary ReiChswehr drove m~ SPD sup-
porters into the ranks of parties further to the left, primarily the U3PD. 25) 
The gulf between the left-wing parties, already present before the uprising, 
widened during the conflict. Marv workers were also alienated fran the SPD 
due to the lack of progress on the question of sooial refozm. The call for 
the socialisation of the iron, steel and coal industries, with which the 
USPD and. KPD were closely associated, had been a bone of contention in the 
province since November 1918. Frustration created by the lack of progress 
on this issue rallied sizeable elements behind 'the 'Red Army' • The opinions 
of many workers remained constant on this matter, and were strengthened, 
rather than weakened, by the crushing of the Ruhr revolt. POlitically, this 
aided the USPD, as seen in its tremendou s advance in the Reichstag election 
of 1920. 
If the 'Ruhr war' of 1920 radicalised the werking class, the occupation 
of the Ruhr in January 1923 stimUlated the conservative, na.tionalist cause. 
The occupation affected a considerable portion of western Westphalia' IS 
industrial zone. Bounded by the river Lippe in the north, the occupied zone 
extended to ihe line Ldnen-Schwerte in the east and ran north of Hagen to 
Hattingen in the south. 26) The occupation underlined Germaqy's political 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
24) 
25) 
26) 
For a detailed account see Colm, Ope oit., pp.l35 ff.; Eliasberg, OPe 
cit., pp.163 ff •• 
Eliasberg, Ope cit., pp.253 ff •• 
On the occupation of the Ruhr an d its impact on Westphalia see K. Pabst, 
'Der Ruhrkampf', in W. Ferst, (ed.), Zwischen Ruhrkampf und Wiederaufbau, 
Cologne, 1972, pp.1l-50j also Lambers, Ope cit., pp.168 ff •• 
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and milita~ weakness and heightened nationalist feelings throughout the 
republic. Intense hatred of the French was whipped up especially by the 
DNVP and v1!llkisch-National Sooialist groups active in the region. Their asso-
ciation with the bard-line taken against the occupation furthered their cause. 27) 
The presence of fue French and Belgians made the population much more receptive 
to crude nationalist ani revanchist sentiments. The intensity of these feel-
ings can be gauged from the fact that even the Westphalian RPD found it prudent 
to drop its attack on 'nationalism' and. to emphasize newly acquired 'nationalist 
sentiments to prevent the masses fran drifting towards the nationalist camp'. 28) 
It was the extreme Left and Right which superimposed an active resistance on 
the passive resistance advocated by the government. Terrorist actions, strikes 
and demonstrations were met qy harsh reprisals by the occupying powers which 
intensified the hostility of fue population. The government's proclamation 
of the end of passive resistance on 26 September 1923 provided more fUel for 
the rightists. The occupation did much to foster the strength of the DNVP in 
Westphalia as well as helping the nascent National Socialist movement to extend 
the precarious foothold it had aoquired in the pre-1923 period. 
Viewed overall, the years 1919 to 1924 saw fund.amental changes in the 
political inclinations of the Westphallm population. This is seen most 
clearly in the rise of a radical Left and Right. The changes were as profound 
as those which were to take plaoe in the latter years of the republic's exis-
tence. The only party relatively immune fran tre impact of the political and 
economic turmoil of these years was the Centre Party, which was .also to prove 
itself the most stable political movement in the republio in the post-1929 
period. For -the democratic cause the early years of the Weimar Republic were 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
27) Pabst, in F1!lrst, Ope cit., pp.24 ff.; Lambers, Ope cit., p.169 and 
pp.182 ff.. A.lso "Lagebericht", MUnster, 25 FebrualY 1923: SAl" I 
pA/274. 
28) "Lagebericht", MUnster, 25 February 1923: SAM I PA/274. 
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a disaster exceeded only in magnitude by the radi calism of the early nineteen-
thirties. The stability which marks the 1924 to 1929 period postponed the 
consequences of the rise of left- and right-wing radicalism un til the new 
economic and political crisis reduced the democratic forces further. In the 
second phase of the grOl'lth of radicalism the effects of 'the 1918 to 1924 period 
were to play their part in bringing down a structure already in a precarious 
position. 
The Economic Situation. 
Throughout the period under review the economic situation of Westpha.lia 
was an unhealthy one. with erratic f3Ilployment trends accompanied by periods of 
acute crisis. The problem of unemployment dcxninated the economic life of the 
province. It was accompanied in the immediate post-war years by serious food 
shortages in the urban centres to add to the misery of the population. Although 
the working class suffered most under these ccnditions, the effects of a de-
pressed economy hit all sections of the ,community. The inflatiolmry spiral 
of the post-war years, culminating in the collapse of the ~ in 1923, seri-
ously undermined the vitality of the middle cla.sses as well as affecting the 
bulk of the labour farce which was thrmvn temporarily out of work. 
The economic structure of WestphaUa contributed to the numerous eoonomic 
problems which emerged in the country as a whole. The major weakness was the 
29) 
mono-structure of much of Westphalian industry. In the Ruhr region the 
position was especially unfavourable cue to the dominance of a few large-scale 
production branches in which the large factory unit doninated. The absence 
of a m:ixed economic structure in the Ruhr made the fd tua tion precariou s since 
an unfavourable situation in one branch of the interdependent and highly 
integrated industrial complex affected most of the others. As the co~l, iron 
and steel industries employed around 85 per cent of the labour force, the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
29) For the following see the "Bericht des Landesarbeitsamtes Westfalen 
und Lippe", 1 April 1926-31 March 1927: WA K2/181. 
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vitality of these industrial branches determined the emplqyment situation of 
much of the population. 
The employment situation in the post-war years was not a f::l.vourable one. 
This is true not on~ of Westphalia, but for Germa~ as a whole. If one takes 
the figure of 5 per cent unemployment as a boundary at which mass unemployment 
and a crisis position ccmm.ences, then Germany enjoyed a non-crisis situation 
for on~ a very short time throughout the period 1918 to 1933. 30) Westphalian 
indu stry in the Weimar period lacked the boom 00 ndi tions necessary for full 
employment. A variety of factors oanbined to depress the economy. In the 
first place, the dominance of the indlstrialists was undermined by the revo1u-
tion of 1918. In the revolutionary period the disoipline of the work force 
deteriorated as the workers felt free to assert themselves. This situation 
was much lamented by the employers, who were ooncerned with the loss of pro-
duction occasioned by workers holding political meetings during faotory hours 
regardless of management objeotions. ;1) Allied to such developments was the 
appearance of a 'lack of will to work', whioh cut the produotivity of the 
labour force. In the Oase of the mining industry the loss amounted to 25 per 
32) 
cent. The 'will to work' was further reduced by the food shortages and 
the poor diet of the post-war period. 33) Large-soale dislocation was also 
produced by the numerous, often widespread and prolonged, strikes which marred 
production in the post-war years. The frustration of the workers, especial~ of 
the miners, at the lack of progress on nationalisation and social improvement, 
produced bitter disputes in both 1919 !ll d 1920. The miners' strikes, and the 
strike by the railway employees in 1922, were the most serious, and dislocated 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
30) Unemp1qyment under 5 per cent occurred in the relatively short periods 
from April 192~ to October 1925 (19 months) and Ju~ to October 1927 (~ 
months) - W. Conze & W. Raupach (eds.), Die Staats- und Wirtschaftskrise 
des deutschen Reiches 1929/33, Stuttgart, 1967, pp.38 ff •• 
31) Cf. Report by A. Bredt & Co., Stahlblechwalzwerk, Witten a.d. Ruhr to 
Nordwestliche Gruppe des Verein s dt. Eisen und Stahlindustrieller 
DUsseldorf, 5 February 1919: vr.vA K2./667. 
32) Report by Bochum IHK, 13 JamalY 1919: W'NA K2/806. 
33) Report by Bochum IHK, 1 November 1919: ',,{.VA K2/806. 
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industry in general. Large numbers were laid off due to fuel shortages, lack 
of power and raw materials. 34) The political restlessness of the period was 
another factor ccntributing to the economic dislocation. The sporadio out-
breaks of left-wing radicalism in 1919, followed by the Ruhr conflict of 1920 
paralysed industrial life. Further problems emerged with the occupation in 
1923, which cut the Westphallan economy in half and led. to high unemployment 
in a number of towns dependent on the supplies of factories situated in the 
occupied zone. 35) 
There were also the effects of the inflation, which became most c1isruptive 
in the months before the total monetary collapse in November 1923. The problem 
of rapid price rises had made itself noticeable lon~ before 1923. As early 
as 1919 a number of strikes had been occasioned by various occupational groups 
t~ing to secure wage and sala~ adjustments to keep in step with inflation. 
In the winter of 1919/1920 railway workers, bank employees, catering personnel, 
post office and telephone workers all resorted to the strike weapon. The lag 
of incomes behind prices led to militancy in professional groups to Vlhom such 
an act as striking was normallY anathema. In MarCh 1920 doctors threatened 
to strike and forced a higher rate of income out of the authorities by dealing 
with insurance scheme patients only under the 'private' catego~. 36) 'Food 
riots' were another ever present danger to public order as frustration and 
anxiety led the unemployed and underemployed to take -the law into their own 
hands. In June 1919 the Bielefeld ci 1;y market was taken over by a mob which 
forced -the sale of foodstuffs at half-price. A sjmilar fate befell the food-
stores in the town centre. 37) Order was only restored after the Freecorps 
"Gabcke" was sent into the city by the authorities. 38) Similar unrest affected 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
34) See the numerous reports by the Bochum IRK for 1919: Vr.VA K2/806. 
On the effects of -the railway strike of 1922 see especially the report 
by -the Oberprlisident, Mtlnster, 16 February 1922: SAD J4I IP/621. 
35) Cf. Lambers, Ope Cit., pp.173 ff •• 
36) Ibid., pp.9~95. 
37) Westf8.Usche Zei tung, 30 June En d 1 July 1919. 
38) Report by OberbUrgermeister, B1e1efela, 3 July 1919: SAD MI IP/577. 
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Bad Oeynhausen aD. Paderborn, where the Bielefeld example influenced identical 
outbreaks. 39) 
The situation of the population became progressively worse between 1920 
and 1922. By the end or 1922 the 'pressure or the poor economio situation 
created a ve~ bitter feeling especially among the poorer elements of the 
population'. 4.0) The problem of high prices of basio necessities affected 
not only the working class but also white-collar workers and civil servants, 
while those living on fixed incomes were finding life impOSSible. 4.1) Even 
before 1he catastrophic collapse of the ~ in 1923 a large part of the popu-
4.2) , lation was no longer able to buy certain foodstuffs, especially dairy produce. 
The decline in the standard or living accelerated following the Ruhr occupation. 
The real income of those still employed ~ April 1923 had fallen to 50 per 
cent or its pre-war value, despite significant increases in wages and salaries. 
The cost of the passive resistance, in the shape of the Ruhrhilfe, placed an 
additional burden on the state's financial resources at a time when the German 
economy was di srupted by the loss of its most productive sector. By the begin-
ning of 1923 the ~ had already lost 2,500 per cent of its value s:ince 1918. 
In 1923 inflation reduced its value further, to stand at an all-time low of 
0.0005 Pfennigs in November 1923. 4.3) 
The collapse of 1he Olrrency affected aU sectors of society. For the 
working class the most damaging result was the loss of employment. In part 
this was due to the deterioration of th::l ex:port trade. German incltstry found 
it impossible to buy the necessary raw material s as these could only be secured. 
through foreign exchange, suppliers refusing to accept the increaSingly worth-
less~. In Westphalia unemployment, albeit short-tem, reached heights in 
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39) 
4.0) 
4.1) 
4.2) 
4.3) 
Police report, Bad O~usen, 6 July 1919: SAD MI IF/5ao; pOlice report, 
Paderbor.n, 15 July 1919: SAD MI IF/581; alsoWestf!lisches Volksblatt, 
6 July 1919. 
Report by Oberp~sident, MUnster, 21 December 1922: SAD MI IP/62l. 
Report by Landrat, Warendorf, 4. April 1922; report by Landrat, Ahaus, 
9 November 1921; reports ~ the OberbUrgermeister, Buer, 8 October 
1921 ani 25 January 1922: SAM VII - 2 Bd. 3. 
Polioe report, Reoklinghausen, 24. November 1922: SAM VII - 2 Bd. 3. 
Heiber, Ope cit., pp.98 ff •• 
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1923 which were not to be surpassed even in the gloomiest period of the dep-
ression of the post-1929 period. By November 1923 Dortmund alone registered 
220,000 unemplqyed out of a total work force of 279,000. Similar figures oan 
be cited for a number of other Ruhr tJwns. 44) The distress this situation 
created needs no elaboration. 45) Drastic too were the short and long term 
effects of the inflation on the middle class. Although inflation did not 
hit all middle class elements with equal severity (sane segments indeed bene-
46) fited), the experience far most was traumatic. The retail and service 
sectors were hard hit. These had been suffering long before the monetary 
chaos of 1923. The erratio and uncertain emp1qyment situation in the post-war 
period had undermined the position of the retail and service industries due 
to the lack of purchasing power of wide sections of the population. 47) The 
enforced economies made by many consumers as prices rose threatened many busi-
nesses with bankruptcy. Small retailers, with a deClining turn-over, found 
it difficult to replenish their stock, a situation which in tum led. to a 
cri si s in the wbolesal e trade. 48) 
For those living on a fixed income or dependent on savings and pensions 
the inflation was a nightmare as prices shot up to ludicrou8 levels. Many 
people lost tileir savings and means of support. The stabilisation of the 
currency heralded by the introduction of the Rentenmark made the 108ses perma-
nent. The whole affair left a deep scar on the minds of those affected. The 
impoverishment, indeed the proletarianisation, of some elements of the middle 
class fed right-wing radicalism, not only at the time but also during the 
years of the depression, when fears of a repetition of the 1923 inflation were 
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44) "Lagemeldung", MUnster, 1 November 1923; 15 and 24 November 1923: S~4 
I PA/276. 
45) Cf. Lambers, op. cit., pp.178 ff •• 
46) H. Lebovics, Social Conservatism and the Middle Classes in Germ8I!Y 1914--
1933, Princeton, 1969, p.20; H.A. Winkler, Mittelst~nd. Demokratie und 
Nationalsozialismus. Die po1itische Entwick1unB von Handwer~ und von 
K1einhandel in der Weimarer RewbUk, Co1og:le, 1972, pp.28-29; also T.A. 
Ross, 'The Passing of -the German Middle Class', The American Journal of 
Sociology, 29, 1924. 
47) Report by Regierungspr~sident, MUnster, 5 August 1921; report by the 
Oberbtlrgermeister, Buer, 8 July 1921: SAM VII - 2 Bd. 2. 
48) Police report, Hagen, 22 July 1922: SAM I P~398. 
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to influence the political judgement of many members of the midtlle class. 
The stabilis'3.tion of tl1e ~ was not a miraculous cure for G-eruany's 
economic ills. It was followed by a deflationary period in which stabili ty 
was secured. primarily at the expense of the v/orking class. The eight-hour 
day, one of "the chief @ins of the Novembar revolution, disappeared in prac-
tice in many sectors of the economy. Labour organisations were powerless to 
preven t a reduction in the wage rates which accompanied the ex:tension of the 
working &'3.y. 49) Capital scarcity and high rates of interest plus an increase 
in taxation led many industrialists to adopt rationalisation programnes which 
produced a permanent pool of unemployed labour. 50) Thi s affected all sectors 
of Westphalian industry, though the largest losses in t.1,.,e number of work-places 
occurred in the mining and metal processL>1g industries. 51) The coal industry 
bore the brunt of the contraction. Between January 1923 and July 1925 105,766 
workers (19.5 per cent of 'the total Westphalian work-force) became redundant 
in the Ruhr region. In the Bochum district alone some 22.6 per cent of the 
miners were displaced in "!hi s period. 52) Communities dependent on one indus-
trial sector were often in dire straits due to underemployment or lack of 
employment. In '.Vi tten, which was heavily dependent on the i:ron md steel 
industry, only 50 per cent of those employed in 1925 still had their jobs in 
1926. A recession in the winter of 1925/26 forced the wholesale closure of 
factories. 53) In Dortmund one mine alone dispensed wi th 80 per cent of its 
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49) Heiber, op. cit., p.155; also L~~bers, op. cit., p.l?l and p.198. 
50) See the report by the IHKn. SUdwestf!1lisches Industriebezirks (IHKn. of 
Arnsberg, Altena, Iserlohn, LUdenscheid, Siegen and Hagen), Hagen, 31 
July 1925: vr.'f.A. K2/806. 
51) Numerous reports of contraction of' labour force in '({'{iA K2/l81. In the 
Hagen region the number working in the metal industry contracted from 
42,500 in 1920 to 15,299 by 1931 - H. Hildenbrand, Die struk~~relle 
Ent'1'Ticklunp' von Wirtschaft und BevBlkerun im Stad.tkreis 1fu. en 1 
Hagen, n.d., p.30. 
52) "Statistische Zusammenstellung fiber den Ruhrbergbnu", Bochum, 27 July 
1925: W'U K2/l0l0. 
53) "Verwaltungsberlcht 1925", Stadt Witten, 6 August 1926: 'iT;'IA K2/181. 
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labour f ar'ce wi thin the space of eight months. 54) Insecuri icY" and fear of 
unemployment haunted many communities with, as one contemporary report noted, 
'widespread distress affecting all sections of the population, whose position 
can only be termed ca.tastrophic'. 55) For much of 1926 the l"'I.te of unemploy-
ment in Westphalia stood ten per cent higher than the ~ average; this 
despite the 40 per cent reduction in the total number of unemployed between 
January and December. 56) A feature of increasing c ancern to the au tho ri ties 
was the emergence of a significant number of long-term unemployed in 1925-
1926. 57) 
In general the situation of the bulk of the working population remained 
an unenviable one even in the po st-1925 period during which the roonomy bene-
fited from the greater internal stability and an improved external position. 
The influx of foreign, primarily American, capital into Germarv bolstered an 
economy under considerable strain due to the reparation payments. But even 
in these years of Slperficial prosperity the low wages received by those who 
escaped redundancy and lay-offs or seasonal unemployment were barely sufficient 
to meet the high cost of living. 58) The difference of income between the 
wage earner ani welfare payments for the unemployed was so 10\'/' that workers 
complained of being better off u!J.employed. 59) The 10'N purchasing power of 
the population inevitably affected other economio actiVity, in particular the 
service industry am the retail trade. The uncertainty and discontent in 
these economic sectors was generated by the threat of bankruptcy which loomed 
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54) 
55) 
56) 
57) 
58) 
59) 
Police report, Dortmund, 31 March 1926: SAM I PA/279. 
Report by Landrat, Altena, 26 March 1926: SAM I PA/279. 
"Bericht des Landesarbeitsamtes Westfa1en und Lippe", 1 April 1926 to 
31 March 1927: ViTiA K2/181. 
"Bericht Uber die Lage cJes Arbeitsmarktes in Westf./Lippe", 2 January 
1925: W.VA K2/806; also report by Landra.t, Siegen, 8 April 1926: SAM I 
PA/279. 
See the reports by fue Lo.ndrat, Arnsberg, 26 February and 30 March 1925: 
SAM I PA/281. 
Police report, Hagen, 28 February 1925: SAM I PA/281. 
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permanently over numerous businesses. 60) The employment opportunities in 
commerce and business in general we re a15 0 very limited due to a surplus of 
labour. Older office employees, often displaced by the rationalisation which 
affected salaried staff as much as wage labour, found it virtually impossible 
to secure a nffiT position. 61) 
The depressed economic position during the nineteen-twenties created much 
discontent which was exploited by political movements. The position of the 
bulk of tile working class made it easier for the KPD to attract SPD supporters. 
The threat of redundancy and unemployment which hovered over white-collar 
workers led to disenchantment and resentment which was reflected in the emer-
gence of sectional interest parties and a drift towards riE!1lt-wing forces 
hostile to the republic. The experience of wage and salary labour in the 
decade 191B to 1928 was not calculated to further stabili~ and moderation 
when the depression set in in the 1928/29 period. The depression made the 
electorate more volatile and radicalism, left and right-wing, became even more 
attractive than it had been in the early nineteen-twenties. 
The Left-wing Parties. 
(i) The SPD. 
For the SPD the post-191B period was one of painful adjustment. The 
initial success of, and the opportunities open to, the SPD in 1918/1919 had 
slipped away by 1920, and for much of the nineteen-twenties the party was on 
the defensive, fending off attacks fran the right a.nd centre, and even more 
vicious as saul ts from the radical Left. During the crucial years of the imme-
diate post-war period the SPD lost ground to movements further to the left. 
Some of the losses sustained by the party in these years were to prove perma-
nent. Even in tile mid-nineteen-twenties, which sa.w a :revival of the fortunes 
of the SPD in a period of greater economic and pOlitical stability, the party 
failed to regain all the ground it had lost before 1923. 
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60) POlice report, Recklinghausen, 5 December 1925: SAM VII - 2 Bd. 4; 
report by Landrat, Lippstadt, 3 October 1925; report by Landrat, Altena, 
23 October 1925: SAM I PA/281. 
61) Police report, Hamm, 3 Jaruary 1925: SAM I PA/28l. 
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The fortunes of "!he SPD in Westphalla parallel the national pattern, 
though in the highly industrialised electoral district ofWestph~lia-South 
the slump in the party's fortunes between the election to the National 
Assembly in 1919 and the first Reichstag election of 1924 was much more 
dramatic: 
WestphaJ.ia-North 
Westphalia-South 
Reich 
1919 
30.6 
41.3 
37.9 
1920 
21.6 
20.8 
21.6 
1924-(i) 
17.8 
16.1 
20.5 
1924-(11) 
21.9 
24-.7 
26.0 
1928 
24-.4-
29.5 
29.8 
The decline in the SPD's position was the consequence of the schisms which 
developed in the socialist movement. The emergence of the USPD in 1917, a 
brea~away socialist movement advocating a mixture of pacifist and revolution-
a~ ideas, began to sap the strength of the Westphalian SPD in the post-191B 
period. At the time of the spll t in 1917 the SPD was able to retain control 
over virtually the whole of the party manbership, party appara'bls and the 
regional party press in Westphalia, which was traditionally more moderate 
in its politics than the western Ruhr where the USPD made significant gains. 62) 
Only in the Hagen-Schwelm and Lennep areas did the aajori ty of SPD bra.nches 
join the newly formed USPD in the course of 1917. Losses were also sustained 
by the SPD in the Altena-Iserlohn districts, where the bulk of the party 
63) 
membership joined the Independent Socialists. However, the gPD retained 
control over its elaborate regional organisation and ccntinued. to enjoy the 
allegiance of a large part of the wo]i{ing class. During the revolutionary 
period the SPD managed to remain the revolutionary socialist movement in the 
eyes of the bulk of the Westphalian proletariat ani was able to secure the 
electoral success of Janu~ 1919. It was in the course of 1919 that the 
position of the party was destroyed. 
The leading role played by the SPD in the firs t Weimar coa11 tion govern-
ment associated the party with the use of 'reactionary' Reichswehr and 
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62) Lucas, Ope cit., p.3l. 
63) Lademacher, in Ferst, Ope cit., p.90j Lambers, Ope cit., pp.24-25. 
freecorps troops aga:inst tile wor.king class. In consequence the SPD lost 
numerous party members to the USPD, which was able to project itself as a 
trul3 socialist party. In many of the smaller Westphalian tO'fms canplete 
64-) l.ocal SPD organisations joined the new force of the Left. Another 
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fail.ure of the SPD in the ~es of many working men was the party's unwilling-
ness to pur·sue a pol.ieur of national.isation. This damaged the reputation of 
the SPD in the Ruhr industrial tcmns, where the nationalisation of the mining, 
iron and steel industries was desired by 'the majority of the popul.a.tion. 
The USPD made much capital out of the SPD's 'conservatism', and the accusation 
of the SPD's 'betrayal of the working class' had its effect. 65) The expe-
rience of tile working class during the RUhr upri sing in 1920 reinforced the 
drift to the radical Left and seriously weakened 'the SPD in those parts of 
the province directl3 affected by the uprising. 66) A regional aMlysis of 
the returns of the SPD and USPD in the Reichstag election of June 1920 shows 
that the SPD was able to retain 1 ts support and ire ep the USPD at bay only in 
the Regierungsbezitk of Minden. Here the ~ parties polled 28.9 per cent 
and 5.3 per cent respectively. 67) In the Ruhr region of 'the Rederungsbezirke 
of Mtinster and Arnsberg, centre of the unrest, the SPD lost heavily and the 
USPD secured almost parity in electoral support, the parties polling 13.0 per 
cent and 10.3 per cent am. 20.8 per cent and 19.7 per cent respectively. In 
many Ruhr towns the SPD's losses were catastrophic. In Dortmund the party 
lost 26.9 per cent of its support between 1919 and 1920, while the USPD 
advanced from a mere 3.3 per cent in 1919 to 28.6 per cent by 1920. 68) In 
Hagen tile vote for the SPD declined from 20.7 per cent in 1919 to 8.9 per cent 
in 1920. In Haspe the respective figures were 26.8 and 11.3 per cent. 69) 
In the three electoral units of Hagen, Ennep&-Ruhr and Dortmund the USPD 
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64-) Lucas, Ope cit., p.60. 
65) Lambers, Ope cit., p.65. 
66) On the political consequences see Eliasberg, Ope cit., pp.253 
67) The percentages derived from statistics given in HA 5Af539. 
68) Graf, Ope cit., p.187. 
69) Lambers. Ope cit., p.69 and p.l~. 
ff •• 
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replaced the SPD as the dominant party. 70) 
The SPD wa.s never able to recover all the losses susta:ined between 1919 
and 1920. The sober Realpolitik of the party leadership in the n.ineteen-
twenties failed to a.ttract new support, especial~ among ~rking class 
youth, t.1-}e mood of 1,vhom was much more in mne with the 'barricade-romanticism' 
of '!he KPD. 71) In the eyes of the electorate as a whole tile party became 
close~ associated with the republic, improved its position in periods of 
stability and lost ground during times of distress. 72) The SPD's position 
was thus an unenviable one. The major challenge after the break up of the 
USPD came frexn the KPD which drew much of its following from former SPD sup-
porters. The antagonism between these two parties became the chief feature 
of left-wing politics in the post-1920 period. In tho late nineteen-twenties 
the conflict between '!he two sharpened with tile onset of too depression and 
the adoption of the 'social fascist' theory by the hPD. The ccmmunist accusa-
tion that tile SPD suffered from 'Verbonzung,~ Verkall<ung und VerbUrgerlichuntj' 
(literally 'bossification, ossification and bourgeoisification') proved 
dannging to the party's efforts to retain its working class support because 
the disparaging description contained much truth. 73) 
In ','1estphalia t .. '1.e KPD proved a dangerous rival to the SPD in the working 
class calurbll.tions of the Ruhr. In many towns the SPD was relegated to a 
secondary position. The poverty and. squalor, the high unemployment rate and 
concentration of unskilled b .. bour in many Ruhr towns, worked ag:linst '!he SPD. 
In the industrial to''ffiS outside the Ruhr in which light and mediulU industry, 
emplqying skilled and semi-skilled labour predominated, the SPD fared much 
better and continued to thrive. 
Contemporary SPD analysts were much concerned. to find an explanation 
for the SPD's rela.tively weak perfonnance in Westphalia. In an article in 
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70) 
71) 
72) 
73) 
Milatz, op. cit., Appendix, map 'Reichstagswahl 1920'. 
Cf. R.N. Hunt, Gerrn.ffi Social Democr~cy. 1918- 1933, London, 196~, pp.106-
107. 
On the SPD's general position see ,I. Tonnin, Geschichte der deutschen 
Parteien seit 1848, Stutteart, 1967, pp.168 ff.; also Hunt, op. cit., 
PP.10b-107. 
Hunt, op. cit., p.24-l. 
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Vorw~rts in September 1928 Siemsen wrote: 'The influence of Catholicism, the 
intenningling of large foreign elements wi thin the working class and there-
fore a lack of unity, -the rapid growth of industry hand in hand with the 
terror of the employers which hindered thorough prop'iganda and educo.tion (of 
the workers), finally the catastrophies of the Ruhr occupation, have so torn 
and undermined the Party that a half-way he':l.lthy and normal development will 
be held back for a long time yet.' 74) Siemsen's amlysis, accurate in broad 
term s, ignored one central factor which did so much to alienate SPD support: 
the party's failure to pursue a socialist policy. It was the failure of the 
8PD leaders to respond to working class demands which cost 1he party so heavily 
at election time and moved the workers first to the USPD, and then to the 
KP 75) D. 
(n) The D'SPD. 
The USPD played a brief, 'though important, role in fue political develop-
ments of Westphalia in the immediate post-war period. At the time of the 
Novenber Revolution the party was still in its infancy and lacked sufficient 
support. The only centre of rbich the USPD influenced working class poll tics 
during the revolution was Hagen, where a eizeable movement had developed in 
1917. 7,) The party lacked the technical means to infJJlence developments 
during the revolutionary phase: it had neither a regional press nor an effec-
tive party apparatus which could compete wi'th the highly organised SPD. 77) 
These defects explain to a large degree the relativeJy poor performance of 
the party in 7Yestphalia in the JamalY election of 1919. In both Westphalin-
North and Westphalia-South the USPD's returns of 2.1 per cent and. 5.1 per cent 
respectively, lay below the national averoge of 7.6 per cent. The only credi-
table perfonnance came in the Hagen region, where the energetic 100\1 party 
functionaries organised an efficient movement which was able to challenge the 
SPD. The returns of 20.3 per cent ail. 26.7 per cent secured in Hagen and Haspe 
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74-) 
75) 
76) 
77) 
Quoted in K. Koszyk, Z,vischen Kaiseerreidl und Diktatur. Die sozia1-
aemok~tische Preese von 1914 bis 1933, Heidelberg, 1958, p.198. 
See the reports by the Regierungspr/1sident, MUnster, 27 September 1920: 
SAM VII - 2 Bd. I; and on 12 November 1920: SA.\! VII - 88. 
Lambers, Ope cit., pp.24-25. 
Lucas, Ope cit., pp.3l-32. 
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were only marginallY below those of the SPD (20.7 per cent and 26.8 per cent 
respectivelY). 73) In other towns tile USPD's vote lagged far behind that of 
the SPD. 
The fortunes of tile USPD changed dramaticallY in the course of 1919. In 
the first place the relative~ weak party organisation was improved wi th the 
creation of a regional party structure, the organisational concepts of which 
were taken from the example provided by the SPD. 79) The numerous party 
branches which emerged in 1919 were organised in two district units, one 
covering western, the other eastern, Westphalia. The second handicap, the 
lack of an independent party press, was overcoJre by -the ex:tension of the 
Volksstimme fnr Mark und Sauerland, which had. been founded by the Hagen 
branch in November 1918, to too rest of the province under the title of 
Volksstimme f!1r Westfalen und Lippe. In Buer the party also founded a paper 
distributed primari~ in the northern Ruhr region, the Ruhrwacht, renamed 
Ruhrwarte in November 1919. The creation of its own press provided the party 
wi th an instrument which was considered by the party le<:\ders as an essential 
pre-reguisi te for success. In the opinion of Wa.lther, a leading Independent 
Sooialist of Hagen, , a good ne.vspaper replaces a hundred good speakers. It 
is the most important moons of agitation. WithoUt it our opponents will hush 
up our existence. t 80) 
By -the summer of 1919 it wwld have beEn very d i:t'f'ioull; for the USPD's 
main opponent, the SPD, to ignore the growing strength of its rival. The 
radical soetal programme advocated by the Independent Socialists, especial13 
their call for immediate nationalisation of the mining, :iron and steel indus-
tries, attracted SPD members in large numbers. Since the social position of 
the average worker had hardl3 been changed by the revolution, the ftl.ilure of 
the SPD to ccnstruct a socialist society alienated a wotking class increasingly 
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78) Lambers, OPe cit., p.6G. 
79) Lucas, Ope cit., p.33. 
80) Quoted in Koszyk, OPe cit., po157. 
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radicalised by it s poor economic position. 81) The use of Reichswehr and. 
freecorps troops to put d.OVID unrest in the province in the spring of 1919 
82) further da.mged. the standing of the sm. Thus the USPD became the party 
of discontented. elements of the working class. The power of its attraction 
is reflected. in the very rapid. growth of its membership, which rose from 
100,000 in 1918 to 300,000 by 1919 and 893,000 by 1920. 83) In Westphalia 
the party expanded. primarily in the urbanised. industrialised. regions of central 
and. western Westphalia. Membership figures of the USPD in ine Bochum-
Gelsenkirchen-Wattenscheid.-Witten-Hattingen area. were estimated. at around. 
84-) 
the 9,000 mark by June 1919. At a district conference of the USPD bran-
ches of the Mark-Sauerland-Siegerland. region the membership of the party in 
the scuth-western part of Regierungsbezirk Amsberg was given as 9,000. 85) 
The continued. influx of new members was enrured. by the increasing leftward. 
trend. of the party, which was in tune with the radicalism of a consid.erable 
section of the Westphalian working class. The announcement of the USPD' s 
programme at the Leipzig party conference at the enti of 1919, with its call 
for immediate nationallsation, the d.emand. for the inclusion of the workers I 
councils in the German ccnstitution, and the declaration that the party was 
aiming at a d.ictatorship of the proletariat, clarified ihe USPD' s attitude 
on a number of issues vi tal to the worldng class. 86) The experience of 
the Westphalian proletariat CUring ihe Ruhr upris:ing in the spring of 1920 
did. much to make the USPD an even more attractive propo sition. It led. to 
the d.estruction of the primacy of the SPD in the socialist movement of the 
Ruhr towns, and. the emergence of the USPD in a position of pari1:iY. The 
Reichstag election of June 1920 oonfinned. the erosion of SPD support. In 
Westphalia-South the parties ran neck to neck, wi ih a poll of 19.7 per cent 
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81) Lucas, OPe cit., pp.60 ff •• 
82) Lambers, Ope cit., p.93. 
83l Tormin, Ope cit., p.134-. 
84 "Lagebericht", Mdnster, 12 June 1919: SAD MI IP/56}. 
85 Volkssti~~e, 29 April 1919 - Lambers, OPe cit., p.93. 
86) Ryder, OPe cit., p.268; Tonnin, Ope cit., p.134. 
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for the USPD and 20.8 per cent for 'the SPD. In Westphalia:-North as a whole 
the USPD fared comparatively badJy. Much of this electoral district was 
agrarian a~or Catholic and neither socialist movement made much impression. 
The SPD managed to retain its strongholds in the Bielefeld-Minden region. 
It was only in the Bottrop-Recklinghausen industrial belt that the USPD 
polled heavily. 87) 
The eleotora1 sucoess of the USPD in June marked the high point in the 
history of the party. By the end of 1920 the uni10T of the movement, and its 
strength, had been seriously undermined. The turning point came at the party 
conference at Halle in October 1920, when the clash of opinions between the 
party's left and light wing on the issue of whether or not to join the Third 
International and fuse wi th the KPD brought Victory to the left. Around two-
thirds of the delegates voted for the fUsion with the Communists. In December 
1920 a large section of the party menbership abandoned 'the USPD in favour of 
the !\PD. 88) 
For the USPD it was the beginning of a steady decline. The party was 
hard hit in the Rhenish-Westphalian indlstria,l region, where 'the trend to 
join the Communists was very strong. Of the 73 USPD delegates from Rhineland_ 
Westphalia present at the Halle meeting 57 voted for the left-wing ticket. 89) 
The resultant split weakened the effectiveness of the party in the area. The 
major issue from October 1920 onwards, discussed and voted upon in all bran-
ches waL\ whether or not to join the KPD. In isolated instances local branches 
had a1reaqy joined the KPD before the issue was debated at Halle. 90) Follow-
ing the conference numerous branches voted for fusion with the radical left. 91) 
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87) In the Regierungsbezirk Minden the USPD secured a mere 5.3 per cent 
(SPD: 28.9 per cent); in the Regierungsbezirk Mflnster the USPD return 
was 10.3 per cent (SPD: 13.0 per cent); results taken from HA 5A/539. 
88) TOrmin, Ope cit., pp.13~135. 
89) Eliasberg, Ope cit., p.255; report by the Oberprlisident, MUnster, 31 
October 1920: S.~ OberprAsidium Nr. 5370. 
90) This happened in Buer and Recklinghausen - report qy Regierungspr~sident, 
!.lUnster, 27 September 1920: SA!.1 VII - 2 Bd. 1. 
91) See the reports by Landrat, Recklinghausen, 25 October 1920 (on Datteln, 
Waltrop, Westerholt, Marl and Recklinghausen-Amt branches); Lan drat , 
Coesfeld, 12 October 1920 (Coesfeld USED); Landrat, LUdingh~usen, 20 
October 1920 (LUdinghausen branch): all in SAM VII - Bd. 1. Also reports 
by Landrat, Hl!>rde, 8 February 1921; Amtmann, Werdohl, 7 January 1921: --~I_PA/343. ___ _ ____ _ 
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In the debates which broke out in the USPD branches the ca.ses of bra.nches 
collective~ objecting to having contact with the KPD were very rare. 92) 
Pro-Communist pressure at the grassroot level invalidated decisions rea.ched 
by the party ~~ctionaries. Thus a eonference o~ USPD leaders representine 
the counties of Hagen, Iserlolm, Schwelm, Altena and Arnsberg voted over,vhelm-
ingly against fusion with the KPD in October 1920 (74 against - 16 for). The 
pa~ membership ignored the decision and joined the KPD regardless of the 
views of the regional party hierarchy. 93) 
The USPD was serious~ weakened by the bloodletting occl).sioned by the 
split. By the end of 1920 the organisation was in a chaotic situation. The 
USPD organ for Westphalia, the Volksstimme, lamented the state of USPD affairs, 
and summarised the position of the party thus: "rhe Party is numerically, 
politically and mora~ weakened and finds itself at the moment in an espe-
cially difficult position. Our organisation is shattered, our former position 
has been lost, newspapers have fallen into the hands of the Communists and 
those that remain are fighting for survival.' 94) Parallel with the move 
towards the KPD there also occurred a drift towards the SPD. In the 1920 to 
1922 period many USPD remnants joined the SPD. 95) This trend towards the 
'righ t' anticipated the reunion of the bulk of what remained of the USPD with 
the SPD in September 1922. On~ a handful of Westphalian Independent Socialists 
remained aloof from both the KPD and SPD, to continue the USPD tradition under 
Ledebour. 96) But as an effective organisation the USPD ceased to exist. 
(iii) The KPD. 
The KPD in Westphalia, as elsewhere, energed a.s a party of consequence 
in 1920 after the influx of USPD members. This transfonned what had been very 
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92) 
93) 
94) 
95) 
96) 
See "the case of Borken; report by Landrat, Boricen, 15 October 1920: SAM 
VII - 2 Bd. 1-
Lambers, Ope cit., p.241. 
Volksstimme, 31 December 1920. 
See reports contained in "Nachrichtenblatt Nr. 20", 7 January 1921; 
"Nachrichtenblatt Hr. 23", 7 March 1921; both in SA:~ Oberprl!sidium Nr. 
5370. Also report by Landrat, Beckum, 22 November 1920: SAM VII - 2 Bd. 1. 
In Hagen a small USPD group continued to exist under Walther, with a limi-
ted membership and little success; Lambers, Ope cit., p.153. 
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much a minority group into a mass party. From 1920 the party became a per-
manent feature of ~~e political landscape. 
Prior to October 1920 the KPD failed to make a~ impression on the poli-
tical life of Westphalia. The strongholds of the KPD in 1919 and 1920 lay 
in the Rhenish sector of t.~e Ruhr, an area in vmich the working class was 
traditionallY more radical in politics. The major organisational activity 
~ in this region, revolving round the district secretariat of Rhineland-
Westphalia established at Essen, to which the Westphalian branches were sub-
ordinated. Membership figures for Westphalian branches in 1919, 80S far as 
they are available, reveal a limited communist presence. The largest branch 
was situated in Dortmund, with a membership of about 200 by ~~ 1919. 97) In 
Hagen, where a 'Spartacus' group was formed in Februar,y 1919, the party's 
membership fluctuated between 25 and 30 in the course of 1919. 98) On the 
eve of the Ruhr uprising in the spring of 1920 the position of the KPD was 
even worse. Numerically the branches had shrunk to insignificance. 99) 
Whereas the western Ruhr region had Slch sizeable branches as Remscheid (1,100 
members), Hamborn (c. 1,100), and Barmen (c. 500), the Westphalian part of 
the Ruhr had sna.ll branches at Dortmund (40) and Ge1senkirchen (40)'. In 
the whole of the Hagen district the KPD had only 7 members. The major reaSon 
for this state of affairs was the first of a number of party splits which 
were to punctuate the histo~ of the KPD throudlout the nineteen-twenties. 
The exclusion of the 'ultra-left' in October 1919, which ultimately formed 
the rival KAPD in April 1920, resulted in the loss of fifty per cent of the 
100) KPD's national membership of approximately 100,000. In Westphalia the 
ultra-left had strong support and the KAPD ma.no.ged to attract the majority 
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97) "AK Generalkommando Bericht", Mftnster, 22 May 1919: SAD MI IP/563. 
98) Lambers, OPe cit., p.84. 
99) For the following, Lucas, Ope cit., pp.61 ff •• 
100) On the rival~ between the KPD and KAPD see O.K. Flechtheim, Die KPD in 
der Weimarer RepubUk, Frankfurt a.M., (2 edit.), 1971, pp.143 ff. 
101 
101) 
of the KPD members. Thus the split virtually destroyed the KPD in the 
province. The few branches Which survived simply ceased to function. 102) 
The chaotic situation created by the split, the fuct 'that many of the 
KPD members rema:ining true to "the party in Westphalia did not approve of the 
national party's executive decision to participate in the 1920 election, and 
the strength of the USPD, all combined to restrict the KPD. The generally 
weak position of the party helps in turn to account for the poor results it 
obtained in the Reichstag election of June 1920. With :returns of 1.5 per 
cent in both Westphalia-North and Westphalia-Sou t.'IJ. the party fai led to reach 
even the low national average of 2.1 per cent. The bulk of the vote was 
secured in the towns of the inner Ruhr. Outside the Ruhr the party mad.e 
hardly arw impact at all. In the Regi erungsbezirk Minden the total number 
of votes polled was a mere 205 (or 0.1 per cent). 103) The best return in 
the province, a vote of 13.1 per cent, was secured in Iserlohn. 10~) 
The fortunes of the KPD radically changed in the latter half of 1920 
OWing to the break-up of the USPD. New branches were formed throughout the 
province as whole 'JSPD groups joined tlxl party. The existing party branches 
expanded beyond recognition and acquired ver,r high memberships. 105) The 
qUick growth rate stimulated the whole of the movement. A flood of instruc-
tions descended on the party branches as the district secretariat sought to 
integrate the new membership and strengthen the party framework. 106) Further 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
101) H. Weber, Die Wandlung des deutschen Kom!l1UnislllU s. Die Stalinisierung 
der KPD in derWeimarer Republik, FrankfUrt a.M., 1969, p.39. 
102j Lucas, Ope cit., p.62j Lambers, Ope cit., p.94. 
103 Regional percentages taken from HA 5A/539. 
104 The high return was due to local factors, namely the able 169.dership 
and good organisation provided by the loos.l communist functionary Brenner. 
In Iserlohn the radical working class vote went to the KPDj the USPD was 
the minOrity movement by 1920. See D.W. Mllhlberger, 'Political Develop-
ments in Iserlohn during the :,I/'eimar Republic', (Draft of London M.Phil. 
thesis), p.48. 
105) By 1921 the KPD had 2,300 members in the Gelsenkirchen area alone; see 
"Nachrichtenblatt Nr. 22", MUnster, 11 Februa~ 1921: S~~ Oberpr!sidium 
Nr. 5370. . . 
106) Cf. "Nachrichtenblatt Nr. 16", Mttnster, 8 November 1920; also copies of 
KPD circulars Nr. 41 (25 October.1920), Nr. 42 (26 October 1920), and 
Nr. 43 (28 October 1920): SAM I PA/269. 
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encouragement was given to the party fu.'lctionaries by the return of members 
previously lost to the !CAPD. From -the autumn of 1920 onwards the KPD absorbed 
whole branches of the KAPD. 107) By 1922 the disintegration of the KAPD had 
reached an advanced state. As a serious riv3.1 to -the KPD the KAPD ceased to 
function. At a district conference in December 1921 the regional KAPD leaders 
came to 'the conclu sion that the KAPD had folded up. 108) 
With the decline of both the USPD and KAPD the KPD had no serious riva.l 
for the radical left-wing vote. The general. economic position favoured growth 
in the early nineteen-twenties. The poor economic climate led to much discon-
tent on which the KPD thrived and prospered. As a party with a 'revolutionary 
stance', however, the KPD faced grea.t problems in retaining its support. 109) 
Its revolutiona~ nature was one of its chief attractions; the party's failure 
to realise the promised utopia undermined its stability. The for1llnes of the 
party were conditioned by the economic situation. 110) Slump and depression 
were good for 'the party, while peri 0 as of growth and expansion were bad. Both 
party membership and electoral support were subject to considerable fluctuation. 
In Westphalia the correlation between economic and political unrest and KPD 
strength is very noticeable. The growth years co-incided wi th the crisis 
period of 1921 to 1923. ~ 1923 the party had 21,259 enrolled members in 
'District Ruhr', a total which fell fbarply as the economic and political 
position improved in the mid-'twenties. B,y the end of 192~ the membership 
figure had fallen to 11,000, to decline to 7,000 by mia-1926. Ill) The elec-
tion returns show a similar trend: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
107) "Nachrichtenblatt Nr. 18", MUnster, 4 December 1920; "Nachrichtenblatt 
Nr. 22", MUnster, 11 February 1921: SAM OberprAsidium Nr. 5370. 
108) A report on the district conference, held on 11 December 1921 contained 
in "Nachrichtenblatt Nr. 45", MUnster, 31 January 1921: SAM I PA/271. 
109) Cf.Neumann, Ope cit., p.87. . 
110) ' ••• at times of adequate nourishment and reasonable wages the masses 
become indifferent to Communist ideas and ignore -the demands of the 
pa~ leaders. The general conclusion here is -that hunger is the best 
party comrade and agitator for the radical Left' - taken from a police 
report, Buer, 10 January 1921: S~~ VII - 2 Bd. 2. 
Ill) These figures relate to 'Bezirk Ruhr', which was composed of the Unter-
bedziBrke Dortmund, Recklinghau~en, Gelsenkirchen~ Hamm, ~nnster (post 1925), 
an ochum. ~all J.n Westphalia); plus Essen and namborn ~Regierungsbezirk ~sseldorf). The Unterbezirke of Hagen, Siegen and Bielefeld. administra-
;fi~~ly E~rNt.ofWestPhalia, belo~ged to the Bezirke of Niederrhein, Mittel-~n a~ ~eaersacfisen respect~ve~ - Weber, Ope cit., pp.372 ff •• 
---~-
Westphalia-North 
Westphalia-South 
Reich 
1924(i) 
9.7 
21.9 
12.6 
1924(ii) 
6.4-
12.1 
9.0 
1928 
8.9 
11.9 
10.6 
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The relative success of the KPD in Westphalia is closely related to the 
socio-economic structure in which it operated. The strongholds of the party 
lay in the urbanised, industrialised Ruhr region, in the Gelsenkirchen-
Dortmund-Bochum triangle, an area in which in(i1strial workers were concentra-
ted. It was from this social C'3. tegory that the KPD secured the bulk of its 
members and votes. 112) In the predominantly rural counties the party was 
virtually non-existent. In the industrialised centres the Communists were 
able to secure the support of the economically insecure. The party's most 
constant success came from its ability to exploit to its own advantage the 
precarious po sition of the unemployed. and underemployed. 113) The KPD also 
tended to attract tile vote of the sizeable Polish minori'tjy' present in the 
Ruhr. 114) Of great i.mportance to the party was the fact fuat CatholiCism, 
which proved to be such a strong bulWark against Nazism, did not adversely 
influence its chance of fUccess to any degree. 115) Catholic workers who 
abandoned the party of their faith were not repelled by the atheistic Commu-
nist movement. It was the social position of the voter, not religion, which 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
112) Weber, OPe cit., p.361; S. Bahne, 'Die Kommunistische partei Deutsch-
lands', in E. Matthias & R. Morsey, (eds.), 1)aB ~nde der Parteien, 
DUsseldorf, 1960, pp.661-662. 
113) This is a feature constantly referred to by the authorities recording 
the party's progress; see especially police report, Gelsenkirchen, 7 
November 1923: SAlll I PA/362; police report, Buer 10 January 1921: S~'\.,.\{ 
VII - 2 Bd. 2; report by 1i1e Oberpr/tsident, gtinster, 21 September 1922: 
SAD MI IP/621; police report, Recklinghausen, 5 December 1925 and report 
by Me1destelle Arnsberg, 16 October 1925: SAM VII - 2 Bd. 4; police 
report, Hagen, 26 January 1926: SAM I PA/279. 
114) "Nachrichtenblatt Nr. 23", Mllnster, 7 March 1921: SAM Oberpdsidium 
Nr. 5370; police report,. Dortmund, 10 December 1920: SAM I PA/269. 
The limited evidence available is in agreement with Lipset's observation 
that minori t-,f ethnic groups tend to move to the left - S. Lipset, POli-
tical :,\an, London, 1969, p.232, pp.242-24-8. 
115) Cf'. if. Kaltefleiter, Wirtschaf't und PoUtik in Deutschh.nd, Cologne. 1966, 
pp.67 ff'.. See also the am:lJ"sis by .:t. Plum, Gesellschaftsstruktur und 
.,E0li tisches Bewusstsein in einar ks.tholi schen Ree;ion 1928-1933. Unter-
suchunf, am Bei seliel des Regi er-ungsbezirks Aachen, Stuttga.rt, 1972. pp. 
31 ff' •• 
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was decisive. An analysis of the KPD's best returns secured. in -the 192!+-
December election, for example, shows that urbanised, industrialised areas 
prod.uced the highest Communist poll regardless of ~le religious composition 
of the electorate: 
Catholic (6Cfb plus) Pari t;y Protestant (6a,~ plus) 
Bottrop 23.7 :Ouer 21.8 Hagen 17.2 
Stkr.Recklinghausen 16.7 Gelsenkirchen 19.5 Schwelm 17.0 
Ldkr.Recklinghausen 17.0 Herne 17.8 Dortmund 15.0 116) 
The existence of a strong Communist movement coloured. the political 
developments of Westphalia throughout the 'Weimar period. The fanaticism, 
activism and idealism of the ra.nk and file of the movement determined to a 
large extent the political life of the Ruhr. In the industrial centres the 
KPD presented a formidable opponent to all other political directions. For 
the National Socialist movement, as it developed in the 'twenties, ti1e hosti-
1i ty of the KPD was to make life esp ecially difficult. 
The Bourgeois Parties. 
(i) The DDP. 
The DDP was the only genuinely new party to emerge following the revo-
lution of 1918. It represented an attempt to fuse -the old National Liberal 
Party with the Progressive Liberals. 117) The hope of uniting the 'liberal! 
bourgeoisie' rapidly proved an illusion. Discussions between 1e9.ding represen-
tatives of both parties failed to prod.uce a united front, as reflected in the 
creation of the VIP by the National Liberals under the influence and b'l.lidance 
of Stresemann in December 1918. 118) The points of difference between tqe DDP 
and DVP were primari~ tactical. Both parties desired to rally the middle 
class liberal element to prevent a total dominance of the SPD. But whereas 
the DDP leadership was pro-republican and. favourab~ inclined towards the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
116) 
117) 
118) 
Percentages calculated from data contained in HA 6A/544. 
Heumann, Ope cit., p.48. The formative yeArs of '!he DDP have been 
thoroughly analysed by L. Albertin, Liberati g.lUS und De!llokratie am 
Anfang der Weimarer Republik. Eine vergleichende Analyse der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Partei und der Deutschen VolksDRrtei, DUsseldorf, 1972. 
Background of the division discussed by Albertin, op. cit., pp.59 ff •• 
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Social Democrats, stresemann's DVP adopted an ambiguous attitude towards the 
Republic and rejected contact with "!he SPD. 119) 
The division between t.i-J.e tNo liberal move.-nents occurred rapidly in 
Westphalia. In southern Westphalia the initia.l steps to dissolve the National 
Liberal Party into the DDP were taken by representatives of the election dis-
tricts of Hagen-Schwelm, Hamm-Soest, A1tena-Iserlohn, Dortmun~HBrde, and 
Bochum-G-elsenkirchen. A conference at Hagen on 20 November 1913 saw a unani-
mous vote in favour of rupporting -the newly fcunded DDP. 120) The comj"nittee 
of the National Liberal Party of Westphalia in turn, though lamenting the lack 
of a. united liberal frcnt in the province, urged its membership to join the 
DVP. 121) Both parties formed their own party organisations and went their 
separa te way s. 
In the election to the National Assembly in January 1919 the DDP met 
wi th ccnsiderable ruccess. In Westphalia the party performed creditably, 
doubline the rupport mobilised by the proeressive Liberals in the last pre-
war election. The returns of 9.8 per cent in Westphalia-North and 10.0 per 
cent in westphalia-South were, however, well below the national poll of 18.5 
per cent. Much of the success of the party in the first election rested on 
its ability to project itself as a moderate centre block, pro-republican and 
socially progressive, but untainted. by 'the extremism which the middle class 
feared from the side of -the Social Democrat 5. 122) The DDP's 'voice of 
moderation' attracted above all the newly enfranchised female voter, whose 
vote the party had courted. assiduously. 123) 
The 1919 electoral returns marked. the high point of the party' 5 electoral 
strength and. political influence. From 1920 the DDP was to be progressively 
reduced to the point at which it was little more than one of a number. of 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
119) 
120) 
121) 
122) 
123) 
Tormin, OPe cit., pp.142-143; Albertin, Ope cit., pp.72 ff •• 
Hagener Zeitung, 21 November 1919; Iser10hner Kreisanzeiger und Zeitnnra, 
29 November 1919. 
See the NLP's "Aufruf" in Iser10hner Krei sanzeiger und Zei tunp;, 30 Novem-
ber 1919. 
Tormin, Ope cit., p.143. 
cr. Lambers, Ope cit., p.59 and p.69. 
- "~----
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small parties with which the republic was so well endol'led by the mid-'twenties. 
The national decline of the party was much more rapid. than in Westphalia: 
1919 1920 1924(i) 1924(ii) 1928 
Westph.-North 9.8 4.7 3.6 3.5 2.5 
Westph.-South 10.0 5.0 4.5 6.0 4.2 
Reich 18.5 8.3 5.7 6.3 4.8 
The clramatic losses sustained. between the 1919 and.. 1920 elections were occa-
sioned. by the shift of DDP voters to parties further to ihe right, especially 
to the D'rP. The association of the DDP with the republican government, its 
variable political outlook, and. the accusation by the Right of pro-socialist 
124) bias all contributed. to the decline in the DDP's popularity. The poor 
economic situation in the post-war period. and. the effects of the inflation 
red.uced. its mid.d.le class base even further. Unable to make allY significant 
impact on the working class, the DDP's losses sapped. its vi tali 1iY. As a 
'mid.dle' party appealing to reason, the DDP waS strand.ed. in a form of political 
no-man's land., on the d.efensive against both the Left and the Right. 
(ii) The DVP. 
The DVP d.eveloped. into the major party of the German mid.d.le class in the 
post-war period.. 125) Its support came from those sections of society on which 
the DDP was also balJed.: industria.l, commercial am. fina.ncial circles, inde-
pendent craftsmen, civil servants, white-collar workers and. intellectuals. 126) 
The anti-republican, pro-monarchist, nationalist outlook of ihe DVP in the 
first few years of its existence found. strong support in middle class oircles. 
As a 'conservative' constellation, the DVP benefited, as is true of all the 
bourgeois parties and the centre Party, from the extension of the vote to 
women. Since the DVP professed' christian and. moral goals' very strongly, 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
124) 
125) 
126) 
Neumann, Ope cit., pp.49 ff.; Tormin, Ope cit., pp.145 ff •• 
Neumann, OPe cit., pp.54 ff.; Hartenstein OllIs it the 'non-proletarian 
party par excellence', Hartenstein, Ope cit., p.25l. 
Hartenstein, Ope cit., p.252. 
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the party was supported by marw Protestant clergymen. As women were more 
religious, the pro-DVP outlook of the clergy brought the party electoral divi-
dends. 127) A great asset for '!he :rnrty was its nationalist stance. Its 
anti-Versailles propaganda was effective because it was in tune with middle 
class sentiments am. it drew support away from the ri va 1 DDP, whi ch became 
tainted in the eyes of ma~ bourgeois voters owing to its close association 
with the 'system'. The strength of '!he DVP in the immediate post-war period 
was further ensured by the creation of an efficient and extensive party 
organisation. In the electoral district of Westphalia-South, fCiL' ex:ample, 
the party built up a regional organisation composed of 264- branches by Septem-
ber 1921. Party membership in srutilem Westphalia stood at 74,000 by January 
1920 and reached 76,350 by September 1921. 128) 
The electoral strength of the rJVP in Westphalia corresponds broadly with 
the national pattern. In the case of Westphalia:-North the returns lay gene-
ral13 belOW' the national average, whereas in Westphalia,-South the party did 
relatively better: 
Westph.-North 
Westph.-South 
Reich 
1919 
6.6 
(15.5)' 
4.4 
1920 
12.5 
16.3 
13.9 
1924-(i) 
9.5 
11.8 
9.2 
1924-(ii) 
9.7 
12.1 
10.1 
1928 
8.3 
10.9 
8.7 
, Combined ~1P-DNVP list. 
The gradual decline of the rJVP in the nineteen-twenties is related in part 
to the inability of the party to retain ihe mass support acquired in its early 
years. The difficulty of organising support on a permanent basis was (\le to 
the resistance of the bourgeoisie to organisation and a resultant lack of 
enthusiasm for tile creation of an active inner party life which could have 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
127) 
128) 
In Hagen, one of the few towns in whi dl the male and female vote was 
separated for statistical purposes in ihe 1919 election, ihe DVP, DDP, 
DNVP and centre Party all attracted a greater propor-tion of the female 
vote - Lambers, OPe cit., p.69; Cf. B. voge~D. NOhlen/R.-O. Schultze, 
Wahlen in Deutschland. Theorie-Geschichte-Dokumente 18413-197°, Berlin, 
1971, p .14-1. 
"Bericht des Gesch!ftsfUhrers", in Westf!1isches Tageb1att. 19 Septem-
ber 1921. 
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kept the party intact. The failure of tile TNP to succeed in this area is 
mirrored in the drastic decline of its membership, from around 800,000 in 
129) 
1920 to a mere 100,000 by 1925. The party lost its ear~ momentu~ due 
to a variety of adverse developments. In the first place the DVP dismayed 
Some of its supporters in 1923 when it became a government party for the first 
time. The radical change of ou tlook, fran oppo sing the republio to active 
participation in it, a change engineered by stresemann, was followed qy a 
gradual drift of DVP voters towards the rival DNVP. 130) This trend aocele-
rated with the death of Stresemann, whose great prestige had held the party 
together in ihe t twenties and. perhaps prevented the DVP fran sharing a fate 
- 131) 
similar to that which befell the Dnp. Certain seotions of the party also 
left to join new middle class sectional interest parties, such as the Wirt-
schaftspartei, which catered for specific eocnomic needs. The most serious 
blow to the party apart from Stresemann's death,.was the onset of the economic 
crisis which engulfed GermallY in 1929. This radicalised DVP supporters and 
moved them further to the right to feed the Nazi movement. 
(iii) The mNP. 132) 
The DHVP emerged as ihe major party rallying the forces opposed to the 
revolution. 133) The movement was an ama,1gan of a number of conservative 
elenents active in -;1ilhelmini::m Germ~. These ranged fran tile G-er:nan Con-
servatives, the Free Conser~atives, and the Christion Socialists to German-
v~lkisch and anti-Semi tic elaIlro ts, forces whi ch had been behind the Deutsche 
Vaterlands"0artei formed during the war, to which the DlrvP was in marv ways 
the successor. Additional support came from tile ranks of the Pan-German 
League and elements of the National Liberal Party. 134) The fusion of these 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
129) 
130) 
131) 
132) 
133) 
134) 
Tormin, Ope cit., pp.148-149. 
Tormin, Ope cit., p.150j Lambers, op. cit., p.208. 
NeumGUn, Ope clt., p.60. 
For the early history of the Di.NP see ihe studies by Liebe, OPe cit., 
and L. Rertzrnann, DHVP. RiO'.t-Win'" OJ osition in the Weimar Re ublic 
1918-1924, Lincoln, 19 3. 
Neumo.nn, op. cit., p.6l. 
Liebe, Ope cit., p.12. 
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forces, albeit very loosely, in one right-wing movement made the Right a 
formidable proposition in the early Weimar perioi and promised an end to the 
fragmentation which had characterised its history in the early twentieth 
century. 
The closing of the right-wing ranks only affected Westphalian develop-
ments in 1918-1919 to a limited degree. Given the social and. religious 
make-up of the province, -the DHVP failed to rally much support in its early 
years. The strength of the Left, and the hostili1;r with which it met right-
wing movements in the post-war period, restricted -the DNVP's progress. The 
major centres of support were in those areas from which the old pre-war con-
servative movem.ents had secured the bulk of -their support, areas predominantly 
rural and Protestant, primarily the Siegerland and the north-eastern parts of 
the Regierungsbezirk Minden. The counties of LUbbecke, ~inden, Herford, Halle 
and Bielefeld provided the Westphalian DNVP with a:9prOlCimately three-quarters 
of its total membership ~ 1923. 135) 
The electoral returns of the pa~ were initially low. Even by 1920 
the D);''VP failed to attract the volume of Slpport formerly obtained by the 
DK, RP and anti-Semites in 1912. 136) This despi t3 the e<:tension of the vote 
to women, a developr.lcnt whic.'1 assisted the DNW considerabJ.,y. 137) It was 
in the post-1920 period that the DNVP extended its narrow base and secured 
more widespread support: 
1919 1920 1924-{i) 1924-(U) 1928 
W'estph.-North 8.7 9.4- 14.7 16.2 9.2 
Westph.-South (15.3)' 6.0 12.3 12.6 8.6 
Reich 10.3 15.1 19.5 20.5 14.2 
f DVP-l:.NVP combined list. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
135) 
136) 
137) 
31,000 of the 45,4-60 members of the -,iestphalian DNVP Were in Bezirks-
verein Westphalia-East, Liebe, Ope cit., pp.135-136. 
The conservative parties secured 9.3 per cent of the 1912 vote _ 
Bertram, Ope cit., p.207; in 1920 the lliJVP polled 7.7 per cent. 
Liebe, OPe cit., p.17; Tormin, Ope cit., p.151. 
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The electoral statistics hide the uneven distribution of support in the pro-
vince. Unli~e the DDP and DVP, whose strength was scattered more evenlY 
throughout the province, the DNVP throve primarily in the agrarian Protestant 
areas and did very badly in Catholic rural districts. This emerges very 
clearly in an analysis of the DNW's performance in the Reichstag election 
of December 1924, which marked "!he high point of its support in the province. 
In predominantly Protestant rural ccunties, such as LUbbecke, Wittgenstein 
and Siegen, the party secured 54.6, 4.8.1, at d 45.8 per cent respectively. 
In predominantlY Catholic rural counties, such as Meschede, MUnster and 
'!(arendorf, the nNP failed to make aru impact, securing such low returns as 
4.5, 3.8, and 3.4 per cent respectivelY. 138) 
In the urban centres the religious canposition of the population played 
a less crucial role in determining the voting pattern and social factors were 
more significant. The best returns were achieved. in towns situated outside 
the Ruhr region in whim the middle class fonned a larger percentage of the 
population, such as Siegen (30.7 per cent), Herford (20.6 'per cent), Bielefeld 
(16.4 per cent) and Iserlohn (15.9 per cent). 139) 
The major successes of the IliVP were in areas with a long tradition of 
right-wing politics. In the Siegen-Wittgenstein region in scuthern Westphalia 
and in the north-eastern counties of the Regierunssbezirk Minden conservative 
parties, especial~ the Christlichsoziale Partei, had been particularly strong 
since the late nineteenth centur,y. The influence exerted by the Protestant 
clergy on the political inclinations of predaninantly Protestant c anmuni ties 
survived the war. The DNVP was also assisted by the widespread discontent 
of the farmers. The fixed quotas levied. on "!he fa.rmers by govern..lJlent decree 
aroused considerable anger which was utilised. by the party to expand its 
support. The intensity of feeling on "!he subject of production quotas can 
be gauged from the fact that police ccmmandos had to be employed to enforce 
------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
138) These percentages are calculated from aata given in HA 6~544. 
139) Ibid •• 
11+0) 
collections in the face of armed opposition by the farmers. 
In the nineteen-twenties 'the mw.c' was able to engage the support of 
III 
people from a much wider social spectrum than those who had c~rried the pre-
14-1) 
war conservative parties. In '.Vestphalia support ranged from the working 
class to the aristocracy. In the case of the aristocracy the party was able 
to break through the barrier of religion, with 'the bulk of the Catholic 
aristocracy inclining tmvards it. 142) The 'Junker' image did not alienate 
working class support. 14-3) The success in rallYing workers to the party 
occurred despite the great limitations placed on 'the DUVP in the urban centres, 
especially those of the Ruhr, where the party found it difficu1 t to organise 
propaganda and hold public meetings cbe to the hostility of the Left. 144) 
The working class interest in, and Slpport far, the party came from 
right-wing workers present in the province. On the initiative of a number 
of labour leaders in Bielefeld a 'Reichsarbeiterausschuss' waS formed. at the 
end of 1919, and this led to the formulation of a party programme which was 
much more sympathetic towards working class interests. 145) The 'Westphalian 
Programme' framed by the Bielefeld group outlined a social policy which went 
far beyond that adopted by the party at its foundation. A considerable sec-
tion of 'the 'Westphalian Programme' was included in a revision of the national 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
140) The most active opposition came in the Minden area where farmers armed 
themselves with 'shotguns, cudgels, axes and pitchforks' to resist the 
collection of their quotas - see Mindener Tageblatt, 22 and 25 February 
1920; also reports by Landrat, Minden, 18 Februa~ 1920 and police report, 
Neuenknick, 18 February 1920: SAD MI IP/564. 
141) Cf. Liebe, Ope cit., pp.16-17. 
142) H. Maller, (ed.), Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus, Munich, 
1965, p.37. 
143) The DN Arbeiterbund enjoyed some Slpport even in the working class 
strongholds of the inner Ruhr - see police report, Gelsenkirchen, 
29 December 1925: SAM I PA/369. 
144) Cf. the letter of complaint by the Schwerte branch, which speaks of 
'the di sruption of eleotion meetings by the SPD and KPD. Speakers 
have been attacked and prevented from speaking by the singing of the 
'Internationale' and the shouting of slogans such as 'Down with the 
dogs of Reaction' and 'Blood must flow'; DIN!' Vorstand del' OG Schwerte 
to Regierungspr!sident, Arnsberg, 8 April 1924: S~~ I PA/387. 
145) Liebe, op. cit., p.25. 
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programme by the central party canmittee, ani formed part of the propaganda 
platform on which the DNVP rested in the nineteen-twenties. 
The working class response to -the DllVP in \Vestphalia has to be kept in 
perspective. It was not extensive and it did not alter the predominant~ 
bourgeois nature of the party. The DNVP in the region, as in the nation, 
was based on the support of academics, professional and business interests; 
it was a middle class party. The nationalist trumpeting of the party, its 
hostility towards the Republic, and its monarchist sentiments struck a chord 
in the hearts of those who looked back with longing to the Wilhelminian era. 
The conglomeration of interests represented in the mnrP made permanent 
uni t.v difficult. The need for unity, enforced on 'the Right by fears of radi-
cal change current in 1918 and 1919, did not survive in the nineteen-twenties 
when events proved these fears somewhat exaggerated. The first serious loss 
came with the exit of ilie anti-Semites in 1922. 146) The DVFP, organised by 
Wulle and von Graefe, secured sane backing in the Protestant agrarian counties 
in eastern and southern Westphalia, where the m~ found its strangest support. 
From the mid- 't"l'Ienties dissension within the party on points of pOlicy and 
tactics led to increasing difficulties. These in turn led to fUrther frag-
mentation. The association of the DlnTP with the Republic, the consequence of 
its participation in the government, weakened the popularity of the party in 
the country at a time when internal divisions sapped its vitali~. 147) In 
the spring of 1928 one of the most powerfUl pillars of the party, the regional 
agrarian land leagues, broke away to form the Chrietlich-nationale Bauern-
und Landvolk Partel. This made seriou s inroa.ds on the Protestant rural vote 
which had been traditionally behind the DNVP. In Westphalia the Landvolk 
displaced the D~1n? in the counties of LUbbecke, Minden and Halle. In Lnbbecke, 
a major bastion of the DTlVP since 1920, the absolute majority it had gained 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
146) Liebe, Ope cit., pp.6l ff •• 
147) On the problems of the ~1TP post-1924 see the analysis by A. Chanaqy, 
'The Disintegration of the German Peoples' Party 192~1930', Journal 
of Modern History, 39, 1967, pp.65 fr •• 
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in the December election of 1924 was replaced by a relative majority for the 
Landvo1k in May 1928. 148) FUrther losses were sustained following the cessa-
tion of the Christian Socialist and Volkskonservativ elements in 1929. 149) 
The impact of these developments on the Westphalian DNVP was very serious. 
The Christian Socialists orientated themselves towards the Protestant circles 
active in fue Christlicher volksdienst since 1924. The fu sion of the tv 0 
produced the CSVD in the spring of 1930. 150) The CSVD made considerable 
inroads into the DNVP's vote in the Siegerland, where it replaced the DNVP 
as the premier party in the September election of 1930, and reduced the DNVP's 
support in the Minden-Ravensberg region. 151) The DNVP's losses to the 
Volkskonse~ative Partei were less significant and were confined primarily 
to the north-eastern counties of Westphalia, where the Vo1kskonservative 
152) Partei managed to rally some support. 
The secessions in the late nineteen-twenties seriously weakened the 
DNVP's efforts to retain its position as 'the premier party of 'the Right. The 
decline of the party coincided with important re-alignments on the Right in 
general. This is best seen in the emergence of a radical right-wing alter-
native which had been overshadowed by the D:m in the 'twenties - the NSDAP. 
The collapse of the DlNP, which was :ymptoma tic of increasing unrest in the 
middle class, helped to produce a poU tical situation conducive to Nazi expan-
sian. 
The Catholic Centre Party. 
Of the marw political movements of the Weimar RepUblic the Centre Party 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
148) Milatz, op. cit., Appendix - ma.ps for "Reichstagswahl 7 Dezember 1924" 
and "Reichstagswahl 20 W~i 1928". 
149) Chanaqy, op. cit., pp.85 ff •• 
150) Cf. the stu~ by G. Opitz, Der Christlich-soziale Volksdienst. Versuch 
einer protestantischen Partei in der Weimarer Republik, DUsseldorf, 1969. 
151) Ibid., pp.3~O-341. 
152) Westphalia-North was one of the fevt electoral districts in which the 
Volkskonservativen had some success. In the 1930 Rcichstag election the 
party managed to attra.ct 14,733 votes in the area - E. Jonas, Die Volks-
konservativen 1928-1933- ~ni;1ldck1ung, struktur, Standort und sta3.ts-
politische Zielsetzun&, DUsseldorf, 1965, p.S8. 
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proved the most stable. It was practically immune to the fluctuations which 
affected other poll tical organisations. In part thi s was due to its nature _ 
it wC'.s less a 'party' and more a 'confessional ccrnmuni ty'. The relicious tie 
proved sufficient to keep together elanents often divided by economic interests 
and aspirations. The close relationship between the Catholic Church and the 
Centre Party ensured a high degree of support and stability. The confessional 
tie still dictated the political response of -ti1e majority of Catholics. Catho-
lics were still, in the words of a Catholio Reichst~·ra deputy, 'bom into the 
Centre Party'. 153) 
During the Weimar period the Centre was supported by, on average, around 
60 per cent of voting Catholics. This percentage was secured primarily by 
the extension of the vote to womm, a development which benefited the party 
enormously. 154-) In Westphalia, with its large Catholic popuh tion, the 
Centre enjoyed considerable support, well above the national average: 
1919 1928 
Westph.-N. 
'llestph.-S. 
Reich 
42.1 
28.3 
19.7 
1920 
42.8 
28.0 
13.6' 
1924(i) 
35.8 
26.0 
16.6' 
1924(ii) 
38.1 
27.3 
17.4' 
31.5 
23.3 
15.2' 
, excluding BYP 
The mobilisation of Westphalian Catholics in the immeaiate post-war years was 
particularly successful. The fear of ilie danger of secularism, atheism, and 
nationalisation were especially strong in Catholic circles in the province. 155) 
At the outset of the revolution the Rhenish-~estphalian Centre Party rejected 
both ilie council qrstem and the 'government of the people's representatives'. 
To counter these 'threats' the Catholic clergy were much more open in their 
efforts to rally the fA.ithful and secure support for the Centre Party, and 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
153) 
154) 
155) 
Quoted by J. Becker, 'Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei 1918-1933. Grund-
probleme ihrer Entwicklung', Das Parlam&~t, II (Beilage), 1968, p.3. 
Ibid., p.4; further Morsey, 0lJ. cit., p.32l. Even -ti1is high percentage 
compares poor~ with the 86.3 per cent mobilised by the Centre Party at 
the heigh t of the Kul turkampf. 
Morsey, in FBrst, Ope cit., pp.3l-32. 
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virtually urged the Catholics to vote for the party as part of their 'Christian 
duty'. 156) The influence of the clergy over the voting habits of their flocks 
was to be a constn.nt feature of the "}I1eima;r period, and the ho stili ty of the 
Church and. clerics was to be directed not only against the Left, bIt also 
increasing~, from the late nineteen-~venties, against the radical Right. 157) 
The support of' the church assisted the Centre Party enonnous~. The influence 
of the party was also reinforced by -the extensive Catholic press in '?festphalia. 
By the mid-'wenties there were some 81 regional Catholic papers, of which 
the 'Tremonia' (Dortmund - 40,000 copies) and 'the 'MUnsterische Anzeiger' 
(MUnster - 37,000 copies) had the greatest significance. 158) 
The distribution of the Centre Party's vote was naturally closely related. 
to the distribution of the Catholio population in the province. In the 16 
counties which were solidly Catholic the Centre Party enjoyed an absolute 
majori~ in all the Reichstag elections between 1919 and. 1930. 159) In the 
bulk of these pred.aninantly rural camties, the party achieved very high 
returns. In the Reichstag election of December 1924, for example, the Centre 
Party secured 86.3 per cent of the vote in County Borken, 84.5 per cent in 
County Warena.orf, 81.8 per oent in County MUnster, ar.d 80.9 per cent in County 
Meschede. 160) The conservatism of the rural population and. its greater 
social coherence contributed. towards the party's success. 
In the urban districts, especial~ in the Ruhr, the abili~ of the Centre 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
156) 
l57l 158 
159 
160) 
Cf. KUhr, op~ cit., pp.59 ff.. See also the electoral appeal by the 
Catholic priests of MUnster in Jal'llary 1919, in which it was pointed 
out to the Catholic population that 'den erst en Anspruch [cuf unsere 
Stimme hat die Zentrumspartei, nach ihran christ1ich-demokratischen 
Programme die zuver1!ssige Vertreterin del' politischen, sozialen und 
wirtschaftliChen Interessen aller stHnde, nach ihren a1tbewahrten 
kirchenpo1itischen GrundsHtzen die tapfere Vork~mpferin fUr unsere 
religiBs-kirchlichen Rechte'. Reprinted in G.A. Ritter and S. Miller, 
(eds.), Die deutsche Revolution 1918-1919, Frankfurt a.lA., 1968, pp.263-
264. 
On this see especially Plum, Ope cit., pp.152 ff •• 
Morsey, Ope cit., pp.603-605. 
These were: Reg. Bez. Arnsberg: Olpe, Meschede, Brilon, Amsberg, Lippstadt 
Reg. Bez. Minden: Warburg, HBxter, BHren, Paderbom, Wieden- • 
brUck. 
Reg. Bez. MUnster: Warenaorf'J._~.mnster, Coesfeld, Borken, Ahaus 
and Steimurt. 
Calculated from results "taken fran HA. 6A/544. 
116 
Pa~ to attract the Catholic vote was noticeably less. In the industrialised, 
urban environment the influence of the Church on Catholics was muted by socinl 
and environmental factors. The anonymity of the voter in tavns probably con-
tributed to the greater readiness of Catholics to vote for other parties. 
Thus in Bottrop, in which catholics formed 75.6 per cent of the population, 
the Centre Party secured only 36.2 per cent of the vote in the Rei chstafj elec-
tion of 1924. In Recklinghausen the respective figures were 70.8 and 33.9 
per cent; in Hagen 66.3 and 20.8 per cent; and in ~ladbeck 58.9 and 28.5 per 
cent. 161) A comparison between the rural and urban Catholic vote in the 
December election of 1924 SUbstantiates the 'to\vn-count~ factor' observed 
elsewhere. 162) 
The presence of a solid Centre Party vote was a constant feature of 
Westphalian politics in the Weimar era. The high Catholic vote in the rural 
counties, and the strong support enjoyed by the party in those urban centres 
which had a significant Catholic population, were a formidable obstacle limit-
ing the chances of non-Catholic parties. The temci 1;y with wbic.l1 the party 
held on to its vote created great difficulties for the NSDAP in the post-1929 
period, and. restricted its success in Westphalia. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
161) Calculated from results taken fran HA 6A/544. 
162) KUhr, OPe cit., pp.278 ff.; Kaltefleiter, Ope cit., p.52. 
I 
I 
j 
j 
i 
I 
j 
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Chapter 4. RIG-HT-WL"fG- EXTRE!HSM m TI-r!': POST-WAR PERIOD, 1919 TO 192.3. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the purpos e of this analysis the term I rlgh t-wing extremism' is 
limited to those movements active in Westphalia which were not prepared to 
accept the ~eimar State, anu whose main characteristic was an uncompromising 
rejection of the democratic ~stem introduced in 1918. Such parties as the 
DNVP and the TN? do not cone into this categoIY, for in spite of their ini-
tia1 antagonism towards the Republic, they were drawn into the "system", even 
if wi thin the DnVp opposition to it remained strong throughout the Weimar 
period. 1) The main concern will be with the v~lki sch-anti-Semi tic movements 
which fed the National Socialist movemEnt, cultivated the ground on which 
Nazism was to flourish ideologically and organisationally, and provided the 
bulk of the early membership of the NSDAP. The history of these movements 
must be seen as an integral part of the genesis of National Socialism. The 
material for westphalia provides ample evidence of the connections between 
the right-wing radical groups and the emerging National Socialist movement. 
Official party histories written during the Third. Reich were 1P play down 
the importance of v!!llkisch movements and emphasize the uniqueness and the 
independence of National Socialism, a party line which grossly distorted the 
facts. 2) 
It is clear that in the early years of the Nazi movement individuals 
interested in, and involved with, the party more often than not also provided 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) For a revieN of the problem of separating conservatism from right-wing 
radicalism see H. Fenske, Konservativisnus und Rechtsradikalismus in 
Bayern nach 1918, Bad Homburg;Ber1in, 1969, pp.9 ff.; pp.313 ff •• 
2) Typical is the account by the 'official hi storian' of the Westphalian 
NSDAP: "Der Nationalsozialismus w~re aber ein trUbes Desti11at, ware er 
aus diesen (i.e. velkisch, anti-Semitic) manchmal auseinander doch auch 
scharf widersprechenden Richtungen hervorgegangen. Die Reinheit und 
Klarhei t, die logische und geschichtliche Folgerichtigkei t, die in der 
nationalsozialistischen Idee una Bewegung zum Ausdruck kommen, wei sen auf 
einen 5chBpferischen Urheber zurUck, auf Adolf Hitler. Und so kann nie-
mand seinen Nationa1sozialismus weiter zurUckfUhren als zu der Zeit, als 
der FIlhrer als Prediger vor das deutsche Volle trat": in F.A.. Beck, Kampf 
und Sieg. Gegchichte der NSDAP im Gau Westfa1en-SUd von den Anf~ngen 
bis zur MachtUbernebme, Dortmund, 1938, p.41. 
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the activism and membership of similar extremist movements. This was inevi-
table in some ways, owing to the relative insignificance of 'the early Nazi 
movement. It had yet to establish a distinct identity. It was only after 
1925 t~~t the Natiol1a1 Socialist Party secured its independence and ceased 
to be an appendage of v~lkisch and military circles. In the ear]y years of 
the movement it was too much part of the amorphous ve1kisch movement and linked 
in numerous ways with right-wing extremist groups. 3) 
The DVSuTB. 4) 
The DVSuTB emerged in 'the spring of 1919 at the Bamberg meeting of the 
A11deutsche verband, one 0 f the most important political organi sations of the 
extreme right to survive the 1918 Revolution. Though -the DVSuTB was Soon but 
one of over a hUndred different v~lkisch and anti-Semitic organisations aotive 
in Germany in the immediate post-war period, it was by far 'the largest, most 
active and most influential anti-Semitic organisation in GermanY'. 5) The 
importance of the DVSuTB should not be overestimated, but it is clear that 
in the early years of the Weimar Republic no other organisation did more, 
albeit often unwittingly and indirectly, to assist the growth of National 
Socialism. 6) 
In Westphalia, despite the fact that the province lacked a tradition of 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
3) The formative years of the NSDAP are covered by G. Franz-Willing, op. 
cit.; W. Hom, FIlhrerideo1ogie undParteiorganisation in der NSDAP. 
Dflsseldorf, 1972; 'Ii. Maser, op. cit.. See also H.-A. Jacobsen & W. Jochmann 
Aus ew[hlte Dokumente zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 1 -1, ' 
Bielefel~ 19 6; J. Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionali sn in -the Nazi Part~, 
MinneapOlis, 1967; D. Orlow, The Histol)" of 'the Naz i Party 1919-1933, 
Vol. I, Newton Abbot, 1971; A. ~rell, FUhrer bp.fiehl ••• Selbstzeugnisse 
aus der 'Kampfzeit' der NSDAP. Dokumentation und Analyse, Dfisseldorf,-r969. 
4.) The history of the DVSuTB has been the object of a recent study by 
U. Lohalm, V~lkischer Radikalismus. Die Geschichte des DVSuTB 1919-1923, 
Hamburg, 1970; see also W. l\rebs, 'DeutschvBlkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund 
(DSTB) 1919-1922', in Die 'BUrgerlichen Parteien in '!)eutschl?nd., Bd. I, 
LeipZig, 1968, pp.77~777. ' 
5) The vie.v of the Rei dlskommissar fUr die fi"ber,vachung der Mfentlichen 
Ordnung, quoted by Lohalm, op. cit., p.ll. 
6) Lohalo, Ope cit., pp.30~328. Cf. SchBn, op. cit., pp.17 ff •• 
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anti-Semitism, the DVSuTB wa3 able to establish itself re~arkab~ quickly 
and to organise significant SUPI)ort. 7) This is surprising in th'lt the 
social and economic structure of the province was not conducive to the 
penetration of vBlkisch and anti-Semitic ideas. It ~s the acute class 
struggle in the post-w'3.r period, especially in the Ruhr towns, where it took 
on its most extreme farm, \"/"hich os.lled forth reaction. In the larger ind.us-
trial centres left-wing politics dominated the scene and it was in these 
towns that the DVSuTB was able to or3anise its most active branches. The 
response came from those middle class clements which felt mo st threatened by 
the 'revolutionary fervour' of the Left and the political pOiver secured by 
the left-wing parties in the post-revolutionary period.. The focus of the 
regional activity of the DVSuTB was Hattingen, where one of the si."'< main 
offices subordinated to the Hamburg centre was established by the end of 1919. 
From Hatti...'1gen one of the founder members of the Reichshammerbund, "Nalter 
Hoffmann, oreanised and controlled the ~ Westphali~Lippe of the ~!SuTB. 8) 
A network of local organisations mpidly spanned the province, t.he bulk of 
the branches lying within the boundaries of the Re,o;ierunBsbezirk of Arnsberg. 
In the Minden administrative region a few branches were established. These 
were mainly in the predcminantly Protestant cronties of the north-west; the 
Catholic counties of the centre and the south were hardly affected. The 
Repjierungsbezirk of Wlnster, with its predcminantly Catholic population, was 
also less susceptible to the anti-Semitic appeal, though the town of l.!finster 
itself, and the towns lying within the Ruhr region, developed sizeable bran-
ches. In Gelsenkirchen, for example, the DVSuTB was able very rapidly to 
establish a considerable presence, the bI"d.nch numbering over one thousand 
members by July 1920. The branch soon made its presence felt in the town 
and eave cause for compla.int by the Jewish community, which protested against 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
7) Lohalm, op. cit., p.119. 
8) For the following see Lohal'll, op. cit., pp.93 ff •• 
I 
I 
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the distribution of anti-Semi tic pamphlets and literature, 'the fixing of 
placards on Jewish shops and property, the &lubing of anti-Semitic sloeans 
on fue ODors of the town's synagogue, and 1i1e activities of street speakers 
engaged in whipping-up anti-Jewish feelings. 9) Bochum and Dort,nund were 
two other notable strongholds of the DVSuTB. In Dortmund the League had some 
four hundred meubers at "the time of its dissolution in July 1922. The high 
membership of: the branch at a time when the D"l3uTB had lost much of its follow-
ing in most parts of the province was dle to "the organisational ability and 
commitment of the lea.der of: the branch, a grammar school teacher named. Helmke, 
who also organised. the local branch of the Deutsch-Sozialistische Partei. 10) 
The DVSuTB was very much an urban movement. Of the 23 branches noted 
by the authorities all but a few were town based. The largest branches 
operated wi thin the Ruhr industrial belt; those in Hattingen, Bocwm, Gelsen-
kirchen, Witten and Dortmund being the most significant. Other importa..'1t 
branches lay on the periphery of this "inner belt": Hagen, Ltldenscheid, 
Iserlohn, Arnsberg, Soest and Werl. 11) The dissolution of the organisation 
in Prussia on 8 July 1922 did little more than f:orce the me:;lbership to find 
a new spiritual home. The anti-Semitic activities continued as before. 12) 
By the time of the ban the League had already 10 st considerable momentum in 
parts of Westphalia. This is especially true of those branches which lay 
outside the Ruhr complex. In the Regierungsbezirk of Minden the organisation 
had declined markedly by 1922, with only four branches still remainine in 
existence; one of these, at Brakel, Coun~ HBxter, bad neither held a public 
meeting nor made its presence felt in anY other way for over a year. 13) In 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
9) The fOllll s of activity are listed in a letter of complaint by the Vorstand 
der Synagogengemeinde Gelsenkirchen to the Police President, ~elsenkirchen, 
22 December 1919, and in a letter to the Regierungspr[sident of Arnsberg, 
Gelsenkirchen, 10 April 1920: SAM I PA/383. 
10j Police report, Dortmund, 1 August 1922: SAl!! I pl/372. 
11 Meldeste11e Arnsberg, 13 September 1922 and 25 August 1922: SA:vl I PA/372. 
12 Police report, Dortmund, 23 November 1922; report by the Landrat, Arnsberg, 
23 November 1922: sx~ I PA/372. 
13) Report by the La.ndrat, Hexter, 1 August 1922: SAD MI IP/569. 
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the larger urban centres, with fue exception of Paderborn, the movement had 
collapsed long before the ban was imposed.. In Bielefeld the local branch had 
dissolved itself as early as March 1921 following the discovery of irregula-
°t o 0 • 0 th 14) I':i loes lon the branch fJ.nances and the removal of e local leader. The 
branches at Minden, Herford, and Bad Oeynhausen had also disappeared before 
July 1922, basically because of lack of support and apathy. 15) 
A variety of factors account for the aevelopment and strength of orga-
nised anti-Semitism in post-war ~erma~, factors Which also explain the situa-
tion in Westphalia. In the first place its appeal was enhanced by the helgh-
tened nationalism which was Slch a feature of tl1e end phase of the war. Add.ed 
to this was the widespread fear, especially among the bourgeoisie and petit 
bourgeoiSie, of possible radical changes as well as the possibili 1iY of the 
16) 
spread of Bolshevisn fran Russia to ~erma.IW. However unjustified these 
fears may seem in retrospect, they led. to '\ite emergence of widespread "anti-
feelings": militant anti-Liberalism, anti-Marxism, anti-Semitism, even a degree 
of unconscious anti-Capitalism. In Westphalia right-wing extremism was also 
fed by two factors peculiar to the province and the Slrrounding region. These 
were, first, the proximity of the allied occupation forces (part of western 
Westphalia was occupied) and, seoondly, the experiences of the revolUtionary 
period, especially the emergence of left-wing radicalisn in the wake of the 
Kapp Putsch. The unrest of 1919 and 1920 involved the appearance of tl1e 
Reichswehr ani Free Corps formations within the Ruhr region and heavy fighting 
wi th "Reds". Both factors favoured the spread of nationalist and anti-bo1she_ 
vist anti-Semitism. This explains the immed:L9.te and rapid fUpport marshalled 
by the DVSuTB within the province. 
There were also strong und.ercurrents of 'economic anti-Semitism' in 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
14) 
15) 
16) 
Police report, Bielefeld, 13 JuJy 1922: SAD MI IP/569. 
Report by fue Landrat, Minden, 15 JuJy 1922; police report, Herford, 
20 July 1922: SAD MI IP/S69. 
Lohalm, op. cit., p.12~. 
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Westphalia. The post-war period., with its food shortages, capital scarcity, 
rapid inflation, general economic uncertainty and widespread political and 
social instability, was a time in which those individuals who felt their 
economic situation threatened were mu ch more likely to accept the simple anti-
Semitic formula. to explain their plight, especia.lly as Germany was inundated 
with anti-Jewish literature. 17) Inevitably in such a situation anti-Semitism 
was much more likely to find support in towns where Jewish firms controlled 
a significant percentage of trade and industry. The success of tre DVSuTB 
in the snall tovm of Warburg in eastern Westphalia underlines the power of 
economic anti-Semitism exploited and encooraged by the League. In a report 
on local anti-Jewish agitation the Landrat of Warburg thus analysed the situa-
tion in the town: 'The fact that the Jews control virtually the whole of the 
livestock, grain and cloth trades explains • • • why the attitude of the 
population to.vards the Jews has become much more negative. Added to this is 
that through the press, furough meetings, aril the more widespread and signi-
ficant anti-Semitic movement, a change of attitude towards the Jews has taken 
place in the mind of the local population.' 18) Even in this relative back-
water the DVSuTB was able to organise meetings attended by over 1,000 people. 19) 
Who turned to the DVSu'llB? The menbership of the organisation in Germany 
had a relatively broad social base, running from the peti t-bourgeoisie to the 
landed class. 20) The national leadership was predaninantly bourgeOis, while 
the regional and locnl leadership was predaninantly petit-bourgeois, with 
academics strongly represented. For Westphalia data is very limited, for no 
membership lis ts fell into the hands of the poli ce at the time of the ban. 
The occupations given in reports suggest a middle class composition: civil 
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17) 
18) 
19) 
20) 
In 1920 alone the DVSuTB distributed sooe 7.6 million pamphlets, 4.7 
million handbills and 7.8 million stickers. Fi@lres given by J. Noakes, 
Ope cit., p.lO. 
Report by the Landrat, Warburg, 11 October 1919: SAD MI IP/563. 
Report by the Landrat, Warburg, 12 September 1919: SAD MI IP/563. 
Lohalm, Ope cit., pp.107 ff •• 
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servants, factory owners and. teachers were prominent. As to the rank and 
file membership, virtually nothing can be gleaned fran the reports. In 
Warburg the DVSuTB was able to find a strong following in the pupil s of 
the local grammar school. They were often eneaged in the distribution of 
anti-Semitic literature in the "lPwn. It is unlikely, however, that they were 
fully paid-up members of the organisation. 21) Not too far off the mark as 
a broad description of the general membership, allowing for the bias, is a 
report in 1he left-wing Volksw111e, which refers to I ossified bourgeoisie 
and. retired anny officers I. 22) 
The prohibition of the DVSuTB in 1922 accelerated the drift of its member-
ship to'Hards a variety of other organisations, a drift which had set in long 
before the official. ban. Leading personalities of the 'Westphalian DVSuTB 
and the bulk of 1:h.e membership scu~t refuge in the DSP, the Buni Oberland 
and the WE, and above all in the NSDAP. Ultimately the latter profited more 
than any other v51kisch or right-wing organisation active within the province. 
'rhis is not surprising in view of the friendly attitude shown tcmards the 
National Socialists by the leadership of the DVSuTB. Since 1920 the Bunl'l.es-
leitung of the organisation had encouraged the regional and local branches 
of the League to further the cause of the Nazis by supporting the creation 
of Nazi party branches. 23) The clo se relationship between the DVSuTB and 
the NSDAP was later recognised in the official history of the Nazi Party of 
Westphalia in which it was noted that 'in the first instance National Socia-
lists came almost everywhere from the so-oalled "'V5lkischer Schutz- und 
24) Trutzbund"'. In Hagen old members of the League swelled the ranks of 
the NSDAP. Here both organisations were led by the san e pers en, a. civil 
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21) 
22) 
23) 
24) 
Letter by the Vorstand der Synagogengemeinde Warburg to the Regierungs-
pr!sident of Minden, Warbur,g, September 1919: SAD MI IP/56}. 
Volkswille, (Gelsenkirchen edition), 12 February 1921. 
Jacobsm & Jochmann, op. cit., p.1S. 
Beck, op. cit., p.193. 
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engineer named Wachenfeld, who was milking a name for himself within the 
vBlkisch movement in southern Westphalia. 25) Wachenfeld had alrea~ per-
. suaded DV3uTB members to form a branch of the NSDAP a year before the ban 
was placed on the League. 26) In some towns the disappearance of the DVSuTB 
led to "!he formation of branches which were little more than the ccntinuation 
of the League in a new guise. In Unna the dissolution of the League, some-
what belatedly, in the f\)ring of 1923, saw its former leader Meinert re-emerge 
as the organiser of a newl;y' established branch of "!he NSDAP, which ccntained 
several members of ihe old organisation. Meinert was to be the leading figure 
in the local National Socialist movement until 1933. 27) A similar develop-
ment also occurred in Witten, where the fonner DVSuTB supporters formed. a 
Nazi branch following ihe ban of the League. 28) In several.. instances former 
DVSuTB members were instrumental at a much later date in fUrthering National 
Socialist interests. In Buer and Bottrop old fllpporters of "!he League were 
behind the formation of Nazi branches in 1925. 29) 
Clearly the DVSuTB did much to promote the emerging National Socialist 
movement within Westphalia, both in an organisational as well as in an 
ideological capacity. The anti-Semites organised in the League were ideal 
recruiting material for the racist Nazi movement and. tile National Socialists 
benefi ted in several ways from the "pioneering"· efforts of the DVSuTB. 
The DSP. 
The DSP pla,yed a role similar to that of the DVSuTB in the development 
of the NSDA.P. Unlike the DVSuTB, the DSP was organised as a political party 
and was first mooted at a meeting of the racist Germanenorden in December 
1918. This gave rise to a Deutschsoziale Arbei tsgemeinsch~ft organised by 
Freiherr van Sebottendorf in May 1919. The programe of the party, and the 
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25) Police report, Hagen, 25 Ju~ 1922: SAM I PA/372. 
26) Lambers, opo cit., p.165. 
27) Beck, Ope cit., pp.3~9 fr.; see also the account in the~, 16 April 1925. 
28) Beck, OPe cit., pp.3l and. 325. 
29) Lobalm, OPe cit., pp.320-32l. 
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name it ul tim at ely assumed, were the result of a meeting held in Hanover in 
April 1920, at which Alfred Brunner, an engineer from DUsseldorf, took over 
the leadership of t.l1e party. 30) Initially the DSP was direoted fran Hanover, 
but by November 1920 it had moved its party headquarters 1P Berlin. 31) The 
party programme was very similar to that of the NSDAP wi th the emphasis on 
national ism, anti-Semi tism, land and financial reform. Such diff'erences as 
there were between the two parties were primarily tactioal in nature. Thus 
the DSP made more effort to rallY working class support, placing greater 
32) 
emphasis on the socialist content of the programme. The mo st important 
difference, in ve1kisch eyes, was the "parliamentary" nature of the DSP, which 
inVOlved itself in elections frau tile start, though without much suocess. 33) 
The similarities of the DSP and the NSDAP brouE1t t the parties into oontact 
on the branch and national level, contact which turned into rivalry and anta-
gonism as the two movements vied for the cc:ntrol of the v~lkisch movement. 
Efforts to resolve the competition were made at Salzburg in August 1920. 
At the meeting it was agreed that the DSP should moentrate on GermaI\Y' north 
of tile Main, leaving southern Germal\Y' to the NSDAP, with the E!lCception of 
the DSP branch established in Nuremberg. The agreement did not end tile fric-
tion. between the two parties. Brunner especially found the enmity tragic in 
view of the similarities between the DSP and the NSDlP, and made repeated 
efforts to fuse the two movements. But these came to nothing Owing to Hitler's 
insistenoe that the leadership of such a united party wculd have to be centred 
on Munich and not on Berlin. 34) 
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30) 
31) 
32) 
33) 
34) 
On the DSP see W. Horn, OPe cit., pp.82 ff.; F.L. Carsten, The Rise of 
Fascism, London, 1967, pp.100 ff.; M. Weissbecker, 'Deutschsozialistische 
Partei (nsp) 1919-1922', in Die Bfirgerlichen Parteien in Deutschland, 
Ope cit., pp.763-764. 
The first Rundschreiben was dated Berlin, 25 November 1920: HA 42/839. 
The members of the DSP addressed each other with the "oomrade" of the 
working class movements - Carsten, Fascisln ••• , OPe cit., p.100. 
The !SP secured only 2,084 votes in ine Reichstag election of 1920; 
Maser, OPe cit., p.228. . 
"Rundschreiben Nr. 5", 10 May 1921: HA 42/839; Weissbecker, Ope cit., 
p.763. 
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In the ccnfiict with 'lile NSDA.P the DSP suffered very much from the 
orgm isational fragmentation which characterised its structure. The DSP 
was never subjected to an effective centralised leadership or organisation, 
which was a oonsequenoe of the early history of the party. The first party 
branches were founded independently of any central organisation, which did 
not emerge until after the Hanover meeting of April 1920. It was a considel'-
able time before the Berlin headquarters issued the first circular in November. 
The first DSP branches were thus left to themselves for long enough to develop 
their own ideas and independence. One important consequenoe of this situation 
was that the small, relatively isolated branches, became vulnerable to the 
pull exerted by the more centralised and activist National Sooialist movement, 
a fact which ultimately hastened the collapse of the DSP. 35) The laok of 
central control ala 0 weakened the effectiveness of the movement in th':l.t it 
lacked drive. Branohes pursued their efforts at their leisure and more often 
than not ignored the directives coming from party headquarters. The party 
als 0 lacked another requirement for success, namely adequate finances. Finan-
cial difficulties dogged the DSP from the start and reduoed the impact of the 
movement. .As early as October 1920 an appeal went out from pa.rty headquarters 
to 'the branches asking for more effort if the party was to succeed since 
'the money sources available from Yiestphalia and the Rhineland are exha.usted. 
In order to expand, money must be found.' 36) 
In Westphalia the OOP made very little impa.ct a.nd reflected its general 
weakness in northern GermaI\Y. Ironically, in view of the Salzburg agreement 
wi'th the NSJAP, the two largest branches of the party were situated in the 
National Socialist sphere of influence south of the Main, namely at Munioh, 
which had some 4-00 members, and. at Nuremberg, which was 300 strang and was 
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35) 
36) 
Franz-Willing notes that the "lack of strong organisation was the main 
reason wqy th e DSP di ssolved itself after a few years and. merged into 
the NS~\P", Franz-Willing, Ope cit., p.89. 
"An alle Ortsgruppen", 10 October 1920: HA 4-2/839. 
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regarded as an exception under the agreement. 37) For Westphalia no member-
ship figures are available, but from ihe little evidence of party activity 
one can deduce that the DSP had but a small following. The major centres of 
the party were Bielefeld and Wanne-Eickel, which were established before the 
Hanover meeting, both being represented by delegates at ihe meeting. 38) 
Hattingen also had a branch, which was founded by former supporters of the 
DVSuTB in May 1921. The bmnch enjoyed sane success in the area. and was able 
to secure the active support of Walter Hoffmann, Gauleiter of the Westphalian 
DVSuTB. The branch was very small at its formation, numbering a mere five 
souls in 1921, a figure which expanded to twelve by 1922. 39) The only other 
branch was organised in Siegen, but it fai led to make aru impact in the town. 
Its 6ltistence only came to tile notice of 'the authorities in November 1923, 
when it was observed that ihe local NSDAP had emerged fran a DSP branch. 40) 
Thus the impact of the DSP was very limited. The reasons can be deduced from 
the history of the Uattingen branch, about which there is some material. Its 
weakness reflected the lack of active support and the absence of sufficient 
financial resoorces, which restricted the propaganda of the branch. Through-
out 1921 it met privately, barring one public meeting in Augu st. The major 
propaganda effort was limited to material drawn from the Vl3lldscher Beobachter, 
which circulated within the branch fran its inception. The highlight of the 
brief branch history was a major public meeting addressed by Feder, in his 
capacity as leader of the "Kampfbund zur Brechung der Zinsknechtschaft" in 
March 1922. 41) 
The Westphalian branches of the DSP had little contact with the central 
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37) 
38) 
39) 
40) 
z..l) 
The largest and most active branch in the north was Kiel, which had 58 
members in 1921: Mi tgl1ederverzeichnis, 1921: HA 42/839. On the Nurem-
berg branch see R. Lerunan, 'Julius Streicher and the Origins of the 
NSDAP in Nuremberg, 1918-1923', in A. Nicholls & E. Matthias, (eds.), 
German Social Democracy and 'the triumph of Hitler, Londal, 1971, pp.134 1'1' .. 
Maser, Ope cit., p.228. 
Beck, OPe cit., p.210. 
Police report, Siegen, 30 November 1923: SAM I PA/398. 
Beck, OPe cit., pp.21Q-211. 
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party organisation. Party circulars were generally ignored, especially those 
which called for regular contributions to the central party fund. The lack 
of response and co-operation over such financial contributions was lamentdd 
in a DSP circular of 1921., in which it was stated tilat the '~Westphalia has 
never balanced its accounts and has always only managed insufficient payments. 
The district organisation of Wanne-Eickel is especially atrocious in this 
respect.' 42) 
Despite the snall scale of' its efforts in Westphalia, "the DSP helped to 
prepare the way for its v8lkisch rival and alccessor the NSDAP. Its importance 
lay above all in extending v8lkisch influence into an area which the DVSuTB 
had generally failed to penetrate- the ranks of the working class. The 
empha sis on German-v8lkisch s ociali sm and the concen tra tion on social demands 
made the rep a much more like]y organisatlon tmn the DVSuTB to secure response 
fran the worlcing olass for v8lkisch polioies. The local DSP leaders were very 
conscious of the s ooial structure of the population to which they were appeal-
ing and were interested in issuing the right wpe of' propaganda for local 
4-3) 
consumption. Follo,'ling 'the dissolu tlon of the rep at its last national 
conference in the autumn of' 1922, the bllk of' its membership drifted towards 
the NSDAP. The small Nazi movement of Westphalia reoeived vaJllable recruits. 
In Hattingen the dissolution of tile DSP led directly to the fonnation of a 
NSDAP branch, which was 11 ttle more at the beginning than a continuation of 
the old DSP. The branch proved a most valuable aadition to Nazi strength, 
for by the mid-twenties it was 'b:> develop into one of the largest and most 
active groups the party possessed in the province. 4-4-) 
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42) 
43) 
44) 
"Rundschreiben Nr. 5", 10 May 1921: HA 42/839. 
The Bielefeld branch of' 'the DSP wrote to Streicher asking him to concen-
trate more on the eoonomic issues, and less on anti-Semitism in his weekly 
paper 'Deutscher Sozialist'; Carsten, Fascism, Ope cit., p.lOl; Beck notes 
that the audience at the meeting of the Hattingen branch were mainly 
working class; Beck, Ope cit., p.211. 
VB, 21 October 1922; Beck, Ope cit., pp.2lo-2l2. 
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Other Right-wing Extremist Movements in Westphalia in the EtlrJ.y nineteen-
twenties. 
The DVSuTB and the DSP were not the only manifestations of rie11t-wing 
extremism in the immediate post-war period. Both movements were important 
in the subsequent development of the I;SDAP, but the Nazis were also assisted 
by the presence of a large number of influential movements of the Right active 
in 'the early nineteen-twenties, the bllk of which were represented in 'West-
phalia. The proliferation of right-wing ex:trem:i st movem ents in Germany is 
one of the striking features of the post-war period. Initially the extreme 
Right, indeed the German Right in general, were left somewhat breathless by 
the collapse of German power and the revolution of November 1918. In the 
course of 1919 and 1920 a large number of extremist groups emerged on the 
Right to resist the changes vbich had occurred so dramatically. These orga-
nisations rejected the new republic and condemned. 'the whole "system" intro-
duced by the revolution. Collectively, the various organisations of the 
Right represented a fonnida.ble pressure group in the new republic. The weak-
ness of the rndical Right lay 1."l its di s-lnity and fragmentation. 
In Westphalia the proliferation of right-wing extremist organisations 
reflected the general developments elsewhere. The bulk of the organisations 
which filled the province were of national importance, a few had only regional 
significance. A catalogue of these organisations in Westphalia would have to 
include, apart fran the DVSuTB, the DSP and the NSDAP, such significant organi-
sations as the JdO, S tahlhe 1m , and Bund Oberland, the less important Orgesch, 
and the Verein nationalgesinnter Soldaten, and the relatively insignificant 
Baltikumkampfer, 'Braver Heydrich', Reichlandsbund, Vereinigung 'Alte Kameraden', 
Verband ehemaliger Freikoryskll.mpfer, Wehrwolf, and the Wiking Buna. One would 
also have to add to this list two very important regional right-wing movements, 
the WB, and the WTB. Not all the organisations which sprouted up in the 
immediate post-war period maintained their early radical stance. Two of the 
largest and most influential movements, the JdO and the Sta.hlhelm, both of 
1.30 
which were banned in 1922 in Prussia since th~ were considered 'a danger to 
the state', went on to playa much more moderate role in later years. 
Viewed collectively, t..l)e right-wing extremist orgn.nisations had certain 
common features. In the first place, they were all ho stile to t.."e new republic, 
and committed in varying degrees to its destruction. The 'philosophies' of 
the organisations were the product of resentment and hostili"tiY, of a collec-
tive "anti-feeling", a mixture of anti-democratic, anti-Semitic, anti-liberal, 
anti-republican, and anti-marxist sentiments. Secondly, by nature these 
organisations were non-party, though their outlook drew them to.'1ards the 
parties of the Right ranging fran the Di]VP to the v5lktsch extremists. Thirdly, 
the social composition of these organisations was markedly heteroBeneous. 
This characteristic is very noticeable in the largest of the organisa.tions, 
the JdO, which was able to cut 1hrough the class barriers. A report on the 
Herford regional branches noted that 'all sections of the population are 
represented: factoIY o,mers, civil servants, white-collar workers, trades-
people, farmers, artisans, ana trade union organised worlcers'. 4-5) Similarly, 
the 130 members of the Hamre branch of the JdO were drawn 'fran all classes: 
artisans, lawyers, bank officials, white-collar workers employed on the rail-
way, businessmen, shopkeepers, students, miners, workers and. other employees'. 46) 
A. wide social spectrum was also represented in the $, though the middle class 
predominated. 4-7) The Verein nationalgesinnter Soldaten was more middle class 
in its composition, and distinguished itself, at least in the Dortmund region, 
by the high percentage of police officers contained VIi thin its ranks. 48) 
More sectional in its cc:mposition was 1he WTB, in which members fran 'the 
farming community predominated. Unlike its chief rival, the WB, it was almost 
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4-5) Report by the Landrat, Herford, 6 July 1922: SAD MI ll'/569. 
4-6) Police report, Hamm, 19 October 1921; report by the Oberbflrgermeister, 
Hamm, 23 August 1922: SAM I PA/34-7. 
47) Report by the Oberprli.sident, MUnster, 15 May 1923: S . .t1 I PA/370. 
48) In the Dortmund area some 20 per cent of the 240 members were police 
officers, mostly" junior members of the force"; police report, Dortmund, 
10 November 1921: SAM I PA/366. 
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totall,y confined to the Regierunesbezirk of MUnster. 49) 
The material acquired by fue authorities on several of the extremist 
organisations is ve~ patchy. Part of tile reason for this was the secretive 
nature of some of the organisations, such as the Wehrwolf, and the insignifi-
cance of some of the others, such as the 'Braver Heydrichl organisation, the 
Wikine Bund, and the Vereinigune; "Alte Kamera de n" , none of which was able to 
make much impact on the province. 50) A major problem Was the difficulty of 
penetrating ri~t-wing radical movements, and police spies had to be ve~ 
cautious and 'take great care' in their attempts to infiltrate too smaller 
organisations, whose ma:nbership was built up on perscnal recommendations and 
personal contacts. 51) What made life even more difficult for the police 
authorities in their attempts to keep the various movements of the Right under 
observation, was the fact that sections of the police belonged to some of 
the organisations which they were Slpposed to be observing. In G-elsenkirchen, 
the local branch of the 'Verein ehemaliger Eal tenk!Lnpfer zur Hebune; des 
Deutschtums', an organisation which had 'strong anti-Semitic tendencies' and 
which was concerned with 'excluding alien influenoes', was strongly supported 
by a section of the local Schutzpolizei. 52) Similarly in Dortmund pOlioe 
officials figured prominently in the looal branch of the Verein national-
gesinnter Soldaten, a nationalist, G-erm~velkisch organisation. 53) In the 
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49) 
50) 
51) 
52) 
53) 
Report by the Oberprllsident, MUnster, 16 June 1924: SAM I PA/370. 
Onl,y two branches of the organisation 'Braver Heydrich' were noted by the 
authorities of southern Westphalia, and neither of these had more than la 
handful of members' - report by the Regierungsprllsi dent, Arnsberg, 24 
August 1922; report by the Landrat, Iserlohn, 7 August 1922; report by the 
Landrat, Schwelm, 15 August 1922: SAM I PA/365. 
There is record of only one branch of the Wiking Bund, that of Siegen, 
which had some 'Wenty members; report by the Regierungspr!sident, Arnsberg, 
20 December 1923: SAD MI IP/570. 
The Vereinigung "Alte Kameraden" was a more localised organisation restric-
ted to Rhineland.-Westphalia. It brooght together former m611bers of the 
Free Corps raised by Pfeffer von Salomon.. Six branches were noted. by the 
authorities: at Eochum, Essen, Elberfeld, Marl, MUnster, and Paderborn; 
report (copy) by Regierungsprllsident Ddsseldorf, 10 January 1923: SAD MI 
IP/570. . 
Police report, Dortmund, 23 Deoenher 1922: SAM I PA/273. 
Volkswille, (Gelsenkirchen edition), 1 September 1921; repOrt by the pOlice, 
Gelsenkirchen, 6 September 1921: SAM I rA/270. 
Police report, Dortmund, 27 June 1922: SAM I PA/366. 
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Dortmund region right-wing organisations were virtua~ free to operate in 
1921 and 1922 owins to the protection afforded to them by the higher police 
official~ In a report compiled by 'lower police officials' which was sent 
to the Oberprl!sident of Westphalia, the complaints against 'their right-wing 
orientated ruperiors' stated that 'they are quick to pursue left-wing radicals, 
but slow up the observation process on right-wing movements by holding back 
reports on them, or altering and toning them demn'. The favourable attitude 
shown qy higher police officials led to developments like the non-enforcement 
of the Prussian ban on the 'Bund Oberland', because the 1000.1 police chief 
did not consider the association a threat to the state and the constitution. 54) 
Within the provincial bur,eaucracy sifuilar right-wing bias was at work. This 
is to be expected to sane degree in view of the few changes which occurred 
within the civil service apparatus in the post-war period. The bulk of the 
civil servants paid onlY lip-service to the republican system. In the ear~ 
nineteen-twenties some 220 of tile 400 La,ndr/tte of Prussia were DNVP orienta-
ted. 55) T'nis situation raises a question mark as to the reliabili W of the 
reports on right-wing extremists made by the Westphalian Landr!lte. Certain~ 
the great number of negative reports on a variety of right-wing associations 
which are contained in the files of the regional authorities cannot always 
be taken as an accurate reflection of the local situation. There is proof 
from other sources of the existence of quite sizeable branches of certain 
organisations whose existence must have been known in the loca.lities, but 
which did not figure in the reports of the Landrl!te. The fact that many 
Landr!:\te, even after the ban of certain organisations, reported that they 
did not regard them as right-wing radical movements, underlines doubts a.bout 
the reliability of the reports. 56) 
Apart fran the problem of tPthering reliable and adequate information, 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
54) Report by the Oberpr!1sident, LHl.nster, 15 July 1922: SAM I P1V382. 
55) Lambers, op. cit., p.185. 
56) See, for example, 'lhe reports by the Landrat, Meschede, 1 March 1924; 
and Landrat, Siegen, z.. March 1924 (on JdO): SAM I PA/387. 
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the authorities of the province were faced with the difficulty of enforcing 
a series of bans on sever~l extremist movements of the RiGht. These bans 
more often th::m not proved futile. The greatest difficul t>J was provided by 
the piecemeal nature of the prohibitions. These affected a number of organi-
sations in 1921 and 1922, but not all of the right-wing groups at the same 
time. Since the members of one extremist organisation tended also to be 
active in several allied movements, the probl~m of right-'wing agitation and 
subversion was not solved effectively. The membership of one banned organi-
sation merely continued its existence within the framework of another, still 
legally operating right-wing movement. Thu s in Dortmund t1.e ban on the 
Verein nationa,lgesinnter Solaaten and the JdO led to -the ex:pl\ll.sion of the 
local branch of the WTB. 57) The dissolution of the DVSuTE and the ~ 
OberltU'ld in the town merely swelled the membership of the WE, with two learling 
officials of the Bund Oberland., and one of the leading liGhts of the local 
58) DVSUTB, re-appearing in the branch committee of their new "home". A 
similar pattern also unfolded in other areas of the province. 59) Another 
expedient used by prohibited organisations was to dissolve the local branches 
and re-enrol the members individually with the national central organisation. 60) 
Some branches of prohibited organisations simply ignored the ban and continued 
to meet privately, ~ile others pleaded ignorance when the police finally 
61) 
c3Ught up with them. The authorities hrul no illusions about their lack 
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57) 
58) 
59) 
60) 
61) 
Police report, Dortmund, 27 October 1922: SAM I PA/347. 
Police report, Dortmund, 19 July 1922: SAM I FA/547. 
For example: "Verein ehemaliger Baltikumer" into "Verein nationalgesinnter 
Soldaten"; police report, Bochum, 15 Augu st 1921: SA1~ I PA/366. Stahlhelm 
into "Verein nationalgesinnter Soldaten"i police report, Bochum! 8 August 
1922: S~d I FA/~72. Orgesch into JdO; police report, Hamm, 27 uctober 
1921: SAM I PA/367. OrgeSQh into·.'I',l3~ report by the Regierungspr!1sident, 
MUnster, 10 October 1921: ~AM I FA/307. 
In Dortmund the membership of -the Bund Oberland enrolled themselves in 
the Munich branch and continued to i'unction as a uni/t on the local level-
pOlice report, Dortmund, 25 September 1922: SAM I FA 382. ' 
Police report on the JdO, Dortmund, 25 September 1922: SAM I pA/347. 
Report by the Oberpr!isi dent on Orgesch, MU.nster, 10 OctOber 1921: SAM I 
PA/367. The Westig branch of the Bund Oberland (barmed on 24 November 1921) 
was still in existence in August 1922. When confronted by the police the 
members stated "that none of them were aware of the ban of their organisa-
tiont"; police report, Hagen, 14 August 1922: SAM I PA!382. 
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of success in curbing the radical Right (or the Left, for tlnt matter) and 
feared that at most they woold succeed in driving the organisations undergrouncl, 
with 'the inner core of the prohibited organisations continuing to exist'. 62) 
By far the largest and most successful of arw of the diverse right-wing 
movemEnts active in Westphalia in the early nineteen-twenties was the JdO, 
which penetrated to all parts of the province. Almost cauplete data concerning 
the movement in itsibrmative ye~rs are provided by the information gathered 
in the Regierungsbezirk of Minden. 63) By the time the JdO was banned in 
August 1922, the organisation had some 58 bramhes, 47 of which lay in the 
predominantly Protestan t coonties of the north and north-east. The total 
memberShip recorded for 49 branches, inclusive of 'estimates', gives the mini-
mum figure of 3,764, and a maximum membership of 3,881. The JdO also had 
large branches e1se ... here in the province. In Dortmund, where the movement 
had. strong connections with the DVSuTB, Stahlhelm, Verein nfltiona1gesinnter 
Soldaten and the DlNP, the local branch contained some 400 to 500 members. 64) 
In County Arnsberg the organisation also had. 'a sizeable membership', with 
several 'strong and active branches' throughout the county. 6,) Both Werdohl 
and Lippstadt had. branches in which the membership number exceeded. the 100 
mark. 66) The total membership of '!he J dO in Westphalia probably exceeded 
10,000. 
The strength of the JdO indicates the degree to which a r.l.ght-wing radical 
appeal could generate response. The movement was to secure even greater sup-
port following the ban imposed on it in Prussia. (from August 1922 to January 
1923). This pattern of development was also shown by another extra-parlia._ 
mentary right-wing pressure group, the Stahlhelm. This organisation was 
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62) 
63) 
64) 
65) 
66) 
Report by the Oberpd.sident. MUnster, 21 September 1922: SAD MI IP/62l. 
See the numerous reports by the Lanar!te and police authorities for 1921 
and 1922: SAD MI IP16l7. 
Police reports, Dortmund, 8 July and. 25 September 1922: SAM I PA/347. 
Report by the Landrat, Arnsberg, 20 October 1921: &\M I PA/347. 
Police report, Werdohl, 18 August 1922; police report, Lippstadt, 15 
August 1922: SAM: I PA/34.7. 
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subjected to a ban lasting from June 1922 to Jaruary 1923. Westphalia was 
one of the few provinces in Germany in which the organisation had been able 
to make sane progress before the ban temporarily halted its growth. 67) Des-
pite the assistance given to the Stahlhelm by the JdO, the former movement 
was ~ far the weaker of the two in the pre-1923 period. 68) By the time of 
its dissolution, the Stahlhelm had only a hand.:ful of branches in southern 
Westphalia, none of which had a significa.nt membership. 69) The organisation 
was to expand rapidly in 1923 and 1924- to become the largest right-wing para-
military pressure group active in the province. 70) 
,Two orga.nisations of regional significance were al so part of the West-
phalian national-vBlkisch movement, the WB and i}.le WT:3. The former covered 
the whole of the province and adjacent regions, especially Lippe-Detmold and 
Schaumburg-Lippe, while the latter was restricted almost tota1~ to the 
Regierunesbezirk of MUnster. The origins of both organisations are tied up 
wi th the ban on the Orgesch movement, the first branches of both the WB and 
the71TB being little more than ccntinuations of the Escherich organisation. 71) 
During the period 1920-1924 both organisations played a crucial role in the 
organisation of tGerman-v5lkisch and German-nationalist' support in the region.72 
Since both organisations were permanent features of the regional vBlkisch 
movement and were never subjected. to arw bans, 'they provided a useful refuge 
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67) 
68) 
69) 
70) 
71) 
72) 
V.R. Berghahn, Der stahlhelm. Bund der Frontso1<t'\ten 1,218-1935, 
DUsseldorf, 1966, p.30. 
The two organisations held joint meetings and emphasized their similarity 
of aim and purpo Be; see pollce report, Iserlohn, 1 July 1922: SAM I PA/547 
Meldestelle, Arnsberg, 24 August 1922; Police report, Bochum, 8 August • 
1922; Pollce report, Witten, 29 July 1922: SAM I PA/372. No data avail-
able for northern Westphalia in the pre-1923 period. 
By 1925 Stahlhelm branches ,dth a membership of between 250 and 500 were 
quite common; the province was well covered by the organisation; numerous 
reports oonta:ined in file SAl! ! PA/372. 
Report by the Oberprasident, MUnster, 10 October 1921: SAM I PA/367; 
pollce report, 1.:Unster, 4 June 1924: SAM I PA/370~ The Orgesch had 
established a strong presence in Rhineland-Westphalia in 1920, with a 
total membership estimated at 8,000 to 10,000; police report, Bochum, 
19 August 1920: SAM I PA/364. On the Orgesoh see Fenske, op. cit., 
pp.l08 ff •• 
Report by the Oberprlisident, MUnster, 16 June 1924: SAM I pA/no. 
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for the membership of a variety of proscribed. organisations. 73) The v~lkisch 
inclinations of the ";VB and the ,fTB were camouflaged behind the :f'a.irly inno-
cuous statutes on which the organisations were based. The statutes of the 
'\VB stated that its pUI".cJose was the' cultivation of Westphalian virtues, the 
encouragement of Low German, the study of .lo~l history, old habi ts and folk-
lore'. Further aims were 'the spiritual and economic rege!l.eration of the 
German~, the cultivation of "Heimatliebe" and love for tile great German 
Fatherland, and the revival of the phySical, spiritual and moral strength of 
the German Volk, especially through the education of the German youth' .. 74.) 
Beyond these aims, the ~B also pursued a number of political objective~, 
advocating above all the 'strengthening of the authority of the State', and 
'fighting Bolshevism, Internationalism and the cc:ncept of class-war' .. 75) 
The programme and objectives of the '3TB were almost identical. 
The importance of the right-wing radical organisations mu st be seen in 
the short and long term perspective. Collectively, the various movements 
demonstrate the degree of response right-wing radicalism generated in the pro-
vince. Since none of the organisations had a 'political' function as such, 
the pOlitically committed elements within than had little choice in the imme-
diate post-wa.r period. except to support the DNVP, and to a lesser degree, the 
DVP. With the emergence of the NSDAP and. the DVFP, and their emphasis on 
v5lkisch id.eals and values, the existing right-wing pressure groups provided 
favourable recruiting ground. The fact that the v51kisch parties could look 
to this support made their establishment much easier. The ground on which 
they could flourish was already prepared. The immediate prOblem was not one 
of creating support, but engaging and organising the available human material. 
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73) 
74.) 
75) 
For example, the COlllmi ttee of the Dortmund branch of the WB contained 
two 'well-known members of the Bund Oberland, and one fonner leader of 
the banned. DVSuTBj police report, Dortmund, 19 August 1922: SAM I PA/379. 
"Satzungen des Westfalenbundes"; cOF:! in file 8-\:4 I PA/370. 
Report by the Landrat, Mesched.e, 29 September 1924.: SAM I PA/370. 
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The early history of the iVestyhalian HSDAP demonstrates how much support 
was given to the party ~ existing German-vBlkisch movements. The first 
Westphalian branch, established in Dortmund, secured considerable backing 
from supporters of the Bund Oberland, DVSuTB, Verb and nation~lee3innter 
Solflaten, and the JdO. 76) Regional leaders of various organis3.tions moved 
towards the NSDAP from 1922, a development which must have influenced the 
rank and file to do likewise. An early convert was the 'Nestphalian lE!<<l.der of 
the Bund Oberland, Franz Burckert, who was agitating for the Nazi movement 
by 1923. 77) Another active supporter of the vl3lkisch cause Was the we11-
known Free Corps leader Pfeffer von Salomon, who ultimately declared for 
Hitler in .1925 follovnng the break-up of the NSFB. 78) For the Nazi cause 
the support of von Pfeffer was extremely valuable since he had built up 
important connections in the early nineteen-twenties with a variety of para-
mill tary right-wing associations connected with the Free Corps movement. 79) 
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76) Police reports, Dortmund, 19 July 1922: SAM I PA/382; 23 April 1923: 
SAM I PA/370. 
77) The Bund Ober1and was especially strong in "!he towns of the Ruhr, where 
the bulk of its branches were si tuatedj report by the Oberpr1l.sident, 
MUnster, 14 November 1921: SAM I P4I382. The organisation contrOlled a 
sizeable a.dministrative set-up in the province composed of a 'military' 
and a 'political' leader, several military instructors, an ordnance ser-
geant, and several t assistants', backed. by S-lf'f'icient financial support 
used primarily to purchase weaponry. See police report, Dcrtmund, 19 
July 1922: SAM I PA/382. The leader of the organisation, Burckert, had 
jOined a Free corps recruited in Minden after the revolution and had taken 
part in the fighting in Upper Silesia as a member of the Free Cor:ps Ober-
lnnd; police report, Iserlohn, 3 December 1921: SA14 I PA/382. 
78) Fr~~z'Pfeffer von Salomon, born 1888; preferred to call himself von Pfeffer 
since he thought that his name soo.nded too Jevdsh; a capta.in in the ar:ny. 
After the war he fonned a Free Corp s in Westphalia; participated in the 
Baltic oonflicts against the Poles,; joined the Kupp affair. First met 
Hi tIer in Berlin during the Kapp Putsch. Later active in sabotaee actions 
in the Ruhr. Became leader of the V-S-B; joined the NSDAP after Hitler's 
release; party number 16,101. Gau lei ter of 7{ es tphalia March 1925 to 27 
March 1926; then Gauleiter (with Kaufmann and Goebbels) of Gau Ruhr (to 
20 June 1926). Became Oberster SA-F!l.hrer 1 November 1926; held po st to 
29 August 1930; resigned after dispute with Hitler. Also Leiter des 
Jugendausschusses November 1926 to 11 June 1930. 
79) Von Pfeffer was honorary chairman of the Vereinigung "Alte Kameraden" 
composed of ex-Free corp s members. The members of von Pfeffer's Free 
Corps were also active in the Verband ehemaliger Freikorpsk!ttnpfer, whioh 
emerged from the Baltikumk~~pfer; the organisation also had contacts with 
the Verband nationalgesinnter Soldaten; see report (copy) by the Regierungs_ 
pr~sident, DUsseldorf, 10 January 1923: ~~ MI IP/570; pOlice report, Bochum 
27 June 1921: SAM I PA/366; police report, Bochum, 17 February 1922: SAM I ' 
PA!379. 
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The leader of the Bund Wiking in Rhineb.nd-',1estphalia, Friedrich \Vilhelm Heinz, 
also joined the nSDAP after a short stay in the Stahlhelm, to.vards the end. of 
1925. 80) 
The ::!:mersence of th e NSDAP 
The presence of the NSDAP in Westphalia can be traced back to the sur-
prising~ early date of 1920, though the movement was of little significance 
in the ear~ period and was very much on the periphery of right-wing politics 
until well into the nineteen-twenties. The history of the i'lestphalian NSDAP 
bet\'veen 1920 and 1923 cannot be used to challenge the view that until 1923 the 
Hitler movement was really only a Bavarian phenomenon. 81) Indeed, the 
weakness of Nazism in the province in the early 'twenties was clenr to all 
contemporary observers. In the official party account the early period of the 
"KampfZeit" is projeoted as the history of a fe''' small and isolated groups 
struggling to exist in a very hostile environmoot. 82) 
The first branch in the province, indeed t be first branch established 
outside Bavaria, was formed in Dortmund in 1920. 83) The Chte of the forma-
tion of the branch is given as 5 July 1920 in the Munich Party Dia.:ry for 
1920/1921. 84) But there is reference to the existence of the branch before 
this date. According to a Dortmund membership list the branch had an enrolled 
strength of 23 by 1 May 1920. 85) Of the early history of 'I11e branch little 
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80) 
81) 
82) 
83) 
84) 
85) 
K. Finker, 'Bund ';Viking (B',i) 1923-1928', in Die Bttrgerlichen Parteien 
in DeutschlDnd, Ope cit., p.190. 
}'ranz-'iii1ling, Ope cit., p.258. The Nazi membership of the pre-Putsch 
party in 'Horthern Germany' was not, however, as insignificant as the 
standard accounts 1'oOu1d have us believe. The available statistics show 
that some 18.~ per cent of the Nazi membership was resident in 'Northern 
GennaZV'. See M.H. Kater, 'Zur Soziographie dar fr!1hen XSDAP', Viertel ... 
lahrshefte fUr Zeitgeschichte, 19, 1971, p.137. 
"The National Sociali st Movement in Westphalia-Sou th was hardly known 
befcre the 9Uovember 1923"; Beck, op. cit., P.42i further- p.522. 
Maser, op. cit., p.315. The founding of the Dortmund branch disputes 
Farquharson's assertion that the Hanover branzh, founded on 2 July 1921, 
was "the first in North GermanY proper". See J. Farquharson, 'The NSDAP 
in Hanover and Lower Saxony 1921-26', The Journal of Contemporary Histol"'l.. 
8, 1973, p.10S. 
Maser, Ope cit., p.237. 
Beck, OPe cit., p.301. 
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is known. The branch leader was a post-office clerk called Ohnesorge, who 
was to make a name for himself in local Nazi circles by assertine that he 
was a personal friend of Hi tIer. 86) There was some contact with Munich. 
Esser addressed the branch in the spring of 1920. 87) The Munich party centre 
also met the costs of the prod.uction of local propaganda material. 88) 
Chnesorge corresponded ''lith Munich and. was a recipient of -the early party 
circulars. 89) 
Until 1922 the Dortmund groop was the only ',festphalian outpost of the 
National Socialist movement. From the spring of that year the NSDAP made a 
more Significant impact on the province, with the appearance of several 
branches of sare numedcal strength and poU tical significance. The expansion 
of the NSDA,P coincided wi th a renewed direct involvement in the province by 
the MUnich party centre. Esser re-appeared in Rhine1and,-·,Vestphalia in the 
spring of 1922, ostensibly to collect 'information on the occupied region'. 90) 
He spoke at meetings in Dort:nund and. Hagen, and was present at the formation 
of the second branch established in the pIOvince, th':l.t of Hagen. Both branches 
were relatively small, with around one hundred m611bers in Dortmund and some 
forty-five in Hagen. 91) In the months following -the Nazi movement mad.e 
significant progress in both these towns and. began to extend its activities 
in the surrounding region, an effort which did not escape t.~e attention of 
the '.vestphalian authorities, who became more interested in the movement. In 
the first expansionist phase the party was often mistaken for the DSF, one 
report referring to Brunner as the party leader and to Berlin as the head-
quarters of the NSDAP. 92 ) In March 1922 a ne.v branch was established in 
Wanne-Eickel, which grew rapidly to 120 paid-up members by May, good connections 
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86) Police report, D<X'tmuna., 15 March 1923: SAM I PA/370. 
87) Beck, OPe cit., p.301. 
88) Maser, 0p. ci. t., p.236. 
89) Ohnesorge to Munich, Dortmund, 3 March 1922; Hitler to OG Dortmund, 
MUnich, 6 March 1922: HA 8/165. 
90) !!, 8 March 1922. . 
91) Ibid •• 
92) Report by the Oberpr!isident, MUnster, 13 April 1922: SAM I PA/398. 
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with the Verein Heimattreuer Ost- und 'Westpreussen und Oberschlesier providing 
scope for further expansion. 93) At about ihe S<'lme time, a branch was also 
established in Bochum; this was relatively weak and failed to malte any impact 
on too town by the summer of 1922. 94) 
As regards the,foundation of party branches, it is evident that Hitler 
himself was not very interested in seeing the proliferation of their number, 
and generally counselled caution to tho se who approached him on this matter 
in the pre-putsch period. 'The party leadership', he informed his supporters, 
'has in the immediate fu 1ure no interest in the possibility of founding many 
branches, though it is very interested in ver,y good ones'. 95) Hitler was 
a\vare of the strain of running snnll ineffective party cells, which were more 
of a hm dicap than an asset to t:re movement. Newly established branches were 
often tempted to exert fueir influence for the "cause" in the neie;hbouring 
towns, and more often than not wasted valuable time and cash in futile efforts 
to spread the creed at a time when the chief loce.l branch was barely viable 
itself. Hagen learned this lesson fairly rapi d1y. In the spring of 1922 much 
attention was given by the branch to creating a party bra.~h in nearby 
Lftdenscheid. The net result of a prolonged campaign was that 'several workers 
of the town joined the party' but ihese were not enough to sustain an inde-
pendent branch. 96) In contrast to the limited progress the Hagen branch 
achieved in the surrounding district, the branch itself £!J.'6W rapidly and 
developed a rudimentary organisational framework on which to blild. By May 
1922 it had 304 enrolled members, drawn fran wotking and middle class circles, 
Skilled workers and office emplqyees predaninating. 97) The attention and 
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93) 
94) 
95) 
96) 
97) 
Report by the Police President, G-e1senkirchen, 10 May 1922: SAM I PA/398. 
Police report, Bochum, 4 May 1922: SAM I PA/398. 
Maser cites the "Mittei1ungsb1att Nr. 4",26 Ausust 1922; Maser, op. cit., 
p.316. See also Hitler's letter to G-ustav Seifert, 6 September 1921, 
reprinted in TYrell, op. cit., pp.37-38. The Nazi leaders of the P~nover 
area appear to have ignored the advice offered by Munich headquarters _ 
see Farquharson, op. cit., p.108. 
Police report, Hagen, 13 May 1922: SAM I PA/398. 
Police report, Hagen, 1 May 1922: SAM I PA/398. 
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interest of the population was also increasing. At a meeting in April 1922 
at which Esser was again the main attraction, the movement was able to draw 
an audience of some 6eO. 98) The branch was controlled. and directed by the 
elected leader 'tlachenfeld, who headed a snall governing canmi ttee. This 
included a secretary, two treasurers, and a propaganda group of five, all of 
whom were elected democratically by too branch membership. There was also a 
group of volunteers responsible for protecting local party meetings. This 
group was of vital importance because of the increasing attention being paid 
to ihe movement by the Left, especially the KPD. 99) To sane degree this 
attention was invited by the style of propaganda developed by the branch. A 
pamphlet distributed in the spring of 1922, entitled "Arnim - German-v~lkisch 
broadsheet and 'Kampfblatt' of the German '.Vorkers' Party Hagen/IVestfalen" 
explained at great length that fue National Socialists of the to,m were pre-
pared to meet the violence of tile Left with even greater violence. This type 
of provocation was designed to bring out the activists. In order to make 
this threat of force more meaningful the branch organised a "Storm Troop" of 
25 volunteers in order to fight the "socialist big-mouths". The branch also 
made its presence felt by the tactic of interrupting fue meetings of other 
parties in Hagen and. district, as well as by distributing leaflets end daubing 
Swastikas on Jewish shops and houses. 100) 
The rapid growth of the Hagen branch outstripped. that of the older centre 
Dortmund., which was also increa.sing in size bu t failed to Slstain its impetus. 
Membership figures given by the police reflect an initial upw·ard. swing and then 
a decline: M~ _ 200 members; July - 250; septe~er - 140. 101) The reason for 
the decline may well have been internal strife among the party leadership. 
In May 1922 seten of the eight members of fue party committee were, like the 
branch leader Ohnesorge, post-office emplQYees with white collar occupations, 
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98! Police report, Hagen, 30 April 1922& SA-\\: I P.A/398. 
99 Police report, Hagen, 15 Ju~ 1922: SA.~ I PA/398. 
100 Lnmbers, Ope cit., p.165. 
101) Police reports, Dortmund, 10 May 1922; 12 July 1922; 22 September 1922: 
SAM I p.A/398. 
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the exception being a miner from the suburb of ",V'esterfilde. 102) This com-
mittee resigned in August and was replaced by one in which working class 
members had a majori~; not one of the old members, not eve~ Ohnesorge, retained 
their seats. 103) The radical transformation of the party les.dership undoubt-
edly reflected a large influx of wat'king class members into the party, which 
may have led to awithdrawa.l of a section of the petit-bourgeois element from 
the branch. The composition of the branch leadership in the post-August 
period generally reflected too guidelines laid dOVln by pa~ hea.dquarters, 
104) 
though it is debatable whether this inflUenced the change. 
In the Dortmund and Hagen region the NSDAp was able to attract signifi-
cant working class support. In the uvo branches established nea.r Dortmund 
in 1922, miners figlI'ed prominently in the m611bership. The ',Vesterfilde branch, 
with its dozen or so members at -the time of its formation, was ccmposed of 
105) 
and led by miners. In the Mengede branch miners also p~vi dad a size-
able proportion of the membership, -thouGh here there were also elements drawn 
from the fanning community and the petit-bourgeoisie. 106) The fragmentary 
evidence available 9.lggests that the social structure of the Westphalian 
branches of the NSDAP was relatively broad, with a significant percentage of 
working class members. The data are insufficient and impossible to qu..'Ultif'y, 
hcrRcver, and can only be used as a very general indicat1on. 107) 
The ban of the NSDAP in Prussia on 15 November 1922 halted -the gradual, 
undro.matic, expansion of the movement in Westphalia. The ban callJ'.'!, from the 
Nazi point of view, at a partiCAAlarJ.;y unfortunate moment in that it interrupted 
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102) 
10.3) 
104) 
105) 
106) 
107) 
Police report, D<r tmuna, 10 May 1922: SA:,4 I PA/398. 
Police roDort, DortlllUnd, 22 September 1922: SAid I PA/398. 
. " The "Instructions for the Formation of Party Branches of 1922 suggested 
that great care should be taken iP see that 'lne social composition of the 
branch leadership should reflect that of "the membership. Ideal~ 2/3 of 
the canmittee should ccnsist of .~rorkers; Tyrell, 01'. cit., p.39. 
Report by the Landrat, Dortmund, 9 May 1922: SAM I PA/398. 
~lkischer Beobechter, 17 June 1922; further, Graf, OPe cit., pp.35-36. 
On the social composition of the ear~ NSDAP see Kater, OPe cit., pp. 
124 ff •• 
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the drift of membership fran a variety of vBlkisch and riiPt-wing org~nisations 
into "the Nazi ranks. The NSDl..p was in a particularly fortunate position in 
the autumn of 1922 au e to the dissolution of a variety of right-wing org<mi-
sations by the Prussian Minister of the Interior following the assassination 
of Rathenau in June. The banned organisations, including the DVSuTB, the 
Verband nationaleesinnter Soldaten, and the St~hlhelm, had sizeable memberships 
lOoking for new homes, and the NSDA? provided one refuge. This "catchment 
function" of the NSDA? came to an end when it too was banned. The <huger which 
the ban represented 1x> the National Socialist cause was made more acute because 
short];y' after the ban there emerged a new vBlkisch movement which filled the 
vacuum caused by the widespread prohibition of numerous right-wing extremist 
movemen ts, nam ely the INFP. Thi s racist movement was formed in December 1922 
by dissident members of the DlIVP headed by von Graefe and Wulle, '!,ho \'lere dis-
enchanted with the moderation of the party over the Jewish issue. 108) The 
DV:i?P was to prove itself a major ccmpetitor to the NSDAP until the mid-"tY,enties, 
especially in Northern Germal1iY', i'There the NSDAP wa.s comparatively weruc. The 
appearance of the DVPP at a time when the National Socia.lists could no long';)r 
undoubtedly ,1as the fact that the NSDAP had been in existence too briefly to 
hold its members via the strength of its organisa.tion. There was no regional 
organisation and little on the local level. Even the oldest branch, Dortmund, 
was run on an ad hoc basis by the branch leader. The branch lacked even simple 
office facilities. 109) 
The NSDAP encountered much opposition in the initial period of penetration 
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108) L. Hertzmann, op. cit., pp.157-158. 
109) Police report, Dortmund, 10 May 1922: SAM I PA/398. 
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in the province. The most vigorous reaction came from the SPD and KPD, 
whose supporters were prepared to use strong-arm tactics to prevent the public 
appearance of National Socialists. The meetings organised by the NSDAP were 
often broken up, or degenerated into brawls. OnlY the larger branches were 
able to resist the tactics of the Left and establish their right to exist. 
In towns where the National Socialists were of little importance, and that 
meant the Inajori ty, the establishment of a foothold was mad.e difficult by the 
Left which prevented the Nazis from making a public appearance. Even slll<'lll 
established branches found it impossible tJ use public meetings as a means 
of increasing membership. The ~esterfelae branch discovered this rather 
rapidly. Its first public meeting was 'dispersed by Communists. From that 
time nothing has been noted of azv propaganda aetivi ty by the ~jS)Party.' 111) 
The second meeting at which Esser spoke in Hagen also ended. in a brawl bet-Neen 
National Socialists and Communists; the "Stormtroop Pfeffer" used revolvers 
and truncheons to threaten the Communists before the police intervened to 
restore order. 112) The near-riot created. by the affair rebounded on the 
NSDAP. A meeting planned for November 1922, at which Esser was again to be 
the main speaker, was prevented fran being held by the police authorities on 
the grounds that it would. lead to public disorder. The police report pointed. 
out that 'the KPD and Trade Union members have already made it clear that 
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110) A report in the VB, 8 March 1922, lists 'the problems facing the party in 
Westphalia, though inevitablY in an exaggerated rom: "Man dart' freilich 
nicht vergessen, dass die Schwierigkeiten die sioh dieser volksbefreienden 
Bewegung in diesen Gebieten entgegenstellen, umgleich gresser Sind als im 
Ubrigen Deu tsohland. Man hat hier ausser gegen die I4mmheit und Verbohrt_ 
het t verfUhrter Volksgenossen auch hier und d3. gegen die Stierneckigkei t 
halbverbledeter und verbrecherisch kurzsichtiger Regierungsbonzen zu 
kHmpfen, so gesellte sich dort zu all diesem noch die teuflische sedist-
ische Brutalit~t der Besatzungsbeherden, und ausserdem noch ein Terror 
Von seiten einet" mit fanatisch d.eutschfeindliohen Polacken durchsetzten, 
van jUdischen Hetzteufeln aufgepeitschten Fabrikarbeiterschaft, wie er 
nioht oft zu finden ist." 
111) Report by 'the Landrat, Dortmund, 9 May 1922: SAM I P1V398. 
112) Police report, Hagen, 30 April 1922: SAM I PA/398. FUrther Lambers, 
Ope cit., p.165. 
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they would not tolerate National Socialist activities. Furthermore, large 
sections of the canmunity are also disturbed by the movemmt. Letters from 
the Zentralverein Deutscher Staatsangehe,riger jUdischen Glallbens and from the 
chairman of the republican Teachers Union also protested against the proposed 
me eting.' 113) 
Left-wing hostility did much to limit the effectiveness of the NSDAP 
groups emerging in tile early nineteen-t<.venties. The Nazis were too weak 
numerically and too poorly organised to overcOlle the opposition. The 
CO-operation between branches, established in the post-l925 period, was absent 
in the early years of the movement, except in the Dortmund-Hagen area where 
each branch swelled the ranks of the other's meetings. Fina~e was also a 
serious problem. Lack of cash restricted fue scope of operation of all the 
branches. Dortmund, for example, depended very much on the Munich party 
centre for financial help and the provision of necessary propaganda mate-
rial. 114) Taken together, these many difficulties made it very hard for 
the movement to reach the mass of the population. The propaganda effort to 
"spread the message" was also sanewhat unimaginative compared to tte.t of 
later years. It consisted mainly of street distrjl>utions of pamphlets prin-
ted in Munich. The pamphlets generally contained the programme of the party, 
but some were little more than anti-Semitic tracts reminiscent of those of 
the DVSuTB. 115) The emphasis on anti-Semitism at tile party meetings was 
hardly calculated to attract new members beyond ilie "faithful" previously 
organised in other velkisch circles. What was needed to trigger off interest 
in the majority of the population, especially in the indu strial centres, was 
a greater emphasis on social issues. A stream of stereotyped anti-Je'nish 
propaganda was too negative to achieve very much. It only made the movement 
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113) Police report, Dortmund, 17 November 1922: SAM I PA/.398. 
114) POlice report, Dortmund, 22 September 1922: SAM I PA,!398. 
115) Examples of these contained in Folder SA:'l I PA/398. 
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vulnerable to charges of representing little more than' stupid anti-Seillitism'. U6) 
The Development 'of the Party fran the time of the Prussian Ban to the November 
Putsch: Noveooer 1922 to November 192.3. 
The ban of the NSDAP in prussia halted the organisational and propaganda 
activity of the movement and stunted its progress. The fortune of the party 
rested more than ever on the ingenui~ of branch leaders to keep the cause 
alive, and a variety of Slbterfuges were used to get round the ban and. dirninish 
its effectiveness. In Hagen the movemEnt was continued by Waohenf'eld in the 
form of a reading society of the Y], the "Lesegesellschaft zur prlege des 
Antiseruitismus una zur Gewinnunl? von Lesern fnr den VB", until this too was 
banned in March 1923. The resultant prosecution of 'Nachenfeld for continuing 
an illegal organisation failed. 117) '.'/achenfeld. refused to accept defeat and 
fonned an "Antisemitenbund". This was little more than yet another continua-
tion of the old Nazi branch, but was allowed to exist, even 1houeh the police 
authorities had sufficient evidence to prove that a large number of Nazis were 
members of the League. Prosecution failed because anti-Semitisrn was not unlaw-
ful in the Weimar state! 118) 
The Dortmund branch also continued to be active, with the old leader, 
Ohnesorge, back in command. It was his effort which gave life to the illegal 
group under his oontrol, which he exhorted 'to pursue a ruthless recruitment 
campaign'. Working class members were picked out to canvass support among 
their fellow workers. 119) In several towns of the province individuals 
recently attraoted to the movement were undeterred by the ban and continued 
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116) This was a constant criticism levied against the party (with justifi-
cation!). Wachenfeld attempted to defend the party line by stating 
that "unser Antisemitismus ist genau so beschaf'fen, me er von mass-
gebenden Vertretern der Katholisohen Kirche vertreten wirdj z.B. bei 
Kardinal Faulhaber in "Sonntagsblatt fHr das katholische Volk 'Leo' in 
Paderborn", Nr. 8, 22 February 1920" - Wachenfe1d in a letter to the 
editor of the Westdeutsche Volkszeitung, 23 November 1922: Copy in file 
SAM I PA/347. 
117) POlice report, Hagen, 27 March 1923; report qy the Hauptmeldestelle, 
Hagen, 12 June 1923: SAM I P~398. 
118) Police report, Hagen, 11 Jama ry 1924: SAM I PA/398. Lambers, op. cit., 
p.184. 
119) Police report, Dortmund, 15 March 1923: SAM I PA/370. 
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to advocate the Nazi cause, the more adventurous founding ne,rr branches. In 
Minden the ban of the party coincided wi th an attempt by a member of the Dll", 
Adolf Manns, to establish a party branch sane fifty strong. A "Manns Sektiontt 
was formed instead, whose members joined the Munich headquarters on an indi-
vidual basis and. thus got round the ban. 120) Manns became very active on 
behalf' of the NSDAP in the taNn, distributing Nazi propaganda and party appli-
cation forms of the Munich branch. 121) Another person to emerge at the time 
of the ban, who was to be associated with too Nazi cause through.ou t the 
nineteen-twenties and early nineteen-thirties, was a Catholic priest, Dr 
Lorenz Pieper, who organised an illegal branch in Hasten, County Arnsberg. 122) 
Pieper achieved temporary notoriety in Hllsten by advocating th~ Nazi and 
vBlkisch cause fran the pulpit, and by using the church for hanging out pla-
cards to announce v~lkisch meetings. Pieper, a fo xmer leader of 1he DVSuTB 
in Neheim-HUsten, organised the first Nazi meeting in the town, at which a 
well-knovm Nazi agitator fran Dortmund was '!he main attraction. The man con-
cerned, Kenig, a former member of the KPD, launched forth for two hours against 
the Jews, national political figures, and the "system", leaving the bulk of 
the audience speechless with the violence of his language. 123) 
The individual efforts on behalf of the NSDAP were too localised, i501o.-
ted and infrequent to cause more than a temporary ripple here and there. The 
dependence of the movement on a f8'IV committed people was no substitute for 
organised, active branches. It only needed '!he !'3mova1 of a major activist 
from a locali~ to cause the collapse of the local effort. 124) . The ban also 
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120) Report by the Landrat, Minden, 24 March 1923: SAD MI IP/570. 
121) Police report, Minden, 22 March 1923: SAD MI IP/570. 
122) Report by the Landrat, Arnsberg, 7 April 1923: SAM I PA/370. 
123) Police report, Hllsten, 20 Februar,y 1923: Sj~~ I PA!347. Accounts of the 
meeting and the SlbseCJ.uent uproar in the Hdstener Anzeie;er, 21 February 
1923; Zentral-Volksblatt, 24 February 1923; Ruhr und Mehne Zeitung, 28 
February 1923. 
124) A good example is provided by 'the developments in Hasten. Here '!he 
removal of Pieper by the church authori ties (he was transferred to 
Bavaria) finished off the local Nazi effort, ml d no f'u rther activity 
was observed by the police; police !'3pcrt, HUsten, 21 April 1923: SAM 
I PA/34.7. 
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left the door open for other right-wing extremist groups unaffected by the 
restrictions imposed on the Nazis, though often these too led but a short 
public lif'e. One such tempon'-ry refuge, in which seme Nazis found a ne\,( 
home, was provided by the GDAP. ':'his was founded by Rossbach some time in 
November 1922 and had a programJlle identical to that of the NSDAP. It appe'lred 
on~ briefly, being banned in Pruss~~, on 10 Janua~ 1923, before it could 
125) real~ get off the ground. The initiative for the development of this 
organisation in ~estphalia lqr in Hagen, where a branch was established before 
the G-DAP was banned. Although a report by the Oberprllsi dent of ·.1estphalia 
noted that 'the GDAP had established branches in almost all the larger towns 
of t.'1e inClustrial region', this view is not corroborated by the reports of 
local authorities, which do not mention a:ny branches apart fran that at Hagen. 
The Oberpr~si dent's report also mentions that 'the membership of the GDAP in 
Rhineland-Westphalia is estimated by informed sources as 25,000', which seems 
126) 
eXaggerated to say the least. More successful in oreanising v~lkisch 
. support was the DVFP, which quickly established several branches throughout 
Westphalia, especially in the EeGierungsbezirke of Arnsberg and Minden. But 
this movement too was subjected to a ban by the end of March 1923 before it 
could entrench itself ~ 127) 
In the spring of 1923 the vBlkisch movement was in considerable disarray 
as a re eul t of the suppression of the various organisn.tions by the Prussio.n 
Minist:ry of the Interior. The NSDAP as a distinct movement no longer eXieted, 
and the promiSing developments of 1922 had collapsed. Yet at a time durine 
which it became virtually impossible to organi se right-wing extremists into 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
125) 
126) 
127) 
On the GDAP see Noakes, Ope Cit., p.31. The party was also the object 
of a circular to ilie Oberprlisident of Westphalia issued by the Staats-
kommissar ~lr Bffentliche Ordnung, Berlin, 12 Febru~ 1923; copy of 
this in file SA!,1 I PA/370. 
Report by the Oberpr!!sid.ent, MUnster, 14 March 1923f SAD MI lP/570. 
There is reference to the Hagen branch attempting to establi sh a branch 
in HUsten in a report by the Amtmann, IIUsten, 26 January 1923: SAM I 
pA/347. 
Reports on DVFP branches in SAM I PA/370 and. I PA/398; also in SAD iIlI 
IP/570. 
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political parties, the v~lkisch elements of the region were given a new lease 
of life and a renewed incentive to continue as a consequence of the invasion 
of the Ruhr by the French and Belgians in Janua~ 1923. 128) To the activist 
right-wi.'1g circles it was a heaven-sent opportunity to justify their existence 
through "patriotic" action. The immediate consequence of th e occupation was 
a rapid growth of the membership of right-wing organisations. 129) The 
government's call for "passive resistance" was almo st immediately replaced by 
a campaign of "active resistance" involving sabotage and underground activities. 
The Nazi elements in the province were rapidly drawn into thi 5 movement, des-
pite Hitler's objections to such participation, and his threat to exclude 
130) 
any National Socialist who took part. For the lo~l Nazi groups it 
would have been political suicide to have adopted Hitler's posture. The 
immediate consequence of Hitler's line of "Down with the November Traitors 
rather than the Frenchl! which went davn very badJ,y in the Ruhr region, was 
that the numerous right-wing grrups in the Ruhr area distanced. themselves 
from tile National Socialists. 131) The Westphal.ian Nazis, however, Simply 
ignored the Munich party attitude and involved themselves in the Ruhr campaign 
alongside the various para-milita~ and v~lkisch organisations, strengthening 
their ties with these as a consequence. Whatever authority Hitler mEW have 
had Over the Bavarian Nazi movement, the NSDllP was at this time by no means 
so monolithic as it later became, and Hitler's influence in Westphalia was 
too limited to enable him to enforce his concepts on the scattered Nazi 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
128) 
129) 
130) 
131) 
The occupation and. reaction to it in Rhineland-Westphalia has been 
analysed by K. Pabst, 'Der Ruhrkampf', in (Hrsg.) W. F~rst, Ope cit., 
pp.l1 ff •• 
"Rundschreiben, Staatskommissar fflr Bffentliche Ordnung", Berlin, 
3 March 1923; copy in file SAM I PA/370. 
For Hitler's atti'blde see Horn, Ope cl.t., pp.10l ff.; Maser, Ope cit., 
pp.367 ff •• 
"Lagebericht", 12 Februa~ 1923: SAM I PA/274. 
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elements. 132) 
Ultimately the involvement of Rhenish-Westphalian Nazis in the "active 
resistance" received Hitler's blessing and encouragement. The "VestphaUan 
Nazis derived considerable advantages from their participation in the guerilla 
warfare waged qy the Right against the occupation troops. 133) The nationa-
listic posture adopted qy the Westphalian National Socialists attracted above 
all the petit-bourgeoisie which was disappointed by the lack of positive action 
by the government. 134) In tile spring and. Stmmer of 1923, collaboration by 
the Nazis with a variety of right-wing extremist groups also strengthened 
their contact wi til a large reservoir of potential support. Not least in 
importance, the participation of the Nazis in the active resistance provided 
the regional, and national, movement with its first "hero", Albert Leo 
Schlageter, who was to figure prominently in the propaganda of tile NSDAP in 
the 'Yeimar era, and especially in the mythology- of the Third~. 135) One 
immediate consequence of Schlageter's execution was the formation of a number 
of organisations "comme!!lorating" the fallen hero. M!lllY of these organisations 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
132) 
133) 
134) 
135) 
Hitler's lack of autilori~ in the formative years of fue NSDAP is noted 
by Krebs: "Gewiss haben vor allem beirn Ruhrkampf die dortigen NS-Gruppen 
tatkrattig mitgewirkt und dabei manche Opfer gebracht. Doch sie taten 
es moot etwa deshalb, weil sie einen Geheimbefehl Hitlers in minden 
gehabt h~tten, mit der er seine offizielle Stellungsnahme widerrufen 
h!1tte sondern weil sie sich um diese StellungsllRhme nioot ld1mmerten •. 
Die Autorit!it Hitlers in jener FrUhzeit war noch zu gering, als a~ss er 
den sehr eigenwilligen ersten AnhRngern hatte befehlen oder verbieten 
kennen, was nicht deren eigener Meinung entsprach". A. Krebs, Tendenzen 
und Gestalten der NSDAP. Erinnerungen an die FrUhzeit CI.er Partei, Stutt-
gart, 1959, p.122. Even in Bavaria Hitler's authori'tiY was not automati-
cally recognised; see Lenman, op. cit., pp.l~5 ff •• 
"Active resistance" involved indiscriminate bombings, assassinations of 
French and Belgian troops, the destruction of bridges, railway equipment 
etc.; see Pabst, op. cit., pp.24-30. 
"Lagebericht", 25 Februa~ 1923: SAM I P~274. 
Schlageter was "claimed" by several right-w:ing extremist groups, including 
the NSDAP. A typical example of the t;ype of young terrorist involved in 
the resistance: A 'perpetual soldier' insignificant until his death. 
Schlageter had been a volunteer in the war, and at the end of the war 
joined a Free Corps which saw action in the Baltic and. in Upper 5ilesia. 
In 1922 he allegedLy joined the N5DAP. He was executed by the French on 
26 May 1923 for his participation in a failed attempt to dynamite the 
Duisburg-Dlisseldorf rail.way line nalr Kalkum. 
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ultimately joined. the NSDAP. 136) 
Hagen, lying on the edge of the occupation zone, with good communications 
to the rest of G-ermaIlY, became the centre from which sabotage activities were 
organised. It was here that interested parties made contact. 137) It became 
the centre of activity for the "active resistance movement" with couriers to 
and. from other parts of G-ermaIlY, especially Munich, establishing contact with 
various right-wing groups in the town. Active above all were representatives 
of the Bund. Oberland. The main agent for the Bund, Frithjoff Storkau, was 
also a member of the NSDAP and the Jd.O. He was sent to · .. restphalia at the 
beginning of March 1923 to make contact with ','I'ilhelm Niggelmann, the Landes-
leiter of the ~ in Southern ";'lestphalia. Storkau's tasks were defined. as, 
firstly, to find. out which persons were spies (for the French, one presumes); 
secondly, to find rut who was collaborating with the French; and thirdly, to 
organise acts of sabotage against the occupation troops. 138) Nigge1Jull.nn, as 
well as having an interest in furthering the Bund. Oberlnnd in the province, 
was a member of the NSDAP and. was active in Haeen and Al tena on behr,lf of' 
that party. 139) Following the November Putsch, Niggelmonn was to be an 
important figure in the regional HSDAP. 
In line with developments in Munich in the first half of 1923, that is 
to say the increasing spirit of co-operation between -the NSDAP and several 
para-mili tary associations, a new "united front" emerged in Westphalia. This 
brOUGht together the activist elements of the Nazi movement with a number of 
para-military and right-wing organisations. 140) In Hagen their fusion 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
136) For example, the "Schlagetergedlichtnisbund" of Hamm, which joined the 
NSDAP en bloc in 1925; Police report, Hamm, 16 Febru~ 1925: SNA I 
PA/398. 
137) Police report, Hagen, 29 July 1923: SAM I PA/273. 
138) Police statement Slmmarising interrotsation of Storkau, no date: SAU I 
PA/370. 
139) Report on Niggelmann's activities by the Reichskommissar fUr frberwachung 
der effentlichen Ordnung, Berlin, 17 March 1923: SAM I B\l370. 
140) For the situation in Munich in the sprine and Slmmer of 1923 see Horn, 
op. cit., pp.108 ff.; Fenske, op. cit., pp.188 ff.. Cf. Schen, op. cit., 
pp.38 ff •• 
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produced the Verband ner nation11.len K'lmpf'orc;anise.tionen, the nucleus of which 
was f'onned by members of the banned Stahlhelm and Wachenf'eld' s "Anti-Semi tic 
League". 14-1) This local organisation gave rise to a regional one in which 
a varie~ of' associations were represented, the V1UCV, which in August 1923 
subordina ted itself' to the SA Oberkommlmdo in Munich. The military leader 
of the Vl.TJ:Y ~ Hagen, which covered the south-eastern section of ~Vestpha.lia, 
was a retired Lieutenant called Gelberg, who was given fUll control of the 
regional movement by G-Bring and Hoffmann. The joint political leadership of 
the organisation fell to Wachenfeld ru1d a retired army Captain, von Saal. 
The VNI\.V was stronsly Nazi orientated; Gelberg was prepared 'without further 
ado, to exclude all those who do not subordinnte themselves to the HSDAP 
11+2) 
without reserve'. 
The evidence available suegests toot the VNKV, though active in the sabo-
tage movement in the occupied zone, was primarily organised to prepare a 
Putsch aeainst the national government. 'l'his idea was current in Munich in 
the summer months. Gelberg headed only one of three zonal units of the VWW 
created in Westphalin, the other two areas falling under the control of two 
retired lieutenants, Grnnscheidt, and Koch respectively. lbese men were given 
'full authori~' by the Chief of Staff of the SA 'until at least the ninth day 
of mobilisation'. 14-3) The creation of the VHKV represented formidable pro-
gress on the part of the Nation~l Socialists. It brou~ht together m~ people 
who had previous~ jealously guarded their independenoe ruld authori~ within 
the framework of separate a.ssociations. The Munioh organisers were well 8.l(l1.re 
of the ease wi th which the VNKV could fl:j apart if the si tulltion in Westphalia 
was not handled carefull:j. One oa.n see this in the letters sent to indivi-
duals who made contact with the illunich SA a.sking how best they could support 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
141) Report by the lIauptmeldestelle, Hagen, 12 July 192.3: SA:A I PA/.370. 
142) "Notizen aus AusfiL1.rangen des Herrn Gelberg bei einer inoffiziellen 
Bespreohung der Vaterllindischen Verbf:l.nde", Hagen, 27 ;\u~u st 1923: HA 
17/297. 
14-3) Ibid •• 
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the "national cause". Such independent enquiries were m1S;"ered with the 
instruction th:J.t they should get in touch 'rTith local leaders 1llch (13 G-e1berc, 
G-rllnscheidt cr Koch before they started the recrui t.11ont of their mm SA for-
mations. The l:lunich authorities urged them to rlo nothing before cont[\ct with 
the lorol leaders had been made, stated that recrui t;nent amon,~ the ol"G'l.nisa-
tions 'of these gentlemen' should be avoided at all costs, and said that ne',', 
leaders 'should not create unrest in the region at any price'. 144) That 
there vms sufficient rivalry among the various in~ividu,11s in the province 
without nevr 'leaders' confusing the issue further, emerges from a letter of 
complaint sent to Muaich by GrlJnscheidt. He' desireil written authoriS'ltion 
and confiroation of his full powers over the SA in his aroa' to counter the 
claims and assertions of a character called Heinz, who was spreading the 
rumour that he controlled' the NatioIk'll Socialists in the Rhineland and ',Iest-
phalia'. GrU.nscheidt also called for instructions for the district in the 
event of 'revolution' or 'alarm'. 14-5) It seems t113,t by September the organi-
sation in the ~ was complete, 'with the exception of the Hational Socialists 
in Elberfeld'. 'The only urgent requirement was for bro liB. chine L~ns. 146) 
The role played by the VHKV in the November Putsch is not clear. Whether 
it mobilised or was caught unprepared by the events remains a mystery because 
m.'1terial covering this episode is lacldng. 147) The official account of the 
history of 'the '!lest';lhalian NSDAP mentions onlY two local responses to t.'le 
Munich Putsch, but neither involved more than a handful of people, and whether 
these had any connections with the V:W is not mentioned. 148) Reg3.riless of 
the reaction, the ;.runich affair was of great importance to the Nazi cause in 
't1estphP.1ia in one important aspect. It brought Hitler and his movement to the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
144) Oberkorrunondo SA, Munich, 13 September 1923, to Kanertz, Iserlohn: HA 
17/297. SA Oberkommando, Munich, ~ July 1923, to Koenen, Lippstadt: 
HAl7/298. Ct'. the situation in Hesse, see ScMn, op. oi t., p,P.40 ff •• 
145) Rudolf Grllnscheidt to l,~unich, Velbert, 12 August 1923: HA 17/297. 
146) Wissmann, v:.nC'1 Hagen, to 1.1unich, 7 September 1923: HA 17/297. 
147) Reaction in North Germ~ was very limited as far ~~ evidence goes. 
For the situation in Lower Saxony, see Noa.kes, op. ci. t., p.40; also 
Farquharson, op. cit., p.l14; cf. Sch~n, op. cit., p.53. 
148) Beck, Ope cit., p.350 and p.412. 
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attention of the nation as a who]e; the event made front-page news in even 
the smaller provincie.l newspapers. 149) To the National Socialists, and to 
the velkisch circles as a vmole, t.."le putsch also gave 1:i1e cause a martyr. 
In Westphalia the :putsch, and its aftermath, the trials of Hitler and Ludeuclorf'f', 
were to give widespread coverage and much free propaganda to what had been a 
relatively obscure movement. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
149) For example, Iserlohner Kreisanzeiger una ~eituno;, 10 November 1923. 
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Chapter 5. CONFLICT AND ca~]'USION: 1923-1925. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The V~lkisch ~,!aelstran: November 1923 to December 1924. 
The Reich ban imposed. on the NSDAP follcming the putsch did. not affect 
the position of the Westphalian Nazis, since the party was already illegal 
as a consequence of the ?russian ban of 1922. It would have been very diffi-
cult to weed out the Nazi elEment in the province, for the N3DAP had moved 
into the v~lkisch movement as a whole. Barring fUch exceptions as the Hagen 
group under Wachenfeld, it no longer retained a National Socialist identity. 
The ban qy the Prussian authorities, and its enforcement, had been successful 
enough at least to prevent aqr open abuse of the law. The few illegal~ 
operating groups had. little chance of furthering their cause openly. In 
this situation the Nazis could hardly compete in terms of attraction with 
other v~lkisch organisations. To add to the many difficulties facing the 
Nazi branches at the time of the Pru ssian ban, the Munich centre took a very 
negative attitude to the fortunes of the non-Bavarian branches. 
1) 
The arrest of Hitler and Ludendorff created considerable cor£usion within 
v~lki~ch circles throughout Germanr. The Munich affair above all gave great 
opportunities to the leadership of the DVFP to extend its influence. With its 
superior organisational structure, its freedom to operate, and a relatively 
healthy supply of funds, the DVFP was now in a most advantageous position to 
cash in on the disarray in the ranks of the right-wing extremists. The DVFP 
was not able, however, to make the most of the situation. In the ~es of the 
velkisch activist the party had certain defects which prevented the complete 
absorption of all v~lkisch support. Resented above all were the participation 
of the DVFP in elections and. the "parliamentary horse-trading" associated with 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Orlow states that "The pre-putsch NSDl\P in northern Germal':lY had been very 
much an organisational step-child. Since Hitler expected the events in 
Bavaria to propel him to nationa.l prominence, he was not seriously con-
cerned with the party's organisational expension outside of Bavaria"; 
Orlow, op. cit., p.40. 
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the movement. In Westphalia another handicap was the overall bourgeois image 
of the DFVP. These "blemishes" were to repulse considerable sections of the 
extreme right in the province. The development of the VBlkisch Sozialer Block 
(V-S-B) in the spring of 1924 is indicative of this resentwent. 
The movement towards a broader vBlkisch alliance, as ultimate~ realised 
in the V-S-B, pre-dated the national ban of the NSDAP. The removal of Hitler 
as effective leader following the putsch opened ne~ avenues for the DVFP's 
drive to achieve a united velkisch bloc. The first attempt to smooth over 
the friction existing between the DVFP and the NSD.;\P, and to define are:3.S of 
activity on a geographical basis, occurred immediately before the putsch in 
an agreement reached in Munich on 24 October 1923 between von Graefe, for the 
DVFP, and Esser, representing the NSn~. In the agreement it was stated that 
the rrrFP was the on~ party in North Germarw with which the National Socialists 
would co-operate as long as the ban was in operation. The relationship between 
the two parties was clarified in the following fashion: 'In those places in 
which the NSDAP has formed independent groups and associations, close co-
operation will be advised. There will be no objections from the side of the 
NSDAP to the organisational inclusion of individuals and groups supporting 
National Socialism through the DVI!P in those places in which an organisational 
inclusion in the NSDAP is impossible, with the proviso that the adherence of 
suCh groups and individuals to the NSDAP will not be affected'. 2) The agree-
ment was overtaken by the putsch, which radically altered the respective 
position of the two parties. The position of the JJ'lFP was enhanced further 
by Hitler's choice of Rosenberg as the ner.v leader of the NSDAP, since he lacked 
the qualities necessary for the job, above all the necessary authority over, 
and influence on, the party. One immediate result was the tendency of eve~ 
branch leader to see himself as the caretaker of Hitler's interests, an attitude 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
2) "Vertrag", signed by Esser and von Graefe, Munich, 24 October 1923: 
HA 69/1508. 
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which made life very difficult for the Munich party centre. 
The si tuation the Nazis found themselves in :follovdng the baft was infuri-
atin6 :from their point of view. For the putsch coincided with, and partly 
caused, a marked swing towards the vl5lkisch circles. This was due in part 
to the great amount of free propaganda given to Hi tIer B.nd his associates in 
the national and provincial press. 3) The drift towards right-wing radicalism 
was also in part the consequence of the impact of 'the inflation and the economic 
insecurity of large sections of the population. The collapse of the Mark 
left a deep imprint on the minds of those affected 8nd fundamentallY altered 
the political outlook of the masses. 4) One of the beneficiaries of the 
discontent was the radical Right. The increasing support which the vBlkisch-
national elements were able to gather did not escape contemporary observers. 
Thus in a report by the Reichskommissar f't1r frberwachung der 8ffentlichen 
Ordnung at the beginning of 1924 it was noted that 'the v81kisch movement has 
seen a strong increase in the immediate past, not only fraIl members of the 
middle class, but also from the working class'. 5) 
The problem facing the Nazis was how, given the ban, they could benefit 
:from this situation. In Westphalia, as elsewhere. the old habit of appearing 
in a new guise after successive bans was continued. Nazi activity concentrated 
in the first instance in the Rolandbund, supporters of which were active from 
November 192.3. The organisation was new to 'the province, but had been observed 
else1'lhere in Germany in 1922, at Magdeburg and Hamburg. In both cities the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
3) Abel notes that "Throughout the period from 1920 to 1923 the German press 
had practically ignored the movement. After the Putsch, however, it was 
forced to give columns to the event, as well as to Hi tIer's speeches at 
the trial. Hitler became a national figure overnight"; in T. Abel, The 
Nazi Movement. 7Thy Hitler came to Power, New York, 1965, p.69. -
4) h'Ne know that ine inflation and the accolilpanying disorders turned impor-
tant segments of the population against the Republic • ••• It is clear that 
the collapse of the mark was a shattering emotional experience for many 
people. It provoked a mood of helplessness and despair •••• Many of the 
dispossessed gave way to all sorts of primitive hostilities. In the atmos-
phere of heightened political suggestibili~, the agitation of ~1e extreme 
right found their opportunities"; K. Ringer, The German Inflation of 1923, 
New York, 1969, p.165. 
5) Report by the Reichskommissar, Berlin, 11 February 1924: copy in SAM I 
PA/344. 
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Rolannbuncl had had strong connections with the NSDAP. 6) The organiser of 
the Rolandbund in Westphalia was a Bavarian, Anton Geiger, ,,'!ho at'!empted to 
found. Nazi branches in Hemer, "Yestig and. A1tena in November 1923, prim~rily 
by making contact with, and. winning over, known right-wing agitators in the 
region. His activities came to light when one of his ietters to Niggelmann 
(a leadine figure in the Westphalian Bund Oberland.) fell into the hands of 
the police. In this letter Niggelmann was a,sked. to form a branch of the NSDAP 
und.er the cover name of "RollmdbundAltena", with the instruction that, if he 
was unable to comp~ with the request, be should. give Geiger the name of a 
suitable and. depend.able person who would work for the Nazi cause in the area. 7) 
A subsequent search of Geiger's home provid.ed. evid.ence that he was involved 
with the NSIl\.P. .A.llong the vBlkisch propagand.a material found. were several 
copies of Drexler's "Mein poli tisches Erwachen". 8) A branch of the Ro1andbund. 
was also formed. in soest by an active Nazi supporter, Franz Rolofs. 9) R010fs 
bad been engaged in "the v~lkisch cause for seme time, and had. been deported 
from the Rubr occupation zone by the l!'rench because of his a.ctivities. In a 
statement to 1he police Rolofs admitted his membership of the 'Hittler (sio) 
movement' and his continuous propaganda activi'tiY' on behalf of the NSDAP in 
DUsseldorf, Elberfeld., an~ Soest. At the time of his arrest, Rolofs had 
just formed a "Rolandbund Soest" consisting of seme thirty to forty Nazi 
sympathisers. At "the first branch meeting there were readings fran Hitler's 
speeches. The articles of association established. the link with Munich, tor 
according to the rules every member of the organisation VTas automatically also 
a member of' the Munich branch of the NSDAP. Every member also hI3.d. the duty to 
t..9.ke a. v~lkisch newspa.per. Membership was open only to those of pure Aryan 
descent. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
6) Report by the ReichskomIUissar, Berlin, 11 Februa!jl' 1924: copy in SAM I 
pA/344. 7j Police report, Altena, 6 November 1923: SAM I PA/344. 
8 Report by t..~e Landrat, Iserlohn, 27 November 1923: SAlA I P-V344. 
9 For the follOWing see the police reports, Soest, 1 November ~nd. 1 December 
1923: SAM I PA/344. 
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The Rol-mClbund. made very little headway before it vms banned as a con-
tinuation of the N'S'9.<\P, in FebruaIjT 1924-. The Soest branch was by fa.r the 
largest, followed by that of Hohenlimburg, which had around. thirty members. 10) 
There were also a number of smaller groups scattered around central West,halia. 
The organis~tion remained very small but made its ~ contribution to the Con-
tinuation and the spread of Nazism within the province. 
Active also in this ca.pacity, and closely ccnnected with the activities 
of the ~dbund, was the SVP. The closest links between the two movements 
were established in Hohenlimburg, where the two "directions" were led. by the 
same person, and vlhere they held joint meetings. 11) The orgsnisational centre 
of the SVP was the stronghold of right-w~~g radicalism in the province, Hagen, 
where the first branch was formed in December 1923. 12) This quick~ estab-
lished itself as the largest and. most active v~lkisch organis13.tion of the tmm. 
The SVP had. good. connections with para-military associations, being a member 
of the ~mpfverbFlnd nordwestliche Gru1?1?e, which looked towards and accepted 
'the d.ecisive influence of Hitler and Ludend.or£f'. In Hagen the Svp was joined. 
by the Verbe.nd "AI te Kame ra.den" another member of the Ka.llpfverbsn d. The Com-
position of fue two Hagen groups represented in the Kampfverband was cpite 
distinct. 11i thin the SVP 'all classes and groups are represented', whereas 
the Verband "Alte lCameraden" was composed 'solely of former officers and 
leaders of other right-wing organisations'. The military leader of the 
Kampfverband. was Gelberg, one of the chief organisers of the ~~KV of the pre-
putsch period, which ha.d. had. close contacts with the SA. Oberkommando of MUnich. 
In the spring of 1924 the SVP managed. to establish branches in several 
other central Westphalian tOl'!US. Branches appeared. in Vorhalle, Soest, 
Hohenlimburg, Altena and Menden. T'ne chief organiser of the SVP was an 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
10) 
11) 
12) 
Police report I Hohenlimburg, 10 January 1924: SA\l I PA/341+. 
Reports by the Landrat, Iserlohn, 29 January and. 23 Februa.ry 1924-: 
SAM: I PA!341+. 
For the following see the police report, Hagen, 15 Februa.ry 1924-: 
SAM I PA!341+. 
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archi tect, GUnther, who had been active in 1he Antisemi tenbund of Hagen. Dif-
ferences with its leader W'a.chenfeld resulted in a split of the association. 
This produced the nucleus of the members of the SVP branch in tile town and 
led to a bitter feud with Wachenfe1 d which was to weaken the vl:!>lkisch front 
in the months to come. 13) The new organisation had contact with both the 
NSDAP and the ~J}~, and the influence of the latter predominated as the SVP 
developed. The ~~o 1ea.ders of the DVF?, van Graefe and Wul1e, spoke at meet-
ings organised by the SVP. The von Graefe meeting, which coincided with the 
"Reichsgrllndungsfeier" of the Hagen branch in January 1924, attracted some 
2,200 people, while 'NUlle drew 2,000 in mid-March. 14) Both these meetings 
were mammoth affairs by vBlkisch standards, quite exceptional in terms of the 
numbers participating. The maqy meetings of the V'l-riou s SVP branches at which 
GUnther was inevitably ti1e speaker, dr~N less support, with attenaances above 
the hundred mark being exceptional. 
The type of supporter attracted to the SVP is :revealed by G.finther's own 
analysis in a speech made in Soest in April 1924: 'Most of us have been reduced 
to poverty ••• And what has happened to all those whom one can best describe 
as the sufferers, the dispossessed and the unemployed - victims of the develop-
ments of recent years? It is really touching to observe that it is especially 
these elEments which comprise the bulk of our movement. They are the carriers 
of our great vlHkisch Freedom Movement. The distress which our war victims 
find themselves in is unbelieva.ble. In Ha.gen we ha.ve our quota at every meet-
ing; fron week to week their number grows. In our movement one finds people 
with no income, people who struggle to secure their daily bread, people who are 
not in a position to finance our movement.' 15) Beyond the economically inse-
cure, the SVP found strong support from youths and. wamm, the latter often 
accounting for 25 per cent of the turn-out. 16) 
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13) 
14-) 
15) 
16) 
Report by the Regierungsprl1sident, Arnsberg, 9 February 1924: SA.'l1 I PA/341+. 
Police reports, Hagen, 15 FebruaIY and 20 May 1924: SAM I PA/341+. 
Police report, Soest, 22 April 1924: SAM I PA/344. 
Police report, Vorhalle, 23 Februar,y 1924; report by the Landrat, Iserlohn, 
29 January 1924; police report, Hagen, 20 May 1924-: S~~ I PA/344. 
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The propagandfl. of the party was a mixture of v8lkisch and. National 
Socialist ideas, and in their efforts to win support party speakers emphasized 
SVP links with both Hitler and Ludendorff. 17) Along with the usual anti-
Semitic and nationalist slogans, the SVP made great efforts to attract working 
class support through the distribution of leaflets with a strons socialist 
emphasis: 
Workers~ Let's have a pogrom against supporters of the Swastika! 
Murder them, as happened to the hostages in Munich, for they fight 
the profiteer wi. th all the means at their dispo 5'11. 
Shoot them down in the street, as happened in G8ppingen and Irnmen-
stadt, for th~ are deadlY enemies of international capitalism. 
Throw them into the streets, as occurred in Central Gernany, for 
they want to nationalise even the banks. 
Prevent ti1eir meetings, otherwise they will free the worker from 
deceitful, incapable leaders. 
Spread lies about them, so that the nation will not recognise them 
as their saviour. 
Down with the supporters of the Swastika, for they are terrible 
"enemies" of the workers. 
The thinking worker will attend vlnkisch meetings and form his own 
opinion. 
SVP. 18) 
The main party speaker G6.nther also emphasized the "socialist angle". He 
too 'supported Socialism', rut not the 'perverted Jewish-marxist-intemational-
socialism', though he did not elaborate what exactly his "sociali~u" consisted 
of. 19) More detailed and informative was an analysis of the SVP programme in 
a speech by GUnther at Hagen, in which the objectives and philosophy of the 
movement were dealt with at length: 'We know that there are two pre-requisites 
for the cleansing and the national renewal of the German fatherland: one is 
the need to instil nationalist ideas in the broad working masses, and the other 
is the attitude of youth... The roots of our decline and. also of the lost war 
lie anchored in the pre-war period. '{{hen we ceased to be an agrarian state and 
became instead an industrialised community in whioh industrialisation embraced 
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17) Ana~sis of Gftnther's speeches in police report, Hagen, 22 April 1924: 
S.AM I PA/344. 
18) COPl of pamphlet in police :report, Hohenlimburg, 18 March 1924: SAM I 
PA/344. 
19) Report by the Landrat, Iserlohn, 29 JarJUary 1924: S_fjlvl I PA/344. 
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the broad masses, then fundamental differences appeared. Stoecker and Naumann 
tried to point out '\he dangers resulting frOtll this development. The road 
towards greatness has to be based on social harmony, a fact first recognised 
by the v~lkisch-National Socialist circles, which see the necessi~ for a com-
plete re-organisation of our financial and economic structure. Because of the 
awareness of working class interests 'shown by our movement, the v5lkisch 
movement r~s been attacked not only by left-wing, marxist circles, but also 
by the great-capitalist circles, which must be viewed as the exploiters of 
the German~. We are anti-capitalist, and especially hostile tOl'/ards inter-
national capitalism. 'iVe hold that some capital is necessary and useful, of 
course. Capital which is harmful is that which increases through interest 
acquired in banks and stock-exchanges, capital which does not really work for 
itself, which can only be termed parasitic of productive work. That form of 
capital is of special concern to our v~lkisc~National Socialist movement.' 
Gftnther went on to state that the velkisch struggle against capitalist exploi-
tation could only be achieved through the formation of a united velkisch front, 
in which there was no room for fellow travellers and which was not simply to 
consist of a herd of voters, but committed activists. 20) 
The desired velkisch uni~ was woefully lacking in Westphalia and on the 
national level. Gftnther's SVP was only one section of a fragmented v~lkisch 
movement split int 0 several groups, with rival leaders feuding amongst them-
selves on the regional and national levels. The complications produced by this 
state of affairs need some unravelling. One of the major factors contributing 
to the confusion lay in the histo~ of the NSDAP fOllowing Hitler's arrest. It 
becrune clear to Rosenberg and all concerned that an illegal, improvised under-
ground continuation of the NSDAP in Bavaria was impracticable. The acceptance 
of this fact led to the fonnation of a new Nazi movement in the @-lise of the 
GVG. 21) This organisation proved rather ineffective under Rosenberg's control. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
20) Police report, Soest, 22 April 1924: SAM I PA/344. 
21) Account of the formation in ~ell, Ope cit., pp.73-74; see also Horn, 
op. cit., p.l77. 
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Its role was to be radically altered, and its effectiveness heightened, when 
Esser and Streicher took it over in July 1924. The GVG in turn was part of 
an electoral alliance, the V-S-B, the result of tvo meetings between repre-
sentn.tives of ihe NSDAP and. the DVFP. Rosenberg accepted. the form3.tion of 
this electoral alliance rather umYillingly. The appe3.rance of the V-S-B OI'led. 
much to ihe initi~tive of the ~estphalian leaders of the D1/FP and. National 
Socialist groups, who revived. the idea of a fusion. In January 1924 the first 
discussions took place between the ~vo movements. Representatives of both 
parties active in the Elberfeld. area came to Munich to discuss and determine 
the organsiation of their respective branches in Rhineland-Westphalia. 22) 
This initiative probably influenced the .d~cision of both sides to settle 
their differences at a meeting in salzburg at the end of JanualY. Thi s gave 
rise to an agreement ratified in February in which co-operation waa to be 
secured through a new association, the V-S-B, which was to SJpervise a com-
bined effort of both parties in the forthcoming May Reichste$ elections. The 
agreement divided Germany between the bo parties on a proportional basis, 
with mixed provincial organisations in those areas in which neither party 
predominated. According to tile provisions of the agreement, the elector"tl 
regions of Westph3.1ia-North and. -South were to be under the control of Munich. 23) 
The translation of the national agreement into action on the regional 
level rapidly produced dissension and conflict in Westphalia. In the first 
instance the formation of the V-3-B in the province heightened "!he antagonisl!l 
bet;'1ecn "!lachenfeld and. GUnther in southern Westphalia. These t\vo influential 
figures not only quarrelled themselves, rut dragged the GVG and DVFP leadership 
into their disputes. with serious consequences to the effectiveness of the 
V-S-B. One most damaging consequence was th e underminine of the election 
campaie;n pursued by t.~e V-S-B in the province, a fact lamented by KP.ufmann in 
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22) 
23) 
Backe;round described by Rosenberg at 1)1e Weim3l' meeting, in JochlJlann, 
oPe cit.,.pp.105-l06. 
Rube to the Vorsitzenden dcr Deutsch-VBlkischen (N3) Wahlverbande, 
Berlin, 4 April 1924-: BAA: NS I/4.l0. 
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a letter to ·the GVG- 11unich head.quarters: ''lie are v/Orkine; in th~ electorq.l 
eli strict Coblenz-Trier. Also in the Ruhr region - news sounds f:woumble. 
Of all the election meetings ours are the best attend.ed. In ''1estphslia.-South 
the a tti tude of t.'1e electora. te tmvard.s us has been fOuled up by the unhappy 
confrontation bet."leen GUnther and. ,Vachenfeld, 'Vhich is especi8.lly sad in 
view of fue great number of large industrial to"fiS in thtt area.' 24) 
Wachenfeld's dispute with GUnther and the G7G- was more than just a clash 
of personalities. One CAUse was ','1achenfeld's jealousy of the success of 
CUnther's SVP, which eclipsed the _~~tise~itenbund controlled by the former. 
After the split within the "Leagu e", when a nu~ber of members joined the SVP, 
the ','lachenfe1d group numbered a mere fifty, com.pared to the SVP, which expand.ed 
rapidly to number 1,500 by March 1924. 25) The two men \vere also at 10g15er-
heads on ideological and tactical Grounds. The SVP, which mpported the V-S-B, 
and bec~e its main-stay in southern Westphalia, pursued a policy designed 
primarily to attract the working cla.ss. The main slogan in the election 
months was 'Bread and 'Nark for "!he 7iorkers'. Simultaneously C.f1nther attempted 
to cut the ties existing between his movement and the middle cl'lsS and acadera.ic 
v~lkisch supporters, who had no place in his "socialist" movement. 26) This 
line was strongly opposed. by \Vachenfeld and his supporters, who refused to 
appeal purely to fue worldng class. Wachenfeld believed in the concept of 
the "Volksgemeinschaft", and saw his movement as a. rallying point for all 
It 27) 
vu1kisch thinking Germans, regardless of their social status. To make 
matters worse, during the eli spute Wachenfeld's control over the Anti semi tenbul!i 
slipped from his hands. One of his close associates, Grotehusmann, formed a 
branch of the GVG in Hagen in March 1924, which meant in effect the disappenr-
ance of the Antisemitenbund.. 28) From Wachenfeld's correspondence with the 
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24) l\.arl Kaufmann to G~ Munich headquarters, Elberfeld, 20 A.pril 1924: 
BAK NS 1/410. 
25) Police report, Hagen, 11 March 1924: SAlil I PA/3S7. 
26) Lambers, Ope cit., p.206; Beck, Ope cit., p.308. 
27) Bere;isch-Wlrkische Zeitune, 29 April 1924. 
28) Police report, Hagen, 28 lilarch 1924: SAM I P1v344. 
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GW party centre in Munich it emerges that he had nothine; to do wi th this 
development, and that it was in fact carried out behind his back: 'The GVG 
branch in Hagen was founded at that time by representatives of the old v~lkisch 
elements without my participation. It was formed at a time "Then I wa3 away on a 
'business trip. I have nothing to do with the branch or its leadership, for the 
chairman is Grotehusmann. At the time it was founded I was designated as an 
"honorary member", but I have placed very little value on this title, for I 
am fundamentally opposed to all such honorary titles.' 29) Wachenfeld became 
increasingly disenchanted vdth this new development, and especiallY with the 
direction taken ~ the G~ under Rosenberg and his poliqy of co-operation with 
the DVFP in the shape of the V-S-B. He also objected to the type of personnel 
involved in the v~lkisch movement, both at regional and at national level. At 
the first public meeting of the G~ branch of Hagen, which Wachenfeld attended, 
he gave voice to his doubts about, and his dissatisfaction with, the general 
trend in the v~lkisch camp, noting 'the division and undermining attempts by 
v~lkisch figures, especiallY in Hagen and the surrounding area'. His major 
grievance related to the new leaders emerging in the area, who were pushing 
aside the traditional organisers of the v~lkisch cause: 'One must be careful 
abou t this', he observed, 'one should onJ,y acknowledge tho se leaders who have 
been active in the movement for at least two years.' Giving his version of 
the split within the Antisemitenbund he pointed to the 'insertion of a wedge 
supportine the Berlin direction by the Elberfeld leaders of the DVFP, people 
who were very agile verballY, but who supported rather shadovt{ leaders', a. 
reference to GUnther no doubt. Wachenfeld also attacked ihe na.ture of the 
propaganda of the SVP, whose 'programme was stolen from the programmes of 
several parties, ranging from the D:NP to the KPD', and he emphasized 'that 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
29) Wachenfeld to GVG Munich, Hapen, 2 June 1924; copies of tbe letter to 
Hitler, Anton Drechsler {sic}, H. Esser, Josef stolzing, NSFP Berlin, 
and Feder, Mc1R Berlin: B.AK N5 I/411. 
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the Berlin direction (of the DVFP, one presumes) has already plsced its hopes 
on this concoction'. 30) 
V/achenfeld was also at odds with Rosenberg, who os.me in for heavy criti-
cism in the spring of 1924. The main reason for his hostili~ was the alleged 
support which Rosenberg was giving to GHnther and the regional V-S-B. ',iaohenfeld 
was also disGUsted with Rosenberg for allo'l,ing the NSIl:'>P to participate in the 
parliamentary system. The conflict came to a head in the course of the May 
election campaign, in which, according to Wachenfeld,- Rosenberg had given 
GUnther 'a written authorisation' of full power in tile region. This upset 
Wachenfeld on several counts, not least because he considered that hi s services 
to the movement over the years entitled him to be automatical~ recoenised as 
the leading figure of the v~lkisch movement in southern Westphalia. When 
Rosenberg denied that he had ever agreed to Gdnther's request, imp~ing that 
Wachenfeld was a liar, there was a sharp protest from the latter. Writing to 
the GVG, Wachenfeld asserted that his version was accurate, and that his facts 
'reflect the truth'. He went on to accuse Rosenberg of having broken his word, 
which he presumed was due to an oversight on Rosenberg's side, rather than to 
malice. Wachenfeld continued, 'Rosenberg may well be academicallY sound, but 
his way of conducting business is proof that he is incapable of dealing with 
the practical aspects of a movement as significant as the one under his leader_ 
ship ••• Has Mr Rosenberg such a short memory that he cannot remember haVing 
delegated power to elements as low as GHnther? Can he not remember his rejec-
tion of the so-called "vlHkisch structure", which I have founded? Instead of 
withdrawing his scandalous authorisation in order to strengthen the position 
of' the old National Socialist s of' 'iiestphalia-South, he fiddle-faddled with the 
GUnther clique right to the end of the election campaign.' 31) 
As a result of the division of opinion within ihe velkisch camp in southern 
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30) Police report, Hagen, 25 March 1924: SAM I PA/344. 
31) Wachenfeld to GVG Munich, Hagen, 2 June 1924: BA.K. NS I/411. 
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Westphalia, two separate groups contested the May elections of 1924, the off'i-
cial V-S-B led by G·Unther, and Wachenfeld' s "V81kischer Block Liste Wachenfeld" 
and this despite the fact that Wachenfeld retained ~~e second place on the list 
of candidates of the V-S-B in Westphalia-South. 32) Wachenfeld's independent 
effort was disowned by the GVG leadership which expelled him from the movement 
before the poll too~~ place. This decision was taken to canbat 'the proven lies 
and machinations' of Wachenfeld and his allies in the "';Vestf!ilischer Vorn-l!rts" .33) 
7iachenfeld, because of his rej ection of the 'parliamentary game', conducted a 
campaign of what might be described as 'non-involvement'. His self-justificator,r 
views were made clear in a lengthy review of the Ma;y election: 'As is well known 
to all v~lkisch elements in Westphalia-South ... efforts by the DVFP member 
Wiegershaus of Elberfeld in ilie second half of last year led to a division in 
the ranks of the v~lkisch movement of WestphaJia. These efforts were designed 
to pervert our idealistic vBlkisch cause, represented until then by ilie old 
Westphalian leaders of the movement, into a party affair of the old style. 
The Westphalian leaders had ••• made it clear from the start to the represen-
tatives of the party cliques sailing under ilie vBlkisch banner, namely 'Niegerhaus 
(Elberfeld) and GUnther (Hagen), as well as to the influential circles in 
Munich and Berlin, that they would rather destroy the vBlkisch. cause in 7/est-
phalia than consent to a devaluation of the vBlkisch movement to the level of 
a party affair. • •• But since those warned believed "\lw.t they could ignore the 
warning, we old vBlkisch members have been forced to make our threat a reality. 
Vie were aware, of course, of the fact that in view of the unbelievable intrigues 
we ourselves had little to expect from the election result, and that large 
numbers would turn to ilie German Nationalist s. Thi s was inevitable considering 
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32) 
33) 
The list is reprinted in Beck, op. cit., pp.546-547. The first candidate 
was a miner, Heinrich Dolle fran Kleinberg, County BUren. Dolle was an 
active speaker on behalf of the liSDAP not only in Westphalia, but as far 
afield as Bavaria: see the report on Dolle ~ the Landrat, B~ren, 14 March 
1924: SAD U IP/570. 
Lambers, op. cit., pp.206-207j Beck, op. cit., p.547. The "Westfalischer 
Vorwarts" was founded in 1920j a weekly, it was printed in Hagen and sup-
ported the vBlkisch movement: see reports by the police, Hagen, 15 and 16 
February 1924: SAM I PA/344. 
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the present circumstmces. For we represent the viel'7 th'1t the vBlkisch 
cause is still guarded better unJer the Germa.n Nationalist fhg than under 
the flag of those committed to boss rule, as represented by the V-S-B in 
Westphalia-South. 'ffe of the VBlkif3cher Block, with our anti-parlia.ment'3.rian 
attitudes, have not attempted in any way, through meetings or any other exer-
tions, to secure a mandate, for on our side virtu'3.11y no electioneering was 
undertak~n • ••• It was our goal to checkmate the above mentioned politic~l 
ca.rpetbaggers and that has been achieved wi thou t meetings and speeches. 71 e 
secured, despite our inactivity, 9,54-7 votes for our list in '.7estphaUa-South. 
The V-S-B (Gnnther) received 19,097 votes, which must be seen as a small 
reward given the large number of meetings, consecrations of flags and other 
pOliticaJ. theatricals launched in the course of the election period..' 34-) 
Wachenfeld's actions were determined to a large degree by his belief in 
the old, traditional vt'>lkisch ideas as he saw them. The concept of i:llmin~ 
the movement into a 112.rli:\Oil(hlt'3..I'Y one was heretical in his ~es. The G'[3. 
leadership could do little to bring him into line. Rosenbere f 5 control in 
':'/'estphalia was of no consequence as far as Wachenfe1d waS ccncerned. Indeed, 
atte:npts to persuade Wachenfeld to drop his separate "electoI!'\.l" effort 'W'ere 
seen qy him as affronts. He considered himself to be his ~n master and made 
this very clear in a broadside directed. ag3inst Rosenberg n.nd. the GW: 'And 
then there is the accusation that I did not withdraw my ovm election organi-
sation despite repeated requests to do 50, and in your letter of the 19th of 
this month you observe that I di d not comply with the instructions. 71ell, what 
on earth are you thinkin;,; of? lJe you by ch:mce my superior Mr !to senberg? ' 
~Vachenfeld had precise ideas about his position. 'I have', he wrote, 'always 
made it clear to the party les,dership, and:.1r Esser "fill remember this, tht'.t 
I would. a.ccept the responsibility of leadinS the 100;1.1 org3.nisll.tion on the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
34-) Wachenfeld's account reprinted in Beck, Ope cit., pp.552-553. 
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unders~~ndine that I would have time~ and adequate know1ed~e of the develop-
ments inaugerated. by you •••• ".ve can only work together if you consider me 
and my friends not as subordin~tes, but as partners in the cornman cause , 35) 
7lachenfeld's opposition to Rosenberg's tactics and leadership, And the 
questionine of the wisdom of the V-S-B concept and tile alliance be'been the 
GVG and fue DYFP, were echoed in a rep~ to his June letter by one of the 
correspondents, Esser. ~he latter, embroiled in a personal vendetta with a 
number of velkisch figures in Bavaria, not only sympathised with ',1achenfeld' s 
views and attitudes, but a.d.ded his own sharp criticisms of the personalities 
involved in ihe National Socialist and. v~lkisch movement, rantine ae;l1.inst the 
'Junkers, stupid academics, thick-head.ed lawyers am brutal impostors' who had 
a.ppeared in the party and were out to 'destroy the belief in Hi tIer' B work'. 36) 
Esser's letter to Wachenfeld is a good ex:ample of the type of polemic 
Esser was to use against his opponents in the conflict which broke out in the 
GVG in the summer of 1924. The vicious personal attacks were to create deep 
splits within the National Socialist movement, and by the ald of the year 
the attacks produced widespread hostility to Esser and his group. Tension was 
felt wi thin the GVG as soon as Esser returned from exile and assumed a leading 
position within the organisation. His claim to be Hitler's only true diSCiple 
and loyal follower was supported by Streicher. Rosenberg was unable to cope 
wi th such an alliance, and the two moo soon pushed him into the sidelines. In 
practice Esser and Strei cher wok over the leadership of the GVG, a position 
th~ used to resist attempts to unite all v~lkisch organisations. Such united 
organisations were the V!!llkisch-Block movement in Bavaria, and the V-S-B' B 
Successor, the HSFB at national level. 37) Esser and Streicher were able to 
strengthen their position within the National Socialist movement as a oonse-
quence of Hitler's attitude of non-involvement and non-commitment, an attitude 
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35) Wachenfeld to GWeV :,funich, Hagen, 2 June 1924: BAK NS 1/411. 
36) Esser to Wachenfeld, (z.Z.) Berlin, 20 June 1924: BAK NS I/411. 
37) A sound amlysis of the conflicting groups i s given by Horn, Ope cit., 
pp.172 ff •• 
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forced on him by his situation. ,38) Hitler's decision to withdrn;,v from poli-
tics in the summer of 1924- and to let things run their course until his release 
permitted increased independence not only to the Esser-Streicher circle within 
the GVG, but also to other National Socialist groups. This meant 'that size-
able National Socialist sections remained aloof from the HSFB. One such group 
was organised by Esser and Streicher in the form of a 'newt GVG, which emerged 
from an extraordina~ meeting held on 9 JulY 1924. 39) The movement developed 
by the ~{o faced great problems and had only a limited importance on the natio-
nal level. Both the organisation and the finances of the GVG at the time of 
the 'take-over' left much to be desired. Of the fifty party branches only five 
had met their responsi bilitie s vi s-a-vi s lJunich, and 'the plll'ty leadership 
was saddled with a debt of 55,000 Marks, -the bIlk of which had been accUInuhted 
in 1he election campaign of May. 4-0) 
Esser and Streicher adopted a ve~ independent line followinG their 
successful acquisition of power wi thin tile GVG, and refused to have anything 
to do wi th other v~lki sch constellations. The change of course by the new 
GVG leadership inevitably had its repercussions at regional and loc~l levels. 
Within Westphalia it led to further re-alignments and. re-adjustments and yet 
more quarrelling within the v~lkisch ranks. To understand this one has to 
look at the developments which took place in the first half of 1924. This 
period gave a general boost to -the fortunes of right-wing radicalism o,d.ng to 
the poor economic situation and the publicity given to -the Rif,ht by the Hitler 
and Ludendorff trials; these favourable circumstances led to the appearance of 
an extensive net",vork of GVG branches within the province. The bulk of these 
had united. with the DVFP branches to form the V-S-B 'electoral association' 
which was active in the May Reichstag election. 41) After -the elections the 
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38) Bitler explained the reasons for his withdrawal in the V8lkischer Beobach_ 
ter, 26 February 1925; see also Jochmann, 01'. cit., pp.78 and 123. 
39) "Rundschreiben", 7 Augu st 1924: HA. 42/857; reprinted in part in Tyrell, 
op. cit., pp.81-83. 
40) "Rundschreiben", 7 August 1924-: HA 42/857. 
41) The establishment of GVG branches documented in SA!\l I PA/398 and SAD VII _ 
64- Band I. 
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leadership of the V-S-3 in ~estphalia attempted to transform this loose-knit 
alliance into a permanent "party" structure. At a. meetinc of the V-S-B lea-
ders in Elberfeld on 25 May 1924- ple.ns were forged to strengthen the co-
operation be~Neen the GVG and tile DVFP. Rhineland-Westphalia was divided 
into two regions for organisational purposes, that is into the occupied ~~d 
unoccupied zones, the latter area, knmvn as the Llmdesverbru1d Westfalen of 
the V-S-B, falling to von Pfeffer, who set about organisin~ the movement from 
the party centre established,at Mftnster. These developments, inaugurated by 
local initiative, received the explicit approval of Rosenberg and 'the GVG 
headquarters in Munich. 42) It is most likely that these changes would have 
been pushed through in the province even without Rosenberg's forced consent. 
As it happened, the agreement of -the GVG Munich centre made very little dif-
ference to subsequent events, since the local GVG branch lea.ders reacted inde-
pendentl;y to the nEm developments. Those who agreed with the changes gave a 
reserved acknowledgement to their new supremo von Pfeffer. Some elements 
resisted amalgamation vociferousl;y. The major opposition came from Ganther, 
who rejected von Pfeffer's leadership of the v~lkisch movement in the province 
and refused to have any dealings wi th him. 43) Rosenberg's intervention proved 
fu tile. Instead of follOwing Munich's instructions to subordinate the Hagen 
branch of the V-S-B to the neR' regional centre, GUnther attempted to form his 
own movement, which was not recognised by the Munich party centre. 44-) Gtlnther's 
efforts to go it alone came to little, and Rosenberg waS cited as the chief 
cause of his organisation's collapse. 45) The isolated position Ganther found 
himself in in the summer of 1924, with Esser backing his old rival Wachenfeld, 
and Grotehusmann rallying sane GVG elements behind von Pfeffer's movement, led 
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42) Von Pfeffer to Elberfeld Zentrale, ~anster, 28 May 1924; reprinted in 
Beck, OPe cit., pp.539-540. 
43) Gtinther to GVG Munich, Hagen, 6 October 1924: BAK NS 1/411, GVG- Munich 
to von Pfeffer, Munich, 27 June 1924: :aAK NS 1/410. 
44) GVG to GUnther, Munich, 27 June 1924: Bl"K NS 1/410. 
45) GUnther to GVG, Hagen, 6 October 1924-: "Auf Betreiben Ro senbergs ist mir 
durch die verschiedenen Manipulationen zweifelhaftester Art die Organisa-
tion zerschlagen worden"; BAK NS 1/410. 
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to GUnther's withdrawal from active participation in the vBlkisch movement. 
Like so many inClividuals and groups throughout Germany he decided to wait 
until Hitler's release and the time of a final clarification. 46) 
Von Pfeffer proved an efficient organiser of the V-S-B (later NSFE). 
He managed to persuade most GVG groups to join his org~nisation. Thus by 
the time Esser and Streicher took over the direction of the GVG in Munich 
there were few groups prepared to respond to the new direction introduced by 
the new leaders. There were few points of contact between such Westphalian 
groups and the GVG Munich party headquarters, which was not surprising in 
vi6\V of the weakness of the Esser supporters in the province. In Hasen 
Wachenfeld led a small group, but he did very little to promote the Esser 
cause. By tile summer of 1924 he had grown tired of the conflicts, intrigues 
and squabbles which occurred so frequently in the vt!>lkisch crunp. As early as 
March, moreover, he had made public his desire to give more attention to his 
buSiness interests and involve himself less actively in politics. 47) Wachen-
feld was less concerned with the formation of an efficient GVG branch than 
wi th the settling of his account with Gilnther. The conflict between the two 
became more acrimonious during the Slmroer of 1924, and led finally to a court 
case, with GUnther s:ling Ylachenfeld for slander. In the dispute Esser was 
Willing to give 'Nachenfe1d considerable Slpport, thouGh Wachenfeld's desire 
to make use of Esser's letter of 20 June as evidence was turned down by its 
author, who feared that 'the letter wou1a rapidly appear in all the newspapers 
in the whole of Germany and would cause in the final instance unendine harm 
to the Great Movement and to Hitler'. 48) Wachenfeld continued to keep in 
touch with klunich for the rest of the year, retaining his characteristic style, 
tha.t of one writing to an equal rather than that of a subordinate writing to 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
4-6) 
47) 
4-8) 
GUnther to GVG, Ragen, 6 October 1924: BAK NSJr/410. 
Police report, Hagen, 25 March 1924: SAM I PJ./344. 
See the correspondence be~Neen Wachenfeld and Esser, 3 October a.nd 6 
October 1924 i~ BAK NS I/411. 
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his party leader. 49) 
The most active supporter of' Esser's GVG in ',Yestphalia ultimately proved 
to be Wilhelm Orth, who joined Esser's movement after some initial hesitation. 
Orth's first contact with ~sser in November 1924 seemed unpromising. The main 
interest of Orth's letter to Esser lies in its reflection of the uncertainty 
which reigned in the v~lkisch movement and the hope placed on Hi tIer to even-
tually solve all problems: 'My wish to participate actively in the furtherance 
of the ideas of our spiritual leader Adolf fiitler, as embodied in the GVG, has 
led me to work for t.'l<J.e cause in Westphalia. This attitude has led me to face 
the fact that here in Westphalia there is an unshakable desire and canplete 
agreement to remain true to the Reichsfflhrersch".ft of 'the NSFB, which is to 
be acknO'Nle~ed until Adolf Hi tIer is free and has spoken. Should it be true 
that the Reichsvollzugsausschuss of the GVG is in the right, I nevertheless 
cannot participate in the destruction of the !!SFB in Westphalia, s:ince I could 
not square such an act with my conscience. The great sacrifices and efforts 
involved in the instillation of National Socialism can on~ be judged by those 
who have assisted thi s process. Since the idealism of Adolf Hi tIer touches my 
heart I am forced to refrain fron furthering the propaganda of both sides and 
to remain a passive member of the GVG. The construction of a bridge be~Neen 
the tiVO will surely be undertaken by Adolf Hitler •••• The situation in 
',Vestphalia is clif'i'erent from that of Bavaria. I am certain that von Pfeffer, 
as leader of the :~ational socia.list moveluent of 7lestphalia, will on1y enforce 
the ioeas of Aaolf Hitler.' 50) 
Within a fortnisht of t:rJ.s letter Orth chanced. his mind and wrote to 
Munich offerinG his services. His reasons for eloing so are not clei.1.r, thOUGh 
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49) '.1achenfelcl felt free to 'advise' Esser; e·s· "Iiachenfeld to Esser, Hagen, 
6 November 1924: ".Aus der ZeitunG erfuhr ich, dass Sie a..'T1 lehten Sonntrtl? 
bei der Vertretertagung in Mtlnchen sich mit Hr. Dinther (sic) zusammen v 
getan haben. Au s diesee Anlass empfehle ich Ihnen i3rBsste Vorsicht. 
Denn Dinther ist ein Schwarm~eist, del' allrch seinen zweiten Roman 'Die 
SUnde wider den Geist' sein redlich Teil dazu beigetragen hat, den v~l­
kischen Ge<b.nken l!\cherlich zu machen";· BAX l1S I/411. 
50) '11. Orth to GVG- i.!unich, r.IUnster, 8 November 1924-: BAK NS I/411. 
he m20Y have become concerned about the direction the NSFJ3 vras t"ddnt:,. The 
fact that the HS::B had put fonfard an industrialist as ch1.irm~ln of the Prussi1.n 
LanClh·e, with the comment 'that is the complete ruin of the Freedom l,lovement' , 
UlC'y provide the ex:plcm::ttion. 51) Orth founded a branch of the G-VG- in Selm, 
Count-J Ltl.ainch?usen, in November. The history of the branch, which is rela-
tively well documented in the correspondence between Orth and the Munich p?rty 
headquarters, throws much light on the difficulties faced by what became the 
Ulost active GVG- branch in the province. Orth listed the most obvious handic::tps: 
the area in which he operated had a large mining community; there hs.d never 
been a lIa tional Socia1i st movement in the 10 O')li ty; he was s.~ort of cash; he 
had no propaganda. material at his disposal; finally, his move;nent had to face 
the competition of the HSFB, whi ch was al sO attempting to establi sh a branch 
in the lomli ty. 52) The :"~nich party centre, though s one";hat surprised at 
Orth's change of mind, aid much to support his e'1rly efforts by sendin5 him 
propaGanda material: neWSpapers, placards and a hundred. Hitler postcards. 
Munich hoped that he 'vrould be active for the pure ;{ational Socialism as rep-
resented by the GVG', and enclosed a bill for the material sent to him, the cost 
of which could not be 111et by the party head.quarters since 'we crm only maintain 
our difficult position if for once the other groups fulfil at least partially 
their responsibilities'. 53) Financially the Selm-Beifan~ branch proved a 
liabili~ to ~~e GVG par~ centre. Orth's first request to Munich, foll~vine 
the enrolment of 'several members', had been that no demands should. be made 
51+) 
for the membership dues for at least two months. Such requests were vie',7ed 
unfavourably by Munich, which had severe finA.ncial problems of its ovm. In the 
reply to Orth, the Munich party headquarters stated that they hr:t.d tHken note of 
the 'difficult fin8ncial position in \vhich your branch is plA-ced at the moment. 
Nevertheless, we must ask you to pay to us urgently at least 20 per cent of the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
51) 
52) 
53) 
54) 
Orth to G-VG Munich, Selm-Beifane, 19 November 1924: BAK NS 1/411. 
Orth to GVG-, Selm-Beifang, 19 and 25 November 1924: BAK HS I/411. 
GVG to Orth, Munich, 27 November 1924: BAK HS 1/411. 
Orth to GVG, Selm-Beifang, 25 November 1924: BAT\: ns 1/411. 
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membership dues, that is 10 Fr. per he:otd. This is needed to help the lll'lrty 
centre to survive financi':..lly in the present difficult circumst'tnces'. 55) 
Orth could do Ii ttle to help ;I:unich. In a lonG letter in mi':c-December he 
explained the financial pliSht facine his membership: 'Our newlY foun(led 
branch has to struggle and fight for survival. Our mer:lbers, mainly miners, 
have had, since their open acmO"lledeemel1t t.hat they are supporters of' Hi tIer, 
to resist the most acute terror. Many are nlreaqy in great need. I must ask 
you for r~.pia. help for our deputy ch:'l.irman, Weise, our most able aei ta tor ann 
a fef1rless fighter for the true spirit of Hitler. His poor wife has become 
melancholic because of the distress - no money, no food... The poorest of 
our members sleep on the ground on stra'o'l'. We need clothes - it is the duty 
of every Ua tional Socialist in the tOim to assist his fellow members im!11e-
diately. If you cannot do anything personally, lilr Esser, please brin~ our 
plight to the attention of the movem61t through ii1e National Sozlalill •••• 
Can you find a post for ''''eise so th''lt he can continue to work for "the party? 
Anything will do as long as he ~~ support his family.' 56) 
Another G-VG br:mch which was primarilY working class in membership was 
th'lt of Dortmunn, founded towards the end of 1924 by Johann Esser. He too was 
a self-appointed "leader" of a group which was purely 'National Socialist 
(Hitler) in character, and nothing else' and looked to'l1ards the working class 
for su?port. Johann Esser's main concern was with the trade union question. 
G-iven his environment, he believed 'that through organised trade unions we 
would undoubtedly have at this time the best opportuni t¥ for ilie spread of 
National Socialist thought t. He was quite sure that "their formation 'would 
ensure for us the greatest success'. 57) 
Apart from the Hagen, Selrn-Beifang and Dortmund brAnches of the G-VG-
(Richtun~ Esser), there is little to suggest that the G-VG made any significant 
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55) G-VG to Orth, Munich, 6 December 1924: B.u( NS 1/411. 
56) Crth to G-~, Selm-Beifang, 15 December 1924: B.~K NS I/~ll. 
57) J. Esser to the "Schriftleitung der Zeitung 'V~lkischer Kurier' MUnchen", 
Dortmund, 9 October 1924: BAK NS I/4l0. 
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impact on -{festphalia. The only other branch formed, apparently, was at 
Paderborn in Janua~ 1925. This too l~ckea adequate support and worked with 
very limited financial resources. The only thing It;unich could offer to it 
VTaS plenty of encouragement. 58) 
The GV~ under Esser and Streicher was too weak f.Lnancial~ to assist the 
precarious branches established in a few towns in the province. The branches 
were permanently threatened by poor finances and "the "hostili ty" of' the environ-
ment in which they were operating. The lack of any regional org'1.nisation and 
the dependence on the Munich party centre for financial help proved limiting 
factors. Most important above all was the inability of the GVG to compete 
with o~her v~lkisch organisations. The most powerful attraction was exerted 
by the V-S-B, and its successor, the NSFB, which overshadowed not only the 
GVG, but all the other v5lkisch fragments active in Westphalia. 
The V-S-B e~d the NSFB. 
The V-S-B, predecessor of the NSFB, emerged in the eRrly part of 192~. 
It drew together a variety of v5lkisch groups in what was initially an electoral 
alliance formed to contest the national and regional elections held in May 
1924. Although the V-S-B and HSFB never included all the Hational Socialists 
and other velkisch elements active in Westphalia, the two organisations were 
by far the most efficiently organised and best supported of the diverse v5lkisch 
groups active in the region. 59) As the major rallying point of right-wins 
extremism these organisations played a crucial part in the development of 
National Socialism in the province. Froln their l'8.nks were to emerge the 
leading figures of the re-organised NSU~P of 1925: the ~quleiter von Pfeffer, 
the district leaders and. the bulk of the branch leaders. 
The importance of the V-S-B in the histo~ of right-wing radicalism in 
Westphalia lies in the organisational innovations it incorpoI"ated. Unlike 
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58) GVG- to F. Hillebrand (Paderbom), Munich, 7 Jaruary 1925: BA1\. NS 1/410. 
59) On the formation of the V-S-B see this chapter pp.l63 ff .. 
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the regional Nazi movement, which frdled to develop a regional structure ann 
left individual branches to their own devices, the V-S-B developed (l hier3.r-
chical structure with a regional organisation interposed betl'leen tl1e local 
and national organisational units. This led to greater unity and strenzth 
in the long run and alla,fed regional leaders to establish greater authority 
over branch leaders through personal contact at ~ meetings ?~d party rallies. 
In the creation of a vertiC'll org.'3.nisational structure \vith defined lines of 
authority the V-S-B anticipated in several ways the orgqnisational structure 
of the post-1925 NSDAP. Another difference, again of importance in the long 
term development of the NSfr\P, was that the V-S-B was organised to perform as 
a "party" from the very beginnine, thoueh, as is true also of the NSD.\P in 
later years, the "parliamenta~ nature" was strongly denied in the party 
progral'n:ne: 'The Freedom Movement is not a party; it has nothing to do with 
parliamen t or parliamentary spiri t; on -the contrary, it embraces all those 
who are sick and tired of party politics and parliamentarianism.' 60) This 
attitude was ve~ muCh in line with National Socialist thinkins in that the 
older Nazi leaders and members thought in tens of "movement" rather than 
"party". Wachenfeld's attitude was typical of seme of the olLler Nazi members 
active in the ~estphalian sphere. Unlike those who were to remain true National 
Socialists (by their definition) and were later to be organised in the GW by 
Esser and Streicher, the supporters of the V-S-B were more flexible and realis_ 
tic. However much elements within the V-S-B mqy have denounced the 'parlia-
menta~ farce', they nevertheless took the line of participation characteristic 
of the major coalition partner, the DVFP. 'the Dotive behind tileir attitude 
was made perfectly clear by the V-S-E's leadership: '"lie a.O not want to ignore 
the many advantages available in these &~ys to movenents which have a strong 
bloc in parliament.' 61) But the leadership did not see parliament as the 
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60) "Lei ts!itze", VSB 'Nahlkreis 17 Westf.'llen-Nord, 16 March 1924; reprinted 
in Beck, op. cit., pp.572-573. 
61) Ibid., p.573. 
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'focal point' of the movement: 'The V-S-B does not represent the whole of the 
Freedom Movement: it is only its outlet, its exponent, its oren,n. ':fe know 
very well that neither a decision nor the desired German freedom c~n ever be 
reached just throuGh a parliamentary organisation and parliament. 'l'he Fre~dom 
Movement has as its focal point the Volk - in parliament sit only helpers and 
delegates. It is this difference of attitude which funrutmentally differen-
tiates us from all other real "parties", for they represent an end in them-
selves.' 62 
The V-S-B had hardly been formed before its effectiveness was tested in 
the May elections of 1924. The Reichsta.s returns f!}.ve little encoura gement 
to the movement. The best return came from '.1estphalia-Horth, where the V-S-B 
secured some 3.5 per cent of the vote; this was 50 per cent be1mv the V-S-B's 
national average. 63) The return for Westphalia-South was abysmal, a mere 
1.5 per cent. Of the 35 electoral districts only Koblenz-Trier (1.3 per cent) 
secured a Worse result. In ',Vestphalia-South the poor result was partly due to 
the existence of WaChenfeld's V~lkischer Block, which acted as a passive COm-
petitor. Its success reflected the large number of Nazis and v~lki sch suppor-
ters not prepared to enter the party game. Nevert..l-J.eless, the results of the 
election eleva ted. the V-S-B to the level of an important minority party. In 
Westphalia-North it polled. only 0.1 per cent less than the D.D:? Compared wi th 
the returns of the ~~jority parties in both electoral areas in Westphalia, 
however, ine V-S-B remained very much on the fringe of the political life of 
the province. 
The 10','1' returns of the V-S-B were related in sOme degree to the unfavour-
able environment in which the party operated. In Westphalia the strength of 
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"Leits1ttze", VS13 Wahlkreis 17 'i1estfalen-Nord, 16 March 1924; reprinted 
in Beck, op. cit., pp.572-573. 
Percentages frolu Milatz, op. cit., p.ll2. TWo-thirds of' the votes (20,100) 
came from the Regierung5bezirk of Minden, the rest froin the predominantly 
Catholic Regierungsbezirk of MUnster. In both tlistricts t.'r1e hrgest cities 
Bielefeld and ~tlnster respectively, provid3d 25 per cent of the vote; see ' 
H. Strief'lcr, ~che W'shlen in Bile.ern. unit ~:>,hlen, Dtlsseldorf', 191~6, 
Appendix, Table 4. 
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the left-wine p'U'tie s, the high returns of the Catholic Centre P'lrty, and 
considcrrtble support for V:lrious bourgeois pc..rties accounted for t:.le bul].~ 
of' the votes. In sane ways the results of the V-S-3 vrere also due to i)oor 
organisation. 'l'he "party" WE'.S little more than a loose-knit D-5socie.tion, an 
electoral alli.:mce which could not E'.utomo.tically expect SUlll)ort from the diverse 
groul's vihich it theoretica,lly represented. There was no cb.ri ty as to who 
oretmised ;,:hom, end ,\'iithin the l~ational Socialist a.ml vlHkisch ranlcs, never 
mind with the voter at large, the term 'V-S-3' was often just a name. 
The major effort to transform the V-S-3 into a politic~l movement of Some 
signific['"nce cmne a.fter the election. The lec"dine; Sl1irit ana chief org'l.niser 
of the V-S-B was von Pfeffer, one of the mal1Y UIJ.[i.ble to settle dO\\'n in the 
post-war period to. civilian life and attracted to the activism and. r8.Cicalisrn 
of the v~lkisch movement. 64) Von Pfeffer initially led. the V-3-3 orGanis:1.tion 
in :Testphliia-Horth in '\he first months of its existence, Md eli spl':l.yed in this 
capaci"bJ his orgcmisational talent and. attention to detail. His thorol1f,hness 
and military style of lea.dership ere evident in hi $ first instructions to 
V-S-:3 branches uno.er his control of 1:ay 1924, vlhich left 11 ttle to chance. 
Local lea.ders were informed about the availability of 'suitable v~lkisch reading 
material, about how to organise propagand..'1., c.<lnvassing, discussion, publio 
meetings and so on, everything being described in ltle greatest detail. (5) 
At a meeting or v[l,lki1'lch leaders of Rhineland-IVestphalia held in Elberfeld 
on 25 May 1924, von Pfefi'er assumed control over the whole V-S-B org::l.l1ised in 
the unoccupied zone of Westphalia, the occupied districts falline to the con-
trol of the Elberfeld centre. 66) The nevI "Lp.ndesverb'lnd ',Vestf"tlen" of the 
V-S-B which emerged fran the meeting did. not secure prior !'.sreement from 
Munich for the org".nisational changes initiated on the regionnl level beM.use 
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64) 
65) 
66) 
On von Pfeffer see chapter 4, p.I37; furti1er Krebs, op. cit., pp.2l8-220. 
"Y3B.7estphalia-North to all Branches", MUnster, 10 May 1924; reprinted. 
in Beck, OPe cit., p~.577-580. 
For this and the follOWinG see VSB (von Pfeffer) to Elberfeld, MUnster, 
28 M.'ly 1924; reprinted in Beck, op. cit., pp.S39-540. 
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von Pfeffer <lid not think th'l.t this was necessary. Thi s independence created 
problems as soon as he tried to rally diverse v~lki ~ch groups behind the new' 
Lffi1desverb'1nd. The rnaj or problem was one of au thori ty. Von Pfeffer had no 
"authorisation" to support his ne'.v position except that derived from those 
participatins in the Elberfeld meetine. EVents proved that he could not arbi-
trarily enforce his ,viII on a movanent one of the main features of 'which was 
the independent attitude of its va.rious local and district leaders. Thus the 
leadine figures of the V-S-B of southern ',Vestphalia. ignored. the d.ecisions 
arrived at in Elberfeld and organised their o?m L~naesverb~na based on the 
boundaries of the ReGierunssbe7.irk of Arnsberg. Tl.e leaders of this ore ani-
flation were in a relatively strong position in th..'l.t their authorii:-J was derived 
from the membership of the are'l.. Party members had democratiC:.'l.lly elected 
not only the local branch leaders, but also, through elected deleeates, the 
district and regional leaders Rnd their respective committees. 67) Still, 
they were not averse to combinins with von Pfeffer's org'lnisation, thou.§;h only 
after consultations, and not on the basis of decisions reached at Elberfeld in 
which they had not been involved. Of fundamental importance in keeping the 
t-'fO groups apart was also the fact thn t von Pfeffer based hi s leadership of 
the vl!>lkisch movement in ~Vestphalia on the authori ty of' Ludend.orff, while the 
southern group looked to Hi tIer a.nd were prepared to await Hi tIer's relea.se 
before 'clarityine' the position. 68) It was the unlikelihood of such an early 
release which seems to have persua.ded the leaders of the V-S-13 of southern 
Westphalia. to accept Ludendorff's candidate, von Pfeffer, as the authorised 
head of a united V-S .. ':3 for the whole of the province, for by the end of June 
1924 agreement was reached between the two blocs. 69) Ludendorff's support 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
67) 
68) 
69) 
"Organisations Plan VSB Westfalen-Stld", no d..'-1.te (probably June 1924), 
reprinted in Beck, Ope cit., pp.543-545. 
M. Pferdek~pfer to Ludendorff, no date (beeinnine of June 1924?), in 
Beck, Ope cit., pp.540-541. 
Ludendorff to M. Pferdek~pfer, 1iunich, 10 June 1924; and VSB Landesver-
band I'lestfalen to M. Pferdelct!mpfer, l~tlnster, 27 June 1924; both letters 
reprinted in Beck, op. cit., pp.54l-542. 
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was sufficient to win over the bulk of the National Socialist and vl'Jlkisch 
elements to von Pfeffer's org:misation, while a series of meetines between 
von Pfeffer and v~lkisch leaders smoothed over fonner difficulties. 70) 
The effort to unify the various right-wing extremists of Westphalia 
occurred at a time of renewed crisis within the v~lkisch circles on the natio-
nal level, a crisis which inevitably had local repercussions. The occasion of 
the crisis was Hitler's decision in June 1924- to withdraw from politics for 
the duration of his imprisonment, and his determination to leave the movement 
to itself and start from scratch on his release. 71) Hitler's re5ie~~tion, 
and his declaration that 'from now on no one has the right to act in my name, 
to refer to me or to give declarations in my name', confused the problem as to 
who wielded 811 thority in the v5lkisch movement. 72) This new development made 
• 
it much more difficult for those forces working towards a unified movement, 
as is witnessed by the situation in Westphalia, where 'all want a united move-
ment but no one allows anyone else to bring it about'. 73) Hitler's decision 
increased the tendency of local and regional leaders to organise their o\vn 
empires and resist amalgamation. In the lonG run Hitler's decision strengthened 
his position in that he became the focus of hope for ~1e future, his supreme 
authority in the last resort being acknowledged by the various factions which 
c~stallised in the latter half of 19~. 
Hitler's decision was greeted most enthusiastically by the DVFP's leader-
ship, which saw a chance openins up for a fusion of all v~lkisch elements 
within one national organisation. Since the autumn of 1923, and especially 
in the first b'o months of 1924-, ven G-raefe and Wulle had been workine to 
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70) 
71) 
72) 
~ilhelm Pferdekftmpfer to von Pfeffer, MUnster, 12 July 1924-; in Beck, Ope 
cit., PP.54-2-543. ~ilhelm Pferdek~pfer had been "SchriftfUhrer des Aus-
schusses der v~lkischen Verblinde" in 11estphaUa-South, a.ctive on behalf 
of the V-S-B in the May Reichstag election of 1924-. 
A. Hitler to L. Haase, Landsberg, 16 June 1924; in JOchmann, Ope cit., 
pp.77-78. Also H. Fobke to L. Haase, Landsberg, 23 June 1924; ibid., p.91. 
Hitler to L. Haase, Landsberg, 16 June 1924-; in Jochmnnn, op. cit., p.78. 
On the consequences of Hitler's "resignation" see Horn, Ope Cit., pp.165 ff •• 
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extend their influence; Hi tIer's decision increased their efro rt and seemed 
to promise greater reward. The difficulty of realising their aspirations to 
lead a united movement soon became evident. The Weimar meeting of 20 July 
1924, designed to bring about uni~, emphasized once asain the conflicts to 
which the national vBlkisch movement was subject. Some 80 Nationp-l Socialists 
took part in the meeting, and their response to the DVFP overtures reflected 
division rather than a general desire for unity. 74) The Nazi deleeates could 
not agree on the question of closer co-operation with the DVFP, nor was there 
ae;reement about their relationship with the Reichsffthrerschaft (von Gra.efe, 
Ludendorff, and strasser, the latter appointed by Ludendorff as Hitler's rep-
resentative) which had emerged in the spring of 1924. Another thorny problem, 
on which diverse opinions were voiced, was the attitude towards participation 
in elections, which had been anathema to the old National Socialists of the 
pre-putsch days and which continued to be seen by some elements as . leacli.ng 
to a 'dissolution' of the true Nation.'ll Socialist spirit. Conflicts a.mong 
the National Socialist representatives about these issues split the N3DAP 
into various factions and led to a situation in which the Nazis agreed to dis-
agree rather than to unite en bloc with the DVFP. It was this disunity and 
the antagonism it produced which prompted sunkel, one of the partiCipants, to 
conclude that the Weimar meetirl;S could best be equated with the 'inner and outer 
dissolution of the old nSD.:~'. 
At the Weimar meeting the representatives of the 7/'estpha.lian NSDAP placed 
themselves 'unconditionally behind the Reichsleitung'. 75) To interpret this 
decision as implying that a united front existed in the province among the Nazi 
groups.is misleadine. The representatives of von Pfeffer's V-S-B Landesleitun~ 
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74) 
75) 
For the folloviing see the account by R. Sunkel: "Nationalsozialistische 
Vertretertagung in 7leimar 20 Juli 1924": HA 44/893; another account of the 
meeting is that by A. Volck: "Vertraulicher Bericht tiber die national-
sozialistische Vertretertaeung in Weimar am 20 Juli 1924", in JOchmann, 
op. cit., pp.98-102. 
R. Sunkel; "NS Vertretertagung in Weimar 20 Juli 1924": H.A 44/893. 
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Westphalia agreed to the fusion with the DVFP and the acceptance of the le."aer-
ship of the ReichsfUhrerschaft. But von Pfeffer was the first to a.C\mit that 
his orgcmisation did. not represent all Nazi opinion in the province, and it 
was only his part of tile National Socialist-v51kisch wing which participated 
in a second Weilllar meeting held in Auzust, at which the details of t..~e fusion 
vrith the DVFP were worked out. 76) 
Several sections remained aloof fran the unity movement, though not for 
the same reasons. One important group in the Bielefeld area had never been 
integrated wi th ilie 7lestphalian sector, and. had taken their letta from the 
North G-erman National Soci3J.ists. The Bielefeld Nazis formed an inteeral part 
of the "Directorate" established by the North G-erman Nazis in June 1924-, and 
they ultimately became part of the National Socialist Arbei tSf,emein5ch~ft 
formed in September 1924-. 77) The "Directorate" and tile Arbeits 0emeinschAft 
were very independent in their attitudes. The "Directorate" rejected the 
leadership of -the Reichsftlhrerschaft and the I,1unich GVG- party centre, dis-
trusted the T1VFP, and. looked solely towards Hitler as their leader. The head 
of the "Directorate", Volcic, regarded himself mereJ.y as ItPlrdzh'llter" for 
Hitler until such time as he woold be free activeJ.y to take over the Nazi 
movement once more. 
Then there were those supporting the G-VG unc1er Esser and Streicher, op-
posed to the idea of a fusion with the DVFP. 'rtle G-VG- branches were relatively 
small and of no great significance, but they represented a.nother Ilationa.1 
Socialist strain a.ctive in the province. 78) Finally, t~re were the suppor-
ters, centred on Eagen, of Gflnthcr's independent movement, who looked to 
Hitler and remained aloof:£'rom the other .!.!ll:.1dsch groops. 
None of these groups had as ma:qy members ,as the V-S-B - renamed the HSFa 
after the second -Veime.r meeting. :Juch of the importance these orgmrl.sations 
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76) VSB "Rundschreiben Irr. 12", Mtlnster, 26 .A.u[;Ust 1924-i reprinted in Beck, 
o;?_ cit., 2.532. 
77) For the follo-;1inS see Noa.kes, op. cit., pp.4-'+ ff •• 
78) On the G-VG- in -;{est:,?halio. seC) this chs.pter, pp.162 ff •• 
acquired was due to the vigour and. nssertive c.cive of ven Pfeffer, ','Iho, wh~t-
ever his lim.it:>.tions, aid. not lack enere;y and initirl.tive. Fol10':rinC the Weil.l?r 
meetin,z of July, he used his position as Lnn(\esleitel" of the V-S-B to organise 
its successor before any ne\v name had been deter.nined fo r it. W'i thout wai tine 
to see what the local reaction to the dispute at the ~'feimar meeting would be, 
he set about rallying the v~lkisch groups. He s:iJnply glossed. over the tactical 
and id.eological points at issue, and. gave a rather one-sided interpretation 
and superficial version of the July deliberations: 'In the vBlkisch movement 
agree:nent has been reached between Berlin and Munich. The ReichsfUhrerschaft 
LUdendorff, strasser and von Graefe has decided to organise a new movement.' 79) 
The V-S-B br~~ches were informed of the new name of the org~nisation, the 
"HSFB Greater Germany", tcmards the end of August in an invitation to ve,lkinch 
leaders to attend a G~u meeting which was to complete the structure of the new 
party in the province and to be held. on 14 September in }f.Unster. It was 
emphasized in the invitation that all tile requirements of the ve,llci f.ch elements 
of Yiestphalia had been met at fue second Weimar meeting on 16 Aueust, at which 
the amalgamation of -the DVFP and. the NSDAP in Prussia. was c'l,rried throueh, and 
that, indeed, the ~'testphalian representatives had had a great influence on the 
proceeclings. 'The only pointt, it was stated, 'on which our wishes were not 
followed. \'las in the creation of fue Preussenleitun.o;', thouCh 'the widening 
of the Preussenf{1hrung into a. triumvirate was suggested by 'Westphalia' • The 
fact that tile word "party" did not appear. in the new name was especially empha._ 
sized, undoubtedly to appease those who resented anything \'lhich implied a. 
connection with party politics and. parliamentarianism. 80) 
The delegate canf'erence of 14 September 1924 was attended. by both Luden-
dorff and. Strasser, and. it coincided with a patriotic rally which mobilised 
v!!>lkisch and right-wing organisations throughout ':lestpha.lia. Thus the JdO, 
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79) 
80) 
Part of a formal letter of invitation sent W -the velkisch leaders in 
the Hagen area by the NSFB, 5 August 1924: SAM I PA!344. 
"VSB Landesverband Westfalen tl , Rundschreiben Hr. 12, lil{inster, 26 August 
1924; in Beck, op. cit., pp.581-582. 
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the Stahlhelm and -the 'liTB participated in the event. 81) For the ne\'1 HSF.d 
the presence of Ludendorff at the meetine, which determined thJ v;trious appoint-
ments of district and branch leaders, was of great importance, and his name 
was invoked by the new leaders to assert their authori ty and legitimise their 
position. 82) 
The NSFB was a well organised party resting on the organisational struc-
ture bequeathed to it by the V-S-B. Making full use of its efficient organi-
sation it carried out a propaganda drive designed to bring about the absorption 
of all rival v~lkisch groups, and to win over n~v support from the numerous 
right-wing associations active in the province, especially the WB, the ',VTB and 
the Stahlhelm. In areas vnere the conflicts with existing v~lkisch leaders 
could not be resolved by discussion and persuasion, such as the Hagen area, 
von Pfeffer authorised new leaders to work the~e on behalf of the NSFB. Apart 
from the Hagen and Bielefeld districts there is little evidence to suggest 
strong or permanent opposition to the movement. In Hagen van Pfeffer attempted 
to bring GUnther and Wachenfeld int 0 line. Gtinther rejected any c cntact with 
von Pfeffer and withdrevi frClll active politics in the latter ha.lf of the year. 83) 
Wachenfeld continued to look to -the GVG as the legitiJJl3.te aUthority of the 
National Socialist-v51kisch movement. The obstinacy of these two important 
figures and their attacks on von Pfeffer and the NSFB led to -their exclusion 
from the v~lkisch movement and an invitation was sent to their followers to 
join the new party. 84.) Overtures were also made by the NSFB to the patriotic 
associations. Von Pfeffer's attitudetoth6ll was made known in a. lengthy 
memorandum distributed to the ~ functionaries. 85) He a:iJned at a subversion 
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81) 
82) 
83) 
84.) 
85) 
Police report, v.ftnster, 15 September 1924: SAM I FA/344. 
For ex:ample, Grotehusmann, district leader of the Volme-Lenne area, empha-
sized the fact that Ludendorff and Strasser had agreed on his appointment, 
and invoked their names to rally support: Police report, Hagen, 18 Septem-
ber 1924.: SAM I PA/341+. 
GVG to von Pfeffer, 1~unich, 27 June 1924; Gtinther tp GVG, Hagen, 6 October 
1924: BAK NS I/4.l0. 
Police report, Hagen, 18 September 1924: SAM I PA/344. 
For the following see the "Rundschreiben I\r. 13, VSB Landesverband West-
fa1en", Mtinster, 26 September 1924; reprinted in Beck, op. cit., PP.586-
587. 
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of the existing associations by NSFB elements rather than a front3-1 attack. 
The leaders of the associations were not to be maligned by NSFB propaganda 
except if they were systematica~ suppressing v~lkisch members (he singled 
out "!he influential Kreuter of the Westphalian Stahlhelm). The JdO, it was 
hoped, 'would develop in the National So cialist spirit'. Recrui tmcnt for the 
purely v~lkisch organisations, . Slch as the SA, was Iiot to be carried out in 
those organisations ,mich were thought to be developing al ong v~lkisch lines. 
Von Pfeffer noted that already the bulk of the membership of ine Bund Oberland 
in 'Nestphalia was to be found in 'the SA. Those patriotic and military aS50-
ciations which were regional and which lacked contact with a~ specific national 
movement were singled out for attention - namely the WTB, the WB, ani the 
"Baltikumer". District leaders were urged to make contact with these organi-
sations and to call in the Gau leadership if their overtures looked as thout::h 
th f!!J were to be rewarded. 
Von Pfeffer's hopes of strengthening the NSFB throueh the inclusion of 
patriotic and para-military associations rested on the a];nost traditional 
friendship which existed between them and the National Socialist-v~lkisch 
movement. In Hagen the JdO, the Wehrwolf and the Deutscher Orden had been 
closely associated with tile V-S-B, while the WTB had members active in the 
SA. 86) In MUnster the St3.hlhelm and W'rB were also an integral part of the 
V-S-B, with Glirtner, the rosiness manager of the V-S-:B and the NSFB, doubling 
up in his capacity as Gauleiter of the Stacltp,au Mtlnster of the WTB. 87) These 
organisations represented a large reservoir of potential members for the NSFB. 
The JdO and Stahlhelm were strong throughout Westphalia in 1924, having a net-
·work of branches which penetrated to the smallest canmunity. 88) The ?lTB and 
WB were smaller organisations, but nevertheless contained significant numbers. 
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86) Police rep ort, Hagen, 31 July 1924: SAM I PA/341+-. 
87) Mnnstersche Zeitune" 27 August 1924; see also the pOlice report, Mttnster, 
10 January 1925: SAM VII - 64 Band 2. 
88) On the JdO see SAM I PA/344 and SAD MI IP!6l7; on the Stahlhel:n especially 
SA:"f I PA/372. 
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The WTB, especially strong in the Regierungsbezirk of MUnster, had over 1,000 
members in its hlUnster branch alone. 89) Both organisations were radical. 
The pro-v~lkisch sentiments of the organisations can be gauged from a series 
of articles published by their leaders in the local and provincial press at 
the time of the Munich putsch glorifying Hitler and his associates. 
The leadership of the Westphalian NSFB pursued a constant "Sammelpolitik" 
to increase the strength and influence of the movement: the overtures made to 
the para-military- and patriotic associations and to the forces of the "national 
right" were a constant feature of NSFB activity. 90) In the short term this 
poliqy did indeed draw elements from these quarters into the movement, but in 
the development of the NSF.a this type of expansion had a dubious vaJlle in the 
long run as it undermined its unity and cohesion. Fusion tended to rob the 
NSFB of its own identity. In Hagen it resulted 'in the submersion of the NSFB 
into -the "Not,semeinschaft Schl'l'arz-"IVeiss-Rot", in which virtually all the rieht-
wing extremist associations of the town and county were represented. ThouGh 
the membership of thilS "E.:lergenqy Association" was an impressive 1,200, the 
NSFB lost itself in a welter of names: the WTB, Bismarckbung, Turn- und Fecht-
~, Wikingbund, J dO, stahlhelm, Wehrwolf, ",VB, and. 'diverse' SA IlUlde up the 
association alongside the NSFB. 91) Such ccnglomerati:ons were prone to dis-
putes and disintegration, and subject to the whims of the leaders of the sepa-
rate organisations comprising the whole. This limited the tactical freedom 
of the NSFB, for in the formulation of policies the reaction of the various 
movements as socia ted wi th it had to be taken into aoooun t. 
The strength of the NSFB lay in the organisational framework developed 
under von Pfeffer. The organisation was based on a triple vertical division: 
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89) 
90) 
91) 
For the following see the police report, Mlinster, 4 June 1924: SAM I 
PA/370. 
NSFB Gau Westfalen to stahlhelm (MUnster branoh), MUnster, 1 September 
1924; reprinted in Beck, OPe oit.,pp.58~586. Also police reports for 
November 1924, Hagen: S~d I PA/398. 
Police report, Hagen, 15 Deoember 1924: SAM I PA/398. 
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the Gau, district and branch levels. 92) To control and direct the party a 
~ party headquarters was established at MUnster. From it von Pfeffer built 
up his influence and authority over the district and branch leaders. Von 
Pfeffer also acted on behalf of the '!lestphalian NSFB at the national level. 
The party was a much more closely-knit unit than previous v~lkisch organisa-
tions. ~ meetings were organised to bring together those responsible for 
organisation and propaganda 50 that they could exchange ideas alld discuss 
mutual problems. To ensure sane financial support membership dues were can-
trolled by the Gau party office. These were fixed at 1 RM per month for each 
member, a sum which was split up between the branch (which retained 40 Pf.), 
the district (20 Pf.) and the Gau (40 Pr.). A monthly report covering Slch 
details as membership strength and party activity had to be completed by eve~ 
district leader. The Gauleiter von Pfeffer did much to instil purpose into 
the party, and the increasing confidence of the leadership in January 1925 
can be measured by the plans for a weekly party newspaper, the "VBlkische 
Westfale", and the idea of fanning a National SOcialist trade union in order 
to win over a larger number of working class supporters. 93) The standing of 
the NSFB was also enhanced through the contacts provided by the patriotic 
associations "allied" to the party. ThrouGh them, for ex:ample, the NSFB was 
able to make contact with the Army COlllluand of Mftnster, a. valuable relationship 
which fUrthered the reputation of the NSFB in certain circles of the popula-
tion. 94) Von Pfeffer was also able to win financial backers, of vi tal impor-
tance for the NSFB, which lacked cash at all times. The cnsh contributions 
were especially important at election time. Before the Reichstag elections 
of December 1924 the party was able to secure some 16,000 ~J with a promise 
of a further 14,000 ~ if the election results proved favourable. 95) The 
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92) 
93) 
94) 
95) 
On the details of the organisational structure of the Westphalian NSFB 
see "Rundschreiben Nr. 14, NSFB Gau "',festfalen", 1 October 192Jf-; full text 
in Beck, Ope cit., pp.587-589. 
Gauleitung der NSFB to Hitler, MUnster, 31 Janu~ 1925;. in Beck, Ope cit., 
p.589. 
Police reports, Hagen, 12 December 1924 a.nd 21 January 1925: SA:;{ I PA/398. 
Von Pfeffer to Reichsparteileitung NSDAP, M6nster, 22 August 1925: p~ 4/86. 
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first payment was vital for tile party. It ailo'Ned 1;,.'4e NSFB to payoff its 
debts of 3,500 Harks and to finru1ce the December election campaign. 96) 
The election results of December were disappointing for the NSFB: 
tblooay a';lful' (sau schlecht) to quote ~on Pfeffer. In 'Nestphalia-South the 
drop in support was marginal in comparison with the May return, that is from 
1.5 per cent to 1.1 per cent. 97) In ~estphalia-North the movement lost over 
60 per cent of its support, with a return of 1.3 per cent as against the 3.5 
per cent secured in May. The Westphalian NSFB shared in the overall national 
decline in vt'ilktsch fortunes, but in relation to the catastrophic declines 
recorded else,'rhere it did not fare too badJy. 98) The lack of success can be 
pu t dO'lm to -the fact the. t conditions for right-wi.'1g extremism were less favour-
able by the end of the year. The economic situation had stabilised and the 
prospects for -the future were less grim. Also the N3FB had existed for too 
short a time to m~~ a strong impression on the mind of the voter. The con-
stant changes of n&ne and the re-alignments which punctuated 1924 did little 
to enhance the chances of the movement. Added to this, the national and 
regional quarrels and diVisions weighed heavily against 'Iile ,party. To illus-
trate the point one has only to look at the fortunes of the NSFB in Hagen, 
where the party could only poll one-third of the May return. Here the bitter 
quarrels among the local leaders had seriously ",eakened the vBlkisch move-
ment. 99) Further, one has to note that not all the Slpporters of the DVFP 
had viewed the fusion \vith the National socialists as desirable, while many 
National Socialists were disgusted with the increasing party nature of the 
NSFB, and refused to vote at all. 
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96) 
97) 
98) 
99) 
Report by the district leaders, NSDAP Gau Westphalia, Harum, 13 September 
1925: HA 4/86. 
Election returns trucen from Milatz, op. cit., p.112. 
In Bavaria, scene of the greatest triumph of the velkisch movement in the 
spring elections of 1924, the vote fell fran 16 per cent to little more than 
5 per cent. Se G. Pridharn, Hitler's Rise to Power. The Nazi ~AoveDlent in 
Bavaria 1923-1933, London, 1975, pp.29-30. 
Police report, Hagen,' 15 December 1924: SAM I PA/398. In Hagen the V-S-B 
(NSDAP) had polled 3.3 per cent (1,571 votes) in May 1924, a higher percen-
tage return than the regional one. This despite competition fran Wachen-
feld's VBlkischer Block: 1.3 per cent (616 votes), and the Nationale Frei-
heitspartei: 0.2 per cent (100 votes). In December the NSFB (NSDAP) secured 
only 1.5 per cent. Details fran Lambers, OPe cit., p.216 and p.226. 
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Conclusion. 
On 12 December 1924 the ban on the NSD,~ in Prussia was lifted, an indi-
cation of hO'.v little the authorities feared a Nazi revival. Nine lbys latEr 
Hitler Vias released from Landsberg. The question asked by the vBlkisch move-
ment as it greeted its returning Messiah was, "Vl'hat would Hitler do?" Tech-
nically there was no obstacle in Prussia to a reconstruction of the old NS~~, 
which raised above all the question of whether the NSFB should oontinue. 
Hi tIer himself was in a strong position. The fragmentation of -the vBlkisch 
movement, and the widespread hopes placed on him by all the various" directions", 
each of whom thought that he would declare for them, gave Hitler the power to 
determine events. His "above party" attitude, cultivated since his vdthdrawal 
from politics in June 1924, now brcught him perhaps unexpected dividends. 100) 
In the overall context of German politics, especial~ in the lieht of the 
poor December election results, the vBlkisch movement which greeted Hitler was 
of little importance and ve~ much on the decline.' This state of affairs also 
applied in 'iI'estphalia. But given the generally gloomy picture, it is never-
theless true that in westphalia the possibility of forming a Nazi movement with 
organisational cohesion'was much greater than it had been in the 1922 to 1923 
period, provided that the NSFB could be won over and utilised as a rallying 
point for the other Nazi fragments. Small as the NSFB was, it had the neoes-
sary structure and personnel to provide a smoothly functioning apparatus. The 
ear~ Nazi movement in the province always lacked cohesion, and failed to deve_ 
lop a ~ administration before it was banned in Prussia. 'fhe various suocessor 
organisations lacked continuit,y and hardly appeared in public before n~v b~ns 
were imposed by the authorities. The NS~13 began to change this state of 
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100) A. Bullock puts forward the vie~ in Hitler. A StUdy in Tyranny, London, 
1962, pp.126 fr., that Hitler welcomed the schisms which had developed 
and is primarily to blame for 'the state of affa.irs which greeted him on 
his release. This view ignores the reality of the situation faCing Hitler 
during his imprisonment. His initial attempts to direct the party had 
made olear to Hitler that it was impractioal to continue exercising con-
trol, am realism, rather than Machiavellian schemi~, had. forced the 
decision on him. 
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affairs, but it too lacked. sufficient influence and. authority to unite all 
v~lkisch elements. 'qith the name "Hitler" as a rallying c~, uni~ was more 
feasible in that the major objection advanced. by leaders of ~elkisch sects 
who refused to follow one specific direction, namely, that it lacked. Hitler's 
support, was nON removed.. 
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Chapter 6. THE REFOUNDING OF THE NSDAP IN WESTPHALIA, 1925 'ID 1926. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Refounding of the NSDAP. 
The hope cherished by various v81kisch-Nationa1 Socialist leaders that 
Hitler, upon his release, would wave his magic wand and quickly establish order 
in the v8lkisch movement, was not realised. Hitler did not use his new freedom 
to act immediately, and some two months were to pass before he declared his 
intentions. The uncertainty produced by his seeming passivity nevertheless 
triggered off developments. It brought about the formal dissolution of the 
NSFB and the first indications of a regrouping in the v8lkisch movement before. 
Hitler finally unveiled his plans at the end of February 1925. We have a clue 
to their nature from Dauser, one of the few minor vB1kisch figures to have access 
to Hitler in the first few weeks of 1925. At a meeting of the NSFB in Munich, 
held in January 1925, Dauser stated that the "FUhrer" had declared that he 'COUld 
not Use the whole of the ballast provided by the GVG and the NSFP, and that he 
could use only "true National Socialists"'. 1) In the meantime, speculation was 
rife about Hitler's intentions, and the strains produced by Hitler's silence 
led to hasty action on the part of the DVFP element in the NSFB. It was the 
leadership of the former DVFP which tried to force the issue. 
A conflict between the DVFP and the National Socialists in Prussia occurred 
at a conference of the regional organisati~ns of the NSFB held on 17 January 
1925, the discussions of which quickly came to Hitler's attention. 2) The 
purpose of the meeting was, in the words of one of the participants, 'to 
present Hitler with a fait accompli, to keep Hitler out of the leadership'. As 
the meeting was dominated by a majority of former DVFP members, the small group 
of National Socialists present could do very little to influence the proceedings. 3) 
-----------------------------------------------------~--------------.-----~ 
Ij Quoted by Horn, OPe cit., p.211. 
2 Fobke to Valek, GBttingen, 2 February 1925. 
3 Corswant-euntzow to Volck, 15 January 1925' 
OPe cit., pp.89-9J. 
HA 44/899. 
HA 44/899. also 1n Tyrell, 
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The meeting was used by Wu11e to launch a bitter attack on Hitler, who was accused 
of 'Ultramontanism', a damaging charge in the eyes of North German v8lklsch 
Protestants. Walle pointed to the danger of Bavarian particularism and a poss-
ible conflict between the North and the South, and emphasized that he represented 
. a decidedly Prussian policy. An even more hostile attitude was shown by another 
DVFP supporter, Dr KBrner, who accused Hitler of being a pope a.nd of having done 
nothing for the movement while the DVFP had done everything. The meeting ended 
the unity which had prevailed in the ranks of the Prussian NSFB. The resignation 
of the Ludendorff-von Graefe-Strasser triumvirate on 12 February 1925 was little 
aore than a formality in the light of the divisions which had appeared in January • 
. The division between the supporters of the old DVFP and the National Socialists 
became fina.l on 17 February with the formation of the DVFB. This gave the mem-
bers of the NSFB a straightforward choice. They could either join what was in 
effect a reconstituted DVFP, or await the expected reformation of the NSDAP. 
The lifting of the ban on the NSDAP in Bavaria on 14 February allowed Hitler 
to make public his decision to refound the NSDAP. 4) The new party was to be 
shaped according to the ideas laid down 1n "Mein Kampf", which envisaged ' ••• 
concentration for the time being of all activ1ty in a single places Munich ••• 
Formation of local groups only when the authority of the central leadership in 
Munich may be regarded as unquestionably recognised. Likewise the formation of 
district, county or prOvincial groups depends, not only on the need for them, 
but also on certainty that an unconditional recognit10n of the centre has beeen 
achieved."S) These ideas were embodied in directives governing the reconstruc_ 
tion of the party published 1n the VBlklscher Beobaehter on 26 February 1925, 
which outlined the nature and structure of the new party. 6) According to the 
article there were to be no profound changed in the guiding principles, programme 
, . , .. . , 
~---------------------~----------------~-------------------------------
4) On the refounding of the party see Horn, OPt cit., pp.2l0 ff., Orlow, OPt 
Cit., pp.5l ff.. On the regional level there are accounts by Noakes, OPt 
Cit., pp.56 ff •• and Pridham, OPt cit., PP.)6 ff •• 
5) A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, (translated by R. Manheim), London, 1969, p.3l6. 
6) V81kischer Beobachter, 26 February 19251 "FUndamental Regulations for the 
. He-formation of the NSDAP". Also 1n TYrell, OPt cit., pp.105-l0? 
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tactics and organisation. The important differenee from the old NSDAP was 
that the "FUhrerprinzip", which had previously been effective only in Bavaria, 
was now to be enshrined on the national level. Dissident elements were 
Harned to keep away from the party, since those who were not prepared to 
submit themselves to the 'properly elected leadership' were deemed 'not fit 
to be in the ranks of the NSDAP'. Practical measures were set out to enforce 
control by the Munich party headquarters. TIds was to be the sole authority 
responsible for issuing enrollllent forms and membership cards. It was made 
clear that every member was first and foremost under the control of the 
Munich party centre. Regional and local organisations were to follow where 
and as necessary; the fusion into 'organisational groups' was to be carried 
out 'organically', 'The criterion here', it was stated, 'is not the division 
into Reichstag electoral districts but their suitability for propaganda, as 
well as the available leadership material'. In the creation of larger sub-
groups the key figure was to be the leader. He came first, the organisation 
followed, not vice versa. Emphasized too was the fact that the organisation 
was not an end in itself but the means to an end, for 'it should only make 
POSsible the political agitation by the movement and create the organisational 
pre-requisites for the spread of enlightenment, which are absolutely necessary'. 
The guidelines outlining the function of the SA also emphasized the political 
nature it was to have in the future. The old role played by the SA during 
the earliest history of the party was revived. The neW SA was to attend to 
the political tasks facing the movement and stay within the bounds of legality. 
The new party, as far as Hitler was concerned, was not to be characterised 
by the putschist and militar1st~ndencies of the pre-November 1923 period. 
The change of emphasis is easy enough to explain. Hitler could not afford 
to upset the authorities by too aggressive a posture and he was determined 
to gain power by legal means. The activist elements within the party had to 
be restricted in the light of the new circumstances in which the party opera-
ted. The putsch did nothing to change Hitler's ultimate objective, but it 
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taught him to be more practical and realistic in the choice of means by which 
it was to be achieved. On the occasion of the formal refounding of the NSDAP, 
at a party rally in Munich on 27 FebruaTJ 1925, Hitler repeated his determina-
tion to be the sole and unquestioned leader of the movement. '1 am not in the 
mood to have conditions prescribed for me as long as I am personally to carry 
the responsibility. And this responsibility I carry for everything that occurs 
within this movement.' 7) Hitler asked for one year in which to prove himself 
to his supporters and promised to resign if the movement failed under his 
leadership. 8) 
The re-emergence of the NSDAP provided a new home for those within the 
NSFB who did not respond to the formation of the DVFB. Those groups which 
had remained outside the NSFB in 1924 and had constantly avowed their belief 
in Hitler had little option but to be guided by their emotions and subordinate 
themselves to him. For the GVG under Esser the dlsselution of the organisation 
in March was only natural, and the branches everywhere transformed themselves 
into branches of the NSDAP. The leadership and leading bureaucrats of the 
party placed themselves at the disposal of Hitler, who rewarded their long-
term support by using them in the reconstruction of the new party. 
In Bavaria Hitler was able to establish control and support for himse~f 
quite quickly. In Northern Germany the independent "Directorate" fell apart 
with the resignation of the leading spirit of the movement, Dr A. Volck, on 
12 January 1925. His instructions to the regional organisers to seek direc-
tives from Hitler gave the supporters of this pro-Nazi movement little choice 
concerning their future path. . Indeed, in G8ttingen and Hanover the NSDAP 
was unofficially refounded at the end of January, a month before Hitler made 
his intentions public. 9) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
7) Hitler's speech reprinted (in an abbreviated form) in E. Kl8ss, Reden des 
FUhrers. Politlk und Propaganda Adolf Hltlers 1922-1945, Munich, 1967, 
) PP.44-54, quote from p.S3. 8 Ibid., p.54. 
9) Noakes, OPe cit., pp.58-59. 
The Westphalian reaction. 
The adoration of Hitler, a mystical figure to the bulk of the National 
Socialist-v6lkisch membership of Westphalia, was widespread in the province. 
In some branches of the NSFB the devotion took on extreme forms. Its Hohen-
limburg branch symbolised their devotion to Hitler by sending a Christmas parcel 
weighing some 22 lbs. to Landsberg in 1924, accompanied by the following notel 
'Dear Adolf Hitler, 
In the name of the party committee of the Hohenlimburg branch we send 
you a small Christmas gift, a witness to the fact that 1n the great German 
Fatherland, as also in our immediate homeland, hearts beat for you which are 
inseparably linked with you (in life and death) and the ReiehsftIhrersct'>a.ft. We 
hope that the day when you will be able to be in our midst once more 1s not too 
far away. 
We Hohenlimburgers would consider it an honour to be able to greet 
you in our closed circle. Enjoy the things on the Day of Love. Let a small 
picture of our native land - our Westphalian Heidelberg - be for you a constant 
reminder and comfort in sad hours of the fact that German youth wants to share 
your fate. "One for all and all for one" - so it should and must be in future. 
Eo • 10) Your Hohenlillburger ys. 
Hitler's release and the resultant speculation concerning the future affected 
the rank and file as well as the party hierarchy in the post-December period. 
The ~ administration pursued the aim of continued unity and the preservation 
of the NSFB. The divisions which appeared in the party at the Prussian 
meeting of the NSFB were deplored Qy von Pfeffer. The Westphalian leader 
also opposed the attacks on Hitler made by Wulle and his supporters. When 
Wulle urged those present to ensure that Hitler should submit for the sake 
of "unity", von Pfeffer interjected heatedly that intbat case he (Wu11e) 
should provide the example and lay down his leadership. 11) Von Pfeffer 
joined the minority who declared themselves for H1tle~.atthe meeting, and 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
10) Beck, oPe cit., pp.392-393. 
11) Gorswant-Cuntzow to Vo1ck, 15 January 19251 HA 44/899. 
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committed the Westphalian NSFB to follow Hitler. 
The decision to support Hitler did not mean that von Pfeffer adopted an 
attitude of blind obedience to him. Very much the reverse is true. Von 
Pfeffer had his own ideas ooncerning future developments, and in a lengthy 
letter to Hitler at the end of January 1925 he outlined what he considered 
should be done by Hitler. Throughout the letter the Westphalian considerations 
which moved von Pfeffe~ emerge clearly. 
, Heil Hitler: 
(i) Westphalia fully shares your fundamental views. We also, in this extensive 
and largest industrial region of Germany, maintain that the revival of 
the Workers' Movement is our present task. 
(ii) But we believe that our present movement and organisation is perfectly 
. adequate for this task, if only it is activated and used properly. A new 
political organisation is not necessary here. What is missing, however, 
is a trade union organisation or something on trade union lines to attract 
the mass of workers. Such an organisation must be created as rapidly as 
possible ••• Such a new independent organisation would be right. New 
political organisations would be wrong. 
(iii) A new division in our movement would signify in the present circumstances 
a sad setback. Confusion and conflict undermine our image and our con-
fidence. Inside and outside our ranks we would suffer a serious moral blow. 
(iv) The name "NSDAP", that is "Workers' Party", signifies a setback in relation 
to our present symbol of the Volksgemeinschaft, a fact which i8 also 
accepted in working class circles. 
(v) The description "Pa.rty" is also a bad drawback. Party signifies in the 
present period parliamentarianism ••• We have fortunately not only over-
come the disadvantages conveyed by such a description, but also emphasized 
throughout the ~ our fundamental difference from party structures by 
means of continuous reference to our name •. A name means more than one 
suppOses. With the "party" label we propagate precisely the falee Berlin 
policy of the DVF.P, perhaps also of that Bavarian bloc formation, which 
you want to get rid of. 
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(vi) A new organisation will be rejected by numerous valuable elements. To 
win those back who have left the party here in Westphalia is virtually 
impossible. The character and outlook of the people here forbid such 
chopping and changing, for whatever reasons. 
(Vii) Yet another new name here will make us a laughing-stock. Nothing is 
held more in contempt by the North German than instability... In the 
past there were two parties here, then we voted under the V-S-B label, 
then as NSFBo The last change damaged us considerably. Yet another 
change to ItNSDAPIt is unacceptable to all serious regional leaders in 
North Germany. 
If a change of name is unavoidable in Bavaria, then the retention of 
the name here is equally unavoidable • ••• 
(viii) It would be appreciated here if General Ludendorff could now quietly free 
himself from the filth of day-to-day politics, into which he was forced bw 
necessity as a result of your imprisonment o But if the situation should 
arise in which Ludendorff decided to withdraw altogether, then this would 
be extremely significant for many people. It was not only the act of 
9 November which gave our movement such a pronounced upward swing and later 
prevented any significant decline, but also in the last analysis the 
unreserved involvement of Ludendorff. 
(ix) All these thoughts are conditioned by one consideration, namely that a 
policy of opposition will meet any trend towards parliamentarianism ••• 
von Pfeffer.' 12) 
It is surprising, in view of von Pfeffer's participation in the Prussian 
conference of the NSFB in January, that he could still refer to a concern for 
a 'new division in our movement', for effectively this had already occurred. 
Though the DVFB and the ~DAP had not as yet emerged in public, it was hardly 
likely that the breach between Wul1e-von Graefe and Hitler could be healed, 
-------------~------------------------------------------------------------
12) NSFB Gau Westphalia (von Pfeffer) to Hitler, Mtlnster, 31 January 19251 
in Beck, OPe cit., pp.589-591. It is unlikely that the original bore 
the ItHeil Hi tIer" form of address. 
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unless one side subordinated itself to the other, which was not a possibility 
in view of the highly charged emotions of the time. The concern of the 
Westphalian Nazis caused by uncertainties surrounding Hitler's relationship 
with Ludendorff is understandable. 13) Von Pfeffer's relationship with Luden-
dorff had been cemented 1n the latter half of 1924 following Ludendorff's 
appointment of von Pfeffer in June 1924 to lead Gau Westphalia. In the first 
months of the NSFB's existence it had been Ludendorff's prestige and support 
which had allowed von Pfeffer to unify the majority of the National Socialist-
v~lkisch supporters behind the new organisation. The legitimacy of his 
authority had rested on his connection with the General. Ludendorff had also 
strengthened his relationship with many of the rank and f1le supporters whom 
he had met at the public rallies he attended in Westphalia. The personal 
contact was significant, especially when it involved an oath of allegiance 
given by SA members to him personally. 14) 
Views very similar to those of von Pfeffer were held by members at dis-
trict and branch levels, though one cannot speak of a unanimity of outlook. 
A series of district meetings organised in February 1925 to ascertain the 
views of the lower leadership made one thing clear. On all sides the collapse 
of the unity of the NSFB as indicated by the January meeting was regretted and 
lamented. The reaction to the division was variable. Some leaders still 
hoped that a compromise could be worked out, while others went into an all-
out attack against the von Graefe "direction". The Bochum district conference 
witnessed a passionate attack by Goebbels against the "DVFP", whose natur e 
and inclination were declared to rule out any possibility of its being an 
associate 'of the young, powerful National Socialist Movement'. The Bochum 
leaders unanimously declared for Hitler and informed him of their trust and 
allegiance. 'The distriot conference of the NSFB, which met today on 7 February 
1925 on the instruction of the Bochum district admln1st~tlon, have become 
----------------------------------_._------------------------------------
13) Hitler's relationship with Ludendorff became very ambiguousl see Horn, 
OPe cit., pp.2l2 ff •• 
14) Police report, MHnster, 7 November 1924. SAM VII - 64 Band I. 
200 
aware, through the speaker Dr Goebbels, that there is a possibility of a 
division within the movement. We beg you to work for a prevention of such 
a division. Should one nevertheless occur, we would like to make it clear 
that the district organisation, and the branches subordinated to it, stand 
united behind the old leader Adolf Hitler and promise him unchangeable 
loyalty and adherence to the end.' 15) 
Such an unconditional surrender to Hitler was not forthcoming from the 
Lenne-Volme district. Here the district and branch leaders had their own 
ideas about future developments. Most of their views were close to those 
expressed by von Pfeffer. 
'At the conference of branch leaders of the district Lanne-Volme (an 
area containing half a million "industrial" population) which took place on 
the 7th in Hagen, there was entire agreement among those present that the 
united v6lkisch movement which emerged at Weimar under the present description 
"NSFB" must remain intact ••• in order to prevent a complete collapse of the 
whole movement. 
If the name "NSFB" has become unsuitable for Ba.varia, then Bavaria 
should form a regional organisation under the old description "NSDAP". An 
extension of this description to the whole ~ is, as far as we are con-
cerned, a complete mistake. 
In all other matters we share the views of Adolf Hitler without reser-
vation. His top leadership (SpitzenfHhrerschaft) is accepted on all Sides, 
but only with the proviso that His Excellency Ludendorff must be kept in the 
movement under all circumstances, and that his past influence must also be 
exercised in the future. His Excellency Ludendorff has secured increasing 
sympathy from working class circles in this area because of his categorical 
repudiation of the circles surrounded by caste concepts and through his 
active intervention for our cause. Almost all the branch leaders have 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
15) NSFB Bezirksleitung Bochum, Kapp to Hitler, Bochum, 7 February 1925, 
in Beck, OPe cit., pp.59l-592. 
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emphasized that the movement would lose ground among the workers if His 
Excellency Ludendorff were to resign from the movement or possibly be pushed 
into the background. 
If there are differences of opinion within our movement ••• then these 
must be bridged over. Bavaria, Westphalia, Mecklenburg and all the German 
~ are so diverse in their political, economic and cultural aspects and in 
the character and attitude of their population, that a doctrinaire, rigid 
adherence to a specific programme will only create new arguments. 
All v8lkisch elements in our movement are Fan-German, nationalist, 
SOCialist, freedom-loving and anti-parliamentarian. In these matters there 
can be no division. Through an exceptionally well-led movement united to 
attain these goals, victory is ours.' 16) 
In spite of the conditions and reservations of important figures in the 
regional movement such as von Pfeffer and Grotehusmann, when the NSFB split 
in February 1925, they and their supporters gave their allegiance to Hitler. 
The position of the Westphalian v8lklsch leaders who felt themselves drawn 
towards Hitler rather than Wulle and von Graefe was made easier by the fact 
that Ludendorff, whose influence carried much weight in the province, was 
not involved in the foundation of the DVFB, so that the choice was not one 
of von Graefe-Ludendorff or Hitler, but the less difficult one of von Graefe 
or Hitler, with Ludendorff's attitude being equivocal. Von Pfeffer had already 
made clear his feelings concerning a'vonGraefe-Hitler confrontation at the 
January meeting of the Prussian NSFB. 
The position taken by Gregor Strasser was also important in determining 
the attitude of the Westphalian leadership corps. After the collapse of the 
Rei chsfUhrerschaft , Strasser moved towards Hitler and reached agreement with 
him at some time between 12 and 21 February. 17). Strasser had 'established 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
16) Grotehusmann to Hitler, Hagen, 10 February 1925, reprinted in Beck, 
OPe cit., pp.591-592• 
17) Noakes, OPe cit., p.62. 
strong connections with the Ruhr region and was relatively well-known in 
v8lkisch circles in Westphalia. He had spoken on behalf of the NSDAP in 
Rhineland-Westphalia as early as 1920, and had been especially active in 
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the region from 1922 to 1924. Strasser was thus a name of some significance 
not only to the v6lkisch leaders, but also to the rank and file members. 
It was Strasser who was authorised by Hitler to organise those elements 
of the NSFB which looked towards Munich. Strasser in turn called on von 
Pfeffer to organise a conference of the West German National Socialist move-
ment, which met on 22 February 192.5 at Ha.mm in Westphalia. 18) At the Hamm 
meeting the leaders of the regional organisations of Westphalia, Rhineland-
North, Rhineland-South, Hanover, and Pomerania, along with over 100 former 
district and br.anch leaders of the NSFB and authorised rep~esentatives of 
the "old NSDAP" of the electoral districts of Koblenz-Trier, Cologne-Aachen, 
DUsseldOrf-East and -West, Westphalia-North and -South, Hanover-East and 
-South, Braunschweig, Weser-ffimsandSchleswig-Holstein, all 'solemnly promised 
anew their unchangeable l~yalty and support to their Fahrer Adolf Hitler'. 19) 
At the meeting Strasser appointed von Pfeffer as leader of the Westphalian 
movement, subject to official approval by Hitler. This was a mere formality 
in the circumstances of the time. Those who declared themselves for Hitler 
were highly unlikely to be ignored when it came to the distribution of power 
within the party. Just as the regional leaders had little chOice, once they 
had tied themselves to the Nazi cause, but to accept Hitler's ideas and style 
of leadership, so Hitler had little alternative in the spring of 192.5 but 
to accept those who had carved out a local or regional position for themselves. 
BeSides, in Westphalia, given the small size of the party, the available 
leaderShip material was too limited to provide alternatives. Hitler formally 
confirmed von Pfeffer. in his new position in. April and ordered him to carry 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
18) p. Hftttenberger, Die Gauleiter. Studie zum Wandel des Machtgefftges in 
der NSDAP, Stuttgart, 1969, p.20. 
19) Gau Hanover (NSDAP) to V81kischer Beobachter, 23 February 1925, in 
TYrell, OPe cit., pp.104-l05. 
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out the organisational build-up of the NSDAP in Westphalia. 20) 
The Westphalian representatives who declared themselves for Hitler had 
remarkably little difficulty in swinging the rank and file membership behind 
them. With the re-formation of the NSDAP at the end of February, the bulk of 
the NSFB branches, along with the few GVG branches which had formerly worked 
against the NSFB, transformed themselves into NSDAP branches, often publicly 
announcing their devotion and allegiance to Hitler. In Bochum virtually the 
whole of the adm1ttedly small NSFB membership joined the NSDAP, and both the 
Bochum branch organisations and the district administration survived1ntact, 
the DVFB failing to make any impact in the area. 21) In Unna the pro-Nazi 
feelings of the local branch had already been demonstrated in January. In a 
letter to Esser on 19 January the branch declared its allegiance to Hitler, 
stating that it 'was only waiting for his orders'. On 1 March a letter to 
the Munich party centre congratulated the "FUhrer" on his first public speech 
since his release and announced that the whole of the membership had joined 
the NSDAP, Gau Westphalia. 22) 
In the industrial towns of the Ruhr the National Socialist appeal was 
traditionally stronger tmn that of the more bourgeois DVFP/DVFB, which never 
made any sign1f1ca~t.1mpa.ct on the largely worldng class population. In the 
Ruhr towns the v6lkisch movement had a more pronounc,ed proletarian character, 
and "socialism" figured more prominently in v8lklsch propaganda. 23) At the 
time of the split the bulk of the membership supported the refounded NSDAP, 
since german-v6lkisch support within the NSFB had never been great. The 
situation was different, however, in the areas surrounding the Ruhr industrial 
complex, especially in parts of the Reg1erungsbez1rk of Minden, where the 
DVFP had considerable support and influence in the few NSFB branches active 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
20) NSDAP Munich to von Pfeffer, Munich, :3 April 1925. HA 8/165. 
21 Beck, OPe cit., p.6S. 
22 Ibid., p.359. 
2) P. HUttenberger, 'Die Anflnge der NSDAP ia Westen', in W. F6rst, (ed.), 
Zwischen Ruhrkampf und W1ederaufbau, OPe cit., p.S5 and pp.62 ff •• 
in the area. In the Bielefeld NSFB the most important factor which determined 
the choice between the NSDAP and the DVFB was the age of the members. Vir-
tua11y all the younger members opted for the NSDAP. At a meeting of the 
NSFB to determine the attitude of the membership the line of division was 
drawn between 'the SA, which as usual supported Hitler en bloc, and the 
"civilian" members, with the exception of four persons, who supported the 
DVFB'. The new NSDAP branch, formed on 5 March 1925 with a membership of 35, 
had a very young membership. They were dubbed "The Stupid Party of Youths" 
by their political oppoftents, the average age of the members being well below 
twenty. Those who were 'over twenty already counted among the older members 
within the party'. The average age of the first female members of the party 
at that time was sixteen. 24) 
The re-estab1ishment of the NSDAP in Westphalia saw the emergence of a 
widespread network of branches during March and April 1925. The newly appoin-
ted Gauleiter von Pfeffer was immediately active in appointing or confirming 
district and local leaders, before Munich's official recognition reached him 
at the beginning of April. 25) Von Pfeffer needed little prompting or outside 
guidance. He simply applied the experience gained in 1924. The major problem 
faCing him was not how to handle his subordinates but how best to adjust to 
the new vigour displayed by the Munich party centre. Problems arose primarily 
because of Munich's insistence on the fulfilment of the organisational measures 
first announced by Hitler at the end of February. Munich's determination to 
control regional and local organisations is evidenced by the rapidity with 
which the new party secretary Bouh1er tried to put into effect the newly 
adopted organisat10nal principles. In Westphalia, as elsewhere in Northern 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
24) M. Hiemisch, Der nationa1sozia1istische Kampf um Bielefeld. Die Geschichte 
der N.S.D.A.P., Bielefeld, Bielefeld, 1933, pp.7-9. 
25) Wagner, district leader of the Bochum area, received confirmation of his 
"Position", to take effect from the beginning of April, at the beginning 
of March 1925 - Wagner to Munich, Bochum, 18 March 1925. HA 8/165. 
Josef Wagner, b. 1899 1n A1gringen, Lorraine, 1917-1919 military service, 
1919-1920 completed Teachers' Training Course 1n Fulda, 1921-1926 employed 
by the Bochumer Verein, then Vereinigte Stah1werke. From 1922 onwards 
active 1n v8lkisch movement, 1924 appointed district'leader for Bochum 
region NSFB by von Pfeffer, same position in NSDAP 1925-1928. 1.10.1928-
31.12.1930 Gauleiter of Westphalia, 1.1.1931-1934 Gauleiter of Westpha1ia-
South. Farty Number 16,951. 
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Germany, this required a degree of adjustment on the part of regional leaders 
used to a great degree of autonomy. The implications of Hitler's proclamation 
of the "Fnhrerprlnzip" were made quite clear by Bouhler's bureaucratic 
activity. accountability, surveillance and control were implicit in the new 
system. This was something new to von Pfeffer and the northern leaders in 
general. Before the collapse of the pre-putsch NSDAP, Munich party headquar-
ters had interfered little in the affairs of the more distant party organi-
sations and had had very little control over branch and party activity in 
general. In consequence the branches had developed around dedicated indi-
Viduals who were often a law unto themselves and whose personal attitudes 
generally determined any development. These independent leaders responded 
more to the needs of their immediate environment and less to the directives 
which occasionally emerged from Munich. In Westphalia the scattered branches 
worked independently not only from Munich, but also more often than not from 
each other. With the failure of the putsch and the collapse of the Munich 
party headquarters the autonomy of regional and local organisations increased 
yet further. The leaders who acquired authority in this situation formulated 
their own concepts, and however sincere they were in their admiration of Hitler, 
however enthusiastic in their support for National Socialism within the 
v~lkisch camp, their independent spirit was strengthened and their hope of 
influencing future developments was encouraged. Even before Hitler's release 
northern leaders engaged in what turned out to be wishful thinking as to the 
path their leader should follow on his release. 26) Von Pfeffer was no dif-
ferent in this respect.' His long letter to Hitler of January 1925 was but 
one of many attempting to influence general developments. 
The revived NSDAP under Hitler's dictatorial control allowed little scope, 
initially in theory and increasingly in practice, for a continuation of inde-
pendent thought and action. The 'Basic,Inst~ctions for the Refounding of 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
26) For the attitudes of the leaders of the "Directorate" see Noakes, OPe 
cit., PPo57 ff •• 
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the NSDAP' made it clear that the party was to be rigidly controlled by the 
Munich centre and that there was no room for any autonomy of the Gaue. Ten-
sion arose subsequently on a seemingly innocuous question, that of the issue 
of membership cards. In practice, Munich's insistence on full control and 
authority over this raised the fundamental issue of regional and local admini-
strative autonomy. Resentment against the implementation of new directives 
relating to this matter was widespread, especially in northern and central 
Germany, and it took Bouhler a considerable time to enforce central authority. 
Few Gauleiter were prepared to accept this aspect of the centralisation pro-
cess, and most attempted to circumvent the directives. The Gaue of Hanover, 
G6ttingen, Hessen-Nassau and Schleswig-Holstein went so far as to approach 
Bouhler jOintly in April 1925, putting forward the argument that in view of 
the stable organisation which had developed outside Bavaria rigid centrali-
sation was no longer a necessity. 27) Munich reacted strongly against such 
attitudes and insisted on the observation of the new rules. Ore can understand 
the policy of the Munich party administration in that more than just Munich's 
control over the regional organisations was at stake. There was also the 
financial aspectl the collection of the enrolment fee (fixed at 1 ~), which 
was to be paid by all members regardless of whether they had been party members 
before, and of membership dues, was essential to oil the wheels of the bureau-
28) 
cratlc machinery which was being constructed at the centre. The reluc-
tance of the Gauleiter to implement the Munich directives can also be under-
stood. Much secretarial and organisational work for the ~ and branch admini-
strations was involved, at a time when the party was beginning to reorganise 
itself at every level. Then there was the resistance of the existing membership 
----------------------------------------------------------------------~--
27) Noakes, OPe cit., pp.6S-66. . 
28) Bouhler, in his efforts to convince Ripke, Gauleiter of Rhineland-North, 
of the necessity of fulfilling Munich demands pointed out that the effi-
ciency of the Munich centre, and its existence, depended on finance, 
see Bouhler to Axel Ripke, Munich, IS April 19251 BAK Samm1ung Schumacher, 
203. 
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to be considered. Farty members of long standing resented the loss of their 
old numbers and felt affronted by the re-enrolment procedure. The Gauleitung 
of Westphalia did not hasten to conform to the new requirements, and it took 
considerable time for von Pfeffer to accept the necessity of the procedure. 
As a result of a visit to Munich, which allowed him to see at first hand the 
whole of the party apparatus, he was finally persuaded of the need for central 
control of the issue of membership cards and the 'other diverse demands' made 
by the party headquarters. 29) 
Membership issue was not the only source of friction which existed between 
the individual Gaue and the Munich leadership. The northern~, almost 
traditionally by 1925, looked with some misgivings at the policies pursued by 
Munich. The Westphalian leadership echoed sentiments current generally in 
northern and central Germany, which were not in line with Munich thinking. 
Von Pfeffer above all shared the feeling expressed by a number of northern 
leaders that the Munich leadership failed to realise the totally different 
position in which the party was operating in northern Germany. He had already 
made it clear to Munich that what was suitable for the Bavarian movement was 
not necessarily a requirement in a Gau which differed markedly in its social, 
political, and economic structure from the Bavarian environment. 30) The most 
obvious and crucial difference between Bavaria and Westphalia and the adjacent 
Gaue was that they were operating in an industrial area. This meant that if 
the NSDAP was to make any significant headway in Rhineland-Westphalia it had 
to emphasize the socialist angle of the party programme, and preferably compete 
with the Left by forming a National Socialist trade union. Interest in trade 
unionism is evident even in the earliest history of the National Socia1ist-
v8lkisch groups active in Westphalia. As early as 1922 th ere had been an 
------------------------- .. --------------------------------------------
29) The Westphalian example ~s used by Bluhler to bring the leadership of 
Rhineland-North into line. The Gau administration was still resisting 
Munich's demand to control membership cards. Bouh1er to Gauleitung 
Rhineland-North, Munich, 24 October 1925. BAK Sammlung Schumacher 20). 
)0) Von Pfeffer to Hitler, MUnster, 31 January 192.5. in Beck, oPe cit., 
pp.589-591. See also the attitude of Volck at the time of his resigna-
tion, Noakes, OPe cit., pp.57-58. 
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attempt b,y the v8lkisch movement established in the mining town of Buer to 
compete in the 'factory committee elections' held in the local pits. 31) The 
leader of the small GVG branch established in Dortmund in 1924 had also shown 
interest in the trade union question. 32) Von Pfeffer too appreciated the need 
for an effective Nazi trade union to further the NSDAP in his area and made this 
clear in his correspondence with Hitler. Hitler did not commit himself on the 
trade union question and for a long time his position remained ambiguous. 
Though not unsympathetic to the union concept, Hitler's reservations were many. 
Above all, he feared the ideological and organisational implications trade 
unionism would involve. 33) By failing to give clear guidelines on this issue, 
a certain degree of antagonism was generated between Hitler and several northern 
leaders. 
Another question which exercised von Pfeffer and several northern leaders 
1n 1925 was the important issue of electoral participation. On this matter too, 
Hitler was vague and contradictory. In general, the Nazi leaders of the northern 
~ viewed the parliamentary nature of the new DVFB with eontempt, and advocated 
the old National Socialist line of non-involvement for both taetical and ideo-
logical reasons. 34) Von Pfeffer, though less dogmatic than the leaders in 
adjacent ~. also wanted the NSDAP to distance itself from the 'parliamentary 
morass'. The knowledge that Hitler had changed his mind on the question of 
partiCipation in elections was not well received by some Nazi groups in northern 
Germany. 
Thus on several issues the attitudes in the North differed from those of 
Munich. This led to increasing disenchantment with the party leadership genera-
ted by a feeling of frustration when it dawned on the northern leaders that 
their chances of influencing Hitler and the development of the newly created 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
. . 
:31) "Lagemeldung", 7 April 1922. SAM I PA/271. .. 
32) J. Esser to GVG Munich, Dortmund, 9 October 1924, GVG to J. ESser, Munieh, 
17 November 1924. BAK NS 1/410. , 
33) Orlow, OPe cit., pp.64-65. On the relationship between National Socialism 
and trade unionism see H.-G. Schumann, Nationalsozialismus und Gewerkschaits 
bewegung, Hannover-Frankfurt, 1958, pp.30 ff .. 
34) Noakes, OPt cit •• pp.67 ff •• 
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NSDAP were negligible. Collectively, this frustration sharpened the atti-
tudes of the northern leaders towards the Munich party administration. Added 
to the general antagonism on organisational and ideological matters, there 
was also their widespread dislike of Esser and Streicher, who figured pro-
minently in the affairs of the party, a dislike shared by both the leaders 
of the old "Directorate" and those actively engaged in the fonner Reichsft1hrer-
schaft. Despite the lack of a united front on all these matters, the various 
differences with Munich led to the formation of an organisation which was to 
present a serious challenge to Hitler's authority and control, and a danger 
to the unity of the NSDAPI the AG, an organisation in which the Westphalian 
~ was to playa supporting role. 
The Consolidation of Gau Westphalia. 
The gradual integration of Gau Westphalia into the national party struc-
ture was accompanied by continuous efforts by von Pfeffer to enforce his 
authority over the regional party, to unify and mould the ~ administration, 
and to expand the influence of the NSDAP in the region. The construction of 
a vertical regional organisational structure was especially important in 1925 
due to the relatively rapid expansion of the membership of the Westphalian 
Nazi movement which had to be efficiently and effectively controlled and 
integrated. 
The nucleus of the "new" NSDAP was the "old" NSFB. In Westphalia as a 
whole the NSDAP emerged as the dominant v8lkisch movement at the time of the 
break-up of the NSFB. The bulk of the organisation and the party hierarchy 
joined the NSDAP, and very little of the strength of the NSFB was lost to the 
main v81klsch rival, the DVFB. This allowed the NSDAP to secure a much more 
dominant position in the province than within Prussia as a whole. 35) The 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
35) "Aus der Rechtsbewegung", report, Berlin, 8 May 19251 "In Preussen und in 
den ttbrigen norddeutschen Staat en dUrfte die DVFB den gr6sseren Teil der 
An~nger des v8lkischen Gedankens in ihren Organisationen zusammenfassen 
... ~I; in HA 69/1509. In the adjacent Regierungsbezirke to the North and 
Eas~ the situation was much less favourable for the National SOCialists, 
see Noakes, OPe cit., pp.81 ff.. In Schleswig-Holstein only the Flensburg 
branch joined the NSDAP, see Stoltenberg, oPe cit., p.142. 
210 
advantage this gave to the movement was inestimable, especially in view of 
the fact that the Gauleitung could concentrate on reinforcing the organisation 
without wasting its energy and limited resources in a struggle for supremacy 
with the DVFB. The damage such "contests" could do was only too evident in 
the few towns where a confrontation between the NSDAP and the DVFB did occur. 
In Soest the split in the NSFB resulted in an especially bitter struggle, 
caused primarily by the clash of personalities among the leaders of the newly 
formed parties. Two blocs appeared in the town in the spring of 1925. One, 
led by the former NSFB branch leader Kuske, was drawn towards the DVFBI the 
other, under the former NSFB treasurer Hemmer, wanted an immediate fusion with 
the NSDAP. Hemmer had the worst of the dispute since the bulk of the NSFB 
membership supported Kuske. The Nazi supporters were unable to win over the 
majority. It took virtually a year to establish a small NSDAP branch in the 
town. Established in December 1925, the branch attracted a mere eleven of the 
seventy strong former NSFB membership. 36) But even this effort proved short-
lived, for in 1926 the branch membership declined to threel the movement vir-
tually collapsed and until 1928 it led a very shadowy existence in the town. 37) 
A similar situation developed in the Siegen area, where the local v6lkisch 
leader Windfelder successfully agitated against the NSDAP and prevented the~ 
formation of a Nazi branch in Siegen itself. Windfelder and his DVFB members 
were able to block the Nazi effort by successfully projecting the idea that 
Hitler, because of his Catholic background, had betrayed the v6lkisch cause 
to. Rome. 38) In a solidly Protestant area the accusation was very damaging, 
and sufficient to keep the National Socialists in the background. In Hagen the 
DFVB also proved itself an active opponent, though here the constant conflicts 
between numerous v6lkisch leaders in 1924 had created a situation in which it 
was impossible for either v61kisch movemen~ to make any headway in 1925. The 
constant clashes and bickering led to a general disenchantment with the v61kisch 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
36 j Beck, OPe cit., p.359. 
37 Ibid., pp.359-)60. 
38 Beck, OPe cit., pp.4l2-4l3. 
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cause in the town. In 1925 the NSDAP, formerly a considerable power in the 
area, hardly existed. 39) The DVFB did not benefit from the situation. The 
DVFB leader Wulle could only draw about a hundred people to a public meeting 
held in March 1925, in contrast to the meetings of 1924 at which high atten-
" 40) dances of a thousand or more had been achieved. In MUnster, seat of the 
Gau1eitung, friction also arose between National Socialists and v61kisch groups 
formerly represented in the NSFB, and the Nazi movement lost momentum. 41) 
The situation was further complicated by a conflict between von Pfeffer and 
the former business manager of the NSFB, Gttrtner. This led to a lot of mud-
slinging and character assassination which created tensions in the local 
v61kisch camp and spilled Over to affect the regional movement. 42) 
Fortunately for the Gauleitung such conflicts with v8lkisch rivals were 
few in Westphalia and did not add significantly to the problems facing von 
Pfeffer. The latter's appointment as Gauleiter Qy Gregor Strasser at the 
Hamm meeting on 22 February 1925 placed him in a strong position in that 
Hitler's authority could be used to legitimise his own authority as leader 
of the Westphalian movement. This proved much more effective in rallying all 
Nazi elements than the 'authorisation' derived from Ludendorff in the latter 
half of 1924. Von Pfeffer's initial task was to thread together the various 
Nazi sections throughout the province and give some semblance of order and 
direction to the movement. The geographic extent of the Gau provided a basic 
problem, especially after the Regierungsbezirk of OsnabrOck was ceded to von 
Pfeffer at the Harburg meeting of the northern NSDAP leaders on 22 March 
1925. 43) Tb overcome this difficulty, von Pfeffer used the same organisa-
tional principle he had employed as Landesverbandfllhrer of the NSFBI he 
divided the Gau into districts, confirming the existing regional leaders 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
391 Police report, Hagen, 5 May 1925. SAM I PA/398. 
40 Police"report, Hagen, 26 March 1925. SAM I PA/2al. 
41 Police report, MUnster, 30 September 19251 SAM VII - 2 Band 4. 
42 Report by the Oberp~sident, MUnster, 25 June 19251 SAM VII - 64 Band I. 
43 Noakes, OPe cit., p.~3. . 
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where these had emerged, and elsewhere waiting for suitable individuals to 
secure a leading position before appointing them. 44) The establishment of 
the rudimentary sub-Gau organisation coincided with a marked expansion in 
the numerical strength of the party and the appearance of a sizeable number 
of branches within the~. 1925 and 1926 were rewarding years for the National 
Socialists of the Rhenish-Westphalian region, which became one of the major 
growth areas of the NSDAP. ~ December 1925 the Ruhr region was being singled 
out (along with Upper SHesia and Saxony) as an area in which the Nazis had 
achieved 'undeniable organisational success'. 4.5) In 1926 it was alao con-
sidered a region in which the Nazi movement had a strong presence based on 
'a lively organisation and much activity and agitation', though by then the 
momentum of 192.5 had been lost and 'the results achieved by these efforts ••• 
are not overwhelming ••••• 46) The developments of 1925 to 1926 have to be 
kept in perspective. The expansion of the NSDAP in Westphalia and in the 
Ruhr in general, significant as it was, started from a low level, and despite 
its real growth the party continued to remain a fringe development in the 
overall context of the political scene. The importance of the period 1925-
1926 is that the party entrenched itself, consolidated its position and con-
structed a relatively disciplined minority political movement dedicated to 
the Nazi "idea" and the embodiment of the "idea", Adolf Hitler. 
The growth of the NSDAP was not uniform within the Gau. With few excep-
tions, the strength of the movementlay in the urbanised, industrialised areas, 
especially of the Ruhr basin. Here the largest and most active branches 
developed in the course of 1925. Bochum, Bottrop, Buer, Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen, 
Hattingen, Herne, Osterfeld, Recklinghausen and Witten all had branches of 
some importance. Significantly, these towns lay within the occupied zone of 
--------------------------------------------------------------_ ... 
44) Gau Westphalia was ultimately composed of 10 districts. Arnsberg (Dr H. 
Teipel), Bielefeld (N. Viereck, then F. Homann), Bochum (J. Wagnerj' 
Detmold (K. Herdejost), Hagen (Dr H. Nieland), Hamm (Dr Hurlbrinck r 
Lenne-Volme (B. SchnIer, then H. Vetter), OsnabrUck (E. Griesbrand , 
Rheine (B. Hartmann), Siegen (E. Walter). 
4.5) "lage der NSDAP", report, Berlin, 21 December 19251 HA 69/1509. 
46) "Iagebericht des Reichskommissars", Berlin, 19 June 1926, copy in SAD HI 
IP/624. 
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the Ruhr region, the presence of French and Belgian troops giving a certain 
fillip to the v8lkisch-nationalist cause. Following the withdrawal of the 
occupying forces in the course of 1925, which made it possible for the NSDAP 
to organise itself openly, the party obtained new recruits thanks to the 
nationalist euphoria in the immediate post-occupation period. 47) Another 
factor which helps to explain the success achieved by the Nazis in Western 
Westphalia was that Josef Wagner, district leader for much of the occupied 
area, was the most able and active Nazi organiser in Westphalia. 
~ far the largest branch was that of Hattingen, a small town with a 
population of 10,000 sandwiched between Bochum and ESsen, which had a com-
paratively long history of vBlkisch activity. Although administratively 
part of the province of Westphalia, Hattingen was at that time part of the 
~ Rhineland-North, and one of its star performers. In December 1925 the 
branch accounted for over 60 per cent of the newly enrolled members of the 
~. 48) In 1926 the branch continued to grow owing to the special attention 
it received from the Ruhr Gauleitung. 49) Sizeable branches such as Hattingen, 
and to a lesser degree Bochum, which could also boast a membership of over 
100, were exceptions even in an area in which the NSDAP was most active. The 
bulk of the branches were very small, having memberships below the 50 mark. 
Elsewhere in the prOvince, the Nazis struggled to make an impression. In the 
Bielefeld and Arnsberg regions, the influential district leaders Homann and 
Teipel were able to develop some momentum. Homann used Bielefeld as a base 
from which to operate, and was the driving force behind the establishment in 
1925 of a few new branches in the Protestant counties to the north. His 
greatest success was the creation of the Minden branch, founded in December 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
47) The boost given to the NSDAP following the end of the occupation is noted 
by contemporary observers - see police report, Gels enkirchen , 14 January 
1926. SAM VII - 64 Band I. On Hattingen, see Beck, OPt cit., p.219. The 
Witten branch tripled its membership following the end of the occupation I 
Beck, OPe cit., p.J25. 
48) Munich PL to GL Rhineland-North, December 1925 - of 460 newly enrolled 
members, 290 were from Hattingenl BAK Sammlung Schumacher 203. 
49) Orlow, OPe cit., p.9l. 
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1925 with a membership of 25. 50) The Nazi influence south of Bielefeld 
was negligible, almost zero, the strong Catholicism of the southern counties 
of the Regierungsbezirk of Minden restricting any development. That it was 
possible to achieve some success in areas of strong Catholicism was demon-
strated by TaipeI in the Arnsberg district. He was able to establish a 
number of branches in counties with a predominant Catholic population. Whether 
the membership of these came from the Protestant minority or whether Catholics 
were also involved is not clear. In general, the Westphalian NSDAP was weakly 
represented in the predominantly Catholic counties. In counties where the 
Catholic population were living in an agrarian setting, Nazism had even less 
success in the mid-twenties. In the Regierungsbezirk of MUnster, with its 
large Catholic population, the NSDAP could only establish a foothold in 
MUnster and Rheine, the rest of the branches within the Reglerun~sbezlrk 
lying in the counties forming part of the Ruhr industrial belt. 51) 
Despite the patchy geographical distribution of party branches, the 
National Socialists were able to make a much deeper impression on Westphalia 
in the first year following the re-fo:rmation of the party than had been the 
case in the years before. Contemporary police reports reflect a certain 
degree of astonishment at the constancy and intensity of effort by Nazi . 
branches. What amazed more than one police observer was the persistence of 
branches which continued to organise, publicise and hold meetings which were 
not well attended. The Gelsenkirchen police concluded. 'It can be said of 
the majority of the supporters of National Socialism that they are fanatically 
committed to their ideas ••• '. 52) The continual effort and agitation emanat-
ing from the Nazi party seemed to indicate a strength and numerical support 
which occasionally misled the police observers, who ascribed a much greater 
following to Nazi branches than they possessed. Thus the Reck11nghausen 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
50) Homann to GL MUnster i./W., Bielefeld, 17 December 1925. BAK NS 1/338. 
51) Report by the Regierungsp~sident, MUnster, 2 November 1925, report by 
the Landrat, Steinfurt, 27.0ctober 1925. SAM VII - 64 Band I. 
52) Police report, Gelsenklrchen, )0 March 1926. SAM Nr. 2076. 
.' 
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police estimated in October 1925 that the strength of the NSDAP in Reckling-
hausen, Buer and Bottrop numbered respectively 70, 90 and 150. 53) The 
membership figures reached by these branches by May 1926 assuming no radical 
decline had occurred since October, fell very much short of such numbers, 
Reckl1nghausen having a mere 29 members, Buer 46, and Bottrop 35. 54) In 
Hamm the police similarly overstated the membership of the movement, given 
as 87 shortly before the official party figures showed a membership of only 
12. 55) Such overestimates were not uncommon in the 1925 period. It took 
some time before the authorities secured a more exact and realistic picture 
of the NSDAP, the result of the penetration of police informers into the 
Nazi apparatus. 
The great efforts made by the NSDAP hierarchy to expand and cover West-
phalia with a network of branches, at a time of organisational reconstruction 
at Gau, district and local levels, were supported by limited financial resour-
ces. The financial situation of the Gauleitung was affected strongly by the 
centralisation efforts of Munich, especially party headquarters' determination 
to secure its share of the membership dues. Munich no longer tolerated the 
misappropriation of its share of funds for regional activity. In this new 
situation it became impossible for the Gauleitung to avoid fulfilling its 
financial obligations to the Bouhler-Schwarz machine. For the Gauleiter of 
Westphalia the end of autonomy created several problems. The old habit of 
using the bulk of available cash to further the regional effort was no longer 
feasible. Von Pfeffer needed some persuasion on this point, but he at least 
attempted to meet Munich's demands by the autumn of 1925. In the adjoining 
~ Rhineland-North, Goebbels and Kaufmann were less responsive to the con-
stant reminders from the Parteileitung of their financial obligations. They 
defended their lack of contributions to Munich by pointing out that they 
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53) Police report, Recklinghausen, 23 October 1925s SAM VII - 64 Band I. 
54) "Gau Ruhr Ortsgruppen Mitgl1ederstand", 31 Na.y 1926. BAK NS I/y..2. 
55) Police report, Hamm, 8 March 19261 SAM I PA/279. 
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themselves were only securing the membership dues irregularly, and that they 
could only continue to work at all in their area by using private donations 
from a few individuals. 56) If the Gau Rhineland-North was able to keep 
afloat financially in 1925 by refusing to meet national party demands, von 
Pfeffer's expedient was to accumulate debts, which stood at around 16,000 
~ at the time of Gau Westphalia's fusion with Gau Rhineland-North. 57) 
Lack of cash, though by far the greatest handicap to the effectiveness 
of the Gauleitung, was not the only problem facing von Pfeffer. A major dif-
ficulty lay also in the nature of the Gauleitung itself. The use of the term 
"Gauleitung" in the 1925-1926 period is perhaps misleading in that it conjures 
up a vision of the extensive horizontal bureaucratic organisation which came 
to characterise the Gau administrations of the NSDAP from the late nineteen-
twenties onwards. The actual "physical" structure of the Gauleitung of West-
phalia was primitive by later standards, and the term "Gauleitung" referred 
to a party organisation with limited resources, the techniques and functions 
of which only gradually emerged. In the Westphalian context the Gauleitung 
meant little more than the Gauleiter assisted by a very small clerical staff. 
The Gauleiter, his deputy, a party treasurer and party secretary and their 
deputies, and the head of the ~SA were the full complement of the party 
officials in the Gauleitung of Westphalia. The facilities at the disposal of 
the individuals at the head of the regional organisation were restricted to 
the financial resources of the individual party functionaries concerned. Even 
at Gau level, the Nazi movement of Westphalia was unable to sustain a regional 
party headquarters or office facilities. Von Pfeffer followed the usual prac-
tice of the early period ~ running the Gau virtually as a one man band with 
"office" facilities situated at his home, which was also the Gau party head-
quarters. Radical improvements in the situation of the Gauleitung were to be 
one of the chief features of the more powerful Gau Ruhr, which tapped wider 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
56) Goebbels & Kaufmann to PL, Elberfeld, 22 October 19251 BAK Sammlung 
Schumacher 203. 
57) Tyrell, OPe cit., footnote, p.18l. 
financial resources able to sustain a much grander party headquarters. 
Gau Westphalia and the A90 58) 
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The initiative to form a closer working association embracing the north 
German Gaue emanated from Gregor Strasser, who came to this decision some time 
during the summer of 1925. 59) In the first half of the year Strasser had 
been actively involved in the reorganisation of the NSDAP in northern Germany. 
Though Hitler's "delegate", he had become increasingly disenchanted with the 
"Munich clique" surrounding Hitler. Ideologically Strasser felt much more 
at home in the company of new leaders who emerged in the Ruhr region. At 
Elberfeld, the organisational centre of Gau Rhineland-North, the young 
Goebbels and Kaufmann were active in forcing the pace towards a greater 
emphasis on the socialist aspect of National Socialism, a trend which reflec-
ted Strasser's own inclinations. 60) Kaufmann and Goebbels strengthened their 
position in Elberfeld in the summer of 1925 by bringing about the suspension 
of the Gauleiter of Rhineland-North Axel Ripke, on a charge of embezzling 
party funds. Ripke, by going on a self-imposed vacation in July, left the 
field open for Goebbels and Kaufmann to take over the leadership of the ~. 
They evolved the novel form of a collegiate rule. As late as September the 
position of the respective parties was far from clear, however, despite the 
fact that Ripke, at the beginning of his 'three months' retirement', had 
authorised Goebbels to control the affairs of the ~ until the situation had 
been clarified. 61) 
It was to the Elberfeld group that Strasser turned for support in his 
efforts to create a movement which would be more independent of the Munich 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
58) The Arbeitsgemeinschaft der nord- und west-deutschen Gaue der NSDAP (AG) 
has been analysed by various authorities, especially by R. KUhnl, Die 
Nationalsozialistische Linke 1925-1930,. Meisenheim am Glan, 1966, pp.5 ff., 
W. Horn, OPe cit., pp.232 ff., P. HUttenberger, OPt cit., pp.26 ff., 
J. Nyomarkay, OPe cit., pp.78 ff., and J. Noakes, OPe cit., pp.68 ff •• 
591 Horn, OPe cit., p.232. 
60 Noakes, OPe cit., p.70. 
61 Goebbels and Kaufmann to PL NSDAP, Elberfeld, 29 September 19251 BAK 
Sammlung Schumacher. The letter calls on the PL to solve the problem 
of Ripke, and asks for Hitler's withdrawal of Ripke's authorisation as 
Gauleiter. 
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party headquarters, and in which "socialism" would playa more prominent role. 
At a meeting at Elberfeld on 20 August 1925 Stra.sser outlined his plan to 
'organise the entire West'. The 'Westblock' was designed to counter-bala.nce 
the' abominable and wretched management of the central office'. The new orga-
nisation was to ha,Ye a voice of its own in the projected 'Nationalsozialistische 
Briefe' to be published by strasser, with Goebbels as editor. The paper was 
to be used as a 'weapon against those sclerotic bosses in Munich'. 62) In 
the months follOl'ling Strasser's relationship with the Elberfeld group was to 
blossom into one of friendship based on a mutual conspiracy against the Munich 
party centre. The enthusiasm of the tireless Goebbels in the shaping and 
organisation of the projected northern group was to be a major factor in the 
realisation of the plans briefly outlined by Strasser in August. Much of the 
"donkey work" Was carried out bY' Goebbels, who almost immediately began to 
secure more support for the idea. 
~ Westphalia under von Pfeffer was 'the :rirst w be approached by Goebbels, 
probably at the beginning of August 1925. Goebbels outlined the whole 'complex 
of the West German AG' to von Pfeffer, with whom 'complete agreement' was 
reached at the end of ~ugust. 63) Von Pfeffer was drawn into the "intrigue" 
and participated in the meeting held on 10 September at Hagen, at which all 
the Gauleiter of northern Germany were present, with the exception of those 
of Berlin, East Prussia, Siles:ia. and Hessen. 6~) As Gregor Strasser was unable 
to attend, due to the illness of his mother, Dr Elbrechter (& friend of Kaufmann) 
took the chair, and the assembled leaders listened to Goebbels, who briefly 
outlined Strasser's plans. These were received well ~ all except L~, Gau-
-
lei ter of Rhineland-North, who had some reserve. tions although he too was finally 
won over. 6.5) Ley sensed perhap s the separatist nature of the AG, and as a 
devoted follower of Hitler opposed anY' movement away from Munich. 66) 
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62) The Ear Goebbels Diaries. The Journal of J. Goebbeh from 1 2 -1 26, 
ed. by H. Heiber, .tr. by o. Watson, London, 19 2; entry 21 August 1925. 
(In f'l!ture Goebbels, Diary). 
63) Goebbe1s to G. Strasser, .Elberteld, 31 August 1925: BAK NS I/3~O. 
6~) Account of the meeting by Fobke in Jochmann, OPe cit., pp.208 ff •• 
65) Goebbels to strasser, Elberfeld, 11 September 1925: BAK NS I/}~O. 
66) Jochmann, Ope cit., p.209. 
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At Hagen strasser's ideas were realised. The, majority present at the 
meeting were prepared to be included in the organisation, which was' to be 
, 
called the 'Arbeitsgemeinschaft dar Nord- und Westdeutschen Gaue der N.S.D.A.P.'. 
It was to be under the leadership of strasser. Goebbels suggested that the 
'well-equipped Elberfeld office' should become the organisational centre. 
The publication of the 'Nationalsozialistische Briefe' was'also generallY 
approved, and all pledged themselves to secure as large an outlet . for the 
paper in their ~ as possible. 67) Strasser and Goebbels busied themselves 
, 68) 
with the framing of the AG's statutes, which finally emerged in October 1925. 
Although section four of the statutes protected the association against possible 
accusations of separatism by stating that the 'AG and the INS Briefe' exist 
,with the express agreement of Adolf Hitler', the organisation had certain 
features which distinguished it fran the Munich party. Most significant was 
the egalitarian nature of the AG, marke~ different from anything in the 
NSDAP under Hitler's Fnhrerprinzip. Within the organisation the Gauleiter 
were equals, and strasser was at most the primus inter pa.res. The AG's demo-
cratic structure must inevitablY have been seen as an affront by Hitler, who 
was engaged on enforcing the idea of ocmmand and obedience within the NSDAP. 
He must als 0 have been concerned by the expansion of the AG, which rapidly 
included the Whole leadership of the north German NSDAP, and the extension of 
its influence, which reached beyond the confines of northern Germaqy. 69) 
Developments at the f'irst conference of the :f\111y o;>nsti tuted AG in Hanover 
on 22 November 1925 also gave food far thought to the Munich party centre. 
Although the conference started with a formal declaration of loyalty to Hitler, 
it turned to IDa tters Which implied a direct challenge to Hitler's leadership 
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67) 
68) 
Goebbels to Strasser, Elberfeld, 11 September 1925: BAK NS ~340. 
"Statuten der AG der Nord- undWestdeutschen Gaue der NSDAP-, signed by 
Strasser and Goebbels, Landshu~Elberfeld, 9 October 1925: BAK NS ~340. 
The statutes are reprinted in J. Noakes & J. Pridham, (eds.), Documents 
on Nazism 1919-1945, London, 1974, pp.7~75. 
Good connections were established with the Gauleiter of Wtirttell1berg and 
Baden, who were also recipients of the cnrculars emanating from Elberfeld; 
see Ktthnl, Ope cit., p.17. 
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and authority. Apart from approving the statutes of the AG as drawn up by 
Strasser and Goebbels, the meeting decided to levy special dues on the AG 
~ and to formulate drafts revising the party programme of 1920. 70) On 
both the last points the AG was moving into dangerous water. The financial 
levy was designed to build up the organisational centre at Elberfeld and to 
create a separate party organisation which duplicated that of Munich, As 
to the revision of the party programme, the dangers this involved must have 
been clear to all concerned. It was a direct challenge to Hitler, who had 
constantly declared the inviolable nature of the 1920 programme. His deter-
mination on this point had been apparent as recently as August 1925 in th e 
statutes of the 'Nationalsozialist1eche Deutsche Arbeiterverein', 1n which 
the party programme was referred to in two places. In section 2 it was stated 
that 'this programme is unalterable', in section 12 the text read 'Name, 
programme and direction of the movement cannot be changed', with Hitler's own 
amendment 'except with the agreement of all members', 71) 
Strasser was already working on his programme draft before the Hanover 
meeting was held. Along with Goebbels and Kaufmann, he was authorised by 
the conference to work on further drafts which were to be the subject of 
another meeting also to be held in Hanover in January 1926. Strasser's draft, 
worked out without Hitler's knowledge, was distributed by Goebbels to the 
~ leaders of the AG and to a few others, including Ludendorff and Rosenberg, 
on 11 December 1925. All were asked to give their views on the contents, 72) 
Goebbels also 'worked hard on his draft', which was to be ready in manuscript 
form by the time of the January conference. 73) Strasser's draft did not 
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70) Noakes, OPt cit., p.74, KUhnl, OPe cit., pp.17-l8. 
71) Horn, OPt cit., p.234. 
72) KUhnl, OPt cit., p.18. The text of the Strasser draft is included in 
KUhnl's article 'Zur Programmatik der Nationalsozialistischen Linken. 
Das Strasser-Program'von1925-6', Vierteljahrshefte fUr Zeitgeschichte, 
14. 1966, pp,324-333. 
73) Goebbels to Strasser, Elberfeld, 16 December 1925; Goebbels to Gauleiter 
of the AG, Elberfeld, .5 January 19261 BAK NS 1/)40. A copy of Goebbe1s' 
draft has not been found, 
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receive general approval from the AG members; it was indeed severelY criti-
cised and attacked ~ several individuals. 74) 
A most negative evaluation was given qy von Pfeffer. The latter's rela-
tionship with the AG was somewhat ambiguous thrcughout its existence. Although 
a participant in the organisation, he was not c cmmi tted to ihe ideals of the 
leading activists, especiallY the 'socialist' ideas held by Strasser, Goebbels 
and Kaufmann. Ultimately von Pfeffer always acted without regard to AG deci-
sions if the situation in his ~ demanded it. He was not prepared to sub or-
dinate himself automaticallY to 1be AG and resened his right to act independ-
entlY. His relationship with the AG underlines a basic flaw in the organi-
sation: its lack ofunlty. The democratic organisational form, and the lack 
of leadership by Strasser, as well as the equality among the Gauleiter gave 
each the option to ignore or renege on points of agreed policy. The AG failed 
to live up to the demands agreed to by the membership in section 2 of the 
statutes, which called not onlY for 'the closest possible union of all par-
tiCipating ~ in organisational and propaganda. matters', but also 'if the 
oooasion should demand it, the fonnulation of a oommon approach to political 
questions of "the day'. The diffioul i;1 of realising this objective can be 
seen even wi thin the "inner oore" of 'the AG, the Rhenish-Westphalian region. 
Though structurallY very similar there were distinct differences between the 
Elberfeld group and Ley and von Pfeffer in ihe adjoining vaue • Von Pfeffer's 
independent outlook conditioned hi s relationship with the AG from the beginning. 
At the Hagen meeting in september 1925 ven Pfeffer, unlike the bulk of the 
Ga.ulei ter present, refusecl to be drawn on the Esser issue raised by the 
G~tt:ingen group, declaring that 'what happened in Munich was of no concern to 
him'. 75) On the second issue which gave rise to debate, the question of 
participation in elections, he agreecl on the line of abstention, pushecl through 
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74) 
75) 
Kaufmann, Elbrechter, Rosikat, Schlange, Viereok, Himmler, von Pfeffer, 
Haase, Fobke, and two unknown party' members all ga.Te their views; Horn, 
op. cit., p.236. 
JOchmann, op. cit., p.209. 
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narrowly at the meeting, rut obviously felt free to have second thoughts on 
the matter. Within a week of t he meeting his attitude changed fundamentally. 
Using the argument that 1he whole issue of electoral participation was of little 
significance anyway, he proposed that everyone should act as his interests 
dictated. 76) To von Pfeffer it was purely a matter of tactics, not a funda-
mental dogma as it was with the G!!>ttingen group. 77) In a second letter to 
the AG and to MUnich, also dated 15 September, von Pfeffer announced his deci-
sion that Westphalia would after all participate in forthcoming local elections, 
though 'only to a limited extent'. 78) This change of attitude followed a 
~ conference on 14 September at which von Pfeffer must have been put under 
severe pressure from local Nazi leaders to ignore the AG decision. One can 
see this in the arguments used by him to justify his change of mind. First 
of all there was the fact that there were 'several areas in which we will most 
definitely have Illccess with our candidates, as well as one, if not bro can-
didates, who will secure a seat in the provincial assembly'. Then von Pfeffer 
argued that 'in several places the NSDAP already plays Slch a role in public 
life that we cannot afford 1:0 omit our name from the ballot papers. Moreover, 
able representatives in these small local "parliaments" can direct welcome 
attention to themselves and our cause; we have in our province town councillol'3 
in several places whose activities produce a greater effect than many a mass 
meeting.' 79) Such unilateral acts weakened the position of those Gauleiter 
committed to non-participation. Rebukes from fellow AG members could do little 
except highlight the differences existing within the organisation. 80) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------~-----
76) Von Pfefferto Hitler, Munich PL, and AG, Mdnster, 15 September 1925: 
BAK. NS I/34.0. 
77) Haase' 8 views are given by Noakes, Ope cit., p. 67. 
78) To 'the Munich PL the bsue of electoral participation was not as contro-
versial a matter as to some of the AG members. The PL was indeed giving 
contradictory instructions to the northern Gaue depending on whether or 
not the recipient favoured electoral participation. This situation was 
especially condemned at the Hagen meeting - see Goebbels to Hitler, Elber-
feld, 12 September 1925: BAKNS x/340. 
79) Von pfeffer to Hitler, Munich, and AG MUnster, 15 September 1925: BAK NS 
1/340. 
80) See Dinc.klake to von Pfeffer, Hanover, 13 October 1925: BAK liS 1/340. 
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Von Pfeffer's ideological attitudes also ran counter to the Strasser-
Goebbels-Kaufmann concept of "socialism". Their emphasis on winninB over 
the working class conflicted with von Pfeffer's idea of organil!ling the maxi-
mum support for the v~lkisch cause from all social groupings. 81) The chasm 
separating van Pfeffer from Strasser's petit bourgeois socialism is reflected 
in the racist-elitist philosophy of the Westphalian leader in his rejection 
of the ideas contained in tile strasser programme draft. 82) Along with Haase, 
von Pfeffer rejected Strasser's draft as being too democratic. 83) Von 
Pfeffer's basic ideas were 'diametrically opposed' to Strasser's, aId involved 
a fundamentally different attitude towards the question of 'the equality of 
the individual. 84) The idea of the 'equality of individuals' and the belief 
in 'equal shares for all', which von Pfeffer Saw as strasser's basic premise, 
were anathema to him. This type of "s ocialism" was 'damaging and poisonous', 
based as it was, according to vm Pfeffer, on 'Jewish-l1beral-democratic-
mar.xist-humanitarian concepts'. 85) Von Pfeffer di d not believe in the idea 
that all men are equal in their physical and mental capacity. Indeed, the 
'iron la7f of' inequality' was the basis of his philosophy. 86) Given this 
d.1fference, von Pfeffer's :ideal was a state structure the function of which was 
not to ensure equal opportunity for all, but to ensure that the 'higher ele-
ments' of the race had the opportunity of eleya ting 'tllemselve:s above the 'lower 
elements'. 87) The Social-Darwinist belief in the surviva.l of the fittest, 
'natural selection', and 'constant conflict' strongly influenced his ideas. 88) 
The 'breeding' of the new elite (which 1't)uld embra.ce some two-thirds of the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
81) 
82) 
83) 
84-) 
85) 
86) 
!B7) 
88) 
In the NS-Briefe von Pfeffer had to remind Goebbels that the party needed 
support from everyone, workers and middle class - Noakes, Ope oi t., p.73. 
Von Pfeffer's Denkschrif't (under the pseudonym 'Fredericus') "Zucht. Eine 
Forderung zum Programm" was dra.wn up towards 'the end of Deoember 1925; oopy 
in HA 44/896. (In future Denkschrift ItZucht"). 
On Haase's Yiews see Noakes, Ope cit., pp.74-75. 
Denkschrift "Zucht", pp.2-3. 
Ibid., p.3. 
Denksohrift "Zuchtlt , p.4. 
Ibid., pp.5 ff •• 
Ibid., especiallY pp.10 and 12. 
22~ 
popu1ation~) was designed to eradicate the 'lowest grade' in the 'inferior 
catego~' of the population, the fate of whiCh 'was decline and death ... 
Barren trees must be hacked out and thrown into the fire.' 89) 
Von Pfeffer's new "breeding establishment", his ideal state, was 1P show 
'no compassion' to those who did not fit in with his eugenic exercise. Though 
von Pfeffer himself admitted that the 'programme demands' outlined by him were 
'phantastic', he defended his ideas as 'fitting reality in an honest way'. 90) 
The rest of the Denkschrift was concerned with demonstrating how the elite 
could take over the running of the state. 91) From this hotch-potch of ideas 
emerged von Pfeffer's pet-theme, the creation of a 'voluntary people's a~', 
service in which was to be a pre-requisite for the elevation of the indiv!lldua1 
into the 'highest elite'. 92) Service in the army was tile key idea behind von 
Pfeffer's new state system. 
Although the Denkschrift did not touoh on many ideas whiCh exercised 
. Strasser's imagination, the differenoes between von Pfeffer's and Strasser's 
drafts were fundamental. At the Hanover meeting of the AG on 25 JaI1lary 1926, 
von Pfeffer, along with several other Gauleiter, proved a strong critio of 
the strasser programme draft, whioh was not accepted by the assembled Gauleiter. 
The meeting agreed in prinoiple, however, tilat the existing 25 Points needed 
expansion ani clarification. 93) This feeling was enbodied in the resolution 
passed by the conferenoe: 'In the recognition that the ~nera1 policy directives 
oontained in ihe 25 Points require the addition of a more detailed programme 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
89) 
90) 
91) 
92) 
93) 
Von Pfeffer's catalogue of the 'lowest grade' in the 'inferior' oategory 
of the population (which was to be elini.inated) was very extensive and inclu-
ded oripp1es, ~i1eptios, the blind, the insane, the deaf and dumb, a1co-
hOlios, 'illegitimate orphans', murderers, prostitutes, sexual offenders, 
as well as th e stupid (!), tb9 weak, those suffering fran hereditary ill-
nesses etc.; Ibid., p.1l. 
Ibid., p.12. . 
Von Pfeffer deals only with the organisation of ~ricu1ture (pp.14-18),. 
and industry (pp.19-22), 81 d the mechanics by which "the state oou1d ensure 
the emergence an d continuou s renewal of the 'e11 te' • 
Entry into tb9 army was severely restrioted and eXcluded not only the off-
spring of the 'lowest grade' in tile 'inferior categoty', but also the off-
spring of 'November criminals', deserters, Jews, B1acka, Yellows, and 
traitors; ibid., pp.23 ff •• 
Otto strasser to Goebbels, Berlin, 26 Janu~ 1926: BAK NS ~3~O. 
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of action, especially in view of tile importance and impact of propaganda 
activi W in the growing political crisis, the meeting of the AG in Hanover 
is handing over the drafts produced by various party c(Jllrades to a study group 
under the direction of party comrade Gregor Strasser for clarification and 
consideration, with instructions to send the material, after it has been 
analysed, on to party headquarters fo r :fUrther eva Juation '. 94-) On three 
other important issues decisions were also arrived at. 95) The first related 
to a new press organ for the AG, 'Der Nat1onal-Sozi~list', on the creation of 
which Goebbels had been working since December 1925. 96) Secondly, a resolu-
tion on the expropriation of 'the royal houses was unanimously agreed upon. The 
decision against ihe idea of compensation, aligned the AG wi til the policy of 
the left-wing parties. 97) Though the ~solution stated specifically that the 
AG did not wish to pre-empt the decision of party headquarters, it did so in 
fact. The decision, on an important and emotional issue of the tlme, can be 
seen as a direct challenge to Hitler's authority and leadership. It reflected 
the detexmination of 'the A!} members 1x> have a say in the formulation of party , 
policy. Thirdly, a resolution dealing with the question of the attitude to be 
taken towards the patriotic associations re-affirmed the decision taken at the 
Hanover meeting of November 1925; namely, co-operation with them was rejected. 98) 
The Jalllary meeting of the AG marked a watershed in the development of 
the organisation. Until December 1925 Hitler and the J4Unich party centre had 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
94-) Jochmann, Ope cit., p.223. 
95) SUllllll8.ry of the meeting oonta.ined in a letter by Otto Strasser to Goebbels, 
Berlin, 26 Janu~ 1926: BAK NS ~34-0. Acoounts also in O. strasser, 
Hitler and I, London, 1940, w.90 ff.; also Goebbels, Diary, pp.62-63. A. 
comprehensive account which 'takes into oonsideration new material (a verbal 
account by von Pfeffer) is given in Noakes, Ope cit., pp.76-78. 
96) Goebbel s to G. Strasser, Elberfeld, 29 December 1925: BAle NS I/34-0. 
97) The resolution of the AG (against the idea of compensation) is reprinted 
in KUhnl, Ope cit., p.299. 
98) Not all the AG members had kept to the original decision, hence its re-
appearance on the agenda. This emerges fran aoebbels' letter to Strasser 
in which'he stated "The Harburg branch and the Gall Ltlneburg-Stade abuse me 
(especially Telschow-Buohholz) beoause I have refused to speak at a meeting 
protected by tile stahlhelm. You can see how muoh even our OWn AG members 
still have to learn"; Goebbels to G. Strasser, Elberfeld, II December 1925: 
BAK NS ~340. 
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not intervened in '!he AG's development. The "neutralll Munich attitude changed 
in '!he light of' 1ile expansion of the Aa.' s activities to include the discussion 
and revision of the party programme. So mar.u copies of the strasser dra.ft 
having been distributed by the Elberfeld. centre, it was inevitable that it 
reached Hitler. Feder, who considered himself the fa.ther of the original 
programme, became aware of the draft's existence through the Nazi branch leader 
of Qued.linburg during the Christmas period, and attempted unsuooessfully to 
secure a copy from strasser. 99) The distribution of the dx'aft (its very exi-
stence in faot) without his or Hitler's knowled8e enraged Feder, a.nd Strasser, 
in view of '!his reaotion, thought it advisable 'b> iaka a series of measures to 
calm Munich feelings. 100) The idea of passing off the ~t with a note stating 
that he had merely wanted to oollect '!he views of different party members in 
order to create a definitive version of the programme at a later sta.ge can 
har~ bave quietened Hitler' s ~ars. The appearance of Feder, uninvited and 
unannounced, at the January meeting of the AG as 'Hitler's :representative' 
made it clear that Munich's suspicions about the AG had :reached a new height. 
His presence meant ihat 'the ex:change of views on details of programme lost 
the character of internal discussions among the AG, and the latent conflict 
nth Hitler and the Munich party headquarters nOW' changed into an open dis-
pute. 101) The continuation of discussions of 'the party programme at the 
Hanover .eeting, and the resolution passed by the G!uleiter to look at the 
problem further, demonstrates tl'at the members of "the AG were not prepared at 
that stage to drop an issue which was bound to creatcoooflict with Hitler. The 
fact that Feder, lfitler's ~es and. ears at the meeting, also noted 'careless 
remarks made in the heat of the struggle', some of which apparently touched 
on the leader'8 per80naliv and ahility, .ade a reaction by Hitler inevitable. ~ 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
99l Feder to PL of the NSDAP, Murnau, 2 Ma,. 1926, in Tyrell, OPe cit., p.125. 
100 Strasser to Goebbe18, Landshut, 8 JaI11ary 1926: B.AK NS ±/340. 
101 Horn, Ope cit., p.237. 
102 Otto strasser to G-oebbels, Berlin, 26 Janua.ry 1926: BAK NS I/340; Noakes, 
oPe cit., pp.77-78. Horn a.ccepts von Pfefferta later statement8 (given Some 
forty years after the event) at face value; Hom OPe cit., pp.237-238. 
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Anything less would have been a negation ot leadership on Hitler's part: the 
discussion of tile "sacred" 25 Points and party policies in general atter all 
smacked of separatism, disobedience and opposition. 
Hitler's counter-offensive was organised rapidly. Inri tations to a meeting 
of the two sides, scheduled to take place at Bamberg on l.4. February 1926, were 
sent out to various individuals by "the Munich :party centre on 4 Februaxy. The 
leading figures wi thin the AG were in no doubt 8.8 to "the seriousness of their 
position and. the gravity with which Hitler viewed the situation. strasser was 
the first to take up a defensive position. FollOl'ling a discussion with Hitler 
a. week before the Bamberg meeting he fe lt it prudent to wi thc1raw hi s progranme 
draft. 103) Goebbels engaged in a piece of 1dsh:t\ll thinking a.nd failed to 
grasp the relative position of "the AG vi&-~-vis Hitler'. 'In Bamberg', he 
confided to his dia.ry, 'we shall have to act the :part of the prudish beauty 
and lure Hitler onto our territoxy ••• Not a soul has faith in Munich. 
Elberfeld must become tile Mecca of German Socia.lism.' 104) Kaufmann was more 
realistio and. prepared to fight it out, but yiewed the fbrthcoming meeting 
wi til misgivings, fearing tile worst. 105) Kaufmann's anxiety was shared by 
von Pfeffer, who declined to attend the meeting because he feared a debacle. 106) 
His fears turned out to be justified. At Bamberg the At;. aupporters were in a. 
minOrity, and. important leaders were absent fran the meeting. 107) For the 
AG leadership the meeting was a disaster; Hitler ploughed them under verbally. 
In a speech lasting aome five hours Hitler ooyered the major points of differ_ 
ence and ba.lIIIIlered home hh viewpoint. 108) By the t:1Jlle he had finished there 
was little room .t'b r oompromise or discuasion. The choice was one between 
acceptanoe or rejection. 
---~---------------------------------------------------------------------
103) Horn, OPe cit., p.24O; Noakes, OPe cit., p.79. 
104) Goebbels, ~ entry 11 February 1926, pp.65-66. 
105) See Kaufmann 15 letter to G. Stras8er, Elberfeld, 8 February 1926: BAK NS 
1/338 Bd. I. 
106) Noakes, ope cit., p.80. 
107) Some 60 to 65 party lea.ders were present. Of' the AG leaders, Kaufmann, 
yon Pfeffer, Fobke and Haase were absent. Otto strasser was also not 
present (since he did not oocupy any party position he was not invited 
anyway) - Horn, Ope cit., p.24O; further Kl1hnl, op, cit., p.44-. 
108) Orlow, ope cit., p.60; KUhnl, Ope cit., pp.44 ft •• 
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In the ween following Bamberg the AG members were reluctant to view 
their setbaek as a final defeat, and G-oebbels especially ccntinued to nurture 
the hope that Hi tIer could be won over and removed from the influence of the 
'rogues' who surrounded him in Munich. 109) As an effective organisation the 
AG collapsed quite quickly. After two meetings, held at G-~ttingen and Hanover 
in the wake of the Bamberg fiasco, towards the end of Februazy, the AG did not 
Bhow signs of' actin 'W. The leading figures in the AG also became uncertain in 
the face of Hitler's tactios. In his ~lations with the leaders of the AG-
the tone Hitler adopted was one of' oonciliation and consideration, especially 
towards Strasser and Goebbels. 110) At 'the beginning of March strasser observed 
his promise to Hitler ani called in all the existing copies of his draft. 111) 
G-oebbels also reoognised where power within the party really l~ and gradually 
began to accommodate himself to '!he Munioh line. 112) 
In the period of the AG's collapse von Pfeffer simply' kept his head down. 
The decline and collapse of the AG in all probability meant very little to him. 
For the most part he had been an observer and a fellow-traveller. He wrote the 
occasional article in the 'NS-Briefe' and involved himseJ.1' in the disoussions 
and conference decisions. But his ccmmitment to 'the AG was not as intense as 
that of strasser or Goebbels. Nor did he particularly wish to follow the line 
taken by the latter. IdeologioallY von Pfeffer (like several other Gauleiter 
actiTe in the AG) did not fit in with the "sooialist" emphasis whioh the 
Elberfeld group and Strasser were committed to. 113) What m~ haTe attraoted 
von Pfeffer to the AG was the rationalisa.tion of organisation it brought about 
in the Rhenish-WestphaJian region. This is reflected to sane degree in the 
enthusiasm with which TOll Pfeffer organised ~ Ruhr, follOWing '!he amalgamation 
o'f' ~ Rhinels.n<i-North and Westphalia in March 1926. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
109) Goebbels, Diary, entries 15 February onwards, pp.67-69. 
110) Horn, Ope cit., p.242. 
111) Jochmann, OPe oit., p.22S. 
112) Noakes, OPe cit., pp.8l ft •• 
113) Acoording to Kaufmann, Ton Pfeffer was never in agre em en t wi '!h his and 
Goebbels' idea. of sooialism, which "went too far" for von Pfef'f'er. Kaufmann 
to Heinemann, Elberfeld, 24 June 1927; reprinted in Tyrell, OPe cit., p.129. 
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Chapter 7. THE WESTPHALIA..'1 NSDAP AND (tAU RUHR: 1926 TO 1928. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The General Trend.s in the Weetphalian NSDAP. 
After the fonnation of ~ Ruhr, created. at the Essen party conference 
of 7 March 1926 by the fUsion of the ~ Rhineland-North and. Westphalia, 
~ Westphalia lost its distinct identi~. From 1926 to 1928 the fortunes of 
the Westphalian National Socialists were closely tied to those of tile ~ 
Ruhr. ~ Westphalia was to re-emeree as a separate organisation in the 
summer of 1928, following 'the removal of Kaufmann as G-auleiter of the Ruhr 
region and. tile re-creation of ~ Westphalia under the leadership of the new 
Gaulei ter Josef Wagner. 
~ Ruhr at -the time of its creation was a formidable pOlver within the 
national Nalli movement. In terms of growth and t~ overall strength of the 
party in the districts which formed. the new (;.all, the record for the period 
May 1925 to May 1926 was impressive, with a membership increase of just under 
270 per cent. In May 1925 the area which was to comprise ~ Ruhr had a tota.l 
membership of 1,420. 1) By the end of May 1926 ~ Ruhr contained 3,740 paid-
up members, of i'rhich 1.447 came from 'the fomer G-a.u Westphalia.. 2) Qm! Ruhr 
thus comprised sane 8 per cent of the total National Socialist membership in 
the Republic, and was recognised on all sides as a centre of major growth 
within the movement. 3) With one exception, the larCest party branches were 
si tue. ted in the most populous industrial towns ot the Ruhr: Essen (508), 
Hattingen (376), D!1sseldorf (273), Bochum (213), Elberfeld (211), In d Duisburg 
(172). 4) The membership of the old ~ Westphalia. was organised in 61 branches. 
of which the province of Westphalia contained 52, while 5 l8¥ in the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) HUttenberger, op. Cit., p.34. 
2) "G-au Ruhr der NSDAP. MitgUederstand vom 31 Mai 1926": BAK NS 1/342. 
3) Total membership of the NSDAP - 1925 27,117; 1926 49,523; Schlfer, op.eit., 
p.ll. 
4) The Ruhr branches could not compete with such important and. sizeable bran-
ches of th e movement, Slch a.s Nl1rnberg. which had a membership of between 
1,700 and 1,800 by the end of 1925; Pridham, OPe cit., p.52. 
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Regierungsbezirk of OsnabrUck, 3 in the small state of Lippe-Detmold, and one 
branch, that of Nette, lay in the Regierungsbezirk of Hildesheim. Thir~-four 
branches in the province of Westphalia lay wi thin the Regierungsbezirk of 
Arnsberg, and thirteen in the Regierugssbezirk of Mttnster. Exactly half of 
the 52 branches of the province lay within the Ruhr industrial belt. Only a 
handful of branches oould boast a large member8hip; there were only 5 branches 
with 50 members or more, t1rO of which, Hattingen (376) and Boohum (213), aocoun-
ted for around ~O per oent of the total Westphalian memberShip in May 1926. 
The wlk of the branches were very small, 25 having a membership of 10 or less. 
For much of 1926 the Rhenish-Westphalian area cootinued to be a growth 
region for the NSDAP. New impetus came from the amalgamation of ~ Westphalia 
and ~ Rhineland-North, and the establishment of the triumvirate of Goebbels, 
Kaufill8.nn and von Pfeffer, which fused the organisational and propaganda acti-
vi ty of the two ~ and. £!/lve the centre of the most rapid gro\Vth, the Ruhr 
oomplex, a unified administration. The activities generated by the new com-
mand structure produced immediate dividends. The mid-l926 period 8aw a rapid 
eXp9.nsion in the number of party branche8 and an influx of new members, a trend 
reflected in the heavy demand made on Munich party headquarters for enrolment 
forms. 5) ~ July 1926 the Ruhr Gauleitung was able to &8sert, with little 
fear of contradiotion, that (}au Ruhr was the' strCJlgest~' of the movement. 6) 
The strength of the movement was reflected not only in the increa.sing 
membership, but a.lso in the interest which the party waS able to arouse in the 
publio at large. Small, newly founded branches were able to organise meetines 
with a.ttendances quite out of proportion to their size. Thus the Ahlen branch 
founded in Maroh 1926 with a membership of between 15 and 20, was able to 
attract some ~OO people to its first PUblic meeting. 7) At Recklingha.usen 
the local party branch was able to entice 60 people to one of 1 ts meetings 
. . 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
5) (}L Ruhr to PL, Elberfeld, 2 June and l5 June 1926: BAle Sa.mm.1.ung Schumaoher 
203. 
6) GL Ruhr to PL, Elberfeld, 1 Jul.y 1926: BAK Sammlung Schumaoher 203. 
7) Reports by 'the Landrat, Beclolm, 19 March and 17 May 1926: SAM VlI - 6~ 
Ba.nd I. 
, 
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despite the exorbitant entrance payment of 50 Pr. per person. 8) In 1925 
and the first half of 1926 the police reports oovering the numerous meetings 
organised by "the party canmented on the good turn-out achieved. They gave 
attendance figures for the majority of the meetings as being between 100 and 
300. Such significant numerical "intere8t" was of great importance to the 
National Socialists in view of the finanoial gains whioh ~sulted from well-
. attended meeting3. In those centres, such as Boohum, where the party was 
beginning to be a foroe of significance, attendances were very much higher. 
This was partly due to the attention given to t he movement by pou tioal foroes 
determined to prevent or disrupt meetings. At a meeting organised in Boohum 
by Wagner, at which Feder was the ohief attraction, some 700 of 'the 1,200 
present were estimated to be from the ranks of the KPD. 9) In general, meetings 
throughout the Ruhr attracted large numbers of left-wing opponents, who viewed 
the new brand of "socialism" preached by 'the Nazis with misgivings. 
The expansion of the NSDAP in 1926 was inoreasingly overshadowed by finan-
cial weakness, which hampered the effectiveness of the party effort. The 
amalgamation of the two ~ theoretical~ provided the new Gauleitung with 
greater financial resources. In practice the financial l!Jl:1ns which acorued 
through the rationalisation of the party administration were largely nulli-
fied ~ Munich's insistence on the fUlfilment by the ~au of its contributions 
to the national funds. In this matter the ~ Rhineland-North had not been 
very oooperative in 1925, though Gau Westphalia was at least making an attempt 
by the end of 1925 to meet Munich's demands. But both ~ at fue time of 
their union had piled. up arrears, fue payment of which Munich party headquarters 
continued to insist upon. For the Ruh! yauleitung there was no way ot avoiding 
the 'burden', since it was caught ~ Munich's control of membership cards. It 
was this administrative feature (acoepted by the ~ leaders) whioh forced the 
Gauleitung to meet its obligations. The pressure placed on 'the Gauleitung was 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
8) Police report, Reoklinghausen, 1 October 1925: SAM VII - 2 Band 4. 
9) Police report, Boohum, 10 March 1926: SAM I PA/279. 
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increased as the party membership in the area expanded, f or the expansion 
was jeopardized if the membership cards were not processed rapidly enough by 
the Partelleltung, while a delay of several months also meant a loss of income 
to the Gau. The Gaulei tung was thus caught in a vicious circle which led the 
~ administration to make a great effort to :f\llfil its cbty to Munich. The 
Ruhr Gauleitung found its offer of 'we will pay later' insufficient to get 
par~ headquarters to process a backlog of membership cards. At the end of 
March 1926 a hundred Marks were sent to Munich to mollify fue Parteileitung. 
In the accompaI\Ying letter the cash sent was referred to 'as proof of our good 
intention to pay'. The Gaule1tung went on to assure Muni.oh 'that we will also 
pay the still outstanding arrears as quickly as possible. You must take into 
consideration that our ~ has got into financial difficulties <he to the 
recently held large meetings, which after all have given a calsiderable boost 
to our movement ••• We will meet our obligations as soon as cash is in hand 
without further reminders.' 10) The Parteileitung had little sympathy with 
the financial problems facing ~ Ruhr, and continued to hold baok membership 
cards until the ~ paid the arrears. 11) 
The financial diffioulties of the movement placed severe limitations on 
its activities, and forced the Gauleitung to rely heavily on the sacrifices 
the rank and file were prepared to make for the cause. There were no alterna.-
tives but to tap this resource, for the Ruhr Gauleitung had few possibilities 
of obtaining funds fran wealthy backers as long as the party played only a 
limited role at regional and national levels. The Gauleitung could do little 
to assist the weaker par~ branches. As far as possible each branch was urged 
to meet its own financial requirements and to restrict its activities within 
the limitations set by its financial situation. Fortunately for the NSDAP, 
the pa~ members were generally prepared to do their u 'bnost to help the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
10) Gau Ruhr to PL, Elberfeld, 29 March 1926: BAK Sammlung Schumacher 203. 
11) Bouhler to Gau Ruhr, Munich, 1 April 1926: BAK Samm1ung Schumacher 203. 
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movement. It was ihi Sll' i1lingness of 'the ordinary members wbich allowed the 
movement to oontinue its efforts in spite of limited progress in the 1926 to 
1928 period. 12) One way in which elttra cash (beyond that derived trom member-
ship dues) was obtained was through '!he establishment of a 'Gau Opferring', 
the so-called 'l'reihei ts-Bund', in whioh the richer members were gathered, and 
to which the party sympathisers, who could not or wculd not openly join the 
party, cou1d contribute. 13) Some branoh leaders tried extreme meAsures to 
obtain the neoessazy oash for propaganda. In Hohenllmburg an order of 'the 
branCh leader in 1926 oontained the following instruotion: tEve~ paid-up 
member of the branCh hereby pledges himself' to give up the enjoyment of aloohol 
and niootine for three months. The savings made in this way wUl be paid to 
the branoh treasuzy am. used for '!he purpose of finanoing 'the propaganda neoes-
, 
sary to spread National Sooialist thought.' In this way a hundred ~ were 
collected Whioh went to finanoe the propaganda aotivities of the branoh. ~) 
The hader and treasurer of the Bielefeld branoh, Homann, workecl on simi1a.r, 
though less drastic lines. In his capaoity as leacler of' the SA, he issued. 
the following order: 'For the SA there will be a ban on alcoholio oonsumption 
in the next week, and on nicotine in the week after. The money thus saved. is 
to be handed in at the beginning of the week to -the party treasurer. Every 
transgression against the prohibitions will be punished by a 50 Pf. fine.' 15) 
As far as it was possible each branohattempted to finance the oosts of' 
propaganda through the inoome der1vecl from publio meetings, and. from vo1untary 
contributions gathered during '!he various events organisecl by the party. This 
w~ of financing pa~ aotivity presupposed, of course, that the meetings would 
attraot suffioient numbers to cover the costs. But often the party branches 
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12) 
13) 
1.4.) 
15) 
"Nur dadurch, dass die Partei an den Opfermut ihre Mitglieder besonclers 
hohe Ansprnche ste11t, vermag sie !bre betrAohtliohen Kosten verschlingende 
Propaganda noeh durohzuhalten". Report by the Reiohskommissariat far 
fiberwachung cler ~ffentlichen Ordnung, Berlin, 15 JulY, 1927; copy in SAM 
Nr. 1707. 
BeCk, 01'. cit., p.220. A similar organisation was also aotive in Gau 
Hanover - Noakes, 01'. oit., p.9~. 
Beck, OPe cit., p.394. 
Hiemisch, 01'. cit., p.11. 
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were unable to achieve a Slfficiently high tum-out, especially in the post-
1926 period. The NSDAP shared the fate of the KPD during 'the period of economic 
revival, when the climate was less conducive to radicalism. The interest of 
the public in the NSDAP declined, a development reflected in the low turn-out 
at meetings, and the lack of growth of the Nazi party membership. 16) In 1925 
the poor economic situation and the distress and dissatisfaction caused by 
high unemplqyment had provided the KPD and NSDAP with a much more receptive 
audience. 17) In the course of 1926 party branches needed the "big names" 
to attract Slfficient numbers to their meetings, and even 'these were no guarantee 
for success. Often what were planned as mammoth meetings turned out to be 
fiascos, the only result of which was to leave branches with considerable debts 
on their hands which effectively curtailed subsequent activities. The diffi-
cUlties failures presented to party treasurers are to be seen in an incident 
which befell the Bielefeld branch following a meeting at which C.oebbels had 
been -the main attraction. Writing to 8oebbels, the party treasurer stated that 
he was • asked by our party comrades to express once more our regret about the 
unhappy end to our last public meeting. Against fJ,lch unexpected finanCial mis-
adventures one is powerless. We had certainly thought that this meeting would 
have brought a useful surplus, as has always happened in 'the past. From now on 
we will only hold meetings when the costs for 'them are already available. But 
since this si. tua tion will undoubtedly never be the case, the last meeting will 
have been our final one in Bielefeld. To cover your costs I enolo sa 10 Marks 
for the time being. On 5 March 1926 we ordered ABC' s to the value of 17 Marks; 
these we have not yet received. In view of our financial 81 tuat10n can we use 
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16) 
17) 
The relationship between economio distress and xadicalism, aId the similarity 
of the position of the two radical parties noted in the police report, Reck_ 
llngbausen, 15 April 1926: SAM Nr. 2076; the lack of the rlght 'conditions' 
for Nazi growth noted in the reports of the Recklinghausen police, 31 Decem_ 
ber 1926: SAM Nr. 2076; and 7 October 1927: SAM VII - 2 Band 5. 
Police report, Recklinghausen, 5 December 1925: SAM VII - 2 Band 4. The 
unemployed often proviCtcd a large percentage of the aUdience of NaZi meetings. 
In Herne, for example, 2/3 rds. of a 300 streng audience at a Nazi meeting 
in Februa~ 1926 were estimated to be unemployed: Police report, Bochum, 
10 March 1926: SAM I pA/279. 
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that money to pay your fee? The remaining 6 ~ I will send to you tomor-
row.' 18) Larger branches such as Bielefeld were in a position to recover 
from such setbacks, and the treasurers' pessimism proved exaggerated. For 
smaller branches dependent on the little income derived from a handful of 
members, a number of poorly attended meetings could be :tatal. The experience 
of the Soest brnnch in 1926 illustrates the point. The first public meeting 
of 1926, at which Feder was the chief' speaker, produced an income of 17 Marks 
to meet an outlay of 150 ~. The deficit l/8.S met by furee branch members, 
and, surprisingly at that stage, the fai1u~ of the meeting did not deter :f'ur-
ther efforts. A second meeting in June, at which Josef Wagner spoke, had an 
audience of around 70, of -mich 80 per cent were Communists. The third meeting, 
at which Kaufmann was to speak, drew only two persons, and was cancelled.. The 
poor turn-out was Iile to a boycott by the Cou:munistS. It tad Oawned on the 
KI'D leaders that it was· their members who cOntributed to '\be Nazi t\.1nds, hence 
the instructions to the party m~ber8 to keep away. As a coo sequence of the 
disastrously low attendance, the net reoeipt of the meeting was 30 Pr., and 
that "swn" was only sec'~red 'be.cause one of the two manbers whioh attendedtbe 
meeting magnanimousq refused to ask for the retuzn of his entrance payment'. 
The branch faced a deficit of 70~. The series of' setbacks proved too much 
for the Soest bmnch. 'The large deficits resulting fran the meetings, added 
to the costs of the general propaganda, ha.d to be borne by the two party mem-
bers Hemmer and Zunvehne since there were no rich members in the branch. Both 
the bea.rers of the financial burden were only low grade civil servants dependent 
on a. small income.' In 'this 8i tuation it wa.s impossible to c cntinue staging 
pub1io meetings, and none were held until 1928. 19) 
The financial situation a.t the Gau aId local levels was only one, though 
perhaps the major, handioap which slowed down tile momentum '\be party had acquired, 
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18) Kassenwart Semmler (Reohtsanwalt) to Gabbels (sic), OG Bielefeld, 12 
March 1926: BAK NS il338. 
19) Beck, Ope cit., 1'1'.359-360. 
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by too s\lIllJ1ler of 1926. In part the slower progress can be explained by the 
determination of the NSDAP to acquire a distinct identity, a poliqy which 
involved the cutting of ties with v~lkisch and right-wing extremist movements 
and associations, and a drift into isolation. As we have seen, the Westphalian 
Nazi movement had cultivated the varioos right-wing associations and received 
valuable support and encouragement fran the 3dO, Stahlhelm and so on, and many 
of the NSDAP/NSFB branches had been strengthened by winning support fran such 
quarters. 20) Hitler himself had aJlVays reserved hi s position on the wisdom 
of merging the movement with similar vl!>lkisch groups. 21) For much of 1925 
the relationship between the NSDAP and diverse v~lkisch and patriotio movements 
was obscure, until a directive issued by the Partel1eitung in September clari-
fied the situation follOwing an inoident at a 3dO meeting held in Lippe-Detmo1d. 
During a parade by various associations participating in the event, a former 
prince who was taking the salute turned his back on the SA as it marched past. 
This action was considered an insult 't 0 the honour and reputation of the 
movement, its flag and the fourteen deaths of 9 November 1923'. The Partei-
lei tung formulated a number of directives to prevent a repetition of such an 
act: 
'i •••• Party branohes and the SA can no longer participate in sc>-called 
"patriotic-national" events. The prohibition against participation applies to 
all meetings of those assooai tions whioh do not see in Adolf Hitler or General 
Ludendorf'f their highest leader. At meetings of the FKB, D.V.O., Fronntbann, 
Schilljugend, Dt. Frauenorden and Tannenbergbund branches mEW participate, if 
invited. At meetings of the JdO the local situation is 1:/:l be taken into oon-
sideration before participation. 
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20) 
21) 
Sometimes tile Slpport given to the Nazis qy r.l.i91t-wing organisations proved 
their own undoing. In Hamill th e NSDA.P at its f' ormation in May 1924. made 
such inroads on the Stahlhelm membership, that the local Stahlhelm branch 
folded up; police report, Hamm, 10 November 1925: SAM I 'PA/372. 
Bullock notes that "In Part I of Mein Kampf' (written in the years 192~5) 
Hitler expressed his dislike of Sloh allianoes. It is quite erroneous to 
believe that 1:he strength of the movement must inorease if it be oombined 
with other movements of a similar kind. ••• In reality the movement thus 
admits outside elements which will subsequently weaken its vigour".' 
Bullock, op. cit., p.124. 
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ii. An official participation of branches at monarchic events is forbidden. 
iii. Participation of branches and the SA in march-pasts before officers of 
the Old Army, who as individuals or as members of their organisation reject 
General Ludendorff, is forbidden. 
iv. Branches or the SA, which do not observe these directives, Oln expect 
to be excluded from the party.' 22) 
The directives were the first step along the road towards the isolation 
whi . ~) 6 ch was to be such a handicap to the movement. In 192 there were per-
sistant attacks on several right-wing movements which generated a "we alone 
feeling" in the ranks of the NSDAP. The JdO, especially Mahraun's "western 
- 2 ) 
orienta tion", came in for particularly severe criticism in the spring of 1926. 4 
The relationship with "the JdO and. StahlheL'Il, am:>ng oiners, became an important 
issue in the branches of the Westphalian NSDAP, which vociferously supported 
the trend towards separation. In 'the Amsberg branch, for example, the whole 
question of the relationship with patriotic and right-wing movements was a major 
point of debate. 25) A motion of the branch considered. at the ~ party con-
ference held in Essen on 7 March 1926 called for the exclusion of all National 
Socialists who were still members of those 'patrioti.c organisations which do 
not stand behind our leader Adolf Hitler'. 26) At the ea.me time the Nazis also 
moved away from the Ludendorff orientated movements. This was perhaps inevit-
abJe as the relationship between Hitler and Ludendorff had. deteriorated in the 
ccurse of 1925, though the former was careful not to precipitate a crisis and 
open conflict with a person of Slch standing within the v~lkisch circles as a 
whole, including the NSDAP. 27) In 1926 the distinction "military leader" 
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22) 
23) 
24-j 25 
26 
27) 
"Rundsohreiben", Munich , 15 September 1925: BAK Sammlung Schumacher 373. 
"Trotz nicht zu leugnender Organisationserfolge der NSDAP in Norddeutsch-
land ••• machte sleh O:leh eine zunehmende lsolierung der NS Bewegung bemerk. 
bar, die die Entwicklungsau8siohten ala wenig gUnstig ersoheinen lassen"; 
in "Lage der NSDAP", report, Berlin, 21 Deoember 1925: HA 69/1509. 
~lkischer Beobaohter, 4 February 1926 - "Offener Brief an Mahra\.ttl". 
"Titigkei tsberioht fur Februar 1926", OG .A.rnsberg: BAK NS I/338 Band I. 
It Antrag dar OG Arnsberg zum Gautag", 22 February 1926: BAK. NS 1/338 Band I. 
For the relationship between Ludendorff and Hitler see Hom, Ope cit., 
pp.227 ff •• 
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(Ludendorff) and "political leader" (Hitler) became untenable as a result of 
the formation and development of the SA and the political role assigned to it 
by Hitler within the NSDAP. Indications of a widening gulf between Hitler and 
LUdendorff are mirrored in the Westphalian developments. A report for February 
1926 noted. that 'the NSDAP is engaged at present in cutting its ties with the 
Tannenbergbund.. The party is attempting to ~parate the pro-Nazi (Hitlerite) 
memb.ers from 'the Tannenbergbund (and its subordinate organisations). This 
development is accompanied by a certain movement away fran Ludendorff, who is 
closely associated with the Tannenbergbund.' 28) 
The division between -the National Socialists and 1ile numerous para-military 
and patriotic movements, whose apolitical and Slpra-pa.rty status was reflected 
in a general distrust of political movements and politicians, including Hitler 
and -the NSDAP, became more permanent following Hitler's last attempt in the 
mid-twenties to persuade their variou8 leaders to subordinate t~mselves to 
his leadership at a meeting in Weimar in October 1926. 29) Its relult was a 
further strengthening of the isolationism within the party. In the long term 
Hitler's tactic gave the NSDAP a distinct identity, and fUrthered the develop-
ment of a movement which 'though insignificant numericallY, represented a 
rigi~ organised, 1ery disciplined radical-revolutionary minority group direc-
ted by one single will'. 30) 
In Westphalia the limitations imposed. on the party by lack of cash, insuf_ 
ficient interest in the movement by the population, and. the isolationist ten-
d.ency, led to a loss of impetus in the post-1926 periOd. 31) Statistically 
it is very difficult to measure this in the membership movements of the party 
due to too lack of data for the whole of the Westphalian part of ~ Ruhr. 
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28) 
29) 
30) 
31) 
"Lage in der Reohtsbewegung", report by the Oberprisident of Westphalia, 
Mf1nster, 24. Fel:\TUary 1926: SAM VII - 64. Band. I. . 
On the meeting and. ita result see OrloIJ, Ope cit., pp.98 ff •• 
From a report b.1 the Reichskommissariat far ~rwachung d.er ~ffent1ichen 
Ordnung, 15 JulY 1927: SAM Nr. 1707. 
These hand.1C'ApS were shared b.1 the movement eleewhere; see Pridham, OPe 
cit., p.63. It is diff1cul t 10 share his view that the lack of the right 
"environment" (i.e. eoonomio stagnaticn) was not a contributing fa.ctor. 
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In one respect, the party exuded confidence. The Nazis were able to extend 
their network of branches in the province, their number increasing to 72 by 
the spring of 1927. 32) A third of ~ese lay in the 'old' growth centre of 
Bochum district, controlled by Josef Wagner. The b.llk of ihe branches oon-
tinued to be situated within the Ruhr industrial area, and ~e party retained 
the urban na'b.lre it had aoquired in 1925-.6. Progress in ihe agrarian and 
predominant~ Catholic counties was negligible. The Arnsberg district, despite 
the able leadership of Teipe1, made no progress in the post-1926 period and 
continued to have a mere !bur branches. The MUnster1and district, geographi-
cally the largest, contained only seven branches, two of which lay outside the 
Regiernngsbezirk of MUnster. The evidence available on party membership pro-
duces a picture of stagnation in canpar1scn withthe growth years of 1925-
1926. The increase in the membership of branches for which there are records 
was limited, and more often 'than not increases were not sustained. 33) The 
figures for the branches ino1uded in the police distriot of Recklinghausen 
(records covering 'the branches of Ge1senkirobea, Bottrop, Osterfeld, Ha1tern, 
Dorsten and Mtlnster) far the year 1927 show an overall deoline of 30 per cent 
from Jaruary to Deoember. 34) The figures for the Mflnster branch show that by 
December 1927 the branch had slif#:lt~ fewer members than it had had in 1925. 35) 
Though these figures cannot be taken as representatiTe for the NSDAP in the 
whole of Westphalia, they do show that in important growth areas of the past 
a marked decline had set in, which augured badly for ~e future ot the party. 
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32) "Anschriften dar OGL des Gaues Ruhr", Spring 1927: a~ Samm1ung Sohumaoher 
203. 
33) The two branches for vbioh Beok gLYes canprehensive figures, LUnen and 
Wickede reflect mixed fortunes. The Ltlnen branch had 18 members in 1924, 
15 in 1927 and only 4 by 1928. In Wickede the party grew from 8 members 
in 1924 to 12 by 1925, 27 by 1926 and 30 by 1927. "Aber dieser stand konnte 
nicht lang gehal ten werden. Die Werke kamen sum Standstill und viele der 
Getreuen mussten von hier abwandern". Beck, OPe cit., pp.3~7-348, 389-390. 
34) Jan. 735 April 810 Ju~ 680 Oot. 575 
Feb. 740 May 788 Aug. 624 Nov. 550 
March 741 June 716 Sept. 612 Dee. 525 
POlioe report, Recklinghausen, 9 Jarw.ary 1928: SAM vn - 2 Ba.nd 5. 
35) The MUnster membership figures are 1925: 66; Dee. 1926: 87; Dec. 1927: 61; 
Or1ow, Ope cit., p.1l1. 
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The revival of the NSDAP fortunes in the provinoe had 1P await the more 
favourable situation of the post-l928 period. Then the increasing economic 
gloom which descended on Germa~ radicalised the electorate, a developmAnt 
from which the NSDAP benefited enormously. The take-over of the Gau by Josef 
Wagner in the summer of 1928 also proved an important landmark in ihe history 
of Westphal.ia.n National Socia.llsm. Hia drive and enthusias!D did much to enable 
the Nazis to exploit the much more favourable situation presented by economic 
and political developments. 
The Gauleitung. 
In '!he reorganised NSDAP the ~ org3.nisational units ccntrolled by ~he 
regional party headquarters, the Gaulei. tung, played kEU roles on the regional 
level in matters relating to administration, organisation and propaganda. For 
the Parteileitung the Gauleitu."l.g was of great significance in Munich's efforts 
to centralise the Vlhole party apparatus. A new fea.ture in the vertical orga-
nisational form of '\he post-1925 party structure, "lne scope and ex:tent of the 
power of the Gauleit\!lfj and its relationship to tb3 Munich Pa.rteilei.tung on the 
one hand, and to '\he regional Slb-divisions on the district ani loc;al levels 
on the other, were only gradually worked. out in the light of experience. 
Theory and practice did. not always coincide in the first few years foll~N_ 
ing the n3construction of 'the party. Hitler's claim 1P control the appointment 
of the Gauleiter, for example, became a reality only as centralisation W8.S 
gradually achieved by the Parteileitung and as the FUhrerprinziE permeated the 
whole of the party structure. The developments in ~ Westphalia, Ill1d ~ 
Ruhr, mirror the changes which took place in the re-orgamsea party. The 
appointment of von Pfeffer as Gauleiter of Westphalia haa heen a formality 
rather than an exercise of authority by Hitler. 36) But at the same time von 
Pfeffer's letter of appointment heralded the end of 'the quasi-independent 
position he had. enjoyed. in the loose-knit organisation of the old NSFB of 1924. 
For the first time his responsibilities as Ga.uleiter in relation to the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
36) See above, Chapter 6, p. 202-
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Parteileituns were made clear. These involved not only the organisation and 
running of the NSDAP in ~ Westphalia, but the Enforcement of the re-enrolment 
procedure of the members by the Munich central party office, the strict and 
prompt collection of membership dues, and the transfer of the central party's 
share of the monthly dues to Munich. 37) In the months following, von Pfeffer's 
reluctance to accept the need of the re-enrolment procedure led to a war of 
attrition between himself and Bouhler, a oontest in which the Parteileitung 
was ulti.ma.tely suocessful. 38) Though oonforming to the Munich directives on 
organisational matters, von Pfeffer did not automatically accept the superior 
authority assumed by the Parteileitung. His rudeness in his correspondence 
with Munich indicates that he still had much to learn about the FUhrerprinziE 
and its implications. While resisting Munich's attempts to control him, von 
Pfeffer took his own FUhrer position ve~ seriously. This emerges in the 
correspondence between von Pfeffer and the Parteileitung concernine BBger's 
accusation that von Pfeffer had used party fUnds for his own private purposes. 39) 
Von Pfeffer felt especially affronted by the fact that Munich corresponded 
directly with Beger about the accusations without informing him. This state 
of affairs 'disgusted' and upset von Pfeffer, who thought that the Partei-
leitu~ 'should have let him have the B~ger letter at once', and should not 
have communicated with one of his 'subordinates' behind his back. Von Pfeffer 
Virtually ordered Hess to write to B~ger 'in the name of the Parteileitun~, 
and not in the name of Hitler', and dicta ted a. letter to Hess to be written 
by him to B~ger calling on the latter to retract. 40) Hess duly complied with 
a.ll von Pfeffer' s perempto~ demands. 41) Von Pfeffer was able to clear his 
name in a oourt action in Janua~ 1926, in which Beger retracted his accusa-
tions. 42) The affair shows that von Pfeffer, while questioning the aotions 
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37) PL to von Pfeffer, Munich, 3 April 1925: HA 8/165. 
38) Correspondence concerning membership etc. in HA a/165. 
39) Beger to Hess, MUnster, 14 August 1925: HA ~86. 
40) Von Pfeffer to Hess, Hitler, G. Strasser, H1mmler, MUnster, 22 August 1925: 
HA ~a6. 
41) Hess to J. Beger. Munioh, n.d.: HA ~86. The text of the letter was vir-
tually one dictated ~ von Pfeffer in his letter of 22 August 1925. 
42) Von Pfeffer to PL, MUnster, 20 Janua~ 1926: HA ~86; von Pfeffer to Munich 
Elberfeld, 28 May 1926: BAK Sammlung Schumacher 203. ' 
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of the Parteileitung and its interference in ~au matters, was not averse to 
using the authority of the Parteileitung to pressurise his opponents when it 
suited him. 
In most matters von pfeffer felt £"ree to determine the affairs and direc-
tion taken by 1he Westphalian ~ with scant regard to the repercussions his 
independent actions might have on Munich. He became not only a permanent 
supporter of the A~, but also involved himself in another organisational deve-
lopment, ~ Ruhr, which emerged independent of the Munich party centre. ~ 
Ruhr was constructed in March 1926 at a time when the AG was already in the 
process of dissolution. The originators of the idea of creating a 'super-~' 
covering the whole of the Rhenish-Westphalian area (similar in area to the 
present ~ Northrhlne-Westphalia), were the cilief figures behind the AG, 
namely Strasser and ~oebbels. The latter was especiallY interested in the 
id.ea believing that such a structure, centred on Elberfeld, would become ta 
43) power factor of some significance' within the national movement. The new 
~ was to be the pla.tform on which the AG was to rest, and -the ~ office at 
Elberfeld was to double as the business oentre of the AG. Strasser liked the 
idea of a Slper-~ in the Ruhr region because he believed tha t the Ruhr would 
be subjected to a severe eoonomio crisis cbring the winter period, which would 
~) 
result in a significant influx of members. It was thought that a larger, 
and thus more adequately financed organisation, would be in a better position 
to control the expected grOifth. The discussions between Strasser and Goebbels 
on the subj ect were widened in Januaxy 1926 when Kaufmann and von Pfeffer were 
.... on over to the idea. The Parteileitung was only informed about the planned 
creation at the eleventh hour by Strasser. 45) Hitler was not calsulted about 
the re-organisation, bJ t was probably aware of the plan through Feder, who 
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43) Goebbels, Diary, entry for 16 December 1925. 
44) Strasser to Goebbe18, 3 October 1925: BAK NS I/341 Band 1. 
45) Strasser to Bouhler, 5 March 1926: BAK Sammlung Schumaoher 203. 
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had been invited to speak at the meeting (provisiomlly fixed to tq.ke place in 
Hagen on 28 February 1926) at which the tvo ~ were to be ceremonially 
joined. 46) In 'the event the meeting was held in Essen on 7 March. 
The new ~ Ruhr was led jointly by Goebbels, Kaufmann and von Pfeffer, 
the collegiate leaderShip system of Gau Rhineland-North being retained. 47) 
In order to streamline administration, cut ou t 0 CJlfusion and possible dupli-
cation of effort, the new tripartite leadership was broken down and areas of 
competence were defined. 49) Von Pt:effer was made responsible for organisation, 
finance and the SA. Much of the routine administrative work tell on him. It 
was he who restructured the vertical GaU administration by extending the triple 
division principle used in ~ Westphalia (~ - district - branch) to ~ 
Ruhr. The introduction of the district division was pushed through by him in 
spite of Goebbels' reservations about its desirabilit,y ani usefulness. 49) 
Kaufmann became responsible for' the internal questions of the movement', such 
as branch leader disputes and questions relating to personnel in general. 
Goebbels took over propaganda, the organisation of meetings, distribution of 
speakers, matters relating to 11e press, pamphlets and literature in general. 
The division of responsibility freed Goebbels and Kaufmann, the most active 
and able speakers of 'the region, !'rem -the daily routine of which Goebbels espe-
cial13 had become sick and tired. 50) 
The relationship of the more powerful Gauleitung with Munich was distinctly 
cool at first. Munich did not hasten to confirm the position of the three 
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46) Goebbels to Frick, Feder, Dietrich, Elberfeld, 14 January 1926: BAlI: NS II 
341. 
47) One immediate improvement rue to the increased financial I!IUpport enjoyed by 
the GL of Gau Ruhr was the hiring of new office facilities in Elberfeld, 
which were remarkably good in comparison with facilities at the disposal of 
other Gauleiter; on this see Hnttenberger, Ope cit., p.25; an interesting 
deSCription of Gauleiter Klant's facilities is given by Krebs, OPe cit., 
p.40. The five-roomed party centre of Elberfeld was noteworthy enough to 
warrant 'bro entries in Goebbels' diary: entries for 31 Maroh and 1 April 1926 
48) For the following see GL Rhineland-North to PL, Elberfeld, 29 March 1926: • 
BAK Sammlung Schumacher 203. Also (copy) pOlice report, Elberfeld, 29 May 
1926: SAM VII - 64 Band 1. 
49) Goebbels had criticised the 'district' unit previously - see Goebbels to von 
Pfeffer, Elberfeld. 21 January 1926: BAK NS 1/389 Banli I. 
SO) "I am sick of organising. I shall be glad when Captain von Pfeffer takes 
over all that junk". Goebbels,~, Ope ci.t., entry for 20 January 1926. 
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Gauleiter, who had to wait until the beginning of April before Hitler offi-
ciall,y recognised the triumvirate. 51) This is not altogether surprising. 
For one reason or another the Gauleiter involved in the Ruhr organisation had 
been getting on 'the nerves of Hitler and party headquarters in the epring of 
1926. When the three went to Munich at the beginning of April (Goebbels was 
invited by Hitler to speak a t a Munich party rall,y), Hitler showed his feelinge. 
Both Kaufmann and Goebbels were reproached by Hitler for their behaviour in 
the Ruhr and their role in the AG, ?bile Kaufmann 'got a dressing-down because 
of a rude letter to Bouhler'. 52) Another reason for the lack of harmony was 
the slowness with which the Gaulei tung fulfilled its obligations to the party' 
headquarters, primaril,y in 'the financial sphere. 53) Then there was the dis-
pute between Gauleitune; Ruhr and Feder, which developed more fully in May 1926, 
in which Hitler and the party headquarters, and finally the Party Court (Usohla) 
became involved. 54-) This bad-tempered dispute had wide implications. Its 
origin lay in Goebbels' invitation to Feder to speak at the Essen party rally 
of 7 March. In his letter, Goebbels offered Feder a mere half-hour for his 
speech, scheduled for 111e end of the meeting. Feder took offence with the 
tone of 'the letter and some of the remarks it contained. Appointed by Hitler 
after the Bamberg meeting ix:l be the chief speaker on questions rela.ting to the 
par~ programme, Feder felt the need for at least an hour and a half ix:l disouss 
the programmatical basis of National Socialism. He considered the need to 
clarity the party programme an especially urgent one in the ~ in view of the 
'notorious ••• strasser draft'. 55) Although he received no reply 1P his letter , 
Feder went to Essen on the instructions of Hitler, and was granted an hour for 
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51) 
52) 
53) 
54) 
55) 
Copies of letters of authorisation, dated Munich, 9 April 1926 in HA 54/ 
l290. 
Goebbela, E!!!z, Ope cit., entry for 13 April 1926. 
See the letters of complaint - PL to GL Ruhr, Munich, 4 May 1926; PL to 
GL Ruhr, Munich, 4- June 1926: BAK Samntlung Schumacher 203. 
Goebbels, ~, Ope cit., entry for 31 May 1926. 
Feder to Goebbels, Berlin, 26 Febru~ 1926; reprinted in Kahnl, Ope cit., 
pp.367-368. 
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his speech by von Pfeffer. 56) After the speech, Goebbe1s apologised for his 
letter of invitation ana the limited speaking time he had offered to Feder. 
The whole affair might well have been forgotten then, bad it not been for an 
indiscretion by Feder Which reached the ear of von Pfeffer and his colleagues. 
In a discussion with Bauschen, a local pa~ figure, Feder had referred to the 
need for vigilance in the ~ to prevent the re-appearance of a new 'treacherous 
concern', undoubtedly an oblique reference to the AG in Which von Pfeffer, 
Goebbels and Kaufmann were all involved. Von Pfeffer, 'with his traditional 
concept of honour, took this as a personal insult t> himself and his co-Gauleiter, 
and wrote two letters to the Partei1eitung, whose 'impertinent and hateful 
tone ••• surprised and hurt' Feder, who took the matter further. In the Uschla 
case which followed, von Pfeffer refused to recognise the need for the party 
courts' intervention: 'As far as we are concerned, the Uschla is not relevant 
There is no "dispute within the party". There 1s nothing that 1s in dispute.' 
In von Pfeffer's eyes, 'a personal dispute between party members (concerning 
par~ affairs) is not involved. The Gauleiter as individuals have taken no 
notice of Feder's monstrous accusations, have not felt personally insulted, 
nor are we disturbed by them. Only the "party organisation Ruhr" ••• has been 
affected and disturbed. Only "the Gaulei tunK Ruhr" is affeoted (and on a 
secondary level the whole of the Gau, whioh is represented by the Gauleitung, 
... 
as wella!! the Parteileitung, which is represented in the ~ by the GauleitunS). 
Anything smaoking of matters related to honour, personal insult etc. has to 
be excluded.' Von pfeffer went on to say that Feder had no 'position' in rela_ 
tion to the ~ as far as he was concerned. He was only a guest and speaker 
at the conference, and there was thus no question of the dispute being an 
'internal party dispute'. Feder, he impUed, had only himself to blame if he 
felt insulted by the tone of his letters to Munich, for 'he interfered in our 
organisation, that is, in matters which do not ccncern him. Not only that, 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
56) For the following see Feder to Hitler, PL, Murnau, 2 May 1926; reprinted 
in TYrell, Ope cit., pp.l2~l28. 
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but he interfered in a manner about which there can be no discussion.' Von 
Pfeffer took Feder's remarks as an insult to hi s author! ty as Gaulei tar, a 
position which he considered as dominant in regional affairs, for he stated 
that 'it is the du~ of every Gauleitung to prevent interference from unautho-
rised sources, especially if it takes on a damaging form. To reject such inter-
ference, and make sure that it does not happen again, is an organisational 
duty placed on us by our appointment asqauleiter. Concerning our position 
and authority there CM never be any doubt ••• 
If par~ member Feder ••• is angry, he should not poke his nose into 
matters which are controlled by those in authority, persons who are in a posi-
tion to react to his interference. The extent of the reaction is up to those 
on "duty"; this we cannot discuss either with the delinquent conCerned nor 
wi th the Uschla.' 
Von Pfeffer stated that 'if someone wants to criticise another Gauleitung, 
such as party comrade Feder, he should approach us, or the next hiGhest autho_ 
rity, the Parteileitung or Adolf Hitler. ~thing else is wrong.' 57) As von 
Pfeffer sent the party court packing, it was left to Hi tIer to intervene and 
settle the dispute. 58) 
The problems with the Parteileitung were not the only ones faCing the~. 
The tripartite leadership also proved increasingly unworkable. In praotice 
von Pfeffer controlled much of the business of running the ~ beoause ot 
Goebbels' frequent absences on 'speaking tours', and Kaufmann's c onstan t ill-
nesses. 59) Kaufmann did not alw~ys take kindly to von Pfeffer's idel\s and 
methods. Since both based their relationship on military ooncepts, thnt is on 
the "comm.."Illd and obey" formUla, compromises were rather difficult to achieve 
when conflicts arose. 60) On top of everything else, the collapse of the AG 
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57) Von Pfeffer to Uschla, Elberfeld, 21 May 1926: BAK Sammlung Schumacher 203 
58) Goebbels, ~, Ope cit., entry 16 June 1926. • 
59) Ibid., entries March to May 1926. 
60) Hnttenberger, Ope cit., pp.3~35. Goebbels also clashed with von Pfeffer 
within one month of the creation of GaU Ruhr; Goebbels, DiaEl, Ope cit., 
ent~ for 4- May 1926. 
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and ~oebbels' increasingly pro-Hitler attitude created friction with Kaufmann, 
and to a lesser degree wi th von Pfeffer. Within two months "the idealis:u which 
had produced ~ Ruhr had vanished. By the end of May ~oebbels oonsidered 
that there was a need for one Gauleiter to resolve the squabblings and dis-
putes. 61) There were also pressures from below to resolve the leadership 
question. The district leaders especially' could not hide their dissR.tisfaotion 
with the tripartite leadership and desired a return to the days when there had 
been only one Gauleiter. 62) In June 1926 the problem was finally settled. 
It was Kaufmann, much to ~oebbels' disappointment, who emerged as the new head 
of the~. The choice of Kaufmann was determined to a significant degree by 
a district leaders' conference held on 6 June 1926, at which the name of ~oebbels 
did not figure at all. 63) Kaufmann was finally appOinted by Hitler on 20 June 
follOwing consultations with strasser, Lutze, Schmitz, van Pfeffer and Goeb-
bela. 64) 
Kaufmann' a appointment ended the unusual tripartite rule in fue ~, and 
from June 1926 ~ Ruhr oonformed with -the general party pattern. The posei-
bili~ of a revived troika was removed with Hitler's appoin~nent of von Pfeffer 
to head the SA in July and the choice of Goebbels to lead ~ Berlin by the 
Partelleltung in August 1926. Kaufmann's appOintment was a more positive act 
of authority on Hitler's part, the first time that a Gauleiter in the Rhenish_ 
Westphalian area owed his position to more fuan just the "Hausmaoht" aoquired 
through his own efforts. Kaufmann's dependence on Hitler's authorit,y and good 
will was quickly driven home to him. Wi thin the first month of hi 8 appointment 
his position was challenged by the Bochum SA (the so-oalled Reeilftent Ruhr), 
which did not accept him as Gauleiter. 65) Kaufmann wa.s unable to overcome 
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61) 
62j 63 
64-
65) 
"Many discussions with K. About the Gau leader. It can't go on like 
this. One man must be King". Goebbels,..E!!!:t, Ope cit., 30 Ma.y 1926. 
HUttenberger, Ope oit., p.38. 
~oebbels, DiaEY, Ope cit., entries for 5 June and 7 June 1926. 
Ibid., entries for 19 June and 21 June 1926. 
Gall SA Ffihrung to PL NSDAP (no date): BAK. NS 1/342. 
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this opposition by himself, and Hitler was forced to go to ~ochum to resolve 
the dispute and to confirm Kaufmann once more in his position. 66) The dispute 
so exhausted Kaufmann that he had to take a vacation. Life was not easy on 
his return. An immediate problem was the debts with which ~ Ruhr had been 
saddled by von Pfeffer, including some 16,000 ~ still owed by the old ~ 
Westphalia. 67) As Kaufmann had been under the impression that ~ Westphali3. 
was free of debts at tile time of the creation of Gau Ruhr, he refused to meet 
the demands and directed ~ Westphalia's creditors to von Pfeffer. This 
occasioned a conflict with von Pfeffer (who asserted that he had mentioned the 
debts of ~ Westphalia at the time of the fusion), which was to last for over 
a year. After a series of accusations and counter-accusations, the whole affair 
ended up before the pa~ Uschla. The atmosphere was ultimatelY cleared by 
Hitler. On a visit 10 the Ruhr in October 1927 he managed to persua.de Kaufmann 
to drop his case against von Pfeffer, which was finally wound up by Walter Buch, 
chairman of the Uschla. 
In the course of 1926 and 1927 the position of ~Ruleiter and the fUnttion 
of the ~ administration became clearer as the control of the Parteileituns 
was asserted throughout the party structure. 68) IncreasinglY important were 
the bureaucratic checks imposed on the Gau administrations by the ~ouhler-Schwarz 
machine in Munich. The administrative measures introduced by the latter forced 
the ~auleituns to adopt businesslike accounting and organisational procedures. 69) 
At the same time, the position of the Gaulei tar, his function and responsibili_ 
ties, were more closelY defined. 70) The party directives gave the Gauleiter 
considerable power over the affairs of 'the party and its personnel on the ~ 
and sub-~ levels, but in turn subjected him to the ultimate control of the 
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66) 
67) 
68) 
69) 
70) 
Report by Kaufmann to PL, Elberfeld, July 1926: BAK NS I/342. 
On this see the correspondence between ~ouh1er and Kaufmann, 1 June 1927; 
and von Pfeffer to Hitler, 5 October 1927: HA 4/86. Further H!1ttenberger, 
Ope cit., pp.47-48; and ~re1l, OPe cit., pp.18l-l85. 
Orlow, 0p. cit., pp.80 ff.j Horn, Ope cit., pp.278 ff •• 
Kaufmann's oral testimony, Nuremberg 1946, cited by Orlow, oPe cit., p.82. 
For 'the follOWing see "Richtlinien f'llr Gaue und Ortsgruppen dar NSDAP" , 
MUnich, 1 July 1926, in Tyrell, OPe cit., pp.230-232. These were slightly 
amended in November 1926 - V~lkischer Beobachter, 24 November 1926. 
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Parteileitung. Thus the Gauleiter was always to be appointed by the Partei-
leituIltj. It was left to "the Gauleiter, however, to determine his deputy, who 
only needed to be conf"irmed by the party headquarters. Each Gauleiter was also 
allowed to appoint a secreta~ and a treasurer (and their respectiTe deputies). 
The Gauleiter's function was defined as being 'in the first place care for the 
regular administratiTe matters, the uniform implementation of the goals of the 
Movement, as well as expansion through the formation of new branches'. Beyond 
this, he was also to be Ter:! actiTe as a party speaker, iD regulate the cor-
respondence between the branches and party headqua.rters, to check on the pay-
ments of dues, and note those who joined and those who left ihe party, trans-
mitting the information (a.t prescribed dates) to the Parteileitune. The 
GaUleiter's function of controlling finance was also heavi~ emphasized. 
In practice, of course, the powers of the q.a.uleiter within his Gau depen-
ded less on his theoretical position tmn on his abili'fQr and personality. As 
regional leader, the ex:ecutiTe and administrative arm ot: the Gau, he had to 
dominate his "court" and crush unrest in order to prevent a collapse of the 
~ as an efficient and effective instrument. Forl:unateJJr for the bulk of the 
Gauleiter, there was an easy-going party leader, who could and did forgive 
the weaker elements in the ~ leadership corps, provided that their total 
devotion to 'the F!ihrer was plain for all to see. Hitler'. loyalty to his 
regional subordinates is well exemplified in the case of Kaufmann. In many 
ways .Kaufmann failed to dominate ambitious and ruthless individuals within 
his~, with disastrous effects for the power of 'the party in the Ruhr region. 
In the spring of 1928 Kaufmann, having just emerged fran the dispute with von 
Pfeffer, lurched towards a new crisis which cast serious doubt on hi. capaci~ 
for leadership. Its origins lay in a personal conflict between two of the 
mo~e important district leaders, Terboven and Koch. 71) In December 1927 Koch 
accused TerbOTen of the misuse of party funds, an aocusation which created much 
unrest in the Gau and threatened the unity of the movement. Kaufmann intervened 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
71) For the following see HUttenberger, OPe cit., p.48. 
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and forced Terboven to resign from his post. At this point Hitler involved 
himself on Terboven' 5 behalf, re-insta ted him in hi s old po 51 tion, a.nd urged 
him to reach agreement with Kaufmann. Koch, encouraged Qr the turn of events, 
continued his intrigues in the first half of' 1928 to the point at which the 
Bochum district leader, Josef'S'agner, called for his exclusion fran the party, 
a request which was rejected by Walter Buch. The decision in his favour was 
used by Koch to initiate a plan of action in August 1928, designed to remove 
Kaufmann and elevate himself 10 the position of G-auleiter. Kaufmann was 
accused of having perpetrated a series of financial misdemeanours in his capa-
ci ty as GaUleiter. 72) In his accusation Koch catalogued Kaufmann's trans-
gressions, which involved 'several acts of embezzlement, falsification of 
accounts and receipts', and, for good measure, the wearing of medals to which 
Kaufmann was not entitled. All these claims were substantiated with ample 
evidenoe accumulated from 1926 onwards! Por Kaufmann, the affair proved very 
damaging, especial~ the charges of embezzlement, whioh were proved to be 
accurate at an investigation by the Party treasurer. 
The Koch-Kaufmann affair had a detrimental effeot on the running of the 
Gauleitung and on the Nazi party's efforts in theRuhr in general. One result 
of lh.e rumours flying around in the summer was that the Parteile! tune; was 
forced to prevent any 'larger meetings in the ~ until the clarification of 
certain questions'. 73) The ~ administration folded up as Kaufmann devoted 
all his attention to refuting Koch's accusations. The result of' this state 
of affairs was • the complete failure of the ~ leadership, an absolute calm 
and lack of movement, no appearance of tile party in public, and complete 
stagnation ••••• 74) In this situation action by Hitler to solve tile problem 
became imperative. His intervention in Au~st 1928 led to a complete re-
organisation of the Duhr~, the removal of Koch to head the party in East 
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72) Koch to USchla, Major Buch, Elberfeld, 25 August 1928: BAK NS 1/340. 
73) Reichsleitung to GL, Kaufmann, Munioh, 27 Jul,y 1928: BAK Samm1ung Schu-
macher 203. 
74) Police report, Elberfeld, August 1928: BAK NS 1/340. 
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Prussia" and the transfer of Kaufmann to Hamburg. 75) The ambitious Terboven 
was allowed to take his district, Essen, out of ~ Ruhr, and it was ultimately 
to form the new ~ Essen. Part of ~ Ruhr went to form ~ Dllsseldorf under 
Karl Florian. What remained of Gau Ruhr was placed under the control of Josef 
Wagner in October 1928. 
The District and BranCh Organisations. 
The nature of the party structure of both ~ Westphalia and ~ Ruhr 
waa atrong~ influenced by von Pfeffer's organisational concepts which he first 
employed during 1924 in the NSFB. Von Pfeffer believed strmgly in a defined 
command structure" which involved the creation of the district unit to aot as 
the 0 cmneoting link between the ~ and local branches in the vertical admini-
stra tion. By the ti.me of the creation of ~ Ruhr, the district organisation 
was already an integral and accepted part of the party organisation of ~ 
Westphalia. The new Ruhr ~ was arranged in the same way_ Goebbels, who 
had made it olear to von Pfeffer that he did not like the "District System", 
did not prevent its introduction. 76) ~ WestphaJia and. then ~ Ruhr were 
thus the first Gaue to be organised on the generally aocepted vertical struc-
ture in force later throughout the NSDAP. 
The introduction of the district units had practical advantages for both 
the ~ and. the branch organisations. In the re-establishment of 'Iile NSDAP 
in 1925 the existence of the district leaders in Westphalia, on whom deVOlved 
much administrative responsibili W" spared the Gaulei tung sane of tM admini-
strative work which faced it as a result of Bouhler's determination to re-
organise the movement and re-enrol its members. 77) For the Gauleiter the 
district leaders were also a means of finding out tM situation of the party 
in the areas under their control. District leaders were a unif'ying factor 
----~-------------------------------------------------------------------
75) Httttenberger" Ope cit., pp.48-49. 
76) Goebbels to von Pfeffer, Elberfeld, 21 Januar,y 1926: BA.~ NS I/339 Band I. 
77) The district leader of Hamm, Dr Hurlbrinck, took the task of organhing 
central ~estphalia off the hands of von Pfeffer in March/April 1925; Beck, 
Ope cit., p.566. 
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in the ~ and became more important as the party expanded in 1926. The 
large number of new and established branches, and the geographic extent of 
~ Ruhr, made it impossible for the q.auleitung to give adequate attention to 
all branches under its control. 78) 
The creation of the district unit and. the construction of a unified ver-
tical organisation in ~ Westphalia and Ruhr threw up the Illme sort of prob-
lems as those which faced 'the Reicheparteilei tung in rela.tion to the Gaulei t-
ungen: their relationship to each other, the rights and duties of the respec-
tive parties, the question of how business was to be conducted, and so on. 
In the event, the relationship between the~, district and. branch organisa-
tions evolved gradual~ in the light of experience. It was influenced by 
the attitude taken by the Gauleiter and. party directives defining 'the relative 
powers of the Gauleiter end the branch leader. Important in thi s process of 
"evolution" was the ability of tile Gauleiter to enforce his w:ill on his sub-
ordinates, many of ~hom either had, or were in the process of developing, their 
own entrenched Hau~~cht to support and strengthen their position. Von Pfeffer 
had a straightforward approach to '!he problem of manpower maIllgement which he 
had probably acquired in his Free Corps dnys. The basiC features of his "system" 
are given in a reply to a request by Schlange (Gauleiter of Berlin) for infor-
Ina tion as to how Gau Ruhr was managed. Schle.nge evidently thought tha.t he 
might learn from the pattern of administration in force in the Ruhr. Von 
Pfeffer stated that the basis of his organisational structure rested on two 
important points: 
'First, it is necessary at all costs to establish subordinate leaders. 
Not so-called postmen'fit on~ to pass on messages, nor itinerant controllers, 
but people who can work independently, who are aotive, prod\lotive, who have 
their own will and ideas. In order to develop such a type I consider it 
------------------------------------------------------~-------------------
78) Gau Ruhr was oomuosed of lJ.4. branches by May 1926; list given in "Mit-
gliederstand", 31 May 1926: BAK NS ~342. 
253 
necessa~ to delegate responsibilit,y and extensive rights, the relinquishing 
of the latter being very hard. for t.he beginner. The subordinate leader's 
position must be strong in relation to his followers; support them even if 
at times th~ are not tota~ in the right; never expose them. 
Glo:ry, praise a.nd recognition gained by 'the G-auleitunp; should be passed 
on to the subordinate leaders (in front of their "people"). If one has to 
select between easy-going, brave subordinate leaders, who are stupid and depen-
dent, and ambitious, troublesome and pig-headed ones, who are capable (even if 
they are only motivated qy the thought of creating a personal position of 
power) - then always choose the latter 'lcYPe wi thou t hesi ta tion. 
But this presupposes that the leader is superior to the subordinate lea-
ders, head and shoulders above tilem, or at least c(J'lsiders himself to be so 
and acts accordingly. See also ultima ratio: Dictatorship (Point 2). 
Further it must be said that these basic principles do not suit anyone 
Who has not had years of practice in constructing a movement according to his 
own tastes, and without further help. 
Finally, these basic principles ha~ realistio opponents, such as both 
of ~ dear colleagues, for example, who apply them only in a very limited 
fashion. 
Second. Crass Dictatorship •••• Impose the diotatorship on ihe subordi-
nate lea ders ... (Gau) leaders should only intervene rarely; thEt'{ should be 
seen more as tile "last court of appeal"; at the .same time ihey should be a. 
sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of tile subordinate leaders.' 79) 
District leaders, both in theory and practice, enjoyed oonsiderable 
latitude under von pfeffer's regime in westphalia. The relationship bet-Neen 
G-l'IUleiter and district leader waS outwardly ca];n. Von Pfeffer did not fear 
his subordinates; he was <pita prepared to use the district leaders to support 
his own pod tion, thus enhancing their status. In the Beger affair it was an 
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79) Von Pf"effer to Schlange, Elberfeld, 14 May 1926: BAK NS I/342. 
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investigation by the then six Westphalian dis trict leaders which confirmed 
von Pfeffer's version. It was on the authority of the district leaders that 
'Gauleiter von Pfeffer's innocence was proven'. 80) Von Pfeffer established 
a good relationship with his district leaders primarily beoause eve~one knew 
precisely where they stood. 
Under the tripartite rule to which Gau Ruhr was subjected in 1926 the 
relationship between qnuleiter and district leader threatened to break down. 
Goebbels caused the discontent. He did not think much of the district system, 
and always feared that the district leaders were 'getting too big for their 
boots'. 81) He habitually ignored the district leaders and sent info~tion 
and directives straight to the branches and this became the subject of com-
plaints to von Pfeffer by several district leaders soon after the creation 
of ~ Ruhr. 82) Goebbels' action produced se'f'eral problems a.Id dangers. 
In the first plaoe, his habit of ignoring the district leaders undermined 
their position in rela tion tJ ihe branohes wi thin their area.s of control. 
The lack of a uniform approach by the collectbe Gauleitung also opened the 
way for 1he di8triot leaders (and even ihe branch leaders) to play one ~­
leiter off against another. In one respect Goebbels' fear that the district 
leaders presented a formidable threat to the Gauleitung was justified. There 
was a danger ttlat 1hey might withdraw their allegiance fran the Gauleitunp; 
and become instruments of the Parteileitunso 
The case of Dr Hurlbrinck demonstrated the (}I.nger to -the G-aulei tun~ of 
rebellious district leaders. Hurlbrinck took offence at the interference by 
the Gaulei tunf5 in the SA. affairs of his area, which occurred in spi te of the 
promise apparently given by all three Gauleiter at the time of the oreation of 
~ Ruhr that they would refrain from involving themselves in SA. matters in 
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80) "Verhandlung. NSDAP Gau Westfalen", MUnster, I. zt. Hal1lll/Westf'., 13 Sept. 
1925; the document gives a breakdown of the financial 'histo:ry' of the Gau, 
and was signed by wagner, Herdejost, Hurlbrinck, Teipel, Homann and Barthel: 
HA 4/86. 
81) Goebbels, ~ OPe cit., entry for 12 June 1926. 
82) "Notiz", 8 April 1926: BAK NS ~338 Band I. 
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the districts wi tho.J.t first informing district lead.ers. Thus when the ~_ 
leituns invited the SA Lead.er of the Hellweg d.istrict to a conference in Hamm 
without informing Hurlbrinck, the latter took this as a breach of promise and. 
complained. to von Pfeffer, stating that no SA Lead.er would. follow the commands 
of the G-auleituIlG without the district lead.ers' agreement. Hurlbrinck threa-
tened to involve the ParteileituM by asking for an independent Munich rep-
resentative to 'clear up the affairs of the Gau'. 83) In the resulting dis-
pute, Hurlbrinck pressed home his threat to defend his independ.enoe by organis-
ing his own private d.istrict, ine "Heart of the RUhr", which he planned. to 
sub or dina. te directly' to the Munich -party centre. 84.) The secret meeting orga-
nised by Hurlbrinck to realise this idea saw a general attaok not only on all 
GaUleiter, but also on the Munich party head.q,uarters, especialJ.y the 'incapable 
boss-rule of :Souhler and. schwar% t. Thi s was a sign that at grassroots level 
the bureaucratisation of the party was much resented.. The G-nuleitunG reacted 
to these developments by holding a general membership meeting in Elberfeld, 
to which all the other district leaders were invited, atd at which Hurlbrinck 
was excluded from the party. Although van Pfeffer and Kaufmann described the 
whole affair as 'inSignificant biokering in a gold.-fish bowl suoh a! happens 
daily' throughout the Rei~h', it was damaging to the !fau. It called. in question 
not onlJ' "the authority of the c.aulei tung, with aU that that implied., but also 
seriously undermined. the effectiveness of the party in Hurlbrinck's district. 
Many of the part.y members supported. Hurlbrinck in his struggle against the 
G-aulei ter, and. the new district leader nominated by the Gaulei tung to replace 
him was unable to restore the vigour of the movement in the Hellweg district. 85) 
The G-aulei ter saw the threat 'Ix> ineir authori t.r and.' d.rew their own Con-
clusions from the case. At tile general membership meeting in May the Gauleiter 
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83) Hurlbrinck to GL, Hamm, 12 April 1926: BAK NS I/.}38 Band. I. 
84.) The 'background and history of the d.ispute is given in the "tichtlinien 
fUr clie General-Mitglied.er-Versanmlung", 22 May 1926, Elberfeld, 21 May 
1926:BAK NS 1/34.2. 
85) Police report, Hamm, 6 June 1926: SAM I PA/28l. 
demanded a change in the ~ party regulations and asked the membership to 
grant the Gauleitung the right to exclude any member. Tb make this proposi-
tion more attractive, every unit in the party (i.e. district, branch) was to 
have the same right. 86) Another slight procedural change was also suggested, 
namely that the exclusion of members from the regional movement was to be 
effective immediately before their cases were tried. This would have given 
the Gauleiter the~portunity to exclude refractory members before they could 
put their case to Munich. It is not clear whether these proposals were accep-
ted at the meeting. Probably they were not, if one takes as evidence the 
difficulty the Gauleitung was to experience in later years in dealing with 
district leaders, for their removal could not be lightly undertaken or easily 
secured. Nor could the Gauleitung be sure that such exclusions were permanent, 
as is shown by Kaufmann's efforts to get rid of Terboven in 1928. 
Most of the district leaders of Gau Westphalia - ~ Ruhr were to hold 
their posts uninterruptedly until the seizure of power by the party in 1933. 
Teipel, Homann, Herdejost, Wagner, Vetter were all deeply entrenched in their 
regions and wielded considerable power through the Hausmacht they acquired. 
The power of the district leaders varied considerably, of course, depending 
on the success and relative strength of the districts. The "star" district 
of the Westphalian region was that of Bochum under Wagner. It contained three-
quarters of the Westphalian membership in 1926, with just over 1,000 members 
at the time of the creation of Gau Ruhr. 87) In terms of branches Wagner's 
district was also in a class of its own. With 24 branches it had twice the 
number of the two next best Westphalian districts combined. Several districts, 
even by the spring of 1927, had very few branches. In the predominantly 
Catholic districts of Sauerland (4) and MUnsterland (7), as well as 1n the 
strongly Protestant region of Siegerland (5), the party had hardly made any 
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86) "Richtlinien fUr die General-Mitglleder-Versammlung", E1 berfeld, 21 May 
1926, BAK NS I/~2. 
87) The Bochum district membership stood at 1,008 at that time - see report 
by Wagner to GL, March 1926, BAK NS r/)42. 
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impact. 88) 
The position of the district leaders was not an enviable one. Unlike the 
Gauleiter and branch leaders, who held officially recognised administrative 
posts and whose authority and status were defined (albeit loosely) by party 
directives, the district leaders were not officially recognised party func-
tionaries. Their existence was at the discretion of the Gauleiter and it was 
not necessarily permanent even where district leaders had formed part of the 
Gau administration for some years. At the command of the Gauleiter they could 
in theory, and practice, quite suddenly disappear en bloc. 89) To add to the 
uncertainty of their tenure, district leaders were faced with a constant demand 
to sacrifice all for the movement. Though the income derived from their share 
of the branch membership dues was sufficient to meet the basic costs incurred 
by the district administrative machinery, the district leaders were apparently 
unpaid, or at most very poorly paid. This fact did not prevent the Gauleitung 
from demanding the utmost from them, and even from threatening their removal 
if they did not demonstrate sufficient drive and activity. The threat loomed 
even over the successful Josef Wagner, who became aware in the spring of 1926 
that 'he would have to concentrate more on his party post or give up his 
occupation'. Since he had a family to support, the situation which faced him 
was a most difficult one because he 'did not wish to leave the party or give 
up his work for the movement'. 90) 
The powers of the district leader were not even loosely defined. The 
degree of authority vested in him was thus very.much dependent on the attitude 
of the Gauleitung. 91) Under von Pfeffer's "rule" the power enjoyed by the 
district leaders was extensive, as von Pfeffer did not believe in appointing 
nonentities. He selected capable people with minds of their own and ability 
to exercise independent control. The fact that the Westphalian district 
leaders occupied their positions into the ~thirties (in general only promotion 
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88) "Anschriften der (x;L Gau Ruhr", Spring 19271 BAK Sammlung Schumacher 20). 
89l This happened in Gau Hanover-North, Noakes, oPe cit., p.lO,. 
90 Wagner to von Pfeffer, Bochum, 28 April 19261 BAK NS 1/)42. 
91 Of interest is the breakdown of the functions of the district leader in 
Gau Thuringia - reprinted in TYrell, oPe cit., pp.237-239. 
produced changes) indicates, at the very least, their talent for survival. Von 
Pfeffer's attitude of investing maximum power in his district leaders was 
crucial in the development of their functions, which in several aspects reflec-
ted the powers of the Gauleiter. Interesting in this respect is that the 
Westphalian district leaders had sufficient authority in practice not only 
to exclude troublesome individuals from local branches, but also to remove 
incapable branch leaders. Wagner exercised authority in this direction in 
several cases. The 30-strong Haltern branch, where local leadership disputes 
led to chaos, was simply dissolved by him after the removal of the local 
branch leader. The initiative for the purge was Wagner's, who merely informed 
the Gauleitung of his acto 92) Tbwards the end of 1926 Wagner also carried out 
another purge of 'disaffected members' in the Bochum branch, who were spreading 
'lies and slanderous accusations' against local party members and against 
Wagner himself. Again, there was no reference to the Gauleitung which Suppor-
ted Wagner's act in retrospect. 93) The Arnsberg district leader Dr Teipel 
also availed himself of the power to remove branch leaders who failed to carry 
out their duties satisfactorily or showed signs of personal weakness, thus the 
branch leader of Meschede was replaced because of his 'frequent drunkenness'. 94) 
TaipeI, who exercised a strict control over his district, was always ready to 
step in to shake up local leaders at the first sign of slackness. He was not 
prepared to tolerate indifferent leadership on the local level, and was quick 
to remove branch leaders if they proved ineffective. Unlike Wagner, who acted 
rather arbitrarily in his district, TaipeI was less dictatorial in his methods 
in that he always called special membership meetings to support his pre-
determined decisions. 95) 
Able district leaders were crucial in the development of the party. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
92) Wagner to GL Ruhr, Bo chum , 25 May 1926. BAK NS I/Y4-2. 
93) "Bekanntmachung", Gau Ruhr (no date), expulsion dated 16 November 1926. 
BAK Sammlung Schumacher 203. 
94) Teipel to GL Ruhr, Arns berg , 20 March 1926. BAK NS 1/338 Band I. 
95) Teipel to GL Ruhr, 20 March and 9 April 1926. BAK NS 1/338 Band I. 
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They exercised guidance, gave encouragement to branch leaders, and assisted 
local branches in furthering the cause. Usually they were the most active 
speakers and chief campaigners in their area. Through them, the party member-
ship was cemented more securely into the ~ framework. They settled local 
disputes as far as possible before a public outbreak of discontent could 
damage the image of the party. Since they were always on the look-out for 
possible trouble, their presence on the local level undoubtedly quashed much 
unrest which would only have penetrated-to the Gauleitung level when it was 
too late to take preventive action. The value of district leaders was self-
evident. In several Westphalian districts no progress was made until an 
efficient district leader had been found. 
A dedicated district leader could do much to further the activity of the 
party through appeals to the more popular speakers to visit their area. Teipel, 
for example. who led the small branches of the Sauerland region, managed to 
persuade a number of regional and national party figures to come and speak in 
what was a relative backwaters Feder, Goebbels, Kaufmann, Gregor Strasser, 
96 ) 
among others, all spoke in the area in the spring of 1926. Homann, the 
Bielefeld district leader, provided constant drive in an area in which the 
NSDAP found it difficult to make anything but very slow progress at first. 
He failed to be dete;red by a number of disastrous meetings and continued to 
organise events at which nationally 'important' figures spoke. He himself was 
permanently on the move in his area, establishing branches and carrying the 
"message" to rural districts. 97) Wagner, too, was exceedingly active. Though 
he was head of a district with the largest number of branches, its geographi-
cal compactness made his job easier. 
From 1926 the district sub-division of Gau Ruhr was a permanent feature 
of the regional organisation. The sheer size of the ~ enhanced the value 
of the district leaders. It would have been almost impossible for Kaufmann 
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96 ) See reports in BAK NS 1/338 lBnd I. 
97) Report by Homann to GL Ruhr, Bielefeld, 20 May 1926. BAK NS I/')42. 
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to change von Pfeffer's organisational pattern without a marked decline in 
the efficiency of the Gau as a whole. By the spring of 1927 the fact that 
there were 114 branches (some of which were admittedly little more than party 
"cells") comprising Gau Ruhr made sufficient personal contact between branch 
and Gauleitung virtually impossible. In this situation the district organisa-
tion was a valuable unit in cementing the vertical structure of the party. 
The expansion of the party in terms of membership and branches demanded a 
sub-division of the~, just as the growth of the NSDAP on the national level 
necessitated the existence of Gau administrations. 
At the grass roots level the key figure, naturally enough, was the branch 
leader. His personality, ability and dedication were as crucial to the welfare 
of the party on the local level as adequate personnel were vital to the smooth 
functioning of the higher vertical administrative units. Branch leaders in 
general "emerged" at the local level, and were men who had. usually made a 
name for themselves in local v8lkisch-National Socialist circles, men who 
could command the respect and support of the majority of the members. Nor-
mally the most dedicated and active individual secured control over branches 
in a democratic election, a procedure which was the norm in the early years 
of the party. 98 ) At local level, the branch leader exercised considerable 
power. He could nominate individuals to other branch positions in the same 
way as Gauleiter could appoint their "team". The Gauleitung had, in theory, 
no control over who became branch leader. An amendment to the party statutes 
1n November 1926 did state, however, that 'the election of a branch leader 
must be acknowledged by the Gauleitung, and the elected person confirmed in 
writing'. 99) In practice, the Westphalian branch leaders were not totally 
secure in their position, and could be removed for a variety of reasons, as 
Wagner. and. Teipel demonstrated in several tnstances. 100) 
---------------------------------------------------.--~-----------------
98 ) In the "Richtlinien fUr Gaue und Ortsgruppen der Natlonalsozlalistlschen 
Deutschen Arbeiter Partei N, Munich, 1 July. 1926, it was stated that "Der 
I. Vorsitzende wird gewHh1t durch eine ordentliche Mitgliederversammlung 
der Ortsgruppe durch Zuruf", Tyrell, OPe cit., p.2:31. 
99) V8lkischer Beobachter, 24 November 1926. 
100) See above, p. 258. 
A truly democratic choice was not offered to the membership of the great 
majority of branches in the refounded NSDAP. In most cases the existing 
leaders of the NSFB assumed control in 1925. There are indications that 
elections were held only in those branches in which a split within the ranks 
of the NSFB left a leaderless pro-Hitler group. This happened in Bielefeld, 
where the branch leadership of the NSFB, alongside the majority of the members, 
voted to join von Graefe's DVFB in February 1925. This left a small Hitler-
orientated group of around twenty to found an NSDAP branch. In the first 
instance, the group only elected a provisional committee to lead the branch, 
and decided to elect a branch leader and local party committee only after the 
members had got to know each other better and were in a position to determine 
who were the most capable members to lead the local group. In the end Fritz 
Homann was elected first branch leader, a post he held until his elevation to 
the district leadership by von Pfeffer at the end of 1925. 101) 
The Gauleiter and the district leader did not generally interfere with 
the local branch leaders unless rivalry between opposing factions, usually 
the sign of an incapable leader, made progress impossible. Intervention by 
superior party officials could prove disastrous. The best safeguard of branch 
vitality and harmony on the local level was a branch leader who "emerged" 
because of his talent and ability. This fact was driven home to the ~ 
hierarchy in several cases. The removal of Wilczeck as branch leader of 
Dortmund in 1926 because of his 'unsuitability' inaugurated two years of 
unrest and the local situation was not stabilised until the branch fell into 
the hands of Heinrich KBnig in 1927. 102) The interference of the Gauleitung 
in the affairs of the Hamm branch in 1925 - the elected branch leader Schr8der 
was removed owing to his 'inability to revitalise the local movement' - vir-
tually destroyed local activity in the town and saw the emergence of an 
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101) Hiemisch, oPe cit., pp.7-9. 
102) On Wilczeck's removal see the correspondence between GL and BL He11weg, 
27 April 1926, Bouhler to GL Ruhr, 2 September 1926. BAK Sammlung 
Schumacher 203, also Beck, OPe cit., p.302. 
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independent 'M~rkerbund' which followed National Socialist goals, but had 
no direct cont9.ct with the Gau administration. 103) The fortunes of the 
NSD,\P on~ gradual~ revived in Hamm during the course of 1926. 104) 
Local rival~ often led to a mass exit of party members who lost interest 
because of the endless squabbling. 105) Insensitive leadership could have 
the same effect. The leader of "the Recklinghausen branch, Kleine, alienated 
his members by leaving them in the lurch after a Dortmund meeting at which 
Hitler was scheduled to be the main attraction. Not only did Hitler fail to 
speak, owing to a pOlice ban, which in itself 'disappointed maqy of the mem-
bers', but they themselves were left to arrange their own traneport back to 
Recklinghausen. Kleine, who had brought the group to Dortmund by lorry, used 
this transport (paid for by "the branch membership!) to ta.~ several party 
officials to their homes. His own members were left to walk back to Reckling-
hausen. As th~ had also been stoned by Communists in Dortmund, their anger 
was understandable, as was their declaration 'never to engage in such stupidity 
again'. 106) Frequent changes in "the branch leadership, with the resultant 
lack of continuity and stability, were also damaging to the party. A few 
branches saw many changes: Wattenscheid had seven different branch leaders 
between 1925 and 1929, and Menden had five dlring the same period.. 107) Seve-
1'8.1 of these changes were dle to branch leaders seeking employment elsewhere. 
Where an 'entrenched' branch leader moved away the effeot could also be 
disastrous. The Ldnen branch lost its part,y leader in 1928 and almost collapsed 
as a consequence. Membership declined from 15 to 4 in a matter of months, and 
108) pa~ activity virtually ceased. 
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103) 
104) 
105) 
106) 
107) 
108) 
Police report, Hamm, 6 June 1925: SAM I PA/28l. 
Beck, Ope cit., p.336. 
The Recklinghausen police noted that in one branch, that of Bottrop, some 
20 members left the party due to "conflicts among 1he leadership"; pOlice 
reports, Recklinghausen, 12 August and 31 December 1926: SAM Nr. 2076. 
See also police report, Hamill, 6 June 1925: SAM I PA/281. 
Police report, Recklinghausen, 25 october 1925: SAM VII - 64 Band I. 
Beck,op. cit., pp.315-316. 
Ibid., Ope cit., p.336. 
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The stability of the branch leadership corps in 'the 50 or so branches 
composing the Westphalian NSDAP is a striking feature of the Nazi organisation 
of the province. Many of the branches were led by the ea.me person until the 
seizure of power, when most of them were elevated into lucrative local and 
regional administrative posts. The stability is related to 'the unenviable 
posi tion branch leaders had in the nineteen-twenties. Their importance, as 
heads of what were in most cases small, insignificant branches was not such 
as to Encourage take-over bids, since there was little to ~in except the prob-
lems associated with the post. Local in-fighting increased in the early 
'thirtie s when the ambitious opportunists joined the party as it became a 
POlitical force of consequence. This raised 'the status of the branch leader 
and increased his power of patralage. Another reason for the low turn-over 
in the leadership of moet branches was the small membership in the bulk of 
the branches and the limited leadership material 1ilus available. As a con-
sequence branch leaders who performed their f\1nctione with a modicum of dedi-
cation were relatively secure in their posts. Their security of tenure was 
assisted by '!he fact that from 1926 onwards new branches were founded primarily 
on the initiative of '!he district leaders, who nominated, and backed, branch 
leadere.· 109) This tied the branch leader more close~ to the district leader. 
With the construction of a vertical administrative machine in the post-
1925 period the branch leaders were rapidly integrate d into the overall admini-
strative etructure of the~. The independence of the branch leader became 
a thing of '!he past. Distriot and ~ meetings and oonferenoes tied the leader-
ehip corpe more closely together. The itinerant distriot leaders increasingly 
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109) This 'nomination system' was especially common in -the Bielefeld area, 
where Homann was directly responeible for fOl.llding the Tengern, Bttnde, 
Bad Oeynha.usen, Dfinne, Herford and Minden branches - see Homann to 
Goebbels 17 Deoember 1925, and Homa.nn to GL Ruhr, Bielefela. 20 May 1926: 
BAK NS I/342; further Hiemisch, op. cl. t., p.15. Teipel was also very 
active in '!he formation of the few branches whieh existed in his area _ 
Beck, op. cit., p.383. There are also ieolated examples of branch leaders 
nominating leadere of branches founded by them. Thu s the branch leader of 
Werne appointed the branch leader of Lttnen at the foundation of 'the 
branch - Beck, op. cit., p.347. 
asserted their authorit,y and regularised the relationship between ~ and 
branch. 110) The net result was that a greater cohesion developed in west-
phalia-~ Ruhr. with each unit of the party fulfilling its allotted function. 
The only recurring problem was the irregular payment of membership dues by 
the branches to the Gaulei. tung, which periodically exasperated ihe Gauleiter. 111) 
But even in this aspect, the number of branches defaulting was a small per-
centage of the whole as party discipline increased. 
The horizontal organisation of the branches was as rudimentary as that 
of the Gauleitung. Until 1928-29 local party offices were a rarity, even in 
the larger branches; the administrative work was carried on from tha homes of 
the branch leaders. The regular weekly or fortnightly meetings of the members 
(compulsory in m~ branches) were almost invariably held in a room provided 
by a frien~ publican, whose "idealism" may well have been influenced by the 
financial rewards he received over "the years. The acquisition of party pre-
mises, primitive as they tended to be even in the later period. usually marked 
a decisive turning-point in the annals of local party histories. 112) The 
low membership, and hence the lack of funds, prevented real bureaucratisation 
at the local level. It also kept the local party hierarcl:\Y' do.m to the minimum: 
branch leader, secreta~. treasurer, and their respective deputies, propaganda 
leader and SA leader were the sole functionaries in most branches. 113) In 
the larger branches the party organisation had more developed horizontal struc_ 
tures. In Hattingen the large menbership allowed, and necessitated to some 
degree, a much more elaborate administrative set-up. By 1928 the local part,y 
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110) 
Ill) 
112) 
113) 
Teipel, for example obtained an accurate picture of hi s district by 
enforcing monthly 'activity reports' to be sent in monthly by the branch 
leaders. See ihe reports from the branches of Arnsberg, Meschede, Soest 
in BAK NS 1/338 Band I. 
Complaints on this 'defect' in "Rundschreiben Nr. 76" (24 April 1928), 
No. 77 (7 May 1928) and No. 79 (6 June 1928) in HA 5/136. 
Hiemisch'saccount of the aoquisition of 'office facilities' by the 
Bielefeld branch is 1(ypical.; Hiemisoh, Ope cit., p.I+5. 
Several of these post s were often held by the S'\me individual in the 
early years. In Bielefeld Homann canbined fue functions of SA. lead.er, 
treasurer and branch leader; Hiemisch, Ope cit., p.ll. 
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organisation consisted of the branch leader, secreta~, treasurer qnd their 
deputies, plus the chairmen of a number of committees responsible for propa-
ganda, youth organisation, sport, and the branch Uschla. Within tbe branch 
administration the definition of function and spheres of influence were a.lready 
well defined. Thus the branch statutes emphasized that 'tbe heads of the com-
mittees and. the business managers of the individual committees had sole res-
ponsibility for fueir areas and were independent of the branch committee and 
of the branch leader'. An exception was "the organisa.tion committee, which 
fo llowed 'the instru otions of the branch c awn! ttee of the party'. The bu sine s s 
manager of the branch and heads of the individual 0 anmittees were allcNed direct 
contact with 'the GaUleiter and '!he Reichsleitun.s without reference to the 
branch leader. 114) 
The refinement of the Hattingen branch was an exception, not the rule. 
Branch organisations in general were simple and basic. Financial weakness 
made sure that tile growth of the bureaucracy was kep t to a minimum, not only 
on fue branch level, but also on the ~ and district levels. 
Techniques and Themes of Gnu Propaganda. 
Propaganda played a crucial part in '!:he growth and success of the NSDAP. 
Indeed, as one authority has noted, propaganda 'bectllIle the foundation of the 
par~'s fortunes'. lIS) Hitler himself placed great emphasis on propaganda, 
and gave much attention to its function and organisation in Mein Kampf. 116) 
For Hitler ine <hief purpose of propaganda was to 'attract support' through 
the dissemination of the 'idea', the ultimate objective being 'to force a 
doctrine on the whole people'. 117) This objective pxe-supposed that the 
'idea' was an attractive, saleable commodity. Propaganda was to make sure 
that it was. It alBo demanded an organisation able to deliver the ':idea' on 
as broad a front as possible. 
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114) Report by Hatt:ingen OG, 26 April 1928: HA S/136. 
115) Z.A.B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, O.U.P., 1973, p.XIII. 
116) Mein Kampf, Ope cit., pp.421-436; pp.S27-S43. 
117) Ibid., p.529. 
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Until the late nineteen-twenties fue Nazi Party did not possess an ade-
quate propaganda machine to expound the oreed of National Sooialism. Laok of 
funds, inadequate and unschooled pe !'Sonnel, a paucity of able sp eakers, and 
the small national, and even less significant regional, press all restricted 
the effectiveness of the party's propaganda efforts. Despite these weaknesses, 
the period 1925 to 1928 was crucial in the history of Nazi propaganda in that 
it saw the first rationalisation of the national and regional propaganda orga-
nisation. For the Nazis the period was of great importanoe for testing and 
perfecting a series of propaganda techniques. The knowledge gained in the 
organisation and projection of propaganda was of inestimable value in the 
period of rapid party growth after 1928. 
The material documenting fue nature and development of propaganda in GAu 
Westphalia and ~ Ruhr demonstrates not only the prooess by whioh a more 
effeotive propaganda arm was created, but also the increasing sophistication 
and skill of the party's propaganda ao ti vi 1:iY. The fir st year after the re-
formation of '!he party was one in which the NaZi propagandists went through 
a form of apprentioeship which stood them in good stead in ihe years to cotne. 
A single example, though a significant one, that 0 f Goebbels, ma.y be cited. 
At the beginning of his career he was a poor and inexperienced speaker. His 
first speech to the Bielefeld branch in July 1925 was so 'boring' that' a 
large number of people left before the end of the meeting'. Goebbels, 'who 
was just starting to speak at public meetings' suffered from a defect shared by 
mar.w novices, namely, a 'failure to end his speech'. 118) By the time of his 
seoond appearance in Bielefeld, at the end of November 1925, he 'was unrecog_ 
nisable'. Not only was his speeoh humorous, but he was able to deal effectively 
with Communist hecklers, and the whole meeting turned out to be 'a great suc-
cess'. 119) Though the transformation may be somewhat exaggerated, the experi_ 
·1 
I 
ence Goebbels acquired at5 one of the most active speakers in RhinelA.nd-Westphalia 'I 
in 1925 had its effect. 
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118) HiemisCh. Ope oit., p.35. 
119) Ibid., pp.35-36. 
Until 1926 the task of organising propaganda and determining its themes 
was left largely in the hands of the various Gauleiter and other regional 
party officials. The Parteileitung turned its attention to this aspect of 
party activity after the centralisation of party organisation had been largely 
accomplished. Until the spring of 1926 the propaganda of the Nazis in Rhineland-
Westphalia was conditioned primarily by regional and local factors. Party 
branches, beyond the odd general directive which came from the Gauleitung from 
time to time, carried out their propaganda activities within the limitations 
of their own ideas and resources. In general local branches did not develop 
distinct propaganda sections within the horizontal party framework. 120) 
Until 1926 the Gau and district levels of GauRuhr lacked propaganda specia-
lists. To the Gauleiter and district leaders the organisation of propaganda 
was but one of many diverse functions. The chief involvement of the Cauleitung 
tended to be the procurement and allotment of the limited 'speaking talent' 
available to the movement. The Gauleiter was primarily concerned with rewarding 
the more active branches by allocating to them important nat1.onal and regional 
speakers. 121) The district leaders' chief contribution to the propaganda 
efforts of the branches under their control lay in their services as speakers. 
In general the content and form of propaganda was left to local initiative 
in the years immediately after the re-organisation and Munich headquarters 
showed little interest in this aspect of party affairs. 
This changed markedly from the spring of 1926 onwards, after which Nazi 
propaganda became more systematized and centralised, both at the Dational and 
regional levels. The initiative for the formation of a more effective pro-
paganda organisation came from the Parteileitung in the form of a circular 
m) 
sent out by Bouhler to party branches in March 1926. The new concern 
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120) There is reference to the existence of a Propagandaleiter in only one 
Westphalian party branch in 1925, that of Hattingen, Beck, oPe cit., p.22I. 
121) Goebbels' first two appearances in Bielefeld in 1925 were due to arrange-
ments made by Gauleiter von Pfeffer, Hiemisch, oPe cit., p.35. 
122) For the following see 'Rundschreiben an die OG der NSDAP', Munich, 20 
March 19261 BAK Sammlung Schumacher 373. The circular is reprinted in 
Beck, oPe cit., pp.595-597. 
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shown by Munich in this area of party activity was linked to the virtually 
national speaking ban imposed on Hitler, which hit the party badly by denying 
it the use of its most effective weapon. An attack on the ban was to be the 
first major task of the propaganda network as proposed by the March directive, 
which was to be co-ordinated through the VB. Two additional considerations 
also moved the Parteileitung. There was the simple fact that the NSDAP did 
not possess a centralised, co-ordinated propaganda arm, a defect which handi-
capped the movement. 'The failure of a continuously active propaganda network 
was one reason why those masses enthusiastic for our idea could not be pro-
gressively enlightened. For one could not expect that the leaders of the 
young groups in our movement in the Reich could utilise any political situation 
in their propaganda without knowing the attitude of the Parteileitung. Nor 
were they in a position to bear the costs of the enlightening of the public.' 
The Rundschreiben noted that this placed the NSDAP in a weak position in 
relation to other parties, especially the 'marxist' parties, from which the 
National Socialists could and should learn a thing or two. 'If we want to 
fight the opposition we must review the methods used by it to secure power 
••• 
If we look at this question we meet in the first instance the comprehensive 
propaganda activity of the opposition, especially that of the marxist parties. 
If we look at the propaganda system of the latter more closely we find the 
cell system which covers the whole of the Reich. This is fed from one :centre, 
receiving its direction not only monthly, but weekly if certain developments 
occur which can be exploited.' In order to remedy the situation the partty 
headquarters urged the formation of propaganda cells which were to be attached 
to each branch. Their leaders were to be in direct contact with the Propa~nda_ 
leitung attached to party headquarters in Munich. These propaganda cells were 
to be functioning from 25 Varch at the latest and were to participate in the 
first concentrated natior.al propaganda campaign attacking the ban on Hitler's 
public speaking. Thi s campaign was to be inaugurated by a special edition of 
the 1] dealing with themes such as 'Who is Adolf Hitler?', 'What does Adolf 
Hitler want?', 'What has Adolf Hitler said?', and 'Why is Adolf Hitler no 
longer permitted to speak?' 123) Attached to the Rundschreiben were specific 
instructions outlining the steps to be taken by each branch 1n the creat10n 
of a propaganda cell. 124) The cells were to be made up of male and female 
members in the proportion of two-thirds male to one-third female, and were 
to be attached to the party branch in the form of a propaganda committee under 
an elected leader (Obmann). The Members of the propaganda cell were to be 
drawn from those who were imbued with 'fanaticism for our movement'. Care was 
to be taken that these individuals represented diverse occupational groups. 
The propaganda cells were to be in direct contact with the Propagandaleitung 
attached to the ]]. 
The response to these instructions in ~ Ruhr at the Gau and district 
levels was instant. How far the different branches reacted, especially the 
smaller branches, is more difficult to determine. Certainly the Gauleitung 
emphasized the 'Why is Hitler not allowed to speak?' theme. The Bochum dis-
trict leader Wagner, following instructions from Gau headquarters, switched 
125) his propaganda campaign to the new theme throughout his district. A series 
of meetings in Recklinghausen, Buer, Bottrop and Osterfeld in April and May 
were exclusively devoted to the topic. At each meeting those present were 
126 ) 
encouraged to sign a petition protesting against the ban. Agitation on 
identical lines was also pursued in the Bielefeld area by district leader 
Homann. 127) In the course of 1926 much greater energy was invested in the 
organisation of an effective propaganda arm in Westphalia, and the basis of 
an efficient network was laid. 128) 
The interest shown by party headquarters in projecting more uniform, 
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123) The ban on Hitler's public speaking was the theme of the first concentrated 
Nazi propaganda campaign in April 1926 - Zeman, OPe cit., p.8. 
124) 'Organisationsplan zur Einrichtung von Propagandaze11en der NSDAP', copy 
in HA 70/1529. Also in Beck, OPe cit., pp.597-598. 
125) Wagner to GL Ruhr, Bochum, 7 April 19261 BAK NS 1/338, Bel. I. 
126) Police report, Recklinghausen, 22 May 19261 SAM Nr. 2076. 
127) Hoamm to GL Ruhr, 20 Nay 19261 BAK NS I/Yi-2. 
128) See Wagner's 'Bericht nber die Bezirkstagung in Bochum am 3 Oktober 1926'; 
reprinted in Back, OPe cit., p.S71. 
270 
centralised Nazi propaganda did not destroy the flexibility of approach which 
had previously characterised the regional propaganda effort. Individual 
branch leaders and the new propaganda committees were astute enough to con-
tinue to frame their propaganda to suit local conditions. They were encouraged 
to do so by Goebbels, responsible for the organisation of propaganda in Gau 
Ruhr for much of 1926. Although he accepted the need for a common national 
approach on certain issues, Goebbels thought that entirely uniform propaganda 
approach was premature. He was emphatic that differing political situations 
in various parts of the Gau had always to be taken into consideration. Meetings 
deSigned to appeal to specific social groupings or economic interests had to 
be framed accordingly. 129) Branch leaders in general framed their propaganda 
to take account of such tactical and local requirements. Homann, for example, 
took great care to give to his audiences the type of material he thought they 
would like to hear. Thus at a meeting to which members of the Sparerschutz-
ver~nde were invited the speech dealt primarily with the theme of revaluation 
of the losses occasioned by the inflation. 130) At meetings held in Bad 
Oeynhausen, a spa 'much frequented by Jews', the major emphasis of Nazi spee-
ches was on anti-Semitism, which was designed to arouse the supposed prejudices 
of the local population. 131) At meetings where the bulk of the audience was 
composed of farmers, their particular interests and grievances were played 
~~. l~) 
The flexibility of its approach to propaganda was but one feature of the 
Nazi Party. Another was its constant energy. Perpetual motion, even when 
the results were negligible, was the hall-mark of the NSDAP. Although most 
of the party's meetings were concentrated in the election periods, the Nazis 
continued their efforts in between. In this respect the party was out of step 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
129) Extracts from Goebbels' speech at the Eochum district conference of 3 
October 1926. in Beck, oPe cit., p.572. 
130) Homann to Goebbels, Bielefeld, 21 July 1925. BAK NS 1/)41. 
131) Homann to Goebbels, Bielefeld, 27 January 1926. BAK NS 1/)41. 
132) Homann to GL Ruhr, Bielefeld, 20 May 1926. BAK NS 1/)42. 
271 
with the general line of political activity pursued by other parties, with 
the exception of the KPD. One conse~uence of the regularity with which meetings 
were held was that the local and regional press gave much more attention to 
the NSDAP at times during which no other party activity could be reported. 
The party functionaries were proud of their continuous activism, the number 
of meetings held being, in their eyes, a yardstick of their degree of commit-
ment to the party and 'idea'. Even such 'politically unseasonal' periods as 
the holiday months of August and September were used by Wagner to continue, 
as he proudly stated, 'the struggle'. 133) Contemporary police reports on 
Nazi activity reflect astonishment at the vigour of the effort and the large 
number of meetings held by the party, despite the fact that many were only 
'poorly attended'. 134) The Nazis themselves seemed to obtain a perverse 
satisfaction from meetings which attracted only a handful of people. Failure 
stimulated their effort and led to an intensification of propaganda activity 
in some branches. 135) The greatest joy was derived Qy the Nazi hierarchy 
from meetings which ended in brawls with left-wing opponents •. Such occasions 
gave much free publicity to the movement in the press and stimulated interest. 136) 
In the absence of an effective Nazi press, propaganda in the neutral and oppo-
sition press was a good substitute. 
Public meetings were one of the most popular means by which the NSDAP 
attempted to win support and draw attention to itself, but the propaganda 
techniques employed and developed to advance the cause were very diverse. Much 
emphasis was placed on routine work (Kleinarbeit), such as door to door canvas-
Sing, the distribution of pamphlets, Nazi literature and newspapers, techni~ues 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
133) Report by Wagner to GL Elberfeld, Bochum, 25 September 1926. BAK NS 1/340. 
134) Cf. the numerous reports for the year 1926, especially those of the police 
authorities in the Reck1inghausen region, in SAM Nr. 2076. Further SAM 
VII - 2 Ed. 5 - for 1927-1928. 
135) See the example of Bielefeld, Hiemisch, OPe cit., p.14. 
136) Beck, OPe cit., p.350. Such calculations influenced Goebbels' approach 
in Berlin - see the introduction and documentation by M. Broszat, 'Die 
Anf~nge der Berliner NSDAP 1926/27', Vierteljahrshefte fllr Zeitgeschlchte, 
3, 1960, pp.85-1l8• 
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copied. from the KPD. Goebbels, as long as he was in charge of the ~ pro-
paganda organisation, placed. great value on these forms of activity and. believed. 
that such 'petty work' often did. more to secure wpport; than public meetings.137) 
These activities aJ.so bad. the important ad.vantage of costing very little apart 
from -the energy and. enthusiasm of the party faithful. Very important too were 
the wee~ or fortnight~ discussion evenings (Sprechabende), Which by 1926 
became a regular feature of Nazi branch activity. Party members were encouraged 
to bring their friends and 'guests' and in many branches attendance at these 
meetings was virtual~ compUlsory. It was a minimum sign of involvement. 138) 
Their function was not only to win over new recruits, but to keep the existing 
memb.ership intact. 139) In many branches the meetings were used to school the 
party members by means of lectures on historical and. political themes and 
diSCUSSions of the writings of party lead.ers, especially Hitler's 'Mein Kampf'?40) 
An increasing role in the Nazi propaganda repertOire was plqed. by meetings 
ostensibly non-political in character, which attracted. apolitical elements of 
the population. Patriotic celebrations were very common, and such events as 
'Sedan celebrations' became annual fixtures in a number of branches. 'Hinter 
feasts', 'Christmas feasts', 'German Evenings', and 'German Days' were popular 
Nazi exercises designed. to interest people sympathetio to the party. Of these 
the most popular event was the 'German Evening', a mixture of musical enter-
tainment, short plays and. d.ancing displays, knitted. together by a number of 
short speeches reminding the participants about the organisers of the show. 14.1.) 
More impressive and. more costly, and hence rarer, were the 'German Days', 
veri table party Jamborees which generally conoentrated. the efforts of the 
regional movement in one town. _ The first 'German Da.y' in ~ Ruhr, centred 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
137) 
138) 
139) 
140) 
141) 
Goebbels' speech atfue Boohum distriot conference, October 1926, in 
Beck, 01'. cit., 1'.572. 
See "Rundschreiben 2 NSDAP OGWitten", 12 October 1926: reprinted. in 
Beck, Ope cit., p.569. 
Cf. the case of OG Hamm, Beck, 01'. cit., p.336. 
Hiemisch, 01'. cit., 1'.15; also Beck, 01'. cit., 1'.394. 
Beck, 01" cit., 1'.390. 
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on Herne in June 1926, mobilised some 3,000 SA and NSDAP members, and was 
attended by the chief Nazi notables of the region, including the three ~_ 
leiter. 142) The 'German Days' were carefully organised to project an image 
of strength am vigour. Maximum participation of the regional party members 
was ensured by 1he various branch leaders, Vlho viewed participation as a matter 
of 'du~'. 143) Torch-light processions, propaganda marches, speeches, milit~~ 
displays and martial music were the staple ingredients of Slch events. 
The propaganda techniques developed by the party in ~ Ruhr were employed 
to win over I!Upport fran aU sections of socie~. The content of the Nazi 
'message' in Westphalia was strongly influenced by two factors: the sociologi-
cal. composition of the population and the attitudes and beliefs of the regional 
party hierarchy. Both factors led to the development of a distinctly 'left-
wing' orientation designed to attract the working class, 'the dominant social 
grouping in 'the region. 144-) The emphasis on vtinnine over the working class 
was by 1926 an established feature of Nazi agitation in Rhineland-Westphalia. ~5) 
The overtures to 'the worker had not been wi'thout success, ani many branches, 
especially those in the Ruhr towns, had a membership drawn almost exclusively 
from 'the VlOrking class. 146) 
The tripartite leadership Which took over Gau Rubr in 1926, barring von 
Pfeffer reservations, projected a 'left-wing' image. Goebbels, one of the 
principal speakers in Rhineland-Westphalia fran 1925 to 1926, pursued his own 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
142) 
143) 
145) 
14-6) 
Beck, Ope cit., p.390. 
See the instructions given by the branch leader of Witten to ensure a 
full tum-out at the Herne meeting - "Rundschreiben I NSDAP OG Witten", 
20 July 1926; reprinted in Beck, Ope cit., pp.568-569. 
In the Ruhr area, where fue party was most active, some 75 to 80 per oent 
of the population was 'working class' - report by Police President, Bochum, 
21 November 1930: SAN VII - 67 Bd. I. 
See chapters 4- and 5 of t his study. In the a djoining electoral district 
of Dt1aseldorf-Ost, which had a similar S)cbl compOsition, early Nazi 
efforts were almost totally orientated towards" inning over working class 
support; cf. Knhr, OPe oit., p.140. 
Beok, Ope cit., p.266 ff.. Report by Landrat, Beckum, 19 March 1926; 
SAM VII - 64 Bd. I. By the end of 1930 57.7 per cent of the membership 
of tile NSDAP in the 'Ruhr industrial region' of Westphalia were workers _ 
report "An die RL der NSDAP-Organisationsabtei1ung", Bochum, 7 November 
1930; copy in SAM VII - 67 Bd. I. 
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form of 'socialist' creed, ccndemned capitalism, though not capital, and 
generally despised the bourgeoisie. 14.7) Kaufmann reserved his abuse for 
the SPD, whose leaders he depicted as mere tools of the capitalist system, a 
system under which he thought the German people had. no hope of redressing 
their wrongs. 148) Ideologically both inclined towards the pro-labour and 
14-9) 
anti-capitalist 'socialism' propagated by Gregor Strasser. 'Socialist' 
sentiments were also a common feature of speeches by local party fUnctionaries. 
In an effort to attract working class support they attempted to project the 
idea that 'the NSDAP was 'the only party of true socialism'. 150) Nazi speakers 
emphasized their 'proletarian' nature, and in isolated instances went 10 far 
as to state that fue programme of the KPD and NSDAP were 'aJJnost the same '. 151) 
The nationa1isation plans of the party, especially of the banks and other 
financial institutions, were also emphasized. 152) 
The 'socialist' line was part~ determined by the environment in which 
the party worked. In fue urban centres of tile Ruhr the effort to attract sup-
port inevitably involved an appeal to working class audiences. Nazi pub1io 
meetings attracted a. high number of KPD and SPD supporters, on some of whom 
the canbina tion of nationalism a nd socialism, ccnstantly expounded by the 
party, had an effect. On occasions tile Nazis were able to win over notable 
figures from 'the socialist opposition. 153) There was a genuine desire to 
reach the worker. The organisers of meetings in Dortmund laid special emphasis 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
14.7) Goebbels' views emerge from his 'Lenin or Hitler?' speech, a great favou-
r! te of his, frequently given in Westphalia. It is reprinted in Zeman, 
Ope ci t., pp.18l-211. 
14.8) Analysis of Kaufmann's themes in police report, Duisburg, 10 October 1925; 
copy in SAM vn - 64. Bd. I. 
14.9) On Strasser and tile Nazi 'Left' in general see the recent study by M.H. 
Kele, Nazis and Vlorlcers. National Socialist Appeals to G-erman Labor, 
1919-1953, Chapel Hill, 1972, pp.8l ff •• 
150) Bezirksleitung to GL Elberfeld, Bielefeld, (no date, probably April 1926): 
BAK NS I/338 Bd. I. . 
l51l Police report, Recklinghausen, 21 December 1925: SAM VII - 2 Bd. 4.. 
152 Report by Land.rat, Beckum, 17 May 1926: SAM vn - 64. Bd. I. 
153 The most signifioant recorded capture was the lea.der of the RFB of Erken-
schrlnk, who joined the NSDAP in Januaxy 1928; police report, Reckling-
hausen, 9 January 1928: SAM VII - 2 Bd. 2. 
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on their being held. on Saturdays since this gave local miners a chance to 
attend.. 154) The emphasis on winning over the worker was not oonfined. to 
Westphalia. in the mid.-twenties; it was part of 'the general policy of the 
NSDAP. A report on the ~neral d.evelopment 0 r the party, drawn up in 1927, 
noted. the special effort to win over Communist s attending Nazi meetings in 
industrial areas and. in the cities: 'They (the Nazi speakers) emphasize strongly 
the social-revolutionary character of their party and attempt to convince the 
Communist worker that his interests are better represented by them than the 
"international" and. "verjudeten" Communists.' 155) 
The 'left-'9'd.ng' bias of ~ Ruhr pt"opaganda was reinforced. and. fostered. 
by 1he distribution in tile ~ of '!he pub1icatiau of strasser's KampfverlaB. 
Though it is impossible to quantify the read.ership, both 'the bimonthly 
Nationalsozialistische Briefe and. the weeklY Der nationa1e Sooialist, had. a 
consid.erab1e readership in Rhine1and.-Westphalia. 156) Support for these pub-
licatians was assid.uously encouraged. at party meetings and. through 'placard. 
propaganda'. 157) The link between the Kampfverla.g and. ~ Ruhr was und.er-
lined. by the Slccessive editors of the Nationalsozialistische Briefe, Goebbels 
and. Kaufmann. 158) The strasser publioations d.istributed. in ~ Ruhr d.evoted. 
considerable space to the question of 'socialism' ani C(J'lta:illed virulent attaoks 
on the marxist parties. 159) 
Nazi propaganda in Westphalia also attempted. tp explain the meaning of 
National Sooialism. The most common titles of speeohes during the 1925 to 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
154) OG Ibrtmund to Goebbels, Dortmund., 28 september 1925: BAK NS I/341. 
155) "Rund.erla.ss", Berlin, 15 Ootober 1927 (Section III, 4 a 'Die NSD.~ 
Allgemeines'); copy in SAM Nr. 1707. 
156) 'Der nationa1e Sozialist' came out in five regional editions, one of 
which oovered. the Rhein-Ruhr region. .An indication of the popularity 
of 'the Strasser publications in Westphalia is given by the SUbscriptions 
of OG Il1d.enscheidt: 32 Der natioJ)9.le Sozialist, 8 VlSlkischer Beobaohter, 
5 Nationalsozialistisohe Briefe: notice of 19 Febru~ 1926 in BAKNS 
1/339 Bel. I. 
157) Kampf-Verlag to Presseste11e des Gaues Rhein-Ruhr, Berlin, 22 June 1926: 
BAle N3 I/34-0. 
158) Kaufmann took over the eclitorship of the NS-Briefe in May 1927 - Kele, 
Ope cit., p.105. 
159) For an analysis of the Strasser press see Kele, OPe cit., pp.lll ff •• 
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1928 period were 'The Goals of National Socialism', 'The Purpose and Aims 
of the N3DAP', '7/ha t does Adolf Hitler want?', and so on. Much attention wae 
given to the Jewish issue, to economic problems and to tm internal and exter-
nal difficulties facing the state. The general condemnation of the Republic, 
the 'system', parliament and opposition parties was a sta.nda.rd feature of 
many speeches. 
The main propaganda effort to 1928 was concentrated almost entirely On 
the urban centres of Westphalia. The only exceptions were provided by Homn.nn 
in the Bielefeld area and Teipel in the Arnsberg region, ~ho made some effort 
to attract the rural population to the party. 160) The experience of the 
Westphalian Nazis in the 1928 Reichstag election was to lead to a re-ev~luation 
of this 'urban tactic', and t:> a much greater effort in tll3 rural areas. 
The Reichstag Election of 192B. 
The Reichstag election of 20 May 1928 was the first major test of the 
strength. of National Socialism since the re-formation of the party in 1925. 
The material available for ~ Ruhr provides a good insight into the methods 
used by the party in maximise its effectiveness and electoral appeal. It also 
highlights the problems facing the movement after three years of re-organisation 
and rationalisation. 
At the national level the party had been preparing itself for an election 
for a considerable time. Since the autumn of 1927 special attention had been 
paid by the Partei1eitunD to the Achilles heel of the party, its poor financial 
position. 161) The same problem exercised the mind of the Ruhr Gnuleiter, who 
was exhorting the party branches 'to establish an election reserve fund to 
avoid being embarrassed by an election' a.t the beginning of 1928. 162) The 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
160) 
162) 
During 1926 to 1928 the Nazis concentra.ted their propaganda. effort in 
industrial centres even in predominantly agrarian regions; cf. Noakes, 
OPe cit., pp.10l ff •• 
The 'Rundschreiben" of 1 september 1927 by the PL warned Gaus and OG to 
prepare themselves financially for 'the coming election campaign': :BAK 
Sammlune; Schumacher 373. 
The repeated"" arnings are noted in "Rundschreiben Nr. 76" (section 5), 
Elberfeld, 24 April 1928: HA 5/136. 
reason for the continued. warnings was that the Gaulei tunt'j itself lacked. funds, 
whiCh meant that in the event of an election branches could not calIon it to 
finance local efforts. In its instructions to the branches throughout the 
election campaign the ~ headquarters made it absolutelY clear that th~ had 
to depend entirely on their own resources, and that no help cOlld be expeoted 
from the Parteileitunr, or Gauleitung. No credit for election material, suoh as 
posters, pamphlets etc., was to be extended to aqr branch. Branches were only 
163) 
to reoeive material if this had been paid for beforehand. Those branches 
still in arrears with '!:heir PlVment of membership dues were also to be penalised 
by not receiving ei the r speakers or election m ate rials unle s s the due s were 
met. 164) To assist the election efforts of poorer branches the Gqulei tun!) 
urged the use of texts taken from the n,. '!bese could be reproduced cheaplY. 165) 
The branChes were also provided with pamphlets which could be bought at special 
rates for use in the house to house oanvassing d.lring the ~mpaign. 166) 
In view both of the attitude of the GAuleitung about extending oredit to 
branches and of the weak financial position of the latter, the response to the 
opportunity of purchasing the publications offered by 'Iile ~ propaganaa centre 
led Kaufmann to despair. His disappointment was intensifiea by the lack of 
interest shown by the branches in the purchase of even 'Iile dleapest propaganda 
material, such as placa.rds ana posters. With the election bu t twelve days 
away only half a dozen of the branches of ~ Ruhr had. availed themselves of 
the material an offer. Even the larger branches, such as those of Bochum, 
Hattingen, Buer, Gelsenkirchen, Essen and Krefeld, had not ordered any pla-
cards. 167) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
163) "Rundschreiben Nr. 76", (section 5 "Wahlkampf"), Elberfeld, 24 April 
1928: HA 5/136. 
164) Ibid., (section 1). 
165) "Rundschreiben Nr. 77", (section 3,c), Elberfeld, 7 ~ 1928: HA 5/136. 
166) The GL advised the use of Goebbels' 'Da! kleine ABC', Jung's 'Nat1onaler 
oder 1nternationaler SoziaUsmus', and. past numbers of 'tile National-
sozialistische Briefe. The latter normally cost 40 Ffgs. eaoh, but were 
available at 8 Marks per 150 - "Rundschreiben Nr. 76", (section 5), 
Elberfeld, 24 April 1928: HA 5/136. 
167) "Nachtrag zu Rundschreiben Nr. 77", Elberfela, 8 May 1928: HA 5/136. 
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Another fundamental problem which limited the effectiveness of the Nazi 
campaign in Westphalia. was the paucity of speaking talent. This was lamented 
by Kaufmann, who 'noted to his regret how few new speakers had emerged in the 
Gau in the recent period'. 168) The small number of' 'external l!IP'lakers' avail-
able to the GaU had already been allotted a month before polling day. These 
were used. primarily in meetings organised in the larger towns. Of the ~ 
speakers only Florian and Bolwin were still available at the beginning of May. 
As a consequence most branches were restricted. iP local resourcel!l. It was an 
'absolute futy' for every district and branch lead.er to wpeak at Nazi. meetings 
and appear at other party meetings in order iP intervene in the 'discussions' 
which usually ended. them. The ploy of appearing at other party meetings was 
widely used, especially in districts where the Nazis did not, usually for 
financial reasons, hold public meetings of their oVon. 169) This tactic pro-
vided. the Nazis with a cheap means of propaganda. It also gave them the chance 
to find. out the attitude of other parties on various il!lsuel!l, which were repor-
170) ted. back to the Gaulei tun,g and. used. in c(Unte~propagand.a. 
To canpensate for the deficiencies which hampered tile party, Kaufmann 
relied on excellent organisation and unflagging effort 'l!IO that the German 
people can l!Iee ••• that the NSDAP i l!I no t dead., but has more life than ever 
before'. The 'feverish activi~' which the branohes were exhorted to develop 
was to dil!ltinguish it sharply fran 'the indolent bourgeois parties'. 171) To 
ensure an efficient conduct of business a special electoral organisation was 
set up for ~ Ruhr under the control of Koch, who dealt with a.ll enquiries 
and problems relating to the campaign. On the lOC9.l level power l8¥ in the 
--------~----------------------------------------------------------------
168) 
169) 
170) 
171) 
For ~~e following see wRundschreiben Nr. 76", (section 2 "Wahlkampf-
mittel"), Elberfeld, 24 April 1928, and "Rundsohreiben Nr. 77". (section 
3,0), Elberfeld, 8 May 1928: HA 5/136. 
The Na.zis in Bielefeld, woo restrictea. their chief effort to Bielefeld 
itself, sent all pa.rty members 'die halbwegs reden konnten' a.s 'discus-
sion' spERkers iP meetings held by rival parties in County Bielefeld. 
Singled out for special attention were meetings of the DNVP and the 
Wirtsohaftspartei - Hiemisch, Ope cit~, pp.42-43. 
"Rundschreiben Nr. 77", (section 3,f), Elberfeld, 8 May 1928: HA 5/136. 
Ibid •• 
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hands of the branch leaders, who were reminded of their responsibility to 
the Reichs1eitung for carrying out their dlties. 172) Although the division 
of responsibility gave the branch leader some independence of action, the 
G-a.u1ei tung attempted to direct the tactical pattern of the campaign. The 
instructions given to the district and branch leaders were deSigned to unif',y 
the propaganda effort. The strategy to be adopted by the sub-~ uni ta, as 
suggested by ~ headquarters, involved specifio aotions in two distinct 
phases. 173) In phase one, the month before polling clay, t~ ma.jor emphasis 
was to be placed on intensive hooS'to house oanvassing, the primary purpose of 
which was to distribute pamphlets. According to 1tle Gau1ei tung the ideal time 
to distribute the bllk of the party's literature was a fortnight before the 
election. This would assure that some of it would be read. In the view of 
~ headquarters there was no point in a masS distribution of pamphlets close 
to election day, since by that time the voter was bombarded with material from 
all the other parties, most of which was simply thrown away without being read. 
In the last two weeks before polling it twas the dlty of every district and 
branch leader to work over in a ~stematio and planned fashion all those parts 
of their area in which the party has neither organisation nor people active 
on its behalf'. Two further considerations were also to be borne in mind dUring 
phase one. Firstly, and exceptionally, the Gau1eitung urged 'that conflicts 
with other parties must be avoided at all costs during the periOd'. Here the 
calculation was probably that too radical a campaign might frighten off voters 
or lead to adverse publicity. Secondly, every effort was to be made to drive 
home to all voters that 'List 10' stood for 'NSDA.P'. Branches were to fashion 
a stamp which was to be used to mark all pa.rty 1i terature with 'No. 10' .. 
Pha58 two, t:re last few days before 1tle eleotion, was to be oharaoterised 
by • the total mobilisation of all the human and material resources of 'the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
172) 
173) 
"Rundsohreiben Nr. 76", (section "Wahlkampforganisation"), 
24 April 1928: HA 5/136 .. 
For the fbllowing see "Rundschreiben Nr. 76", (section 5), 
24 April 1928; "Rundschreiben Nr. 77", (section 3,a to e), 
8 May 1928: HA 5/136. 
Elberfeld, 
Elberfeld, 
Elberfeld, 
280 
party'. 174) This was 'the period in which "the party branches were urged to 
paste up their placards and picture posters. The ideal time to do this, 'in 
the light of experience', was on the eve of the poll, 'since "the opposition 
parties use 'the last hours 'Ix> stick up their placards and remove those of the 
opposition' • .Purther, the Gauleitung instructed that 'it is 'the first priority 
and. "task of the SA to Ensure 'that our placards survive undaunged until voting 
day'. 'Street propaganda' was also to be employed in the last three days 
before the election, this being "the 'only period when it has a purpose and 
effect'. The best propaganda weapons were lorries, festooned with party stickers 
and. placards, touring extensively in the towns and districts. The presence of 
'party comrades at election centres with Na.tiolVll Socialist pla.cards' was also 
recommended.. 
The various instructions from ine Gauleitun,g show that it possessed a 
degree of propaganda skill which had been previously absent. The plan of 
campaign covered most eventualities aril was designed to utilise available 
techniques and reSo.lrces to the full. The extent to which the carefUlly thought_ 
out guidelines influenced the propaganda campaign of individual branches is more 
difficult to gauge. The larger branches alone had the resources 'Ix> make use 
of the proffered advice. In Bielefeld, for example, the whole electoral cam-
paign was severely restricted by lack of oash, and speakers, and by the faot 
that there were too few party members to carry out all the basic propaganda. 
The branch even laoked the mon~ to purchase sufficient posters, and it resorted 
175) to daubing slogans on houses and public buildings. In the town of Soest 
the party was not able to manage even one public meeting, and restrioted itself 
176) 
to distributing pamphlets and 'Ix> placard propaganda. In the urban centres 
of the inner Ruhr ine Nazis were unable to avoid the attention of political 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
174) 
175) 
176) 
For the fbllowing see "Rundschreiben Nr. 76", (sectiona 4 and 7), 
Elberfeld, 24 April 1928; "Rundschreiben Nr. 77", (section 3, c and f), 
Elberfeld, 8 May 1928: HA 5/136. 
On the election campaign in Bielefeld see Hiemisch, Ope aLt., pp.4l ft •• 
Beck, Ope cit., p.360. 
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opponents and were involved in heavy street clashes with Communists and 
Socialists. 177) The Gau1eitllng's theory of how the campaign should be 
conducted, and the way in which it was actually carried out, were not 
necessarily the same. 
For the NSDAP the outcome of the election was a disappointment. In 
Westphalia-North the party polled a mere 1.0 per cent, which was a frac-
tional decline compared to the 1.3 per cent secured in December 1924. 178) 
In Westphalia-South the return of 1.6 per cent was a marginal increase 
compared with the 1.1 per cent polled in December 1924. Both Wpstphalian 
results were well below the national average of 2.6 per cent. Neither 
the regional nor the national poll gave much comfort to the Na7.i hier-
archy. Considering the effort made by the party nationally, the 840,000 
votes cast for the NSDAP were not an impressive total. 179) The only 
satisfaction the party could have had was the knowledge that these votes 
were for the NSDAP and not for the v81kisch amalgam of which the party 
had been but one segment in 1924. The party leadership did its best to 
gloss over the disappointment. A commentary in the VB stated that 'for 
a revolutionary movement the number of votes cast is not the important 
factor, but the type of persons who have supported it. And we can assert 
without qualms. 840,000 votes and 840,000 fighters.' 180) But such an 
attitude failed to hide the disappointment feltqy the party leaders. 181) 
The only trend which encouraged them was treperformance of the NSDAP in 
rural areas, which bore little relationship to its major organisational 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
l77j Beck, OPt cit., p.244. 
178 Election results taken from Milatz, OPe cit., p.112. 
179 An idea of the vigour with which the party had wooed the electorate 
is reflected in an article in the VB, 30 June 1928, in which it was 
stated that 118 speakers had held 10,000 meetings in the three months 
prior to the election. 26 of these had each spoken in 50 to 80 meet-
ings alone according to the article. (These figures do not add up 
since each speaker on average would have had to hold 86.5 speeches 
each). Cf. "Runderlass " , Berlin, 20 July 1928 - copy in SAM Nr. 1703; 
also report on the NSDAP, Berlin, 13 July 1928 - copy in HA 69/1509. 
180) VB, 31 May 1928. 
181) Cf. the report on the NSDAP, Berlin, 13 July 1928, HA 69/1509. 
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and propaganda efforts. In several predominantly agrarian electoral areas 
the party achieved considerable success. The NSDAP averaged over 10 per cent 
of the vote in the rural counties of East Friesland and northern Oldenburg 
in the electoral district of Weser-Ems, with exceptionally high returns being 
recorded in County Wittmund (36 per cent) and County Ammerland (28 per cent). 182) 
Rural support for the party also resulted in returns of 18.1 per cent and 17.7 
per cent in the Schleswig-Holstein counties of Norderdithmarschen and S~der­
dithmarschen respectively. 18) In Bavaria, where the party performed slightly 
better in urban than in rural areas, encouraging results were also obtained, 
especially in Upper Franconia. 184) The rural successes impressed themselves 
on the Parteileitung, which came to the conclusion that 'the election results 
in the rural areas show that with less expenditure, of effort, money and 
time greater successes can be achieved ther e than in the cities. National 
SOCialist meetines with good speakers in small towns and villages are events 
and form the topic of daily conversation for weeks afterwards, while in the 
cities meetings even with ),000 to 4,000 people quickly sink into insignifi-
cance.' 185) 
In the urban-orientated Gau Ruhr similar conclusions were reached by the 
G 1 it 186 ) rt' f th ba au e ung. In Kaufmann's analysis of the pa y s per ormance, e ur n 
results secured by the Nazis was deemed 'satisfactory'. The results achieved 
in the rural areas struck him as 'astonishing' and he considered that the 
rural districts had considerable possibilities. 'In those rural areas in which 
active party comrades were operating we have secured surprisingly large suc-
cesses. I name the districts of Arnsberg and Sieger1and ••• The votes secured 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
l82} Noakes, oPe cit., p.121. 
183) R. Heberle, Landbev81kerung und Nationalsozlalismus. Elne sozlo10gische 
Untersuchung der nol1tlschen Willensbi1dung in Sch1eswt~-Holstein, 1918 
big 1932, Stutt~a~, 196), p.42. The PrUssian Landtag results were 
equally high - Stoltenberg, OPe cit., p.145. 
184) Pridham, OPe cit., p.8). 
l85)..!], )1 May 1928. 
186) For the following see "Rundschrei ben Nr. 79", (IILehren aus dem Wahlkampf"), 
Elberfeld, 6 June 19281 HA 5/136. 
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bear no relation to party strength in terms of membership numbers.' 187) The 
reason for these rural successes according to Kaufmann was 'the absence of 
counter-agitation' and the poor organisation of the other parties. The con-
clusion reached by him was the logical one of 'following up the success. In 
those districts where great strides in our voting strength were made the 
follow-up should see the creation of party branches in areas of high votes, 
if no branch existed already, or at least the establishment of a party cell.' 
The need 'for a further improvement of the town organisations' was also noted 
in the report. 
The implementation of these plans was not to be realised under Kaufmann. 
In the summer months of 1928 internal regional disputes were to necessitate 
a fundamental re-organisation of the Rhenish-Westphalian NSDAP. This was 
initiated by the removal of Kaufmann and the dissolution of the mammoth Gau 
Ruhr. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
187) The rural vote was not all that impressive, though in the Arnsberg dis-
trict there were a few very good returns. In County Iserlohn, for 
example, the NSDAP obtained 21.2 per cent and 17.6 per cent of the vote 
in the villages of Kalthof and Evingsen respectively - Iserloh~er 
Kreisanze:i..,.er llnd Zeitunl!, 21 May 1928. 
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Chapter 8. TcrNARDS A MASS PARTr, 1928 TO 1930. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gau Westphalia under Josef Wagner. 
The 1928 ReichstRg election was followed by a period of crisis in ~ 
Ruhr which threatened to destrqy the regional movement. A serious intra-party 
dispute in 'the summer of 1928 jeopardized the uni 1ur of the party, weakened the 
position of Gaulei ter Kaufmann, and restricted the effectiveness of the Gau-
lei tung. This occurred at a time during which 'the party was ftlced with severe 
financial difficulties accentuated by the election campaign. In the run-up to 
the election the party branches had concentrated their resources on meeting 
the cost of the campaign with the result that an increasing number failed to 
remit their membership dues to ihe Gauleitung, which seriously worsened the 
lattert s financial position. Whereas in the pre-election period only six 
branches were in arrears, the number of branches failing to meet their obliga-
tions accelerated rapidly in the post-M~ period. 1) ~ May branches owing 
contrlbutions numbered fifteen, a figure which rOSe ix> twenty-seven by June. 
An add.ed. problem fur the Gauleituns was the fact that fifteen branches failed 
to pay for election material supplied by the ~ during the oampaign. 2) To 
add to the difficulties of the Gauleitung, Kaufmann and the district leader 
of Essen, Terboven, chose this rather inappropriate time to launch the first 
~ paper, Die Neue Front. This was to tbe uaed to fight the auertions of 
the hostile local. press' and provide the party with a further propaganda 
instrument, the lack of which had been a serious disadvantage 1n the recent 
election campaign. 3) 
Kaufmann found it increasingly difficult to exert his will within the 
~. Though he sent oontinuous :reminders to the branches to pay their arrears 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) "Rundschreiben Nr. 76", 24 April 1928: HA 5/136. Two of the six branches, 
Salzuflen and Haltern, still owed their dUes from December 1927 and January 
1928 respectively. . 
2) "Rundschreiben Nr. 77", 7 May 1928, and "Rundschreiben Nr. 79", 6 June 
1928: HA 5/136. 
3) "Presserundschreiben", NSDAP Gau Ruhr, 6 June 1928: HA 5/136. 
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and circulars in which he emphasized the Gau1eitung's weak financial position 
and its imminent bankruptcy, the bulk of "the ofiending branches did not even 
4) bother to reply to his d.emands. To make matters worse, the Parteileitung 
was pressing the Gauleitung to flllfil its responsibilities vis-a-vis Munich. 
Kaufmann's wthorlty, already in question, was further undermined by a personal 
feud with Koch, which ad.ded. to the disruption of the party's organisation in 
the aunmer of 1928. 6) This struggle cost Kaufmann much persooa.l prestige 
and the Gau lei ter' IS acti vitie s were virtually suspended as he fought to clear 
his name. The Parteilei tung had to intervene. In July Y.aufmann was forced to 
take a 'vacation' and the de facto leadership of the ~ passed. into the hands 
of the district leader of Bochum, Josef Wagner. 7) 
The events of the 9.lmmer, culmin'lting in the removal of Kaufmann, occa-
sioned. a fundamental re-organisation of ~ Ruhr. The re-organis~tion was 
undertaken in the light of Hitler's decision that in future the ~ were 
to correspond to the Reichstag electoral districts, frOll1 which they were to 
take their name, a decision motivated by the desire to facilitate 'the propa-
ganda efforts of the movement. 8) For ~ Ruhr this involved several divisions 
and. adjustments: the creation of bl'o independent dutricts, Bergisch-Lana! 
Niederrhein (which covered the electoral distriot of D(1sseldorf-Ost) and 
Essen (which covered 'the electoral distriot of D!lsseldorf-"Nest), and the 
re-creation of the former ~ Westphalia. (which oovered the eleotoral districts 
of Westphalia-North and -South). The new ~ Westphalia lost 'bro regions 
previouslY attached to it, namely the Regierungsbezirk OsnabrUck, whioh was 
ceded to the newly formed ~ Weeer-Ems, and the SlDll.ll ~ of Schaumburg-Lippe, 
which went to ~ Hanover-South-Brunswiok. 9) The division of ~ Westphalia 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
4~l "Rundschreiben Nr. 79", 6 June 1928: HA .5/136. 
Ibid. •• 
On this see chapter 7, pp. 249 ff.; also Hnttenberger, Ope c1 t. t p.48. 
7) Tyrell, Ope cit., p.376. It was wagner's signature which appeared on the 
Gau Rundschreiben frOll1 August 1928 - see "An alle OG Gau Ruhr", 10 August 
1928: HA 5/136. 
8) Or1o'R, Ope cit., pp.139 ff.; also strasser to Wagner, Munich, 23 July 1928: 
BAK N3 22/1076. 
9) Schaumburg-Lippe ulti!n9.tely became part of ~ Westphnlin-:70rth in January 
1931. 
286 
into the two electoral districts which it covered had to Wl-it until Janua.ry 1931, 
by which time the membership of the NSDAP in northern Westphalia was sufficient 
to make 1:m-o independent ~ a viable proposition. 
~ Westphalia was official~ taken over by Josef Waener on 1 October 
1928. 10) He immediately set about ending the organi511tional la.. .dty which had 
characterised Gau Ruhr in the last months of its existence. Wagner's first, 
and SUbsequent, circulars to the branches left no doubt about the style of 
leadership to which the ~ was to be subjected. The instructions were peremp-
tory in tone, and they left no room for argument. 11) Having been 'given the 
task of re-organising the Gau by Adolf Hitler', he intended to create a 'closed 
front through fighting unity'. This was 'to be achieved within fourteen days'. 
In this allotted time-span the branch leaders had to activate their memberShip 
and :rulfil their duties to the ~ and Reichslei tung. A mixture of 1:hreat and 
appeal to the pride and 'conscience' of fue branch leaders was to effect this 
transformation: 'Branch leaders and branches not doing their duty ••• cannot 
expect the right to voice their opinions. The instructions of the Gauleitun, 
must be obeyed without fail. The relationship between branch and ~ is depen-
dent on them doing their duty. I expect that fue branch leaders have enough 
pride to realise what they have to do.' 
Wagner was just the type of ruthless individual ideal for organiSing the 
Westphalian National Socialists. His long experience as district leader of 
Bochum, which contained the bulk of Gau westphalia' s branches and members in 
the 'twenties, had enabled him to develop his own prinCiples of leadership. 
During the period 1925 to 1928 ~e had been a most active speaker for 1:he party, 
which brought him into oontaot not on~ with party offioials throughout the ~. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
9) Schaumburg-Lippe ultimately became part of ~ westphalia-North in January 
1931. 
10) Wagner had taken charge, on a provisional basis, of Gau Ruhr in July 1928 
folloVling an interview with Hitler on 21 July. His appointment to head Gau 
Westphalia was effeotive from Ootober - see "Parteigenossen Gau Ruhr" Bochum 
8 November 1928: HA 5/136. ' • 
11) For the following see wagner's circular "Parteigenossen Gau Ruhr", Bochum, 
8 November 1928: HA 5/136. 
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but also with IDaXV of the rank and file members. 12) His election to the 
Reichstag in 1928 was a fUrther advantage. 13) It furnished him with the 
freedom to roam the Gau in pursuit of party duties at the tax-payer's expense. 14 ) 
His mobility, ana the financial security ani privileges attached to his posi-
tion as a member of parliament, all helped Wagner to fUlfil his Gauleiter role. 
The major problem facing the ~ was the perennial one: the lack of funds 
at all levels of the regional organisation. The desperate position of the 
Gauleitung can be gauged from its ciroular to "the branches in August 1928, in 
which its own bad financial position and urgent need for cash were strong~ 
emphasized. 15) To sort out this and other problems Wagner ordered the whole 
of "\he party hierarohy, from the branoh level upwards, to appear at a G3.U-
fUhrerta&'lng in DOrtmund in September. Those branches which failed to send 
repre sentatives were declared 1P be 'non-existent and will be dissolved'. 16) 
That this was no idle threat can be seen in the instant removal of "the district 
leader of Lippe-Detmold, Carl Herdejost, who failed to turn up at "the meeting. 
Herdejost's excuse, namely that fue NSDAP of the Lippe-Detmold area was engaged 
in a propag3.nda drive on the day of "\he Dortmund meeting, was dismissed by 
Wagner since 'orders of the Gau take preoedence over those of the district'. 17) 
Wagner was determined to remove Herdejost because he considered him to be the 
most ,ineffective district leader in the Gau. Also perhaps he wanted to issue 
a warning to others to run their districts more effioiently. In his corres-
pondence with the Parteileitun5 Wagner deolared that Herdejost was 'absolute~ 
incapable' as his district had lost eighty per cent of its membership and 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
12) Wagner was a very popular speaker in the Gau and muoh in de~nd. On his 
speaking ability see the exaggerated eulogy in Beck: "1m Gau 'Nestfalen-
SUd gab es keinen, der stilistisoh und inhaltlich das Format der Reden 
des Gauleiters Wagner erreichen konnte. Seine Reden waren kUnstlerische 
Manifestationen eines staatsphilosophischen Geiates, die mit allen Mitteln 
ursprang11cher Rhetorik ausgestattet waren." Beck, Ope oit., p.8l. ?}l He was elected via tile Reiohsliste, the 'hospitall1st' in Weimar parlance. 
~ On the advan tage 8 to the party 0 f the MdR see Pridham, op. c1 t., pp. 79 ff •• 
15 ".An alle ortsgruppen", Elberfeld, 18 Augu at 1928: HA 5/136. 
16) "RundsChreiben", Elberfeld, 11 September 1928: HA 5/136. 
17) Wagner to Herdejost, Bochum, 17 September 1928: BAK NS 22/1076. 
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was the only region in westphalia in which nearly fifty per cent of the 1924 
poll was lost in the May Reichstag election. 18) Herdejost, although he 
accepted his removal, defended himself ~ainst wagner's accusations by pointing 
out that he had sent a representative to the Dortmund meeting, and by rejecting 
wagner's statistics concerning the decline of the party in Lippe-Detmold. 19) 
Herdejost also sought support against Wagner, and a reversal of the decision 
to remove him, from the parte11ei.tung and from ven Pfeffer who had appointed 
him in 1924. 20) A section of the largest branch in his district, that of 
Detmold, similarly appealed on Herdejost' s behalf and asked for pressure to be 
applied by 'the parteilei tung to force 'the reversal of Wagner' 8 order'. 21) 
All these efforts came to nothing. Despite Herdejost's long servioe he 
was powerless in face of wagner's insistence on his removal. The case clearly 
demonstrates the power of the Gauleiter by 1928. Wagner's emphasis on his 
a.uthority 1n his G-s.u, ,/hich can be seen in his correspondence, and his deter-
mination to organise his region as he saw fit underlines the fact that effec-
tive power could be rapidly secured by an authoritarian G-auleiter. It was all 
a question of attitude. If one compares Wagner's experience with Herdejost 
and Kaufmann's attempts to remove Terboven (who was admittedly, more powerful, 
and had evidence proving Kaufmann's misdemeanour), the difference is striking. 
Wagner imposed his dictatorial rule and enforced his will :£'rom the sta.rt. In 
his first year he not only ruled ~ Westphalia with a firm hand, rut, seeming~ 
heady with power, had. the nerve to attempt tx> give ord.ers to Gregor Strasser. 
His 'instructions' to strasser were occasioned by Wagner's failure to attract 
the 'big names' to 'the first ~ party rally to be held under him in April 
1929. Preparations for this event had been set in motion at the beginning 
. . . 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
18) Wagner to strasser/Organi8ationsabteilung ~r NSDAP, Bochum, 18 October 
1928: BAK NS 22/1076. 
19) Herdejost to Wa.gner, Detmold, 17 September and 22 September 1928: BAK 
NS 22/1076. 
20) Herdejost to Rt, Detmo1d, 25 September 1928; Herdejost to von Pfeffer, 
Detmold, 25 September 1928: BAK NS 22/1076. 
21) "An die Reichsleitung der NSDAP, Herrn A. Hitler", OG Detmold (11 
signatures), Detmold, 22 September 1928: BAK NS 22/1076. 
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of the year. The invitation to Strasser had been sent out in January, and had 
been accepted. 22) Strasser subsequently cancelled his proposed visit in order 
to prepare the election campaign in Saxo~ in mid-May. Wagner was extremely 
annoyed and gave vent 1P his anger: 'Your rather late canoellation of your 
proposed visit to our ~ rally has reached and astonished me ••• The idea 
that the Saxon election of mid-May prevents your presenoe at our Bochum con-
ferenoe ••• must be totally rejeoted. As you m~ see from the programme already 
sent to you, your non-participation is absolutely impOSSible, espeoially since 
refusals have alread,y reached us from party comrades von Epp and St5hr ••• 
In Sl\Y case, I am of the opinion that you, in your capacity as national party 
organiser, must be present at large rallies in a~~. I ask therefore for 
a telegraphic reply to let us know when you will reach Bochum on Saturday 13 
April. t 23) 
Wagner's failure to appreciate that ihe Ftlhrerprlnzip, whioh he used so 
effectively in his dealings with sub-Gau organisations, oould also affect him 
when he was dealing with tile Parteileitung, was emphasized in strasser's reply. 
Strasser pointed out that his actions were determined by tbt authority of the 
FIlhrer, who had ordered his partiCipation in the Saxon election. Stra88er also 
made it. clear that his aotions as party organiser were determined by the needs 
of' the parteilei tung, and not by ihose of an;y particular~. The' abrupt and 
intolerable viewpoint' expressed in Wagner's letter was en affront to his 
authori~. He rejected the 'impertinent formulation of the latter on disci-
plinary grounds'. 24) Wagner's oollision with strasser taught him a lot a.bout 
the manner with which he had "to deal with the central party authorities. He 
did not repeat his mistake. Although he retained his authorita.rian, assertive 
tone in his ~ instructions, his correspondenoe with the Parteileitung was 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
22) Wagner to G. Strasser, Bochum, 18 Janu~ 1929; Strasser to GL Westphalia, 
28 Janua~ 1929: BAK NS 22/1076. 
23) Wagner to G. strasser, Bochum, 7 April 1929: BAK NS 22/1076. 
24) strasser to Wagner, Munich, 15 April 1929: BAKNS 22/1076. 
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framed in the light of hia experience. When Wagner deemed that Strasser's 
presence 'was urgently necessary' at a ~ ccnference in Jaruary 1931, his 
appeal was couched in more respectful language: 'would you please appear at 
the meeting if possible'. 25) ~ that time the two had established a friendly 
relationship, and. the initial clash was a matter of history. The harmonious 
relationship between Wagner and Strasser is demonstrated by the warm letter 
of thanks by strasser to Wagner in December 1930, in which he emphasized his 
pleasure at the 'smooth co-operation' establiShed between himself, in his 
capacity as party organiser, and Wagner as gauleiter. 26) 
Between 1928 ani 1930 Wagner had transformed the NSDAP in ~ Westphalia 
from a minority splinter group into a party which stood in the forefront of 
affairs. The dramatic change in the party's position was in step with the 
national development of the party in this period. The various means of measur-
log the party's progress, such as increase in membership, electoral support, 
organisationa.l strength, all indicate growth and. expanaion. Part of the 
explanation for tile rapid rise of the movement is related to the nature and 
activism of tile party. Part of the answer lies in environmental factors: the 
combination of an acute economic and. political crisis which faced Germaqy 
from 1929 onwards. Nothing assisted the party more than the collapse of the 
economy. It was the fear of an economic crisis fraa 1929 onwards, especially 
among the middle class, which drove people towards the Nazi movement. 27) It 
was the reality of the crisis which stimUlated membership and. electoral sup-
port from 1930 onwards. The NSDAP, with its aggressive, opportunist leader-
ship at the national, regional and. looal levels, backed up by an efficient 
propaganda machine, flourished in the gloom. 
The most obvious sign of economic difficulties was the rapid increase in 
the number of unemplqyed from 1928 onwards. In Westphalia the number of 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
25) Wagner to strasser, Bochum, 22 December 1930: BAK NS 22/1076. 
26) strasser to Wagner, Munich,24 December 1930: ibid •• 
27) Cf. the example of flortheim, in W.S. Allen, 't'he Nazi Seizure of Power. 
The Experience of a. Single German Town 1930-1935, London", 1966, p.24. 
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28) recipients of unemployment pay more than doubled. between 1929 and 1930. 
Hardest hit was the heavy industrial zone of the inner Ruhr, where the number 
of unemp1qyed increased from 14.9 per 1,000 population in 1929 to 40.5 per 
1,000 by 1930. In the iron and metal-working regions of the Sauer1und and 
Sieger1~1d a similar deterioration occurred, with unemployment running on 
average at 16.7 per 1,000 in 1929 and 36.6 per 1,000 in 1930. The growth of 
unemployment placed great strains on the financial resour~es of the towns. The 
demanda on them caused by ever expanding unemployment and welfare payments 
resulted in deficit budgeting in a number of towns throughout the province. 
The difference between income and expenditure rose sharply as the crisis 
deepened: 
1928/29 
Deficit (in R.v.) 
1929/30 1930/31 
Dortmund. 
Mttnster 
Hagen 
Bielefeld 
Bochum 
Gelsenkirchen 
Herne 
Witten 
9,500,000 
560,000 
4,456,000 
7,600,000 
1,000,000 
1,500,000 
),617,500 
1,145,766 
800,000 
17,843,500 
7,977,600 
6,153,400 
3,703,856 
1,96),370 
One immediate consecpence of the financial crisis was a curtailment of expen-
diture on public projects, which further exacerbated the 81lployment situation. 
Public works were postponed as more income was diverted towards ameliorating 
the plight of the unempl~Jed. The example of Bochum suffices to illustrate 
the difficulties facing fue authorities: 
1930/31 
1931/32 
Expend! tum 
51,050,000 
56,073,950 
Income 
50,26},400 
48,096,350 
Welfare Ex:pendi ture 
11,640,400 
19,619,700 )0) 
The economic recession vmich hit the provinoe in 1929 was characterised 
by the reduction in the use of the productive capacity of industry and the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
28) For the fol1ofling see the reports by the Landesarbei tsamt of Westphalia 
for 1929, 1930 and 1931 in WNA K2/4l0. 
29) "Entwicklung der Finanzwirtschaft verschiedener SUdte", Bodlum DIK, )0 
April 1931: WtlA K2/743. 
30) "Etat Bochum", n.d., copy in Vi'o'IA K21743. 
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increase in plant closure due to lack of demand or bankruptcy. The lack of 
capital, the high credit rates, and the uncompetitive position of German indus-
tIY in the contracting export market, sapped the vitality of industry. The 
major concern of industrio.lists was to survive by restricting costs to the 
31) bare minimum. By 1930 Westphalian industry was contracting on all fronts. 
The chief rufferer was the iron and steel industry. In the Dortmund region 
alone the decline of output in this industrial sector fell by 36.8 per cent 
in the first year of the depression. 32) Hagen, heavily dependent on the iron 
and steel industry, was particularly hard-hit. Between 1930 and 1932 12 metal 
processing pla.nts went bankrupt, 3 further iron and steel works were closed, 
and 9 others were reduced to work at low capaci~. The ccnsequence was a 
rapid rise in unemployment, vilich reached 31 per cent by 1932, of which about 
halt' consisted of metal-workers. 33) Other branches of ind1stry show similar 
patterns of development. The textile inO-lstry of the MUnsterland. was working 
at 80 per cent of its capacity by the end of 1929. 34) The important brewing 
industry of central westphalia cut back output by 20 per cent between July 
1929 and July 1930 owing to a decline in deunni occasioned by 'the bad economic 
position and the decline in the purchasing power of the population, which has 
cut consumption by 30 per cent'. 35) 
Hard hit from the very beginning of the crisis was 1he retail trade, the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
31) The dilemma facing industry brcught au t in a report, typical of many of 
the period, by the Lohmann and Stolterfoht AG in 1930. In it 1he develop-
ments during 'the financial year 1929/30 are S.unmari8ed as 'cheerless'. A 
former export trade of 40 per cent haa 8unk to zero by 1930; the plant was 
only able 1x> keep going by outting prices to oover the bare production 
costs and operating at a slight 108s; productive capacity was cut by 30 
per cent due to declining demand - report by Maschinenfabrik Lohma.nn and 
Sto1terfoht AG, Witten, to IfiK BoChum, 24 September 1930: WWA K2/49; see 
also X'e,Port on iron and steel industry, nm: Dortmund, 26 February 1930: 
W.vA K2/284. 
32) Report by nne Dortmuna for September 1930: W.'fA K2/284. 
33) Hildenbrand, Ope cit., pp.29-30. 
34) "Monatliche Wirtschaftsberichte aer Mitg1ieaskammern und Zweckverbandes 
der IHKn Bochum, Dortmuna, EBBen und MUnster", 29 JaIllary 1930: WYIA K2/284. 
35) Report by IHK Dortmund, July 1930: VNiA K2/284. ]\lrther repcrt by Verband 
Rheinland-Westfalen Brauereien, Dortmund, 28 July 1930: vrNA K2/49. 
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position of which rapidly approached 'catastrophe'. By January 1930 many 
medium-sized and small shops were in a 'crisis situation'. After years of 
constant expansion since the inflation of 1923, 1929 proved a year of regres-
sion for all retailers, including the larger chain-stores. 36) In the course 
of 1930 the situation of the retail trade deteriorated month by month. The 
decline of the purchasing power of the population as unemployment and short-
time working increased, and the generally uncertain economic situation led to 
constant contraction of turn-over. By the end of 1930 only the barest neces-
sities were being purchased by the consumers. Some branches were especia11y 
hard-hit, such as the shoe trade, and the textile trade in general, 'which 
really sold only cheap goods'. Durable goods, such as household implements, 
were rarely bought as reduced incomes were used in the purchase of foodstuffs. 37 ) 
Inevitably in this situation numerous businesses collapsed while efforts to 
promote consumption and turn-over, such as special sales, reached 1u~icrous 
proportions. 38) Increased too, was the demand for credit, especially in 
the groceries. This embarrassed shopkeepers who felt obliged to extend credit, 
which faced them in turn with a ri,sing volume of debt to the wholesalers. 39) 
The net result of the situation was a decline in retail turn-over of between 
20 and )0 per cent in September 1930 in comparison with September 1929. 40) 
The worsening economic situation triggered off fears and resentments 
which were exploited and encouraged by the propa~anda of the radical Left and 
Right. The most constant theme at Nazi meetings was the existing misery and 
the threatening economic situation. An anticipated bankruptcy of the German 
state was prophesied with great enthusiasm by the Nazi speakers in a number 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
36) "Allgemeiner Bericht tIber die wirtschaftliche und wirtschaftsTlol1 tische 
Lage des Einzelhande1s", Bochum IHK, 17 January 19301 WWA K2/49. 
37) Reports on the retail trade by the IHK Bochum, 25 Februa:ry, 29 March, 
28 May, 27 June, 28 August and 27 September 1930. WWA K2/284. On the 
effects of the depression on the retail trade in general see the study 
by H.A t Winkler, OPe cit., pp.3J-J4. 
38) See especially the report by the IHK Bochum, 28 August 19301 WWA K2/284. 
39) Reports on retail trade by IHK Bochum, 27 June and 28 August 1930. WWA 
K2/284. 
40) Report by IHK Bochum, 27 September 1930. WWA K2/284. 
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of meetings throughout Westphalia, which occasionally had quite dramatic 
consequences. Thus a series of Nazi meetings in County Halle in February 
1930, in which district leader Homann spoke on the theme 'Germany facin~ 
State Bankruptcy', led to a run on the Versmold Savings Bank. 41) In the 
uncertain economic climate of the period the Nazi prophecy of doom found 
many believers. The political consequence was a rapid rise in the support 
for the extreme political parties, the KPD and NSDAP. The Nazis derived 
greater advantage than the Communists. Starting from a much lower base, the 
rapid increase in support catapulted the NSDAP into the forefront of politics. 
This is not to say that the emergence to prominence of the NSDAP can be 
explained purely qy the simple equation 'depression equals Nazi growth'. 
Another key factor was the ability of the party to capitalise on the unrest. 42) 
The existence of an efficient party organisation, built up since 1925, the 
flexibility and adaptability of Nazi propaganda, and the activism of the 
party in general are all crucial factors which help to explain the growth of 
Nazism in the post-1928 period. 
The available evidence makes it clear that the year 1929 represents an 
important turning-point in the fortunes of the Westphalian NSDAP. From the 
beginning of 1929 the party was able to record progress once more after a 
period of stagnation between 1927 and 1928. In parts of the Gau the party 
had experienced a considerable decline in members after the growth years of 
1925 and 1926. In the Ge1senkirchen area the party fared particularly badly. 
Between January 1927 and December 1928 the membership of the branches 5i tua-
ted in the Gelsenkirchen-Recklinehausen region declined by just over 42 per 
cent, from 735 to 418. 43) The Mfinster branch lost over a quarter of its 
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41) Report by Landrat, Halle 1/W., 18 February 1930. SAD MI IP/604. 
42) "Das Anwachsen der Bewegung beruht in erster Lin1e auf der Unzufrieden-
heit der Bev8lkerung, hervorgerufen durch die ungUnstigen wirtschaftlichen 
Verhlltnisse. Dieser Umstand wird von der NSDAP z.Zt. mit Erfolg aus-
genutzt" - from a report by the Police PreSident, Bielefeld, 22 April 
1930' SAD MI IP/625. 
43) Report by police covering the Po11zeibezirk of Recklinghausen, 12 January 
1929' SAM VII - 2 Bi. 6. 
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44 ) 
members in one year. The year 1929 was to see a reversal of the trend, 
with expansion being recorded on all fronts. A report on the Dortmun~ dis-
trict, an area in which 'the terror of the KPD made propaganda very difficult', 
noted the 'tremendous surge' towards the party in 1929. Constant house to 
house canvassing and continuous agitation at public meetings and demonstrations 
resulted in the formation of several new branches and membership increases 
in eXisting branches ranging from 150 to 400 per cent. 45) Such success 
spurred the rank and file to pursue their party's cause still more vociferously. 
The Nazi appeal produced a response from those sections of society made 
vulnerable by the economic difficulties of the period. The party made further 
inroads into the ranks of the working class, which already provided it with 
much support in the Ruhr towns. 46) The unemployed in general, but especially 
unemployed youths, were given special attention by the NSDAP in the big Ruhr 
towns. By copying the Communist tactic of intensive propaganda at the labour 
exchanges the Nazis secured 'significant success' in attracting working class 
supporters. 47) Other social groupings also responded to the party. For the 
first time in its history the NSDAP secured widespread support in the Protestant 
counties of southern and eastern Westphalia. The acute agrarian crisis, which 
had set in long before industry collapsed, moved even the dour Westphalian 
fanner to respond to the overtures of the NSDAP. 48) In the first half of 
1930 another main feature of the party's development was the sizeable influx 
of members drawn from the middle class. 49) The growing sympathy for th~ 
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44) The membership of the branch declined from 87 in December 1926 to 61 by 
December 1927 - Orlow, OPe cit., p.lll. 
45) Report on the "Bezirksvertretertagung, Bezirk Gross-Dortmund", 2 February 
1930; copy in SAM VII - 67 Ed. I. 
46) Claims made in the Gau newspaper me Nene F'r('l1'Jt contained some t!'Uthl 
"Das Anwachsen der Nationalsozialisten ist das Versap;en der deutschen 
Linken, und es ist nicht zu verheimlichen, dass auch ein grosser Teil 
der nach Links geh8renden Schichten der Gewerbst~ti~en zu dem neuen Idol 
wie zu dem Messias emporsieht', Die Neue Front, 9 May 1930. 
47) Police report, Bochum, 20 October 1930. SAM VII - 1 Ed. 1. 
48) See the regort by the Regierungspr~sidenten Minden, 23 August 1929' 
SAD NI IP/604. 
49) See especially police report, Reckiinehausen, 30 May 1930, SAM VII _ 
67 Ed. 1. , 
Nazis among the middle class in general was very important because it eased 
their financial situation. Sympathetic elements from the professional classes, 
factory owners, shopkeepers and civil servants, people who could not or would 
not join the ~rty openly for personal or professional reasons, supported the 
Nazis materially" through a 'neutral' front organisation founded by the party 
specifically to tap such 'hidden' support, called the Deutsche Freiheitsbllno. 
The organisation did not hold public meetings, nor did its members meet or 
know each other. The voluntary gifts and payments made by the secret bene-
factors of the NSDAP were collected from time to time by the branch leaders 
or branch treasurers, who kept a special membership list. The only direct 
connection between the members of the League and the Nazi party was a special 
pass carried by the former. Although the organisation played an important 
role in the movement, to describe it as 'the financial backbone of the NSDAP', 
may well have been an exaggeration. 50) 
The growth rate of the party in Westphalia from 1929 is impressive. In 
January 1930 the total enrolled membership, according to reliable police con-
tacts inside the party, was 3,500. 51) In 1930 applications to join the NSDAP 
swamped the party bureaucracy. Major growth centres, such as the Bochum branch, 
which alone had a membership of 2,100 by July 1930, were unable to cope with 
the flood of applications and had to refuse new members for some time. In 
the case of Bochum no new members were admitted between I July and 1 October, 
by which time the backlog had been cleared. 52) Official figures published 
after the 'seizure of power' gave the Westphalian Gau a membership of 5,779 
by 1 September 1930. 53) Within two months membership figures jumped by over 
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50) The 'Deutsche Freiheitsbund' is the subject of two reports by the police 
president of Bochum, 30 October 1930' SAM VII - 67 Ed. It and the police 
president of Bielefeld, 6 November 1930' SAD MI IP/625. 
51) Report by Police President, Pcchum, 9 January 1930' SAM VII .. 67 Bel. 1. 
52) Police report, Bochum, 3 October 1930s SAM VII - 67 Bel. 1. 
53) Parteistatistik. Stand 1 Januar 1935. Herausgeber Dar Reichsorganisatlons. 
leiter der NSDAP, Band I, p.26. A contemporary police report based on 
'reliable information' estimated the party membership on 1 September 1930 
at 11,500 - police report, Bochum, 3 October 1930s SAM VII .. 67 Ed. 1. 
, ! 
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500 per cent. According to ~ statistics, by 31 October 1930 Westphalia 
had a total enrolled membership of 32,186. 54) The breakthrough by the NSDAP 
in -the September Reichstag election undoubtedl,y improved the fortunes of the 
party, producing a bandwagon effect. A section of the newly enrolled members, 
called 'Septemberlinge' by the 'old' Nazis, were probably Konjunkturritter, 
attracted by what was now a succe8Sful and. powerful movement. By the time 
the ~ was divided into ~ 'Westphalia-North and -South in January 1931 the 
membership was estimated. to be 36,500. 55) 
The Westphalian NSDAP had a strong working class base. To describe the 
movement as the 'Salvation Army cf the Lumpenproletariat and Lumpenbourgeoisie' 
by 1930 was neither accurate nor adequate. 56) The scuthern section of 'the 
~, ~ Westphalia-South as it became in Jawary 1931, had the highest per-
centage of blue-collar workers in proportion to 'the total Gau membership of 
all the 32 Gaue into which the NSDAP was divided by September 1930. 57) A 
statistical breakdown for September 1930 gives the following: 
Occupa ti on group Society NSDAP Westph.-N. Westph.-S. 
Workers 45.9 28.1 32.4- 35.3 
White-collar workers 12.0 25.6 28.1 29.6 
Self-employed 9.0 20.7 19.6 19.3 
Civil servants 5.1 8.3 5.7 5.9 
Farmers 10.6 14.0 6.1 2.4 
Others 17.4 3.3 8.1 7.5 58) 
The data provided by Wagner to the parteilei tung concerning 'the oanpo si tion 
of "the NSDAP in the 'inner inrustria1 area of Westphalia', which excluded 
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54) 
55) 
56) 
57) 
58) 
"An die RL der NSDAP - Organisationsabteilung", NSDAP Gau Westfalen, 
7 November 1930 - copy in SAM vn - 67 Bd. 1 •. This figure probably 
included a large percentage of !!l1pporters who were not contributing 
regular membership dues. 
Police report, Bochum, 21 January 1931: SAM VII - 67 3d. 2. This esti-
mate is too high; at its formationGau Westphalia-North had a membership 
of only 4,256: "Statistlk Gau W.-N." 1.6.1931: copy in SAD MI IP/607. 
Gall Westphalia-South had. a total membership of 24,214 by Jaruary 1933: 
Farteistatistik, Ope cit., p.26. 
Thus the KPD's MUnster paper VOlksdlle,· 18 July 1930. 
Parteistatistik, Ope cit., p.138. 
Compiled from statistics given by Sch!fer, OPe cit., p.17 and from 
Parteistatistik, Ope cit., p.146. 
" 
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the agrarian regions of the MUnsterland, Sauerland, and eastern Westphalia, 
emphasize the working class basis of the party. According to Wagner's figures, 
57.7 per cent of the party was made up of 'workers' J of whom 26.2 per cent were 
miners, While what Wagner called 'Mittelst!ndler' accounted for only 19.5 per 
cent. The other categories listed were 'civil servants and employees', which 
totalled 18.1 per cent (sub-divided into 5.?,per cent 'lower', 3.1 per cent 
'middle', and 9.3 per cent 'higher'), 2.0 per cent 'Freie Berufe', and 'Others', 
numbering 1.4 per cent. 59) The high percentage of 'workers' belonging to the 
party in "the Ruhr industrial belt, o:>uble the NSDAP's national average, reflec-
ted the fact that 75 to 80 per cent of the population of the industrial region 
consisted of 'workers'. 60) Thus the party in the area had. to be working 
class based, and despite the high percentage of working class support, workers 
were still under-represented given the cir~stances prevalent in the Ruhr. 
The percentage of 'Mittelstllndler' was, on the other hand, extremely high given 
the comparatively weak middle class in the indUltrial belt. 
The rapid and enormous increase in party member!Jhip necessitated and 
resulted in a significant expansion of the network of party branches in the 
~. From 1929 onwards the Nazis were able to penetrate 'the province in a 
much more systematic fashion and establish a series of new branches in areas 
previousJ.,y hardly affected by the movement. By April 1930 the ~ organisation 
consisted of ten districts controlling 118 branches. 61) By 'the time of the 
ReichstaG election expansion had necessitated the creation of three further 
districts and the number of branches had increased beyond the 200 mark. 62) 
The major growth areas caltinued to be traditional stralgholds of "the party in 
the urban, industrial centres •. The, districts of Bodhum, Dortmund"Bielefeld, 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
59) "An die RL der NSDAP-Organisationsabteilung", NSDAP Gau Westfalen, Bochum, 
7 November 1930. Copy in SAM VII - 67 Bd. 1. (Wagner 'lost' 1.3 per cent). 
60) Report by Police President, Bocwm, 21 November 1930 concerning the "Rund-
schreiben der NSDAP Gau Westfalen 7 November 1930": SAM VII - 67 Bd. 1. 
61) Police reports, Bochum, 1 and 24 April 1930: SAM VII - 67 Bd. 1. 
62) Police report, Gelsenkirchen, 17 July 1930j report by Police President, 
Bochum, 16 September 1930: SA~ VII - 67 Bd. 1. 
.. , 
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Lenne-Volme and Ruhl'-Ennepe headed fue Glluleiter's growth charts for May and 
Ju13. Significant growth also occurred in fue predominantly agrarian regions 
of central and eastern Westphalia, including fuose counties in which Catholicism 
predominated. The Sauerland and Mansterland areas saw the creation of numerous 
branches and a much deeper penetration by the party. 63) 
The success of the Westphalian NSDAP in engaging increasing Slpport is 
measured by the statistical data noted above. The electoral breakthrough of 
September 1930, and the SUdden Slrge of membership in the September and November 
period of 1930, emphasize the progress of the party. By the end of 1930 the 
overall strength of G-au Westphalia was sufficient to allow fue division of 
the ~ into ~ Westphalia-North and WestphalifrSouth, to ccnform with the 
national pattern of ~ equating with electoral district. 
The SA. 
In the development of tile NSDAP the SA played. a crucial role. Its impor-
tance rested on tile funct iOn of the organisation within the ovem 11 party 
effort. Westphalian SA leaders were in no d.oubt as to the value of the SA 
to the NSDAP. Since they considered the NSDAP as 'a state witilin the state', 
the SA was regarded as the cutting edge of tile Nazi state, 'the sword of the 
movement'. In the words of SA-leader Voss, the SA was 'not a wander club, nor 
a Stahlhelm organisation. Our main function is to destroy the Marxist terror. 
The SA has to conquer the streets and fuus prepare the ground for the conquest 
of the people.' 64-) Throughout the 'pe riod of stNggle' the SA formed the 
'propaganda. corps of the movement', a ruthless, rowqy, activist terror orga-
nisation, a rallying point for the most fanatioal members of the party. 65) 
For the ~owth of Nazism in westphalia the presenoe of effective strong-arm 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Vergleichende tfuersidlt nber die Mitglied.erzahlen im Gau Westfalenlt, 
(n.d., covers the May and July period of 1930); copy in SAM VlI - 67 Bd. 1. 
Extract fran a speech by SA lea.der Voss at the Bez1rksvertretertagung of 
Gross-Dortmund, 2 Februa~ 1930; copy in a~ VII - 67 Bd. 1. 
On the Westphalian SA see Beck, op. cit., p.99 ff.; on the propaganda 
activi ties ot the SA in general see zema.n, op. ci t., pp.13 ff •• 
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squads was a basic necessity. The hostili~ of the Left, especial~ that of 
the Communists, made life very difficul t for the radical Right. In most urban 
centres it was impossible for the Nazis to pUI'3ue active propaganda and to 
hold public meetings before an SA had been created. 66) As tile party developed, 
the protective function of the SA became more and more important in vie".v of 
the greater interest taken in the NSDAP by i t5 poli tica 1 opponents, who were 
not averse to using force. The motto coined by Heinz Neumann, a member of the 
Communist Central Par~ Committee, 'Slay the fascists where you meet them', 
became a reality in the terror waged by the Communists against the Nazis in 
the late nineteen-twenties. The histor,r of the ~estpha1ian SA testifies to 
the. effectiveness of the opposition by the Left. The years after 1925 were 
marked by an escalating number of physica.l conflicts and street-level ccn-
frontations. Although the intensity of public bwlessness increased after 
1930, the type of violence employed by the opposing factions did not change 
fundamentally. The originators of much of -the brutali~ ocourring in the 
brawls and street battles were the Nazie themselves. In their deeire to a.ttract 
attention and tn anphasize their radioalism, artY' method was used to intimidate 
their political opponents. 67) 
The first recorded 1vestphaUan 'Stonn Troop' was that founded at Hagen 
in -the spring of 1922 to protect Nazi party meetings from the disruptive tac-
tics of lef't-:-wing opponents. 68) During the Ruhr occupation a number of 
v~lkisch-National Socialist commando group s emerged which were akin to SA 
groups and \\bich accepted the overall authorit;y of the Munioh SA Oberkommando. 69) 
After the Munich putsch fiasco, these organisatiOns severed their connections 
wi th the NSDAP. The re-app~rance of a specifically Nazi para-military organi-' 
sation occurred in the au 1llmn of' 1924 at a meeting in Bochum. This saw the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
66) 
67) 
68) 
69) 
Beck, Ope cit., p.100. 
Cf. the example of the Berlin SA in Broszat, 'Die Anf!nge der Berliner 
NSDAP', Ope cit., pp.90 ff' •• 
Rote Tribune, 28 April 1922. 
See Chapter 4, p.I52. 
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formation of a Bochum SA, which beoame the nucleus of what was later called 
'Regiment Ruhr'. 70) The tBA.-Regiment Ruhr' expanded in the course of 1925 
with the formation of a number of small SA groups in Hattingen, Gelsenkirchen, 
Euer, Herne, Dortmund and Hagen. 71) The growth enjoyed by "the NSDAP after 
the re-orgrmisation of the party in 1925 also led to the emergence of SA for-
mations in many of the newly founded branches. 
The functions of the SA were varied. The organisation proteoted par~ 
meetings, engaged in propaganda marches, participated in the eleotion campai6ns, 
and generally stood in the forefront of "the pol! tical struggle waged by the 
Nazis. 72) In view of the small membership of individual SA groups combined 
action by the regional SA quickly became the order of the day. Party rallies, 
'G-erman Days', and the rare visits to the ~ by Hitler were all occasions at 
which the whole ~ SA was mustered to impress the population and protect the 
movement from outside interference. In the course of' fulfilling these functions 
and in the numerous clas'hes and street brawls, the SA formations developed 
an esprit de corys and an SA mythology which bound the heterogeneous member-
ship together. The feeling of comradeship developed in the physical conflicts, 
the continuous emphasis in SA propaganda of the need for the SA member to 
saorifice all for the movement, the nags, uniforms and fascist salute had 
considerable significance in the creation of internal unity and the cultiva-
tion of an elitist attitude. 73) 
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70) Report by -the G-au SA Flihrung to the PL of the NSDAP, (n. d., probably 
summer of 1926): BAK NS I/342. P\1rther Beck, Ope ci. t., p.llO. 
71) Beck, Ope cit., pp.110 ff •• 
72) For an account of an SA group 'in action' see "the example provided by 
the Bielefeld SA in Hiemisch, OPe Cit., pp.23 ff' •• 
73) Cf. "Richtlinien" of the Bielefeld SA (1925): 
"11. pnege Val Kameradschaft ist die Vorbedingung f'!1r ein Zusammen-
geh5rigskei tsgef6.hl ••• . 
12. Die Fahne ist das Symbol unseres Freihei tskampfes. Unsere 
Treue gilt ihr bis zum Tode ••• 
13. Nur der 1st wUrdig dar SA a.nzugeh~ren, der sich jederzeit klar 
darftber ist, dass er vork!mpfer und Wegbereiter Adolf Hitlers ist, der die 
Macht des G-egners kennt, und daher auch weiss, dass nur unaufbBrliche 
Arbeit un sere Bewegung ZUllI Siege ftlhren kann, ferner der Ctle Bewe{;Un8 dber 
seine Person stell t, al s hinge von ibm und seinem Handeln das Schicksal der 
Bewegung ab ••• " 
From Hiemisch, Ope cit., p.25. 
• 
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The o rgani sa tion of t.~e Westphalian SA was rudimentary in tile first years 
of its existence. Apart from the presence of a ~~u S~leader there was little 
to be seen of a ~ SA hierarchical structure. 74) The individual SA groups 
were relatively autonomous and determined their own programme in the light o~ 
local ocnditions and resouroes. The oreation of a sy~tematic organisational 
structure and the development of the SA's 'Party Army' image occurred in the 
autumn of 1926. The turning point in the organisational history of the SA 
came with Hitl~r' s appointment o~ von Pfeffer to lead. the SA in the .summer of 
1926. 75) The latter proved an outstanding administrator and. in a series of 
over 20 sA 'orders' and directives from 1926 onwards he gave the SA a solid 
national and regional organis:.\. tional structure oentralised. on 14unioh. The 
major feature of '\he re-organisation waS the sepa.ration of the SA from the 
political organisation of the party. This secured. an independ.ent position for 
the SA, emphasized for example by the fact that from the summer of 1927 onwards 
the party Usohla no longer retained. jurisdiction over the SA members. 76) That 
this separation could lead to problens with ibe poU tical leaders of tile party 
was recognised by von Pfeffer from the start. 77) The re-organisation demanded 
a fundrumtal re-adjustment on the part of poU tical leaders who viewed the SA 
as part and parcel of their local and regional organisations. There was also 
a considerable overlap in personnel, and many a branch leader was also local 
SA leader. 78) Under von Pfeffer's regime such a fusion of 'power' was no 
longer feasible since no party member was allowed to hold SA and political 
posts simultaneouslY. This situation opened the door to rivalry and tension 
between the SA and the party, occasioned by wl1;1t were of'ten petty squabbles 
over matters of authority and jurisdiction. 79) 
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74) 
75l 76 
77 
78) 
79) 
Hiemisch, Ope cit., p.25. 
For the following TYrell, Ope cit., pp.226 ff.; Horn, Ope cit., pp.288 fr •• 
Cf. "GRUSA III", 3 June 1921, reprinted. in Jochmann, Ope cit., pp.266-268. 
Von Pfeffer to the Gauleiter, Munich, 1 Ootober 1929; reprinted in Tyrell, 
Ope cit., p.234. 
See the example of Bielefeld in Hiem1sch, OPe cit., p.ll. 
Thus the dispute between 'tile Brunswick branch and lo~l SA leaders in May 
1927 as to whether or not the branoh leader could ban the taking of a flag 
to a meeting! See Noakes, OPe cit., p.182. 
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In Westphalia the re-organisation of the SA was carried out smoothly. 
The only serious recorded conflict between 1he SA ani the party was occasioned 
by a power struggle wi thin the SA before von Pfeffer' 8 measures were announced. 
The dispute accompanied the fusion of ~ Westphalia and Rhineland-North in 
March 1926, which led to a re-organisation of the ~ Ruhr SA under Lutze, the 
old SA leader of Rhineland-North. His appointment was resented by the W'est-
phalian sA leader Herzog, who 'found it difficul t 11:> subordinn te himself' to 
the new ~ SA leader. 80) ,The dispute between Lutze and Herzog widened to 
affect the relationship with the regional party leadership in the summer of 
1926 owing to the appointment of Kaufmann as sole GaUleiter, a development which 
also upset Herzog. The triangular squabble which arose after his appointment 
was only solved by Hitler's direct intervention in a dispute which threatened 
to tear the ~ to pieces. 81) 
Under Lutze the RUhr SA expanded rapidly in 1926 and 1927. The SA shared 
in the general growth of the party after 1926. By January 1929, according to 
party records, the Ruhr SA was one of 1ile bright spots in the national develop-
ment of the SA. The Westphalian SA was -the fourth stroogest ~ organisation 
in Germaqr. 82) By the autumn of 1929 the total strength of the Westphalian 
SA was 1,250, organised in 39 units. The party machine could tws wield a 
useful instrument of terror in its efforts iP persuade the population to take 
notice of the 'CAUse'. By farfue largest units were attached to the growing 
urban branches of Bochum (165 strong), Dortmund (177), Hattingen (108), 
Gelsenkirchen-Buer (83), Hagen (50), and Herne (80). 83) SA recruitment was 
assisted by the ban on the Stahlhelm para-military organisation in Rhineland-
Westphalia on 8 October 1929. 84) The NSDAP and 1ile SA were -the chief bene-
ficiaries of the ban, which was usea to attract the 'homeless' Stahlhelm 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
80) Gau SA Fnhrung to PL NSDAP, (n.d.); BAK NS I/342. 
81) Report by Kaufmann to PL Munich, July 1926: BAK NS I/342. 
82) "Statistischen RUckbliCk auf das Kampfjahr 1929"~ BAK Sammlung Schumacher, 
415. 
83) Copy of li st of units comprising -the "Gausturm Westfalen SA", dated 15 
November 1929 in SAD 141 IP/604. 
84) On the background to the ban see Berghahn, Ope cit., pp.131 ff •• 
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members. From mid-October a steaqy influx of Stahlhelm members into the SA 
and NSDAP was observed by the authorities .. 85) In isolated cases whole~­
~ branches transfered their allegiance to the Nazis. with ne.v SA groups 
being drawn entirely from the converts. 86) 
In 1930 the SA continued to grow rapi~ despite legislation designed to 
restrict the organisation. The uniform ban imposed on the SA in Prussia on 
11 June 1930. though 'observed ever,rwhere', had little effect on its develop-
ment. 87) The Westphalian ~ SA hierarcqy, in the light of the ban on the 
Stahlhelm, had expected much more drastic action by the authorities, and had 
prepared plans to oounter a ban of the whole movement. In the spring of 1930 
the regional party press encouraged SA members to join branches of the Nazi 
dominated 'Deutsche Turnerbund', whioh was to be the front organisation designed 
to keep the SA intact in the event of a ban. The SA responded to the advioe 
and prepared itself to go underground. The consequence of the tactic was the 
appearance of a number of new branches of the 'Deutsche Turnerbund' throughout 
the province. 88) In the event a total ban on the SA did not materialise, 
though the possibility of such aotion was considered by the authorities. It 
was rejected on the grounds of impracticability I since the SA did not form a 
close, united organisation with a legal status of its own'. 89) 
Apart fran the uniform ban, which created some organisational handicaps, 
the SA had serious internal problems to contend with in the late nineteen-
twenties. The major difficulV limiting the effectiveness of 'the organisation 
was its poor financial situation. The rapid expansion of party activity,' and 
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85) Police report, Reoklinghausen, 17 December 1929; Police reports, Bochum, 
23 December 1929 and 19 Febru~ 1930: S~~ VII - 65. Police report, 
Recklinghausen. 11 January 1930: SAM VII - 2 Bd. 6. 
86) See the case of the NSDAP branch at Enger, which reoeived 'a oonsiderable 
membership influx' following the absorption of a oomplete Stahlhelm branch. 
On the basis of the influx a new sA unit numbering 30 members was founded _ 
police reports, Bielefe1 a., 22 April and 16 July' 1930: SAD !If I IP/625. 
87) Report by Police President, Bielefeld, 16 July' 1930: SAD lU IP/625. 
88) See the lengthy report on the 'Deutschen Tumerbund' and its connections 
with the SA by the police, Bochum, 4 April 1930: SAri VII - 67 Bd. 1. 
In tie same file - police report, MUnster, 31 May 1930. 
89) Circular by Oberprlsident, MUnster 21 November 1929; report by Regierungs-
pr!1sident, Minden, 14 December 1929: SAD MI IP/604. 
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the pressure this placed on the SA, outstripped its financial, and huma.n, 
capabilities. On the national level the party leadership attempted to ease 
the problem by calling on the party branches to form 'Di3Positionsfond' to 
finance the SA. These were to be created through 'voluntary' contributions 
made by the rank and file membership, every member being oalled upon to 
contribute 10 .MW.a.. 90) This appeal was merely a repetition of previous ones 
which had failed to meet with much response. In 1930 the financial situation 
of the SA became more acute with the suspension of the SA tax, which had pre-
viously been raised by the ~ and sent to Munich, to be redistributed to the 
various ~ SA. 91) The end of the tax placed the SA in the position of 
greater direct dependence on the goodwill of the political leadership. Since 
the politioal w:ing of the party was constantly short of £bnds to meet its own 
obligations, payments to tile SA were not always fully met. For the SA ade-
quate financial support was especiall,y crucial at the time because of the 
large number of unemployed within its ranks, a number whioh increased ail the 
economic depression deepened. 92) The demand! made on the SA escalated dra-
matically in 1930. Propaganda marohes, election meetings, house to house 
oanvassing and numerous other duties burdened the SA at a time when the orga-
nisatian was in constant readiness to assist the party, a !i tuation which 
taxed the endurance of the membership. 93) In the summer of 1930 the tension 
and strain brought to a head the latent calflict between party and SA and Von 
Pfeffer reSigned in AUgust. He felt, as did so many within the SA, that the 
organisation was not receiving its due from the party. 94) Unrest in the 
Berlin SA, led by the Osaf-Stellvertreter Ost. Walter stennee, to which laok 
of mo~ contributed, led to a review by Hitler of the financial situation of 
the SA. Thus the compulsory SA tax was re-introduced and the SA were given 
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90) "Ihlndsohreiben" of '!he NSDAP, Munioh to party bra.nches, 15 October 1929 _ 
copy in SAt\( VII - 67 Bd. 1. 
91) Noakes, Ope cit., p.182. 
92) Beck, Ope cit., p.266 and p~380. 
93) Beok, Ope cit., p.10l. 
94) Horn, Ope cit., pp.326 ff •• 
the right to a 50 per cent share in the proceeds of party meetings. In 
Westphalia the Gauleitung reached an agreement with the Osaf-Stellvertreter 
~, von Fichte, to prevent an outburst similar to the one which had occurred 
in Berlin. 95) The agreement attempted to define the financial responsibili-
ties of the two 'sides'. The Gauleitung secured the right to collect all the 
contributions secured at party meetin~s, and in return pledged itself to reim-
burse the SA for all 'the costs incurred in the fulfilment of the political 
duties it undertook'. In return, the SA agreed to stop collecting contributions 
at party meetings for its own purposes and to finance what were purely SA 
affairs out of its own resources. The new SA tax for which the Gau became 
responsible was administered according to instructions framed by Hitler. The 
tax was paid into a special fund controlled by the political ore,anisation. 
The new financial arrangements netted the Westphalian SA a total of 1,950 
~ in the first month of their operation. 96 ) The money came just in time 
to appease the more restless SA elements in the Gau. The first distribution 
of cash came at a time of much grumbling and discontent among the regional SA 
units, which was censured by the Osaf-Stel1veTtreter West in his November 
directives I 'The number of enquiries on the part of SHlrme to the Standarten 
and the Osaf-StellveTtreter West as to where the so-called SA-money has gone 
are increasing. In part these enquiries are phrased in a really peculiar 
fashion; a few even speak of a suspicion that these .funds are being held rack 
by the Standarten or other official organs. These enquiries are jJstified of 
course. But they should not assume the nature of a threat nor express such 
suspiCions, for which there is absolutely no cause. The Os~f Stel1vertreter 
~ has reached agreement on the financial situation of the SA with every 
~. The main consideration throughout the deliberations has been to ensure 
that SA members will be freed from every possible increased burden, and to ensure 
that the SA will receive those funds which it absolutely needs in order to 
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95) For the following see "Rundschreiben, Gau Westfalen der NSDAP", Bochum, 
27 October 19301 copy in SAM VII - 67 Ed. 1. 
96) Police report, Bochum, 28 November 1930' SAM VII - 67 Pd. 1. Also "SABE" 
for November, OSAF Stellv. West, Dnsseldorf. 11 November 1930; copy in 
SAM VII - 67 Ed. 1. 
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continue its activities.' 97) 
Further efforts to assist the SA were undertaken in the winter of 1930. 
In view of the many unemployed gathered in the ranks of the SA, the SA and 
local party branches, 1n conjunction with the NSF, set up a number of SA-Homes, 
which generally provided cheap food, acted as a 'social' centre, and as the 
centre for the distribution of second-hand clothes gathered by the NS? q8) 
The SA-Homes assumed greater significance in the worsening economic climate 
in the early 'thirties. They became rallying centres for local SA units and 
developed a club-like atmosphere. They were also visible proof to the rank 
and file that the party 'cared' for its less fortunate members, and were thus 
a propaganda instrument which must not be underestimated - particularly in 
its power to attract the growing army of unemployed youths. By being able 
to offer one square meal a day the idea of joining the SA became more attrac-
tive. The SA-Homes were also visible proof of the Nazis' determination to 
realise the Volksgemeinschaft concept which loomed so large in the party's 
propaganda. 
However acute the tensions between the SA and the political wing of the 
NSDAP may have been from time to time, the bond between the two, and the 
dependence of the party on its 'political soldiers', remained. Branch leaders 
needed the SA for many of their undertakings. Without it the existence of 
many branches would have been seriously threatened. This is especially true 
of the branches active in industrial towns, where the opposition from the 
Left reached new heights as the NSDAP became a political force of consequence. 99 ) 
Of the value of the SA to the Westphalian NSDAP there can be little doubt. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
97) "SABE" for November 1930, Osaf-Stellvertreter West, Dtlsseldorf, 11 
November 1930 - copy in SAM VII - 67 Ed. 1. 
98 ) Cf. the police report, Bochum, 21 November 1930: SAM VII - 67 Ed. 1. 
99) Cf. the "Arbeitsplan 1930" for the Bezirk GroSS-Dortmund - copy in SAM -
67 Ed. 1. Further the accounts on the SA in Beck, OPe cit., passim. 
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The Rural Campaign. 
Until 1929 the Westphalian Nazi party generally ignored the rural popu-
lation and concentrated its major propaganda effort on securing the allegiance 
of the urban population. 100) The wisdom of this policy was seriously questioned 
at national and re~ional levels after the success of the party in the noTth 
German agrarian reEions of Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony in the 1928 
election, success which reflected the widespread unrest which be~an to affect 
the rural population in the winter of 1927/1928. The lack of progress in the 
urban centres, the failure of the party to capture working class votes gave 
the party hierarchy much food for thought. 
Although the unrest of the rural population in 1928 manifested itself 
most dramatically in Schleswig-Holstein, many rural parts of Germany were 
affected by an acute agrarian crisis which had been gatherin~ momentum since 
the mid-nineteen-twenties. 101) Since the stabilis~tion of the currency after 
the post-war inflation, Germany's a~rarian economy had undergone a gradually 
accelerating decline and by the end of the decade it was in a state of acute 
crisis. 102) ~ 1928 the total indebtedness of German agriculture was close 
to the stag~erin~ total of ten billion Marks. This was in part the consequence 
of the inefficiency of the farmin~ methods employed, but it was also due to 
the fact that agricultural prices were lagging behind those of industry, which 
made the cost of machinery, fertilisers, and equipment increasingly prohibitive. 
The financial burdens placed on the farmer also grew because of increased wage 
demands, higher taxes and social welfare payments, and the high rates of inte~ 
rest on loans, mortgages and related debts. As a consequence, farmers were 
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100) Gies asserts that the Nazis, with the exception of Schleswi,,-Holstein, 
largely ignored the rural population until 1930 - H. Gies, 'NSDAP und 
Landwirtschaftliche Organisationen in der Endphase der Weimarer Repllblik'. 
Vierteljahrshp-fte fOr Zeitgeschichtp-, 15, 1967, p.J41. This view needs 
some correction in yiew of the Westphalian example. Noakes' study on 
Lower Saxony also undermines Gies' assertion, Noakes, OPe cit., pp.121 ff •• 
Cf. Sch8n, OPe cit., pp.145-154. 
101) On the Schleswig-Holstein situation see Stoltenberg, oPe cit., pp.10.7 ff •• 
102) For a brief review of the position of the agrarian sector of the German 
economy see W.T. Angress, 'The Folitical Role of the Peasantry in the 
Weimar Republic', Review of Fblitir.s, 21, 1959, pp.536-539. 
continuously hovering on the brink of disaster, with foreclosures and forced 
sales a real threat to what they valued most in life: their land. As the 
economic crisis of the farming community became acute, the demands for help 
grew louder, and patience and conservatism gave way to unrest and a tendency 
towards rural anarchism, first seen in the events which unfolded in Schleswip"-
Holstein in the autumn of 1927. 
In Westphalia the reaction of the farmers to the agrarian crisis was not 
as drastic as in northern Germany. But the authorities monitoring the atti-
tudes of the farming community recorded a bitterness which brought with it 
the threat of violence. The reasons for the restlessness were the general 
lack of profitability of both the small- and large-scale farming units, the 
lack of capital and increasing indebtedness. 103) The factors creatine this 
situation -in Westphalia were (i) overproduction and thus impoverishment of 
land during the war and post-war period; (ii) the loss of capt tal durin~ the 
inflation; (iii) the loss of the 1923 harvest which was sold before the sta-
bilisation of the ~: (iv) the destruction of part of the 1924 harvest due 
to excessive rainfall during the summer and autumn; (v) a poor 1925 harvest 
accompanied by low wheat prices and a high cost of fertilisers; (Vi) bad 
weather in 1926 accompanied by outbreaks of foot and mouth disease, a poor 
corn crop and low pig prices; and (Vii) adverse conditions in 1927. with a 
mild winter and a damp summer producing an average harvest, but a low beet 
crop at a time of falling meat prices and rising costs of fodder. It is little 
wonder, given this catalogue of calamities, that the Westphalian farmers were 
in a crisis situation and debts accumulating rapidly. In County Tecklenburg 
alone the indebtedness of some 3,800 farms increased from 3.1 m. Marks in 1926 
to 4.8 m. ~ by the beginning of 1928. 104) 
Given this situation it is hardly surprising that the distress mobilised 
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103) For this and the following see the report by the Landrat, L6dinghausen, 
3 March 1928. SAM VII - 89 Ed. 2. 
10+) Report by Landrat, Tecklenburg, 5 March 1928. SAM VII - 89 Ed. 2. 
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what had traditionally been a very passive element of the population. From 
February 1928 mass meetings of farmers became a common feature, 'a reflection 
of the great distress on the farms in the whole province'. 105) A mammoth 
protest rally held in MUnster in March, organised by the three major agrarlan 
organisations active in-Westphalia, attracted between 10,000 and 12,000 
farmers. 106) The protests were accompanied by an increasingly hostile atti-
tude towards the authorities and the state in reneral. What irked the farmers 
above all were the high level of taxation and the large sums 'spent on schools, 
welfare services and road improvement and construction'. 107) Local taxation 
officials bore the brunt of the verbal abuse of irate farmers. 108) 
The unrest and resentment were utilised and stimulated by the NSDAP to 
create support in the rural areas. Whereas only isolated meetings had been 
held in the agrarian counties of Westphalia in 1928, the year 1929 saw great 
efforts by the Nazis to win converts, primarily in the Protestant counties of 
the Minden region. Not having any specific agrarian programme, the Nazis, in 
the first phase of rural agitation, concentrated on heightening the fears of 
the farming community. The most popular themes of meetings were 'The Diffi-
culties of Agriculture', 'Why is the German Farmer facing Extinction', 'Farmer, 
Your Farm and Land is in Danger'. The speeches were accompanied by the usual 
tirade against the government and state 'system'. 109) The intensity of the 
Nazi effort can be gauged from the fact that in September 1929 alone some 60 
rural meetines were planned for the five rural, Protestant counties in the 
110) 
north-east of the Regierungsbezirk Minden. The systematic propa~anda to 
which the rural population was subjected brought its rewards. The influence 
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105) Reports on several meetings in western Westphalia in the Bocholter und 
Borkener Volksb1att, 12 and 1) February 1928. 
106) Report by Reglerune;sprltsident, Mtlnste-c, 9 March 1928, SAM VII - 89 ru. 2. 
107) Report by Landrat, Tecklenburg, 5 March 1928, police report, Reckling-
hausen, 5 March 1928, SAM VII - 89 ru. 2. Report by Landrat, Halle i./W •• 
22 February 1929' SAD MI IP/623. 
108) Report by Landrat, Beckum, 8 February 1929. SAM VII - 64 Bi. 2. 
109) Report by Regierungsprltsident, Minden, 23 August 1929' SAD MI IP/604. 
110) Report by Police President, Bielefeld, 31 August 19291 SAD MI IP/520. 
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of the Nazi movement increased. ~ the autumn of 1929 the success of the 
agitation was especially noticeable in north-eastern Westphalia, above all 
in the County Lllbbecke, where it was thought ~ the authorities that the 
NSDAP had the majority of the population behind it. Ill) In contrast to the 
major advances registered in the Protestant counties, those made in predomin-
antly Catholic rural regions were insignificant. The Nazis did not believe 
that they could secure much support from the Catholic farmer, and in conse-
quence made little effort to do so. This attitude was realistic as is shown 
by the developments of the early 'thirties. The loyalty to their faith, the 
structure and solidarity inherent in Catholicism, did not allow an easy pene-
tration into the ranks of the rural Catholic voter, and religious ties usual] y 
proved stronger than economic necessity. 112) The Nazis took the line of least 
resistance and concentrated on the Protestant counties. Thi s is not to say 
that agitation in Catholic counties was non-existent. Urban-based rarty bran-
ches established in Catholic regions did make overtures to the agricultural 
population, but with little success. II) 
The success of the Nazis in the Protestant rural areas diminished the 
support enjoyed by the DNVP and the DNVP-orientated Landbund. The DNVP's 
defence against the encroachment ~ the Nazis was to 'enlighten' the agrarian 
community as to the true nature of the NSDAP and its 'socialist ideas'. At a 
meeting of the DNVP regional organisation 1n Recklinghausen 1n May 1929 an 
offensive against Nazi agitation was initiated, designed to show that 'in 
reality the Nazis were arch-enemies of the landed population'. What was 
called 'the highly dubious attitude of the National Socialists towards rrivate 
property' was emphasized above all. 114) This oblique reference to Point 17 Of 
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111) Report by Reeierungsp~sident, Minden, 23 August 1929. SAD MI IP/520. 
112) Cf. the observations of C.P. Loomis and J.A. Beegle, 'The Spread of 
German Nazism in Rural Areas', American Socio1opica1 Review, 1946, 
pp.724-7J4. 
11)) See the reports ~ the Iandrat of Steinfurt, Burgsteinfurt, 21 August 
1929: report by Landrat. LUdinghausen, 19 Au~ust 1929. SAM VII - 89 Ed. 2f 
land rat , PaderboTn. 19 August 1929; report by Landrat, Wiedenbrllck, 17 
August 1929. SAD MI IP/604. 
114) Police report on DNVP conference, Recklinghausen, )1 'May 1929. SAM VII _ 
64 rue 2. 
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the official Nazi programme, which called for the 'unrenumerative expropria-
tion of land for the common good' was no longer apposite. Until 1928 the 
ambiguity surrounding Point 17 had not been an asset to the Nazis in the rural 
regions 0 But since their major effort was directed towards winning the urban 
masses it was allowed to stand undefined. Once the Nazis switched their 
tactics on account of their success due to the agrarian crisis, Hitler was 
quick to interpret Point 17 to mean expropriation of that land only which 
had been 'secured in an unlawful manner' or had been 'administered contrary 
to the' good of the Volk'. 115) 
The anxiety of the DNVP to project the Nazis as 'expropriators' and 
'radical socialists' is understandable given its waning influence in the 
Protestant agrarian regions of Westphalia, The DNVP's fears were based not 
only on the recognition of Nazi inroads in their traditional support, but 
also on fears about the emerging power of the Nazis within the Iandmlnd, which 
had been closely allied to the DNVP before the Nazis appeared on the scene. 
Of the three Westphalian agricultural organisations, the Bauernverein (25,000 
members), the Kleinbauernbund (4,000 members), and the Lan~bunn, the first 
two were predominantly Catholic and Centre Party orientated. 116) The Iandbu~ 
was influential in the non-Catholic areas of the Re.':1;ierung;sbezi rke of Minden 
and Arnsberg, and had a membership of 15,000 which 'traditionally supported 
the DNVP'. In the course of 1929 subversion by pro-Nazi elements led by a 
former Landrat, Schulze-Pe1kum, who was an influential landowner in central 
Westphalia, seriously undermined DNVP influence. ~ September 1929 one-fifth 
of the membership were thought to have deserted to the Nazi party. 
The tactics employed by the NSDAP to win support in the rural areas in 
1928 and 1929, were limited to pointing out the disastrous situation of the 
farmers, and to ar@ling that their position could only eet worse under the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
115) Gies, OPe cit., pp.)41 ff.r Angress, OPe cit., p.546. 
116) For this and the following see "Rechtsradikale Bewegung auf dem lande" -
report compiled by the police president of Reck11nghausen, 2 September 
1929. SAM VII - 89 Ed. 2. 
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'Weimar System'. These tactics were amended in the course of 1930 with the 
development of a positive agrarian programme. A circular issued by the Partei-
leitun~ ~n February 1930 outlined the attitude to be adopted by the party 
towards the agrarian population. Great emphasis was to be placed on driving 
home the fact that 'the recognition of inherited property was a central pillar 
of National Socialist policy'. 117) In March 1930 a lengthy policy statement 
designed to secure support in rural regions was published by the party. 118) 
Two months later Hitler called on a relatively obscure civil servant, R. Walther 
Darre, to oreanise the famers for the party. The efforts of the Nazis to 
mobiiise the farmers were to be centred on Darr~'s creation, the ApA, which 
was founded towards the end of 1930. 
The construction of the ApA came after the Reichstag election of September 
19)0. In their agrarian campaign during the election the Nazis relied on the 
projection of the March programme and the influence of the agrarian depression. 
In Westphalia the progress made can be seen 1n the electoral breakthrough 
achieved in several rural counties, above all in the counties of Wittgenstein 
and Halle, l-lhere the Nazis secured relative majorities. In four of the five 
Protestant rural counties 1n the Regierun~sbez1rk Minden the NSDAP achieved 
very high returns by regional standards. 
Halle 
Herford 
Ltlbbecke 
Minden 
31.16 
29.55 
26.4 
20.46 
These returns were two to three times higher than the averar,e of 12.2 per cent 
secured by the party in the electoral district Westphalia-North as a whole. 119) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
117) "Betr. Stellung der NSDAP zum landvo1k und zur landwirtschaft", Rundschrei ... 
ben der NS Reichsleitung, Organ. Abt. 11, Munich, J February 1930, copy in 
SAM VII - 67 Bi. 1. The text is full of flattering remarks about the 
peasantry, which 1s variously described as 'HaupttrHger v81klicher Erb-
gesundheit', 'Jungbrunnen des Volkes', 'RUckgrat der Wehrkraft', etc. 
118) "NS und landwirtschaft. Parte1amtliche Kundgebung tiber die Stellung der 
N,S.D,A.P. zum Landvolk und zur Landwirtschaft"l dated March 19)0. copy 
in BAK Sammlung Schumacher 2140 
119) "Abgegebene Stimmen anlHssl1ch der Reichstagswahl am 14.9.1930" - report 
by Bielefeld police, 6 November 1930. SAD MI IP/625t Mi1atz, oPe cit., 
p.l12. 
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Given that the party possessed only a rudimentary organisation in rural areas, 
the performance was impressive. Even in the Catholic county of H8xter, in 
which the NSDAP had but one party branch, the not insienificant figure of 10.97 
per cent was recorded, a sign that the Catholic population was not entirely 
immune to the Nazi appeal. In 1931 the creation of an efficient Gau ApA exploi-
ted the breakthrough by systematically subjecting the agrarian population, both 
Protestant and Catholic, to a continuous barrage of propaganda. 
Developments in Gau Propa~anda. 
Though the agrarian propaganda became an important ineredient in Nazi 
propaganda activity in the period 1928 to 1930, the main effort of the West-
pha1ian NSDAP continued to be the traditional one of attempting to expound 
120 ) 
'socialism' as interpreted by the party. The Nazis were forced to project 
a 'socialist', pro-labour image for tactical reasons. The success of the Nazis' 
anti-capitalist propaganda in the area also invited its continuation. The 
successful impact, and the influx of proletarian elements into the party in 
the industrial centres, was admitted even by the party's socialist opponents. 
The SPD especially viewed the drift of working class elements to the NSDAP with 
concern and attempted to stop the trend with a programme of 'rationally based 
socialist enlightenment'. 121) A second major consideration in the continuation 
of the pro-labour propaganda stemmed from the view held by the regional party 
hierarchy that the main hope for proeress lay in winnine over the supporters 
of the Left. Party leaders thought that the 'boureeois orientated forces', 
affected by the economic crisis, would turn to the party in any case, without 
much effort by the party to attract them. 122) 
To achieve their chief objective the Nazis' propaganda assumed such a 
-----------------------------------------------------------< .. -------------
120) Even in predominantly agrarian regions this aspect of Nazi propaganda 
figured prominently. In the adjacent Gaue of Lower Saxony to the north 
and east of the province, with only small industrial areas, the efforts 
to attract the worker were not eiven up: Noakes, OPe cit., pp.174 ff •• 
121) See especially the Westf~11sche A1l~emeine Volks-Zeitun~, 2 July 1930. 
122) "Rundschreiben", Gau Westphalia, Bochum, 8 Nay 1930; copy in SAM VII -
67 Ed. 1. 
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radi~a1 tone that it was almost impossible to distinguish, at least in its 
anti-capitalist sentiments, from that of the Left. 123) The most popular 
themes were the standard ingredients of the propaganda of the mid-'twenties. 
The vague 'Brechung der Zinsknechtschaft' sloGan figured prominently, along 
with attacks on the 'parasitic exploitation' of the people by syndicates, 
trusts, and department stores. 124) At meetings in urban areas at which 
miners and other 'workers' were used as speakers, the aUdience was promised 
that the advent to power by the NSDAP would be accompanied by 'an end of the 
exploitation of the worker by capital', and a re-organisation of the existing 
economic system since this 'was responsible for the creation of the high 
unemployment' currently affecting society. 125) The choice facing the working 
class, the Nazis maintained, was a simple one: either a continuation of 'capi-
talist servitude' or 'freedom under National Socialism'. 126) The striking 
aspect of many of the Nazi speeches is the vagueness of the party's labour 
programme. The absence of a clear 'socialist' platform was disguised by a 
plethora of emotional slogans. Such an approach was so effective because of 
the dire economic situation in which the population found itself, or feared to 
find itself. PI1.mitive 'bread and work' formulas became much mare meaningful 
in a period of rising unemployment. Tb many workers they were more compre-
hensible and immediate than an exposition of a defined 'socialist' doctrine. 
The Nazis pursued two other themes. attacks on the SPO and KPD, and violent 
anti-Semitism. Of the two left-wing parties the SPO was the prime object of 
ridicule and contempt. Singled out above all was the SPO bureaucracy and the 
party's habit of exploiting its members through its 'boss-rule'. Common titles 
of Nazi meetings illustrate the anti-SPD approach. They included such favourites 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
123) Cf. report by police, Recklinghausen, 12 October 19291 SAM VII - 2 Ed. 6. 
Also report by Regierungsp~sident, Minden, 23 August 19291 SAD MI IP/604. 
124) Numerous reports in files SAM VII - 67 Ed. 1. and SAD MI IP/604 covering 
the 1929-1930 period. 
125) See especially report by Landrat, Llldin~hausen, 30 AU~Jst 1930, police 
reports, Beckum, 26 August and 9 September 19301 SAM - 67 Bd. 1. 
126) Police report, Minden, 13 February 1930: SAD MI IP/604. 
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as 'Eleven Years of SPD Betrayal of the People', and 'The Stupefaction of 
the German Nation by the SPO'. The verbal assault by the Nazis on the KPD 
was more muted. One cannot help feeling that the Nazis had a greater 'respect' 
for the rank and file KPD members, admired their commitment and fanaticism, 
which parallelled their own. The frequent street brawls between the Nazis 
and Communists contributed towards a feeling of grudging admiration, 
No consideration beyond blind hatred moved the Nazis in their attitude 
towards the Jews. In line with Hitler's anti-Semitic obsession, the Westphalian 
NSDAP worked in anti-Jewish propaganda at every possible moment. 127) In 
their attacks on the 'marxist' parties, the Jewish influence 'whiCh misguided 
the working class masses' was emphasized ad nauseam. The excesses of capitalism 
were associated with the supposed Jewish stranglehold over the German economy, 
High unemployment, the distress of the artisans, of the middle class in general, 
and the 'exploitation of the worker' were all, according to the NSDAP, attri-
butab1e to the Jews. 
From 1929 the Nazis developed new propaganda themes designed to fan the 
rising discontent in Germany. In the forefront was the 'misery' theme and 
the 'disaster' prophecies which were tied to the accelerating economic depres_ 
sion. This became a constant ingredient in the party's agitation. The themes 
of meetings indicate the approach adopted by the party. 'People in Need, who 
will save you?', 'The new-German Bankruptcy - National Socialist Reconstruction' , 
'Our Fight for Freedom and Bread', 'Before State Bankruptcy', 'Who will Save 
Germany?'. 'The Struggle of the Gennan Woman fO,r Freedom and Bread', 'The 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
127) Their choice was extensive given Hitler's guidelines as laid down 1n 
'Me1n Kampf', in which Hitler associated the Jews with, and/or made them 
responSible for, a long list of 'defects and blemishes', such as demo-
cracy (p.?2), Social Democracy (p.56), Bolshevism (p.296), Marxism 
(p.195 and p.290), the Trade Union Movement (p.292), Capitalism (p.28l), 
the 'interest-slavery' of the money lender (p.282 and ~.285)' the free 
press (p.5?, p.79 and p.290 ), Parliamentarianism (p.?9 , Liberalism 
(pp.54-55), Internationalism (p.294), anti-militarism p.247), class 
warfare (pp.289-290), modernism in art (p.296 ), prostitution (p.SS) -
etc •• 
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Economic Depression of the German Reich', and similar titles. 128) Thoue:h 
the speeches underlined what everyone knew already, prophecies of doom and 
the remedies offered by 'the only party which could sa.ve the nation I, were 
hammered home relentlessly. Further fuel was added to the party's propaganda 
with the Young Plan proposals of June 1929 •. -1This measure, desiened to ease 
the reparation problem by spreading the burden over a time-span of 59 years, 
gave the Nazis a new, nationalist theme with which to whip up unrest. 129) 
In conjunction with the DNVP, the Stahl helm and the Landbund, the party en{!ap:ed 
in an extensive propaganda campaign against the acceptance of the plan. The 
anti-Young campaien, for which the finances were supplied largely br the DNVP, 
culminated in a plebiscite held on 22 December 1929. 130) The chief bene-
ficiaries of the campaign were the National Socialists. Fed by DNVP funrls, 
the NSDAP was able to increase its propaganda activity to new hp.ights. The 
major consideration of the Nazis in the campaign waS not the success of the 
plebiscite, but the expansion of the party. In Westphalia the Gauleitun~ 
tended to organise its own rallies and propaganda drives without regard to 
the activities of its 'partners', and it remained aloof from mammoth regional 
rallies in order to further independent action designed to increase party 
membership. 131) 
The propaganda of the Westphalian NSDAP, despite its strong 'socialist' 
emphasis, was ideologically in agreement with the national paTty line. ~ 
1930 the Gau1eitung and Gau propaganda apparatus adjusted itself to t.he twists 
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128) See the numerous reports on Nazi meetings in the files SAM VII - 67 Bd. 1 
and SAD MI IP/604. 
129) Cf. Pridham, OPe cit., p.84 ff.r Noakes, OPt cit., pp.147-148. 
130) Of the 53 Stadt- and Landkreise into which Westphalia was divided only 
7 gave the anti-Young coalition over 10 ~er cent support. The best 
returns were secured in the Counties of Siegen, LUbbecke and Halle 
(between 20 and 40 per cent). These were areas in which the DNVP and 
Landbund had strong followings. See Mi1atz, OPt cit., appendix, map 
"Der Volksentscheid am 22 Dezember 1929". 
131) This calculation motivated Gauleiter Wagner, as seen in his letter to 
Strasser, Bochum, 2 September 19291 BAK NS 22/1076. 
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and turns of the Parteileitune with considerable alacrity. 132) Propaganda 
determined by regional considerations could, however, conflict at times with 
the strategy pursued by Munich. The pro-labour, anti-capitalist attitude of 
the Rhenish-Westphalian movement embarrassed Hitler above all in the autumn 
of 1928 at a time when he was in the process of cementin~ the party's ties 
with the Kirdorf circle. An article in Terboven's 'Die Neue Front', a weekly 
newspaper which served as Gau organ for Westphalia, launched a strong attack 
on the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, which upset Kirdorf, a founder of 
the syndicate, and led to his resignation from the NSDAP. I))) There was as 
yet no national uniformity of Nazi propaganda, which created difficulties from 
time to time on a number of issues. An example of regional variations in 
propaganda was the 'National Bolshevic' outbursts of the north German party 
newspapers, which created problems for a number of Gaue. The assertion by 
Count von Reventlow 1n an article in Der nationale Sozialist in April 1930 
that the NSDAP had views similar on economic and social questionsto those 
of the SPD and the KPD was anathema to the more 'conservative' Nazi leaders. 
/ Josef Grohe, business-manager of Gau Rhineland-South and editor of the 
Westdeutscher Beobachter, viewed such attitudes as especially damaging since 
they made it very difficult to refute the charges made by the DNVP and the 
Wirtschaftspartei that the NSDAP was 'marxist'. 134) 
If Nazi propaganda in Westphalia was characterised in general by an 
aggressive tone, in one respect it was very much on the defensives the party's 
attitude to religion. The denominational parity in the province presented 
the party with a serious dilemma. An anti-Catholic slant, which could have 
been useful in the Protestant regions, was not feasible. An irreligious 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
132) A good example of this is the acceptance without reservation of the 
'hostile' attitude adopted by the PL towards the Young campaign partners 
in the spring of 1930. The new party line was faithfully reflected in 
the Westphalian propaeanda. See police report, Bielefeld, 16 July 1930t 
SAD MI IP/625. 
133) On this episode see Kele, OPt cit., pp.128-129. Further H.A. Turner, Jr., 
'Emil Kirdorf and the Nazi Party', Central &lropp~n History, 1, 1968. 
134) Redaktion, Westdeutscher Beobachter to R. Hess, 13 April 19301 BAK 
Samm1ung Schumacher, 260. 
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approach in general was not possible even in the Protestant areas. The con-
victions of the Protestants had to be considered by the par~, and concern was 
indeed constantly shown for their religiou s eutlceptibil1 ties. Homann, district 
leader of Bielefeld, beoame very concerned at the time of the September election 
of 1930 because of the appearance, in third place, of an agnostic on the Nazi 
list of candidates for the electoral district of Westphalia-North. In view of 
the 'strong religiosity' of the predcmlnantly Protestant po!,ulation of M 8 
region he viewed such a candid'lture as t catastrophic' • The romage it could 
do to the party, he wrote to strasser, 'was underlined by the intense interest 
shown in the religiOUS ls511e at every meeting, at whidl the most frequent 
question raised was the one of "How does the party stand in relation to the 
Church and religion?"'. 135) More delicate still was the relationship of the 
NSDAP wi th the Catholic Church. 136) Here '\he situation was o:>mpl1cated by 
the presence of the political arm of fue Church, the Centre Pa.rty, and the 
extensive Catholic press, which was generally quick to exploit artY mistake 
made by the Nazis in their hand.ling of religious questions. Until 1930 the 
Catholic Church, .press and Centre Party, had largely ignored the relatively 
ins ignifican t Na.zi movement. As the NSDAP exp anded its activities and gTe' • ., 
in size and influence, it was Slbjected to much more analysis, and its pro-
gramme was examined with greater care. Concern was shown by the Catholic press 
on the question of the National Socialists' attitude towaras the Catholio 
Church. 137) In the September election the major attack by the Centre Party 
was concentrated on exposing the NSDAP's 'hostile attitude tm'l'ards the Catholic 
Church'. 138) 
The Westphalian Nazis were very careful not to a.ttack reli~ion at their 
meetings. 139) At most the party advocated the cocclusion of the clergy from 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
135
1 
136 
137 
138 
139) 
Homann to strasser, Bielefeld, 8 September 1930: BAK NS 22/1076. 
On thi s problem in e;enera1 see Pridham, op. cit., pp.l41) ff •• 
See esjlecia.lly the issue of "the Mtlnster:l.sche Morgenpost, 18 October 1930. 
Tremonia, 1 September 1930; further K. liotzbach, Gagen den Nation'tl-
sozialismuB. Widerstand una Verf'olgung in Dortmund 1930-19Jt5, Hannover, 
1969, p.31. 
This is true of Nazi agitation in "the Rhenish-Westphalian region as a 
whole. Cf. KUhr, op. cit., pp.l44-l~5. 
320 
politics, but it was careful to emphasize repeatedly that National Socialists 
believed in the right of the individual to worship freely, a right which would 
be observed in the coming Nazi st!~,te. 140) It was unfortunate for the Nazis 
in Rhineland-Hestphalia that while their regional organisation might observe 
a neutral attitude towards the Churches, especially towards the Catholic Church, 
other ~ in northern and eastern Germany, where the Protestant Church pre-
dominated, felt free to let fiy their anti-Catholio broadsides, which were 
then picked up in the Rhenish-Westphalian Catholio press to justi~ its attack 
on the local Nazi movement. Grohe's letter to Hess in April 1930 lamented 
this and the lack of a national party policy on religious questions. Grohe 
felt that 'several newspapers of our movement are very tactless in their atti-
tudes towards Rome and the Papacy' and were creating great difficul ties for 
the movement in western Germany. Singled ou t for criticism were a number of 
anti-Christian articles which hacl appeared in the Deutsche Wochensch'l.u, the 
Ostdeutscher Beobachter, and Der nationale Sozialist. In them atheistic views 
had been expounded which did great damage to the movement in both Catholio and 
Protestant areas of the Rhineland. 141) 
To project their views the Nazis used the by now traditiornl methods of 
propaganda, with publio meetings and regional party rallies at the head of 
their list of priori ties. The verbal approach took preoedence Over any other 
form of agitation. 142) The only noticeable chanee was the intensity of the 
prop38anda effort •. A stream of meetings had been a ch!lracteristic of party 
agitation even in the ear~ years of the movement. Prom 1929 onwards the 
stream became a flood. In the months April to June 1930 the Reeierunta3bezirk 
Minden alone saw 60 Nazi meetings, as against one by the DNVP, three by the 
DVP, one by the SPD and two by the KPD. 143) In the run-up to the September 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
140) Thus Wagner at a meeting in Reckl1nghausen - police report, Reckling-
hausen, 30 August 1930; also report by Landrat, Ahaus, 30 August 1930; 
police report, Beckum, 26 August 1930: SAM VII - 67 Bd. 1. 
141) Redaktion Westdeutscher Beobachter to R. Hess, 13 April 1930: BAK Samm1ung 
Schumacher, 260. 
142) Cf. Zeman, op. cit., p.29. 
143) "Lagebericht 2", Polioe President, Bielefeld, 16 July 1930: SAD MI IP/625. 
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election the party hel d 259 meetings in '\:he same area, a quarter of all the 
political meetings, wInch totalled 1,002. 144) In November and December 1930 
a further 116 Nazi meetings were organised which accounted for ju st over 4-0 
per cent of the total of 288. This period saw the Bielefeld local elections, 
which alone accounted for 58 of 1:21e 112 meetings held by opposition parties 
in the Regierungsbezirk. 145) The Nazi effort was prodigious, and at a time 
when the Gaulei tS$ was lamenting the lack of speakers available in 'Nest-
phalia! 146) 
The large number of meetings gave several advantages to tile NSDAP. In 
the first place the fact that -the Nazis attracted good attendances, despite 
entrance fees ranging from 20 to 40 Pi., allowed the movement to pay its way. 
Indeed, the NSDAP was the only political party which could cover the cost of 
meetings through entrance receipts. 147) CarefUlly organised mass meetings 
at which the leading party figures spoke also gave large profits to -the mOVe-
mente The rare meetings at which Hitler spoke were especially useful in filling 
the party treasuxy. l48) Aside fran the financial consideration, the effect 
of the meetings was often 'sensational', especially in the smaller towns and 
in the rural areas. 149) In the absence of other political aotivi~, the 
Nazis had 'the field to themselves. Their meetings, and the 'show' which 
generally accompanied them, were a point of discussion, a focus of attention 
for the local press, which was bound to report 1:21e event in sane form and 
thus give the party free propaganda. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
144) "Lagebericht 3", Polioe President, Bielefeld, 6 November 1930: SAD MI 
IP/625. 
145) "Lagebericht ~", Police President, Bielefeld, Janu~ 1930: SAD MI !p/ 
625. 
146) "Rundschreiben der GL NSDAP Westfalen", Bochum, 8 July 1930; copy in 
SAM VII - 67 Bd. 1. 
147) Report by Police President, Bielefeld, .31 August 1930: SAD MI IP/520. 
148) A Hitler meeting in Bielefeld in November 1930 drew an audience of 7,000 
despite the high entrance charges ranging trom 1 to 5 Marks - police 
report, Bielefeld, 18 November 1930: SAD MI IP/606. 
149) Police report, Bielefeld, 31 August 1929: SAD MI IP/S20. 
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Of great impact were the increasing number of district meetings, p.'l.rty 
rallies and Gau ccnferences which punctuated the history of the NSDAP in the 
early nineteen-thirties. These were superblY orchestrated events, carefully 
organised and stage-managed for maximum impact both on the participant nnd 
the on~ooker. 150) Action by political opponents, usually by the 'AnUfa' of 
the KPD, ensured that the spotlight wenld fall on these events. 151) P\1rther 
pub~icity was given by 'the widespread reporting and ana13sis of the speeches 
and proceedings at ~ meetings in the ~o(ll.l and. regional press. 152) The 
district party meetings, organised on a much smaller scale, were also of signi-
ficance in that they were inevitably acccmpanied. by a spate of other meetings 
and propaganda marches in the localities in which they were held. The appearance 
of well kncmn Nazi ~eaders boosted the morale of party branches and stimulated 
greater interest in the local population. 153) In retrospect these events 
were often seen by the Nazis as 'a milestone in the development of National 
Socialism' in a particular area. 15~) 
By the late ninetelID-twenUes the Nazis had developed a variety of tech-
niques to project their ideas. The party continued to ropy any practice which 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
150) 
151) 
152) 
153) 
154) 
Emphasis was invariably placed on size of turn-out and on the snooth 
functicning of 'the event. A huge turn-out was desired 1x> 'demonstrate 
the progress made by the movement'; it was ensured by the dictatorial 
mobilisation of all branches by the GL. Cf. the instructions by the GL 
to 'the branches for the Gauparteitag in Dortmund in May ~930 - "Rundschrei_ 
ben der GL NSDAP Westfalen", Bochum, ~ April 1930; and "Anordnung", 'Nagner 
to OG, Bochum, 29 April 1930: copies in SAM VII - 67 Bd. 1. 
A major effort was made by the WestphaUan leadership of the AnUra to 
mobilise its membership on the occasion of the Dortmund G-auparteitag of 
the NSDAP, with instructions to disrupt the proceedings - pOlice report, 
Recklinghausen, 30 April 1930: SAM VII - 67 Bd. 1. The Communist press 
likewise urged the working class to provide an appropriate reception for 
the 'guard of trust capitalism'; see Westf!lischer K!mnfer, 28 April and 
2 May 1930. 
Cf. 'the analysis of the Dortmund Gauparteitag in General Anzeiger, 5 May 
1930; 1Vestf!1lische Allgemeine volks-Zeitung, 5 May 1930; Tremonia, 5 May 
1930; Dortmunder Zeitung, 5 May 1930; for the Nazi view see Die neue Front 
9 May 1930. -, 
See the report on the Bezirkstagung held at Enger-Besenkamp in June 1930 
in "Lagebericht 2". Police President, Bielefeld, 16 July 1930: SAD MI 
IP/625. . 
Thus Hiemisch on the Bezirksparteitag at Tengem, 8/9 June 1929 in 
Hiemisch, Ope cit., p.~9. 
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seemed to promise success. One was taken f",t'om the KPD in -the summer of 1930, 
when fue Gaulei tung urged the formation of a Naz i street cell system designed 
to facilitate the penetration of working class districts. The cells held weekly 
discussion meetings which eocplained what National Socialism was about. The 
meetings were also used to further the readership of the Nazi press. 155) Much 
emphasis continued to be placed on the less spectacular routine work of the 
party: hoose to house canvassing and the distribution of pamphlets and party 
literature, work which formed the basis of much of branch propaganda throughout 
the years of 'struggle'. 156) To overcome the chronic shortage of speakers 
'Schools of Politics' were organised in the larger branches. 157) Their function 
was to tamiliarise the partiCipants with the party's views on political, economic 
and cultural matters 'through a weekly lecture programme, attendance at which 
was compulsory for all local party officials. 
To break up the pattern of political activity the Nazis periodically 
arranged gatherings at which entertainment took precedence. These 'German 
Evenings', pioneered in the mid-'twenties, became canmon by 1930 and were 
encouraged by tile Gauleltung, which held the view that these events 'if they 
are care:f'ul~ organised, possess real propaganda value'. 158) The 'German 
Evenings' involved a mixture of pOlitics and entertainment. Their typical 
content is indicated in -the programme of one such event organised by the 
Gelsenkirchen branch: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
155) Police report, Bocbum, 13 May 1930; "Rundschreiben GL Westfalen", Bochum, 
8 May 1930 (copy): SAM VlI - 67 Bd. 1. FUrther, report by Police PreSident 
Bielefeld, 16 July 1930: SAD MI IP/625. ' 
156) The GL placed great importance on 'routine propaganc}l', which cost very 
little and was thus well within the capaci1iV of every branch to perform _ 
cf. "Rundschreiben GL Westfa1en", Bocblm, 8 May 1930, copy in SAM VII _ 
67 Bd. 1. AlsO report on branch activity at the Bezirksvertretertagung 
of the Dortmund aistrict, section "T!tigkeitsberiCht 1929", 2 Februa~ 
1930; oopy in SAM VII - 67 Bd. 1 •. 
157) POlice report, Bielefeld, 16 Ju~ 1930: SAD 1.11 IP/625. 
158) "Rundschreiben GL Westfa1e:l", Bocblm, 8 May 1930; copy in SAM VlI - 67 
Bd. 1. Also police report, Bocblm, 13 May 1930: SAM VII - 67 Bd. 1. 
Opening march I Entrance of the SA standards and 
flags / Initial address / Speech of welcome / Song 
'We are the army of 'the s'Nastika' / Music piece / 
Address by district leader Dr. Meyer / German an-
them / Beethoven quartet / Music piece / Conseora-
tion of Sturmfahne 25 / SA Soog 'The Flag up high' 
Interval 
Beethoven quartet / Tragi-come~. 
Interval 
German dances / Exhibition of local handicrafts. 159) 
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Of great propaganda value was another feature of Nazi activity employed oon-
stantly, namely the rituals which accompanied any major gathering of the SA 
and the party: the inevitable wreath-laying at monuments commemorating the 
fallen of World War One. This type of activity assisted the Nazi s in stirring 
up the intense nationalism whioh formed a basic ingredient of much of their 
propaganda. 
The NSDAP engaged in an intensive and varied propaganda which was to 
become the most striking feature of the political landscape after 1929. The 
Nazis were quick to adjust their tactics to meet any eventuality. The flexi-
bility of approach and the content of "the message took into coosideration the 
nature of the population and the !Uppose~ prejudioes and outlook of the people 
appealed to. Little effort was wasted on themes which 'the Nazis thought inap-
propriate for specific social groups. Thus at "the time of intense rural agi-
tation in the Herford region in 1929, when meeting after meeting in the rural 
areas was concerned with "the plight of the German peasantry, not one word was 
wasted on thi 15 topic in the meetings held in the town of Herford itself. 160) 
In framing their local propaganda. tile branch and propaganda leaders had con-
Siderable independenoe. The 'Campaign Plan for 1930' of branches situated 1n 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
159) 
160) 
Police report, Gelsenkirchen, 17 July 1930: SAM VII - 67 Bd. 1. In this 
meeting some 500 people wok part, paying 50 Pf. each. Aocording to the 
police observer the audience 'represented all social groupings, which 
applauded the proceedings with great enthusiasm'. 
Report by the Regierungspr§.sident, Minden, 23 August 1929: SAD MI IP/604-. 
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the Dortmund district demonstrates the individualist approach. The Hamm branch 
thought that its best hope lay in winnine over the middle class and moved the 
cr.testion of the 'Mi ttelstand' int 0 the forefront of its propag'1.ndn. aei ta tiona 
The Mengede branch believed that the Stahlhelm membership provided good. pros-
pects for cCllversion and focused its energy in tlat direction. In Westerfilde 
the branch leader wanted to concentrate on winning over the patriotic associa-
tians, Which were strongly represented in 'file town and were considered to be 
an ideal target. In Selm, Boric, Nordkirchen and Olren, where the party member-
ship was composed almost entirely of miners, propaganda appealing to the interests 
of the miners and working class in general was to be pursued. 161) 
The greater sophistication of Nazi propaganda ani the various techniques 
developed Uy 1930 were to be fully demonstrated in the Reichstae; election of 
September 1930. Compared to the efforts of 1928, 'the 1930 campaign was pursued 
wi th a vigour which was fuelled by the hope of success. 
7he Breakthroueh: The Reichstar, Election of 14 september 1930. 
The ReichstA.g election of 1930 took place in the miast of a profound poli-
tical crisis set in motion by the collapse of tbe MUller government in March 
1930. The immediate reason for its fall had been 'the inability of the SPD and 
DVP coalition partners to compranise on the issue of the refoIIU of unemployment 
insurance. The new government, headed by BrUning, possessed on~ a narrow 
parliamenta~ base. Its failure to obtain the consent of parliament to a 
deflationary package introduced in July 1930 led 1:P the dissolution of parlia-
ment and the September election. The use meanwhile of Article 48 to enforce 
the deflationary policy by emergency decree undermined the principle of govern_ 
ment ~ consent, and in retrospect it can be seen to have placed the Weimar 
Republic on the slippery slope which was to end in the collapse of the con-
stitutional and democratic ~stem. 162) The reason behind the political crisis 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
lSl) 
162) 
Report on the "Bezirksvertretertagung Bezirlc ~ro ss-Dortmund", 2 February 
1930; copy in SAM VII - 67 Bd. 1. 
On the background to the 1930 crisis see W. Conze, 'Die politischen Ent-
scheidungen in Deutschland 1929-1933'L in W. Conze and H. u ach (eds.), 
Die Staats- und Wirtschaftskrise des veutschen Reiches 1 2 1 ~tutt-
gart, 197, pp.17 ff.; and K.D. Bracher, Die A.url sung dar 'Neimat"er 
Republik. Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie, 
Villineen, 1964, pp.33l ff •• 
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was of course the economic depression. Some three million unemployed, increased 
taxation and decreased salaries combined to create widespread dissatisfaction. 163) 
The Nazis entered the election full of optimism. At the height of the 
campaign G-auleiter Wagner prophesied. a minimum five-fola increase in the number 
of parliamentary mandates which the NSDAI' would. secure. 164) The content of 
the Nazi election propaganda was very much the $line as that which had. been 
pu t forward. for muoh of 1929 and 1930. The main emphasis fell on explaining 
the party programme, on exploiting fears about the economic crisis, and on 
condemning the' system'. All other parties came in for abu sa and mud-slineing. 
The intellectual content of the propo,ganda left much to be desired. It was 
little more thm a mixture of 'loud-mouthed phraseology' laced. with 'irrational 
promises'. 165) 
The effort invested. by the Nazis in the election campaign was not matched 
by aqy of their rna jar rivals. Fran t~ end of July omvards the party machine 
moved. into overdrive and subjected the population to a continuous barrage of 
words. Dedication and careful organisation overcame the party's main d.efi-
ciencies, the usual problem of lack of oash, but more important in this instance 
the lack of an ad.equate corps of speakers. There were few well-known speakers 
available to the ~ and most of the larger meetings relied. on (}aulei ter 
Wagner to attract the crowds. The party overca.me the handicap by using its 
limited. resources to the utmost. In the Bielefeld district. a major growth 
point in 1929 and 1930, the party had only 8 trained. speakers available to 
cover the bulk of the RegierungsbeziTk Minden, as well as assisting in the 
adjacent ~ Lippe-Detmold, which fonned. pa.rt of ~ Westphalia. 166) The 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
163) Cf. C.P. Kindleberger, Die Weltwirtsch~ftskrise, Munich, 1973. pp.145 ff •• 
l6~) Wagner at Recklinghausen meeting, 11 September 1930 - polioe report, 
Reckling~qusen, 17 September 1930: SAM VII - 67 Bd. 1. 
165) Thus the description in Tremonia, 15 september 1930. cr. the view of 
Pollock: 'Its (the NSDAP's) campaign ta.lk was the sheerest drivel. Never_ 
even at home - have I heard. such blithering nonsense'; J .K. Pollock, Jr •• 
'The G-ermen Rei chstag Eleotion of 1930', The American PoU tiMI Science. 
Review, 24, 1930. p.993. 
166) For this and the following see Hiemisch. OPe cit., pp.57-59. 
, 
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Umi ted number of speakers formed the spearhead of a propa.ganda campaign 
inaugurated by district lead.er Homann at a regional party conference, held 
two days after the dissolution of parliament, at which he outlined. the main 
electoral strategy of the NSDAP. From 20 July onwards the campaign was in 
full swing. Each of 'the 8 district speakers made on average between 40 and 
60 speeches at party meetings before polling day, as well as attending rival 
party meetings in the capacity of 'disoussion speakers'. 
The party workers engaged in a variety of tasks during the campaign. If 
meetings were the central propaganda instrument, the less spectacular routine 
work, such as canvassing and the distribution of pamphlets and placards, occu-
pied the bulk of the party faithful. 167) The resources and resilience of the 
SA were above all subjected to a severe test. The much greater attention given 
to the party by left-wing opponents meant that numerous Nazi meetings were 
transformed. into brawls. In the urllan areas of "the Ruhr the KPD called the 
tune in marrr Nazi meetings by turning up in great numbers, disrupting the pro-
ceedings at will, and. even determining the amount of time allowed to the NaZi 
speakers. The SA and the police were unable to intervene effectively. 168) 
The Nazis themselves employed the same provocative taotics to disrupt SPD and 
KPD meetings whenever possible. 169) Such negative tactics became a normal 
feature of electioneering in the campaigns after 1930. The Nazi s, always 
rea~ to learn from their politioal opponents, also adopted what was for them 
the new 'street chorus' technique popula.rised by 'the KPD. 170) The Nazis even 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
167) See the maIV reports in SAM VII - 67 Bd.. 1., especially the pOlice 
reports, Recklinghausen, 31 July, 4 August and 17 September 1930. 
168) Report by OG Dortmund, 20 August 1930; ClJpy in SAM VlI - 67 Bd. 1. 
169) A catalogue of disturbances by Nazis of SPD and KPD meetings is con-
tained in too report by the police, Bocwm, 11 September 1930: SAM VII _ 
67 Bd. 1. 
170) Popular Communist rqymes which taxed. the vocal cho:roe of' many a Communist 
went 
'Wer Mlt das Volk in ~annei?' 
"fer hat das Volk verra-ten?' 
'Wer h1!lt die Menschen dumm?' 
In Klotzbach, op. cit., p.33. 
'Die Volkspartei!' 
'Die Sozialdemokraten!t 
'Das Zentrun!' 
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went so far as to copy some of the KPD slogans. 171) One new technique first 
employed extensively by the NSDAP in the 1930 campaign, and one which it made 
very much its own, was the use of motorised transport to help with its propa-
ganda effort. 172) In this the party was aided by th e employment of the first 
group of motorised SA (initially called the NatioT"alsozialistischer Allt.omobil-
korps (NSAK», which had. been formed in the ~ in April 1930. 173) By the 
time of the election campaign this 'new propaganda weapon' was used to 'extend 
the action radius (sic) of the party's political propa~anda'. It gave greater 
mobility to the Nazis and was of considerable value in enabling the SA to 
protect many more meetings. The use of its own transport allowed the movement 
to carry out much more propaganda in the rural areas, where the appearance of 
a column of motorised SA was in itself an effective propaganda trick. 174) 
The election in Westphalia showed significant changes in voting habits 
and participation. As was general throughout Germany the election saw many 
more votes cast compared to 1928. In Westphalia-North the percentage increase 
of valid votes was 5.9 per cent (77.3 per cent in 1928 as against 83.4 per 
cent), in Westphalia-South the increase was higher with 7 per cent (77.0 per 
cent to 84.0 per cent). The electoral participation in Westphalia was thus 
marginally higher than the national average of 81.4 per cent. 175) The result, 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ .. 
171) A report by the police in Recklinghausen noted that the typical Nazi 
'rhymes' went as follows 
'Wer hat uns verraten?' 'Die Sozialdernokraten:' 
'Wer Macht uns frei?' 'Die Hitlerpartei!' 
'Juda' 'Verrecke!' 
"Bei den Ch~ren kann man nicht etwa von Rufen und Sprechen reden, sondern 
es handelt sich urn ein regelrechtes Brtlllen. Die Wirkung blieb auch nicht 
aus; aus allen Ecken str8mten Neugierige herbei", police ~eport, Feckling_ 
hausen, 27 AUe:llst 19)0, SAM VII - 67 Pd. 1. 
172) "Der Einsatz motorisierter Krflfte im politischen Kampf war neu und blieb, 
trotz aller Versuche im gegnerischen Lager, der jungen (NS) Bewegune vor-
behalten:" - thus A. Schr~der, Mit der Pa:rtei VOTW~rtS: Zehn .J'ahre Gau 
Westfalen-Nord, Detmold, 1940, p.l)4; similarly Beck, 01" cit., p.141. 
173) For the following see Beck, 01'. cit., 1'.141 ff •• 
174) On the impact of the motorised SA in the rural areas see the report by 
the Landrat, Borken, 8 September 1930' SAM VII - 67 Ed. 1. 
175) Percentage returns taken from Milatz, 01'. cit., pp.86 ff •• 
in percentages, was as follows: 
Westph.-N. Westph.-S. Reich 
NSDAP 12.2 13.9 18.3 
DNVP 
.5.9 3.9 7.0 
DVP 4.9 6.0 4.5 
Centre Party 31.5 22.1 14.8 
Staatspartei 2.1 2.7 3.8 
SPD 19.8 21.3 24.5 
KPD 11.3 17.0 13.1 
Others 12.3 13.0 14.0 
In terms of votes cast the gains and losses recorded by the parties in rela-
tion to the 1928 election werel 
Westph.-N. Westph.-S. 
Losses Gains Losses Gains 
NSDAP 148,859 175,761 
DNVP 32,054- 50,918 
DVP )4,910 46,543 
Centre Party 45,530 25,711 
Staatspartei 2,377 13,110 
SPD 26,652 62,961 
KPD 45,40'+ 93,845 
others 273 59,240 
Total Vote 144,527 180,947 176 ) 
The main beneficiaries of the increased turn-out were the two extremist par-
ties, the NSDAP and KPD. The increased poll of the NSDAP was based 1arfely 
on support secured from new voters or former non-voters. If one assumes that 
radical voting changes (e.g. from KPD or SPO to NSDAP, or DNVP to SPO) were 
fairly rare, the second major catchment area of the NSDAP were the former 
supporters of the DNVP and DVP. The Nazis also secured votes from a number 
of other bourgeois parties and interest groups, primarily from the ~­
schaftspartei, which lost 21,444 votes in Westphalia. One can assume that 
the bulk of these went to the NSDAP since the chief centres of support for 
the Wirtschaftspartei were the Sieger1and and Bielefeld areas, in which the 
NSDAP did very well in 1930. 177) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------.-
176) Figures taken from W. Dittmann, Dag Politische Deutschland vor Hitler, 
ZUrich, 1945. . 
177) On the Wirtschaftspartei 
front und He ublik. Die 
Mitte1standes 1919-1933, 
p.222. 
in Westphalia see M. Schumacher, M1ttelstand~­
Wirtschaftspart,ei - Reichspart,ei des deutschen 
sse1dorf, 1972, PP.95-9 ; election statistics 
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Despite the dramatic gains secured by the Westphalian NSDAP, the returns 
secured fell well below the national average. For an explanation of the 
relatively poor performance one need not look fars the social and relieious 
structure of the province worked against the movement. The major obstacle 
was the Catholic Centre Party which dominated politics in 30 of the 53 urban 
and rural electoral units into which Westphalia was divided. In 20 of these 
units the Centre Party secured an absolute majority. 178) In its election 
campaign the Centre Party had concentrated on two broad issues. It defended 
its association with the 'authoritarian' BrUning government whi.1e refuting 
the charge that the party had 'betrayed democracy'. 179) More vigorous was 
the pursuit of the second major electoral theme,directed towards exposing 
the 'irreligious' and 'marxist' tendencies.of the NSDAP. 180) The hostile 
attitude of the Centre Party was effective in preventing serious Nazi inroads 
into the Catholic population. In the MUnster and Paderborn regions, and 
especially in the Catholic counties of the Sauerland, the Nazis encountered 
181 ) intense opposition from the local population. The effectiveness of the 
Centre Party's anti~~azi propaganda can be seen in the very poor results 
secured by the NSDAP in Catholic counties, which fell well below the regional 
average. 182) 
The second 'bloc' preventing Nazi expansion was provided by the parties 
of the Left, which called the tune in the industrialised rerions of the pro-
vince and blunted Nazi efforts by a forceful and vigorous election campaifn. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
178) Milatz, OPe cit., l'!lpendix - map "Reichstagswahl 14 September 1930". 
179) Tremonia, 4 August and 8 September 1930: General-An~eiger, 8 September 
1930. 
180) Cf. Klotzbach, oPe cit., pp.33-34. 
181) On this see Beck, OPe cit., passim; also Hiemisch, oPe cit., p.58. 
182) This is underlined by a comparison of three Protestant counties and 
three Catholic counties with similar social structures in the Regierunrs 
bezirk Minden. The average return of the NSDAP in the three Protestant 
counties of Halle, Herford and Lffbbecke was 29 per cent; the averaee 
in the three catholic counties of BUren, Paderborn and Warrnlrg was 4.6 
per cent. Detailed regional election statistics taken from the IAer-
lohner Kreisanzeiger- und Zeitung, 15 and 16 September 1930. ----
33) 
Of the two socialist parties the SPD found itself in a difficult position 
in that it had to combat both the extreme Left and the extreme Ri~ht. In 
their election campaign the Social Democrats attacked the NSDAP as t~~ 'main 
enemy' of Germany, ridiculing its cla1ms of 'socialism' and drawing attention 
to its reactionary nature. 183) At the same time a major effort was a)so 
directed against the KPD, which was seen as a threat to democracy equal to 
that posed by the Nazis. The theme of 'enemies all round' dominated the 
SPD's electoral tactics. 184) The hostility shown by the Social Democrats 
towards the Communists was reciprocated. In the 1930 campaign the KPD fol-
lowed electoral tactics dictated by the 'ultra-left' policy adopted by the 
party leadership in 1928. 185) Its main feature, enforced largely on the 
German Communists by the dominant influence of the Comintern, was the view 
that the chief opponent of the KPD was the SPO, and that the SPD and NSDAP 
were really one and the same. Thus the WestphaHan KPD issued a propar~nda 
'against National and Social fascism, against trust capitalism and its satel-
11 tes - the Social Democratic leaders'. 186) The la.rgest gains of the West-
phalian KPD, generally at the expense of the SPO, came in the urban centres 
of the Ruhr, areas which were hit hardest by the economic depression. 187) 
In both Westphalia-North and -South the SPD lost votes to the KPD, losses 
which were heavy in some parts of Westphalia-South, where the SPO was displaced 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
183) A whole catalogue of a busi ve sloe:ans were aimed at the Nazis. d es~ri bed 
variously as "Idiots in the employ of CapHal", "Fait for the Worker". 
"Also a 'Workers' Party"', "Peculiar Socialists", the "Hope of all 
Monarchists", "Another fom of communist destructive fury" and "The 
Party of Lies, Murder and War. led by capitalist-feudal reaction:trj,es" r 
Klotzbach, OPe cit., p.33. Cf. WestfM1is~he Al1p:emeine Volks-Ze'itun,:, 
23 July, 25 July and 11 September 1930. 
184) Reports on SPD meetings in Iserlohner Kreisanzei{"er- uno Zeitun!":. 15 and 
28 August, 8 September 1930; Westf!.tUsche AUp"eme:ine Volks-Zeitune, 
23 and 25 July, 11 and 12 September 1930. 
185) Dn KPD policies see Bahne, in E. Matthias and R. Morsey, OPt cit •• pp. 
656 ff.. Also Weber, OPe cit., pp.239 ff •• 
186) Westf!.tlischer K!.tmpfer, 28 July, 9 August, 12 Au~ust and 1 September 1930. 
187) On the correlation between high unemployment and KPD success see Kalte-
fle1ter, OPe cit., pp.67 ff.. Further H. Bennecke, WiTtschaftliche 
Depression und politischer Radikal:ismlls. Die Lehre von Weimar, Munich, 
1968, pp.47 ff •• 
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as the majority party in the Gelsenkirchen end Ennepe-Ruhr regions. Overall 
the two socialist parties continued to hold on to the socialist share of the 
vote in relation to the 1928 election, and the Communists benefited signifi-
188 ) 
cantly from the increased poll. 
The NSDAP secured varying results in different parts of Westphalia.. The 
maximum impact was made in the Protestant rural areas in the north-east and 
south of the province, areas in which the DNVP had held sway in the 1924 and 
1928 elections. In 1930 the Nazi impact in these areas was restricted by two 
factors. A major competitor for the 'conservative'Protestant rural vote was 
the Landvolk movement, which continued to hold on in north-eastern Westphalia, 
especially in County LUbbecke, where it retained its relative majority in 1930 
despite the Nazi gains in the county. Another political rival for the Pro-
testant vote also emerged in 1930: the CSVD, which attracted some of the DNVP 
votes and benefited from the increased polIo The CSVD performed creditably, 
by its standards, in both Westphalia-North and -South, securing 45,737 votes 
(3.4 per cent) and 81,630 (5.8 per cent) respectively. 189) Petit-bourgeois 
in its social structure, and heavily dependent on the female vote, the CSVD 
became a strong force in the Siegerland and the Minden-Ravensberg area. 190) 
In County Siegerland the CSVD secured its best result in Germany, polling 
32.8 per cent, largely at the expense of the DNVP, which had dominated the 
county in the 'twenties. In other Protestant communities in Westphalia the 
party also obtained a number of very good results. 191) The success of the 
CSVD shows that in 1930 the NSDAP was not yet the automatic choice of 'troubled' 
Protestant voters. 
It would be a mistake to deduce from the results secured by the Nazis in 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
188) In Westphalia-North the parties combined secured 33.3 per cent in 1928 
and 31.1 per cent in 1930; in Westphalia-South the respective figures 
were 41.1 per cent and )8.3 per cent. 
189) Figures taken from Opitz, OPe cit., pp.)46-347. The returns were better 
than the results obtained by the DDP, and rivalled those of the DNVP and 
DVP. 
190) Opitz, OPe cit •• pp.181-l82. 
191) Ibid., pp.340-)4l. 
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Protestant rural areas that the NSDAP was merely a radical version of the 
DNVP-Iandvolk variety. The party did very well in a number of urban ~entres, 
both within and outside the Ruhr: 
Above the national averaee 
Below national average, but 
above regional average 
Close to regional average 
Iserlohn 
Minden 
Herford 
Hagen 
Hamm 
Ennepe-Ruhr ( urlanised ) 
Bielefeld 
Gelsenkirchen 
Mengede 
25.6 
23.0 
22.1 
21.8 
21.7 
20.0 
17.6 
11.6 
11.1 192 ) 
These results were secured in towns very diverse in size and va~Jin~ in their 
socio-economic and religious composition. Creditable performances were attained 
in towns in which the odds were theoretically very much ar,ainst the NSDAP 
because of the powerful working class parties (SUCh as Hagen, Hamm, Bielefeld 
and Gelsenkirchen). 
Overall the NSDAP returns in Westphalia confirm the observations made 
elsewhere, namely that the movement was most effective in eneaging the voter 
in rural, Protestant areas, and of the middle class in medium sized towns 
(SUCh as Iserlohn, Herford, Minden in the Westphalian case). 193) In the 
Westphalian area, however, the success of the Nazis in a number of industria-
lised, urban areas, points to the need fDr a revision of the view that the 
NSDAP failed to make much impact on the working class voter. Given the social 
make-up of the region, and the determination of the Gauleitun~ to cultivate 
working class support, the success of the Nazis lay largely in the hands of 
the 'proletariat'. ~ 1930 some success was recorded by the Nazis, not only 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
192) The percentages were calculated from figures taken from the Iserlohner 
Kre'lsanzp-il'"er- und Zei tung, 15 and 16 September 1930. 
193) On the rural voting trends see C.P. Loomis and J.A. Beegle, OPt cit., 
PP.724 ff.; Stoltenberg, oPe cit., pp.163 ff.1 Noakes, OPe cit., pp.152-
1.54. Cf. the analysis by E.-A. Roloff, 'Wer wl:thHe Hitler? Thesen zur 
Sozial- und Wirtschaftseeschichte der Weimarer Republik', Politi sche 
Studien, 15, 1964, pp.293-)00; K. O'Lessker, 'Who voted for Hitler? A 
Hew Look at the Cla.ss Basis of Nazism', ~Amerjcan Journal of Socioloe;;y, 
74, 1968, pp.6)-69; J.K. Pollock, 'An Areal Study of the German Electorate, 
1930-1933', The Amer:i.can Political Science Revip.w, 1944, pp.89-95. 
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in the votes obtained in the September election, but also in the comparatlvely 
high percentage of workers in the party. The question now was whether or not 
the National Socialists could extend their base in this direction, Tor lack 
of continued growth in the large urban centres would doom the party to play 
a secondary role in regional politics. 
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Chapter 9: THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE NSDAP, 1931-1932 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oreanisational develo-pments in Gaue Westphal ia-l-!o'Y'th and -S011th. 
The division of Gan Westphalia into the r~1Je Westphalia-North and -South 
in January 1931 completed the process of the redrawing of the Gan boundaries 
to correspond with the boundaries of the Retchstag electoral districts first 
set in motion by the Parteileitung in 1928. The initiative for the division 
came from Gauleiter Wagner, who towards the end of 1930 decided on a division 
of his Gau into two Unterl'"aue, over which he would continue to enjoy full 
control. The decision was prompted by a desire to construct a more efficient 
regional organisation, necessitated by the influx of new party members in 
1930. 1) The proposed reoreanisation, though passed to the Parteilettun~ for 
consideration, was implemented before Munich's attitudes were known. It was 
on Wagner's authority that the district leader of Bielefeld, Homann, took over 
Untergau Westphalia-North. Wagner's independent action, his attempt to retain 
control in Westphalia, and his appointment of Homann as G;:wlei tar, met with 
failure as the Parteileitun~ intervened to assert its central control. The 
concept of the division of Westphalia was agreed to by Strasser, but not the 
way in which Wagner had tried to operate. On Strasser's advice, Hitler a-ppoin'-
ted Dr Meyer, distr:l.ct leader of Ge1senkirchen, as provisional Caulei ter of 
Westphalia-North, the 'final transfer of the ~ beine deferred by one year or 
more', a probationary period during which Meyer had the chance to prove his 
ability. 2) The problems involved in the reorganisation were sorted Ollt at a 
conference in Hamm on 4 January 1931, at which the houndaries of Gaue West-
phalia-North and -South were defined. In accordance with the 'electoral dis-
trict principle' a number of boundary chane:es were settled with the adjacent 
~ Hanover-SUd-Braunschweig, including the transfer of the Land Li~pe-Detmold 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) "Iagebericht 4", police report, Bielefeld, January 1931. SAD MI IP/625. 
2) G. Strasser to Wagner, Munich, 24 December 1930; Strasser to Mever, 
Munich, 24 December 19301 BAK NS 22/1076. . 
by the latter to the new Gau Westphalia-North. 
Meyer faced a num,ber of problems followine the creation of the new r,a1J. 4) 
One major difflculty was the low membership of the Nazi Party in northern 
Westphalia. At the time of the division the paid-up membership o~ the West-
6 5) phalian section which he took over numbered 4,25 , oreanised in 115 branches. 
The strength of the party was unequally distributed. Just over one-third of 
the membershi.p, and 40 per cent of the branches, were concentrated in the 
district of Bielefeld. In the Catholic areas of the ~ the party had ha:nHy 
established itself. The geographically extensive districts of Mfinster, Pader-
, . 
born and Rheine, contained only a handful of small branches1 Mfinster han only 
4 branches with a total membership of 274; Paderborn numbered a mere 169 
members di.stributed among 10 branches. The relatively low membership had 
to carry an extensive party bureaucracy, which was rapidly constTllcted 1.n 
the spring of 1931. The development of the Gan apparatus presented its own 
problems. At its formation the Gauleitune; consisted of only six functionaries: 
the Gau1eiter, Gau business manager and treasurer, party auditor, Can Uschla 
chairman, propaea,nda leader, and Hi tIer Youth leader. 6) In the course of 
1931 the Gau leadership expanded rapidly to reflect the horizontal orr,ani-
sation typical of the more established~. By the end of the year, excluding 
the Gauleiter and SA leader, the Ga,uleitung consisted of 18 officials con-
trolling 18 departments. 7) Many of these officials were men of compara-
tively little experience, for the bulk of the experienced personnel of 
------------------ -- ---------------------------------------------------
3) Meyer to Strasser, Gelsenkirchen-Bller, .5 January 19311 BAK NS 22/1075. 
4) Alfred Meyer, born 5.10.1891 at Gtlttinpen. Abitur' 1911. Studied law at 
Lausanne. Officer during World War Oner prisoner of war 1917. Had reached 
the rank of Captain by the time of his demobilisation. Secured doctorate 
1922. Employed as Zechenbeamter in Gelsenkirchen. Joined NSDAP 1928; party 
number 28,738. Branch leader of Gelsenkirchen and district leader of 
Emscher-Lippe. 1930 MdR: 1931 deputy in Prussian Landtag. 1933 Reichs-
statthalter of Lippe and Lippe-Schaummlrgr 1938 OberprHsident of Westphalia. 
Committed suicide 1945 • 
.5) For the following "Statistik Gau Westfalen-Nord It, probably spring 1931 
covers period 1.1.1931 to 1.6.1931: copy in SAD MI IP/60? 
6) Schr~dert OPe cit., p.16. 
7) Full list of these contained in "Gaurundschreiben Nr. 15", Ge1senkirchen, 
20 November 1931 - copy in SAM VII - 67 Bio 3. 
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~ Westphalia W'lS retained by Gau Westphalia.-South at the time of the division. 
As a consecpence the Gau1eitung was not very efficient. The impression of 
Reichsorcanisations-Inspekteur Ley at the first ~ conference of Westphalia-
North was that the party organisation was of a lower standard than that of 
the older, established Gaue. 8) 
Apart from the difficulties involved in the construction of the ~ appnra-
tus, Meyer also had to face a problem which had worried Wagner towa.rds the end 
of 1930, namely opposition wi thin the party caused in part by the Otto Strasser 
crisis in the summer of 1930. 9) The split between Strasser and Hitler cre~ted 
some unrest, primarily in the branches situated in nort~eastern Westphalia. 
Wagner had dealt with this by wholesale expulsions of refmctoty party members 
and the dissolution of a number of branches in which oppo!d.ticn sentiments were 
particularly strong. 10) Hardest h~by these internal disputes were the large 
~ 
branches of Bielefeld, Herford. and Minden. The opposition appears to have been 
motivated less by ideologica 1 S-lpport for Otto Strasser !'Illd more by ill will 
towards, and jealousy of, branch and diStrict leaders. The major complaint of 
the disaffected Nazis was about the 'boss rule' in 'Ihe party. Few of those 
expelled. joined. O. strasser's 'KampfGemeinsch~ft revoLutton~rer National 
Sozialisten', which failed to take root even in the areas of major unrest. 11) 
Dissolved branches re-emerged in the spring of 1931 with mertberships composed. 
of those who had former~ been eKpelled. 12) The unrest did. not affect party 
functionaries above the branch level. The sole exception was the editor of the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
8) "Bericht Uber den Gautag Westfalen in Ml1nster", 1:u Ley (Jawary 1932) 
copy in BAK NS 22/1075. 
9) For the background see KUhnl, Ope cit., p.248 ff.; also HUttermerger, 
Ope cit., pp.53 ff •• 
10) "Lagebericht Nr. 4", police report, Bielefeld, Jarruary 1931: SAD MI IP/625. 
HUttenberger notes that the strasser crisis cost Gau Ruhr (which no longer 
existed) some 1,500 to 2,000 members. Evidenoe for thi sis hard to find in 
the case of Westphalia. See HUttenberger, Ope cit., p.53. 
11) See the report on the Kampfgemeinschaft revolutionl1rer NS by the police, 
Bielefeld, 20 March 1931: SAD MI IP/606. 
12) Police reports, Bielefeld, 8 December 1930: SAD MI 1J?/606; and 12 January 
1931: SAD MI IF/607. 
338 
WestfIHischer Be(/lbachter (a regional Nazi paper printed in Herford and dis-
tributed in the Minden-Ravensberg region), who was dismissed from his post. 13) 
Since the bulk of the expelled. members continued to look to Hi tIer as their 
party leader, and. demanded to be allowed to re-enter the party, the G3.111ei tung 
of Westphalia-North wasvell placed. to solve 'the problem. Provided that the 
expelled members paid their missed membership dues, they were allowed back into 
the fold. 14) By April 1931 the unrest had died down, and 'oomp1ete peace 
reigned in all the branches'. 15) Significantly the Stennes affair in the 
spring of 1931 hardly affected the Westphalian region. 
Though the Gauleitung of \Vestphalia-North succeeded in quelling the unrest, 
the disharmony within the ~ at its formation was a serious embarrassment to 
Meyer engaged, as he was, in asserting his authority over t he regional movement. 
It was just as well for him tmt Homann, whom he 'replaced', did not use the 
unrest in an area which formed the basis of his Ha.usmacht to make further dif-
ficulties for the new Gauleiter. Meyer's appointment of Homann to the position 
of Gauoreanisations1eiter of Westphalia-North probably appeased the latter, 
and ihe two 'worked hand in hand'. 16) Tactically it was an astute move by 
Meyer, who won over a well-known regional figure, a man fully aware of the 
party situation in the ~ and one who had proved his organisational skills by 
creating the most successfUl district in northern Westphalia. 
The years 1931 and 1932 SaW a continuation of the expansion of the NSDAP 
in Westphalia. Between September 1930 and Janua~ 1933 ~ Westphalia-South 
attracted 20,5~ new members, which brought the total party membership to 
24,214. In the sn.me period ~ Westphalia-North recorded an increase of 
14,467 members, giving it a total membership of 16,546. 17) These increases 
--------------------------------------------------------------- .. ... ~-------
131 "Lagebericht 4", police report, Bielefeld. JaI1la~ 1931: SAD MI IP/625. 
14 Police report,. Bielefeld, 20 March 1931: SAD MI IP/606. 
15 "Lagebericht 5", police report, Bielefeld, 20 May 1931: SAD MI IP/625. 
16 M~er to strasser, Gelsenkirchen-Buer, 13 Febru~ 1931: BAK NS 22/1075. 
17 Parteistatistik, Ope cit., p.26. These figures a.re lower than those given 
on a list drawn up in 1933, which gave Gau iVestphalia.-South a membership 
of 29,771 on 30 Januar,y 1933, and GauWestphalia-North 19,341 - list con-
tained in BAK Sammlung Schuma.cher 376. 
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were relatively small canpared to the general growth rate in other Gaue, and 
both 'Nestphalian Gaue had fewer members in proportion to their population 
than most of 'the other 30 Nazi Gaue. 18) 
The membership increases were important in easing '!he fin.''l.ncial strains 
imposed. on the rank and. file by an expanding party bureaucracy, the crea.tion of 
a regional party press, and. the numerous election campaigns of 1932. Of great 
importance to fue Westphalian Nazis wa.s tile growth in the number of supporters 
organised. in the Freiheitsbund.. This orglnisation nourished. in 1931-32, and 
was particularly streng in the Bielefeld, Dortmund and Bochum regions. 19) The 
Bielefeld. district alone had fifteen branches by 1932. 20) The organisation 
enjoyed support from' doctors, lawyers, and profusional people employed in 
industry and business', some of whom contributed ccnsid.erable sums to the 
NSDAP. Individual monthly centributions in Dortmund ranged from 50 R.M to 
120 RIl. 21) Due to the secrecy which surrrunded manbership, the total member-
ship of fue Freiheitsbund is impossible to determine. In the Hamm region the 
organisation was estimated to contain 300 to 400 members; in Bielefeld it had. 
60 members, and. in Paderborn 30. 22) Even at 5 RM per head. per month the 
income d.erived. fran this source would. have been quite substantial. Certainly 
the flow of funds from these hidd.en sources did much to alleviate the financial 
situation of the party. The money was used. for' covering debts in branch 
budgets and. for financing more extensive propaganda'. The funds were also 
important in the 'furniShing and. running of SA-Homes', which were a common 
feature in party branches by the. early nineteen-thirties. 23) The income 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
18) In terms of the membership strength of the .32 Gaue, Westphalia-South waR 
placed. 22nci and. Westphali&-North 28th - Parteistatistik, op. cit., p.27. 
19j Police report, Bochum, 2~ December 1931: 5~~ 67 - Bd.. 3. 
20 Police report, Bielefeld, 27 May 1932: SAD MI IP/522. 
21 RepOl"t by the Reg1erungsprllsident Arnsberg, 30 October 1931: SAM VII -
67 Bd. 3. . 
22) Police report, Bielefeld, 27 December, 1932: SAD MI IP/522. 
23) For this and. "!he following see police repcrt, Bocrum, 24 December 1931: 
SAM VlI - 67 Bd. 3. 
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derived from the Freiheitsbund was jealously guarded by the branch leaders, 
who considered the funds 1P be branch property. In ma!\y oases even the district 
leaders were not informed of too total incane derived :!'ran this source. At a 
district meeting held in Bielefeld on 25 October 1931, f or example, one answer 
given by a branch leader to the cl:i.strict leaders' question about the total 
sum collected through the Freiheitsbund was 'that he did not wish to divulge 
any information on this since it would only lead to greater financial demands 
being made on his branch by the district leader; he cculd use the money for 
propaganda purposes himself'. 
The general developments of both westphalian ~ in the years 1931 and 
1932 show marked si:nilarities to those reoorded in the two previous yea.rs. The 
basic pattern of party operation was relatively fil1D. by 1931. The intensity 
of effort, the type of propaganda style, 'Iile organisational principles and the 
structure of the Ga.u administration remained practically unchanged. Refinements 
in too vertical organisational structure of the Gauleltung, such as the rep1ace_ 
ment of the district leader by Kreisleiter in the course of 1931-32, were in 
line with national developments. The imitation and utilisation of propaganda 
techniques employed by rival parties also continued. Thus the example provided 
by the KPD's Agitpropgruppen prompted the yauleitung Westphali&-South to develop 
a number of Spielscharen, whose function it was to 'entertain visitors to Nazi 
meetings through one-act plays enphasising National SOCialist ideas'. 24) 
Since the Communist pre ss regularly announced the names of former Nazi s who 
joined the KPD, the Gauleitung Westphalia-North thought it useful to use this 
propaganda method in reverse. Party branches were asked to report the number 
of former Communists who entered the NSDAP. They were especially a.sked to 
provide 'favourable comments made by these new party ccmrades, which Should 
emphasize their reasons for changing their allegiance, whioh could then be 
used for propaganda purposes'. 25) Much greater emphasis was also placed in 
--------------------~----------------------------------------------------
24) Poli ce reports, Bochum, 6 and 19 February 1931: SAM vn - 67 Bd. 2. 
25) "Rundschreiben dar GL \1-1'1", 22 November 1931 - copy in SAM VII - 67 Bd. 3. 
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the early nineteen-thirties on the acquisition of 'political intelligence', 
both on the party's own activities as well as that of its rivals. The impetus 
for this development came from the Reichsleitung in 1931. From 1931 monthly 
reports were dutifully produced by the Gallleitunf, which issued special forms 
to the district leaders on which to record the major activities of the party 
in the area under their control, the p~paganda activities of the opposition 
parties (including copies of pamphlets distributed by them), and sllggestiOB 
. 6) 
concerning propaganda suitable for their areas. 2 The activity reports 
compiled by the Hestphalian Gau propaganda departments indicate the cont:i.nuation 
of the characteristics of Nazi agitation in force by the late nineteen-twenties: 
a mass of meetings and party activity in all parts of the Gaue which over-
shadowed the efforts of all the opposition parties combined. 27) 
One party development which merits special consideration in the period 
1931 to 1933 is the creation of a regional Nazi press. Compared to its major 
polittcal rivals, the NSDAP did not possess an influential party press until 
1933. 28) In Westphalia the construction of a regional press was initiated 
by Wagner in the course of 1930. The initial reluctance to construct an lnde-
pendent Westphalian Gau paper was due to the lack of finance and suitable 
personnel. Also, it was felt, an independent Westphalian Gau paper might lead 
to the end of Die Neue Front (Terboven's ESsen publication which was distri-
buted in Westphalia). The collapse of this paper had to be avoided at all 
costs since it might undermine party morale. 29) Wagner's reluctance to 
venture into the press world may a.lso have been influenced by his first efforts 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
26) "An die BL der NSDAP Gau W-S", Gaupropagandaleiter, Bochum, 14 February 
1931 - copy in SAM - 67 Ed. 2. Cf. the "Sonderrundschreiben Gau W-S", 
Bochum, 2 November 1931 - copy in SAM VII - 67 Bd. 3. 
27) Cf. the example given in Schr8der, OPe cit., pp.56-65. 
28) Pridham points out that by 1933 the Nazis controlled only 121 papp.rs out 
of a total of 4,703 -paners published in Germany. The Nazi pubUcations 
had a circulation of circa 1 million. Pridham, OPt cit., p.244. 
29) This consideration was voiced at the district leaders meeting in Dortmund 
in February 1930 - copy of the report in SAM VII - 67 Bi. 1. 
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with the WestflUischer Beoba.chter, a weekly which appeared in Herford fran 
July 1929. By February 1930 it had run up a debt of 6,800~. 30) What 
finally persuaded the Nazis to develop a regional press in Westphalia was the 
belief that alV major political movement had to have one •. 31) After the elec-
tion breakthrough of September 1930, and the increase in party membership in 
the 1a tter hal! of that year, Wagner thought it appropriate to bring out a 
~ paper, which he thought would be useful in furthering the 'organisational 
and spiritual unity of ihe Gaule1tung and the individual party member'. 32) 
The new paper, the Westfalenwacht, appeared from 1 Ootober 1930. A weekly, it 
was published in Bochum and edited by the Ganpropagandalei.ter Dr Fiolum. At 
first it had a print order of 8,000, whioh roee to 15,000 by February 1931. 33) 
By FebruaIy 19.31 the moderate success of the Westfalenwacht encouraged the 
Gauleitung to bring out a dai~ paper, the pote Erde. This developed into the 
chief publication r£ ~ Westphalia-South (it was also distributed in the 
southern parts of ~ Westphali~North), with a. print order which increased 
J..) 
from 8,000 to 20,000 between February 1931 and Jamary 1933. The ~-
falenwacht continued to be published for distribution in the rural areas ana 
was written accordingly. 35) The Rote Erne was aimed primarily at the working 
class. Eighty per cent of its readership were manual workers (Hn.ndarbei ter). 
Its language was t simple and crude so that 'the .!2!!£ could understand it'. 36) 
In the course of 1931 a number of additional local an:1 regional papera were 
a.lso founded in the.VestphaUa.n~. In sou thern Westphalia the Siet'jesl!nder 
Nationalzeitung first emerged in October 1931, whidl served the Siegen and 
liittgenstein area. The paper struggled for surviva.l unt1.l 19.B, with a cir-
. 37) w 
culation fluctuating between 900 and 2, 000. ~ estphalia-North was 
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30) Sohr~der, OPe cit., p.BO. 
31) Beck, op. cit., p.87. 
32) Thus '!he "Rundschreiben der Ga.upropagandaleitung", Boohum, 10 September 
1930 - oOPY in SAM VII - 67 Bd. 1. 
33) "Die NS-Presse in Gau Westfalen-Sdd': HA 49/1157. 
34) Westf!lische Landeszeitung "Rote Erde": HA ~9/1157. 
35) "Westfalenwacht" - report 1n HA ~9/1l59. . 
36) Beok, op. cit., pp.90 and 95. 
37) A brief history of the pa.per is given in "HS-Presse: Siegeslllnder National_ 
zeitung" in HA 48/1067. 
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initially served by the Westflilischer Beobaehter, and its tvo local editions, 
the Bielefelder Beobaehter and the Her.f'order Beobachter. These had a ciroula-
tion of 2,000 and were insignifioant; when compared to the l.00 or so newspapers 
printed in northern Westphalia, which had a combined circulation of 500,000. 38) 
Three other local pipers which a.lso appeared in northern Westphalia in the 
course of' l.93l. and 1932, namely the Lippi sehe Kurier, Die Schl'lumburg and ~ 
Filter, all suffered from laok of subsoribers until the co-ordination of the 
regional press in the Gleichschaltung of 1933 led to a rapid increase in their 
readership. 39) 
The laok c£ Slccess of the Naz i press in Westphalia la.v basioolly in the 
nature of' the papers produ ced by the party. They were no t newspapers in the 
accepted sense of the word. Even the largest, the Rote Erde, was little more 
than 'a daily street pamphlet'. 40) The ne'NS content of the Nazi papers was 
very limited and objectivity in reporting was lacking 'as a matter of policy'. 
Their purpose was ttl further the political struggle of the NSDAP. They were 
not designed to replace til e daily papers previously taken by the party mem-
bers. 4-1) Technically the papers were of poor quali 1;y', the IX'int was bad and 
mistakes abounded. Even 'the party members constantly complained about their 
low quality. The loyalty of the readership was tested fUrther by the irre-
gularity of their appearance. eru de attacks on the state, politicians, poli-
tical parties, regional and local personalities especial~ disliked by the 
Nazis, as wel.l as sensational reports of Jewish 'ritual murders' and eo on, 
led to a series of prohibitions. The Rote Erde, for example, had one of the 
worst records in this respect. Between April. 1931 and April 1932 it was 
banned six times, for a total of 17 weeks, a 'record' exceeded nationally 
by only one other Nazi paper, the ~estdeutseher Beobachter. 42) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------~---
38) 
39) 
40) 
41) 
4-2) 
Schreder, Ope cit., p.75. 
Ibid., pp.81 ff •• 
Beck, Ope cit., p.88. 
For t his and the fo11ew ing 
oPe cit., pp.75 ff •• 
Beck, Ope cit., p.90. 
see Beck, OPe cit., pp.86 ff.; also Schr~der, 
The appea 1 of Nazi publications was small. Even the c cmrni tted party 
member had to be cajoled into supporting them. 43) The simple expedient of 
sending each branch a fixed quota, regardless of whether there ?las any rJ,(.;mcr.c 
for the papera, was used to get rid of each edition. 44) The branches tried 
to sell as many copies as possible chiefly for financial reasons. The~­
falenv19.cht, for example, which cost 20 Pr., was sold. iP the bI"~nches at half 
price. 45) Few branches could make such profit in practice, however, since 
most failed. to sell their quota. The poor economic climate of the time, which 
led. even establi s."ed papers to struggle for survival, was not propitious for 
the luunching of fue Nazi papers. 
The role pl~ed by the regional Nazi press wa.s a minor one. The pa.pers 
were u sed for propaganda purposes, espeCially at e1eotion time, when special 
issues suitable for house to house propaganda were provided to branches at a 
cut price. 'The papers did act as a mannel r£ CClllmuniC3.tion bet-..,een the 
Gaule:Uung and. party members and announcements and general information were 
distributed. daily through the publications. It is fairly certain that outside 
the party the Nazi papers had few regular readers and hardly aqy Significance. 
One feature of the national development of the NSruP which is particularly 
striking in the ear],y nineteen-thirties is ihe expansion of specialist orgllni_ 
sations within the movement. By 1930 a number of organisations existed alonC;-
side the political organisation. Apart fran the SA and the 53, founded by 
the party, there were seven further organisa.tions fCllnded by private initia-
tive. These had all been cfficially acknowledged as 'National Socialist' by 
Hitler, and integrated into the movement. 46) As '!he party expanded in the 
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43) 
44) 
45) 
46) 
Schr~d.er notes in his account of the history of the regional Nazi press 
that 'no party member would want to read suoh papers a.gain, never mind 
pay for fuem alB 0'; sohreder, op. cit., p.75. 
The Bochum district alone had to get rid of one-third of the first issues 
of the ~Vestfalenwacht - police repcrt, BochUlll, 3 October 1930: SAM VII -
67 Bd. 1. 
The finanoial advantages to be gained by party branches in selling as 
ma~ papers as po ssible were ou tlined in a circular by the Gau propaganda 
department in September 1930 - copy in SAM vn - 67 Bd. 1. 
The organisations were the NSnStB, the Kampfbund ror Deutsche Kultur, 
the Deutscher Frauenorden "Ro tes HakEIlkreuz" , '!he DNSDJ, the NSLB, the 
NS lrztebund, and the NSS. 
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early 'thirties, these organisations grew in size and importance and were 
joined by a number of other specialist organiS3.tiona developed to attract 
specific economic and professional interests. Existing organisations emerged 
from the obscuri~ which had surrounded them in the late nineteen-twenties. 
The specialist organisations were not only engaged in the political struggle, 
they were increasingly charged with preparing the party for the various tasks 
it woold face once it secu red power. Of ihe new organi sa tions the ApA and the 
NSBO were by far the most significant. 
The specialist organisations were important in facilitating the party's 
rise to power. 47) They allowed. the Nazis to permeate a number of professional 
associations, and they were instrumental in removing from the bourgeois par-
ties much of their social and. financial support. For the NSDAP specialist 
departments furnished the movement with expert information which helped. it in 
its 'struggle' for power. The various organisations elso allowed the party 
to overcome more easily the problems confronting it in 1933. On the negative 
sid.e, the sheer number of specialist organisatiOns threatened the party with 
over-bureaucratisation. The bu roen placed on the party member, often enrolled 
in several organisations at the same time, also increased. The proble.lls of 
defining the respective areas of competence of the various organisations, as 
well as their relationship to the party organisation on the lo<nl and. regional 
levels, were difficult to solve. The tendency tOl'lards 'empire building' und.er-
mined the unity of the party. The scramble for influence and power within an 
increaSingly successful party resulted in a marked increase in P~stchenj~gerei. 
In the Westphalian NSDAP in the nineteen-thirties it led to much jealousy, 
bi tterness and di. sruption. Long serving par~ members were pu shed aside by 
the new 'experts' who secured pOsitions for ihemselves in the various specialist 
organisations. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
47) For the following see Noakes, op. cit., pp.163-164. 
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Few of the many specialist organisations had much significance in 'Vest-
phalia in the pre-1933 period. Professional organisations such as the NSLB, 
the DHSJ.B. the Ns-lrztebund and -the NS-nearntenabteilun~ made little headway 
before the removal of their non-Nazi rivals in 1933. 48) The degree of support 
enjoyed by the NSLB, for example, was neglf~ble. In southern Westphalia the 
first branch was founded as late as November 1931. By 1933 tb:l organisation 
existed in only 12 of the 22 Kreise in which ~ Westphalio.-South was divided, 
with a total membership of 326. 4-9) 
A similar picture emerges if one looks at fue Nazi youth organisations. 
Attempts to interest youths in Nazi am had a long history in the province. The 
first Nazi orientated organisation, the N3-Jugendbewe,~ng founded in the early 
nineteen-twenties, had established a branch in Dortmund in November 1922. 50) 
The N3-Jutjendbewegupg' s successor, the HJ, was founded in 1925 on t~ initia-
tive of Kurt Gruber. Called the Grossdeutache Jugendbewer,ure at first, it 
assumed the familiar HJ title at the party ccngress in Weimar in July 1926. 
The first Westphalian branch was founded in Bochum towards the aId of 1927, to 
be followed by a number of fu rther groups sca.ttered throughout th e province. 
These early branches were extremely small with memberships which did not reach 
the double figure mark. 51) Progress of -the HJ wa.s restricted due to the 
OPposition of the schools and churches. Some impetus was given to the HJ 
after the growth of the NSDAP in 1930 and 1931, par~ m&~bers being encouraged 
to enrol their Children in the movement. BY October 1931 the Westphalian HJ 
numbered 922. The organisation was largelY confined to southern Westphalia. 
~ Westphali~North having only 188 members. 52) Given the slow growth of 
the HJ, the call by Gau:N\hrer Loewer in 1932 to enrol as quickly as possible 
---------------------------------------------------------------~---------
48) Beck, op. cit., pp.178 ff •• 
49) On the histo~ of the NSLB in Gau W-S see Der National SoziRliatische 
Erzieher, Sonderausgabe: "Sechs Jahre NSLB in GaU 'Nestfalen-Sttd", April! 
Mal 1937; further Beck, op. cit., pp.190-192. 
SO) "Bericht 11: Landesverbttode der NS-Jugendbewegung", (n.d.): copy in HA 
18/333. 
51) Beck, op. cit., pp.172-173. 
52) "HJ Zusammenstellung fUr Oktober 1931" - list in HA 18/344. 
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'10,000 youths in G-au Westphalia-South to fight for 'the idea of Adolf Hitler' 
was absurdly optimistic. 53) The NSS, a department added to the HJ towards 
the end of 1930, also failed to elicit much response. 54.) In ~ -Nestphalia-
South it had a strength of 368 by the end of 1931. The organisation had 18 
branches, most of l'ilich were very small. Even in large towns, 8Uch as Bochum, 
Dortmund and Hagen, the memberships were low, 35, 30 and 20 respectively. 55) 
In part the weakness of the NSS is related to the lack of I!Upport enjoyed by 
the NSLB. Few teachers in Westphalia showed much sympatl\,y for the NSDAP, yet 
it was on the 'unobtrusive propaganda of teachers organised in the NSLB' that 
the NSS primarily depended. 56) Most of the 11 ttle Slpport enjoyed by the 
NSS came from the grammar school secto r; in the Mi ttelschulen and Volks!!Chulen 
there was har~ a~ response. 57) 
Of all the specialist organieationsot the NSDA.P the SA was by far the 
most important in the Kampfzei t period. In tb3 early nineteen-thirties the 
Westphalian SA gre'tT with the party. By November 1931 the :recorded strength 
of the Westphalian SA wae 8,020. 58) As is true of all the other party orga-
nisations, the main strength of the SA 1~ in southern Westphalia (5,558 mem-
bers), an area in which it grew mpidly in 1931 and 1932. Between October 
1931 and January 19.32 the SA increased ita membership by some 50 per cent, 
from 5,102 to 7,795. 59) Between November 1931 and July 1932 the SA in both 
~ more than doubled, to reach a total of 18,743. 60) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
53) "Rundachreiben 2/32", (N.D.); cOFJ in SAM VII - 67 Bd. 3. 
54.) In parts of Lower saxony the NSS did canparative1y well - aee Noakes, OPe 
cit., pp.193 ff •• 
55) "NSS Gau Weatfa1en-Sttd. Bestand 1930-1931." Copy in HA 18/3~. 
56) Police report, Bielefeld, 15 July 1932: SAD MI IP/611 Bd. 8. Police report 
on "Monatskonferenz der OG-F und UnterfUhrer des NS SchUlerbundes, Bezirk 
Dortmund 29 November 1931", Dortmund, 23 Deoember 1931: SAM VII - 67 Bd. 3. 
57) Polioe report, Dortmund, 23 December 1931: SA.M VII - 67 Bd. 3; police report 
Minden, 20 July 1932 and police report, Bielefeld. 15 July' 1932: SAD WI • 
IP/611 Bd. 8. Cf. the report on the NSS in Minden in Mindener Zeituns, 
24. June 1932. . 
58) Report by Police President, Bochum, 2 December 1931: SAD MI IF/521. 
59) "OSAF Betr. stand der S.'I. nach clem stande der letzten StllrkemeBung", ~o 
reports dated 15 December 1931 and 1 February 1932 in HA 17/307. 
60) "OSA]' Stand der SA", 1 September 1932: BA.K Samrnlung Schumacher 4.15. 
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For the Westphalian NSDAP 'the strength of 'the SA cootinued to be the 
crucial factor in 'the conduct of its operations, espeoially in view of the 
increasing power of anti-fa sci st organisations whioh confronted the party by 
the early nineteen-thirties. In southern Westphalia alone the two major anti-
Nazi or~anisations, the Communist Kampfbund gegen den Faschismu s and the SPD 
inspired. Reichsbanner had 11,993 and 9,931 members respectively by November 
1931. 61) Both of these organisations were aotivelY engaged in meeting the 
NaZi 'threat'. This is refleoted most olearly in the increase of violence. 
Between 1930 and. 1932 the Dortmund. area alone witnessed around 100 serious 
incidences involving loss of life and serious injuries as a result of political 
differenoes between the Nazis and left-wing supporters. 62) Without its quasi-
military organisation the NSDAP would have found it impossible to operate, 
espeoially in the larger u:roan centres where the Left was hic§1ly organised 
and strongly supported. 
Fortunately for the Nazis the Westphalian NSD"~P was spared. the damaging 
63) 
connicts between the party and the sA which occurred. elsewhere. There is 
eVidence of only one serious confrontation, which temporarily threatened the 
stabili -tor of 'the Hagen NSDAP in 1931. Here '\he branch leader and SA leader 
came into oonflict concerning their respective powers: the clash was worsened 
by 'the personal antipathy of the men oonoerned. 64) Barring such isolated 
squabbles, a relatively harmonious relationship existed between the party and 
the SA. This may be explained. in part by the good relationship which existed 
between the Westphalian Gauleiter and the SA leadership, and the determination 
by the Gauleitung, to quote Meyer, 'to ensure a smooth co-operation between the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
61) 
62) 
63) 
Report by Polioe President, Bochum, 2 December 1931: SAD MI IF/521. 
The incidences are listed in material collected by the Gestapo, Dortmund, 
16 May 1938: HA 26/522. . 
See Horn on the Stennes and stegmann affairs, Horn, OPe cit., pp.409 ffo; 
on the regional level, see·Noakes, pp.18~l85j Sch~n, Ope cit., pp.128 ff.; 
andPridham, Ope cit., pp.298 ff.. . 
OGL Theiler to DL Vetter, Hagen, 4 May 1931; Vetter to Strasser, Hagen, 
l2 May 19.31: BAR: NS 22/1076. 
349 
Gaulejtun~ and the SAF'. 65) The fact that Schepmann, SAF for Westphalia, 
was a close friend of both the ~lestphalian party leaders, is also of importance. 
His appointment in 1931 was the result of the efforts of Meyer, who thought 
that the Munich candidate for the position, a man called Apfelstaedt, was 
unsuitable for Westphalia. 66) 
The friction which existed within the Westphalian NSDAP tendpd to com~ 
from within the political organisation itself. The organisational develop-
ments of both Gaue were punctuated by dissent and confront,ation. The reriod:\.c 
clashes between the GauleiteT and their subordinates show that the ~hrer-
prinziE was still not fully appreciated by branch and district leaders, who 
challenged its implications on a number of occasions. At the grassroots 
the dictatorial authority vested in the ~ and distri.ct leaders could meet 
with strong opposition on points of organisational principle which had been 
clarified, theoretically at least, in the late nineteen-twenties. Thus the 
party members of the Detmold branch protested against the appointment of a 
new branch leader by the district leader in 1931 on the grounds that in their 
branch the party members had traditionally elected the branch leader. 67) 
The patronage concentrated in the hands of the Gauleiter, district leader 
and Kreisleiter was a source of friction. Local party leaders felt that their 
interests were being ignored in favour of those members of the cliques which 
surrounded the Gauleiter. Several accusations qy branch leaders that their 
removal from office was motivated by 'the desire of the GauleiteT' to further 
68) the 'political ambitions of their friends' are recorded. The conflict 
between Gauleiter Wagner and district leader of Dortmund, in the spring of 
1932, is illustrative of the kind of tension which existed within the party. 
Wagner's motive in dividing K8nig's district into two (Be7.irke Dortmund and 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
65l Meyer to R8hm, Ge1senkirchen-Buer, 31 March 1931. BAK NS 22)1076. 
66 Ibid •• cf. Strasser to Meyer, Munich, 20 May 1931. BAK NS 22/1076. 
67 Letter of complaint by K. Siedke to Strasser, Detmold, 19 May 19311 
BAK NS 22/1075. 
68) Cf. Dr Fuhrmann's objection to his removal - Fuhrmann, OCL of Hlddessen 
to GL Meyer, Hlddessen, 18 June 1932. BAK NS 22)1075. 
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Hamm), app~ared to K~nig to be an attempt to find a post for Waener's per-
sonal friend Stttrtz, the deputy Caulei teT" of Westphalia-South. It was SU!rtz 
who was desienated by Wagner to replace K8nig in Dortmund. The latter was 
to take over the Hamm distrlct, a rackwater in comparison with the Dortmund 
area. The diminution of his status was bitterly resented by K8nie, who 
contested the decision forcefully. In the acrimonious correspondence which 
followed it is clear that KBnig's opposition to Wagner's action was not 
unaffected by personal interest. 69) In a letter to Strasser he implied that 
his past services to the movement should be acknowledged and rewarded. He 
expected a "return" for his services, not a reduction in his party position: 
'In view of my twelve years of service to our party, of which I assume the 
leaders of our NSDAP, including our FtlhTer, are cognizant, I cannot believe 
that the action taken against me by party comrade Wa~ner will be allowed to 
pass unchallenged. That I cannot accept the degradation is understandable. 
No one can suppose that I will relinquish my post., at which I have flacrificed 
my ~, sweat and family wealth for the NSDAP and at which I have been 
repeatedly atta.cked by political opponents and reduced to a cripple, 1n order 
to continue my activities in some lonely little place.' 70) 
K~nig was but one of many of the "old fighters" of the movement who 
expected some reward at a tim:! of increasing success for the party. His dis-
pute with Wagner lfaS two-dimensional. Not only was his ambition to lead 
Dortmund into the Third ~ frustrated by Waener's organisational chanees, 
but his aggressive attempts to secure a Reichstae or Iandtag mandate weTe also 
being blocked by \vagner. 71) The net result of KBnig's PHstchenj~p'en was a 
sharp rebuke from Strasser and a steady deterioration in K~nie's position. 
He lacked servility and failed to comprehend how the party was organised under 
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69) The corresyondence between K8nig, Wagner and the PL is contained in 
BAK NS 22/1076. 
70) K8nig to Strasser, 7 Nay 19321 BAK NS 22/1076. 
71) On the question of the mandates see especially K8nig to Waf,ner, Dortmund, 
3 May 19321 BAK NS 22/1076• 
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the Ftthrerprinzip. In a letter to Kenig, Strasser rebuked him for his atti-
tude towards his Gauleiter, 'which lacks the necessary discipline demanded of 
a National Socialist t. 72) 
The desire for advancement is understandable. The growth of the N3DAP 
in 1931 and 1932 opened new possibilities which had not been there in the 
'twenties. The idealism of the "old fighters" was increasing~ tempered by 
material considerations. The case of Irrgang, another long-serving party 
member, also illustrates the attitudes and motives behind the scramble for 
positions. 'Nri ting to Strasser in 1932 he lamented the fact thll t 'in the 
coming Reichstagswahl I have been placed in a hopeless position ••• I have 
worked for years in the hope that one day I would be in the position of working 
for the movement without experiencing financial difficulties. MY political 
position in Bielefeld is such that it is unbearable for me to be placed behind 
party comrades who are recent recrui ts to the party and vi rtually unknown to 
the public at large.' 73) 
It appears from the 'bro cases cited that under '!he FUhrernrinzip the key 
factor for advancement lay in one's relationship with regiol'$l party superiors, 
especial~ the Gauleiter, who determined success or failure. In the nineteen-
thirties long service was no longer a guarantee of advanoement. Kenig's broad_ 
sides against Wagner merely led to his removal. 
The jostling for posts and preferment, although it could temporari~ under-
mine par~ work in serious disputes, gave the Gauleiter an important weapon with 
which to keep the more ambitious elements in line. Kenig could have availed 
himself of a substitute "bribe" offered to him by Wagner in his dispute in 
1932 (a Gaukommissqr position in return for obedience) had it not been for 
KBnigs high ambi tions. 7~) There were numerou s jobs available to placate 
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72) Strasser to KBnig, Munich, 31 May 1932: BM NS 22/1076. 
73) Irrgang (Gaufaohberater far Kommunalpolitik) to Strasser, Bielefeld, 
~ Ju~ 1932: BAKNS 22/1075. 7~) Wagner to KBnig, Boohum, 7 May 1932: BAK N3 22/1076. 
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restless elemmts, especially in 1931 and 1932 when fue introduction of the 
Kreisleiter position opened the way for lower part,y officials to move up in 
the hierarchy. The Gauleiter was also in a much stronger position vis-a-vis 
his subordinates because of the Parteileitunr,'s rigid adherence to the prin-
ciple of non-involvement in G-R.U affairs. Those party members who turned 
directly to the Parteilei tung with complaints against regioM.1 party of'f'icbls 
were t old to conform with t he accepted rule in f orce within the party, namely 
to complain to their immedia ta superior a rrl no t to the Parteilei tung. 75) 
More of tan than not direct contact with party headquarters by complainants 
was deemed a sign of opposition or indiscipline, and brusquely rejected. 
Invariably complaints from district or branch leaders were passed on to the 
Gauleitunl'). This was a standard pra.ctice since, as strasser pointed. out to 
the branch leader of Hagen (who had canplained about the loc:l1 SA leader), 
to. branch leader is not accountable to me or Adolf Hitler, but only to t"e 
Gaulei ter'. 76) 
The major limitation on the dictatorial pOVfer exercised by the G~uleitcr 
was the right of a.ny member to appeal to the party Uschla if he wag expelled 
from the pa.rty. Thi s right of appe'l.l was well established by t.'1.e nineteen-
thirties. Wagne r, who was prone to expel members a.t the first sien of trOUble 
and investigate matters afterlfards, was thwarted by thi s practice on scver!'l.l 
occasions. An example of ine problems which could arise if a.n excluded party 
member took matters ~Jrther is provided by ine c~se of na.rtstang, branch lea0er 
of 'Nattenscheid. He reta.liated against Wagner, \'1ho had relloved him fro:n his 
post in the s pring of 1930, by rallying local SUP}ory against the deCision, 
a step which led to his exclusion from the party by 111e Gall Uschla.. 77) 
Iiartstang's appeal 116ainst this move to the party Usch1a ccmplicated the aff9.ir 
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75) ThusRL I to Irrgang, Munich, 16 July 1932: BAK NS 22/1075. 
76) Strasser to Vetter, Munich, 29 September 1931: BAK NS 22/1076. 
77) For this and the following see Wagner to Organis'ltionsabteilung I and 
~. Strasser, Bochum, 19 December 1930j Gau Usch1a. cha.iman Dr. Plicu'n 
to Reichs-Uschla der NSDAP, Bochum, 21 December 1930: .3AK NS 22/1075. 
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in that Munich queried the decision of the ~ Uschla and ornered another 
investigation of the case. As a consequence, the Hartstang affsir drflg~;ed 
on i'or mo st of th e year. This gave Hartst~ng the chance to orsanise his 
supporters effectively, 71hi ch seriously unde rmined the unity of the 10 cal 
Nazi movement. For ~'Iaener the decision of the party Uschlo. 'No.S dfllnagint;, 
i'or, as he stat~d in a letter to the Reichsore~nisation5ab~eilun~, such 
long-drawn out dispu tas I fundamentally d:l.rnaged the di scipline of the move-
mentl. Quick action, even if unjust, was preferred by Wagner to long investi-
gations, for long-drawn out disputes invariably leaked out, and. were used by 
the opposition press for propaganda purposes. Schnrlenfreude of the left-wing 
press accompanied Hazi squabbles, not only in the case of HArtstang, but 
similar affairs in other branches. 78) 
Not all the locnl party leaders were obsequious in face of the power 
wielded by the Gauleiter. The increas:ing centralisation and bureaucr3.tisation 
of the party produced some resi stance. A minor canplaint by the branch leaders 
was the lack of response to their letters fran the ~ headquarters. The 
expansion of the party, and the increase in the number of branches under the 
Gauleitung l s control, presented the administrative staff of the ~ headquar-
ters with a work-load which they were unable it> bear. This W..lS particularly 
noticeable in the case of ~ Westphalia-North, the bureaucracy of which took 
some tUlle to organise itself effiCiently. 79) 
District, ~ ani branch lead.ers objected above all to the reduction 
of their power to fue point at which they were little more than recipients of 
central directives, stripped of their freedom to react it> the demands imposed 
on them by loco.l c cndi tions. The loss of freedom was felt most severely in 
consequence of the centralisstion of party propaGanda. A. strong critic of 
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79) 
79) 
Cf. 121e case of the dispute between tl:e OGL of HUIs b the Recklinghausen 
area as interpreted by fue local socialist press - Volksfreund (Gelsen-
kirchen), 19 Jaruary 1931; further poUce report, Recklinghausen, 6 Feb-
ruary 1931: SAM VII - 67 Bd. 2. 
See the complaints by the Kreisleiter of Werne, Kreisleiter Werne to GL, 
';/erne, 23 May ani 28 June 19.32: BAK NS 22/1075. 
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this was Kesting, Kreisleiter of ?lerne, who 00 mpla:ined bitterly about the 
lack rf rega.rd showftoby the Gauleitung to his local difficulties and about 
the unrealistic demands impo sed on the branches by the G-Aulei tung. Kesting 
wanted 'a free hand in his ~', as he had alwa.ys had, and asked to be 
free from various directives and orders emanating from the G-auleitunl':. In 
particular, he wanted more independence in the formulation of propaganda for 
'the instructions of the fu2. cannot meet the requirements of both the urban 
ani rural population. In the larger towns it is po ssible to holD. a meeting 
every week. But here this is not fea.sible.' What irked Kes ting was 'the 
~ order given at the last conference at DnImen, held to prepare the party 
for the presidential election, which stipulated. that I would have to hold 20 
meetings wi '!hin the time-span of 12 weeks, 6 of which had. to be held in Werne 
itself. It was clear to me fran -the start t hat this was impossible, and tha.t 
I woold be left with the SA as my sole a'-ldience in the later meetings.' 
Kesting's fears were justified and led him to demand greater wtonomy to 
arrange campaigns ali table to hi s district: 'If I run to VIO rk as Krei slel ter 
in this district, and if I am to car~ the responsibilities imposed on me by 
my post, then I demand that I have the freedom to determine how I operate. 
If I do not have aqy rreedom to manoeuvre, then I am not a Kreisleiter, but 
only a common European who has been given an inappropriate title.' 80) 
Kesting was 0.1 so annoyed by the Gaulei tung's habit or demanding payment flr 
unSolicited. propaganda material sent to him by ~ headquarters, and by the 
extra financial demands made on the branches in his area to meet the debts 
of the G-aulet tung. 81) 
The incidence of protest by lower party officials, ~oueh relatively 
few in view or the large number of branches and districts, is an indica.tion 
of the kind of tension created. by the authoritarian nature of the Gaulei tunc 
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80) Krei slei ter Kesting to GL Meyer, Werne, 7 April 1932: BAK NS 22/1075. 
81) Kesting to G-L, Werne, 28 June 1932: BAK NS 22/1075. 
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and its style of operation. Not all the local party leaders were prepared 
to accept every command of tile Gauleituns without protest. In general, hOI'1-
ever, both Westpha.lian G~.u1ei tel' could depend on 'the discipline a.nd loyalty 
of the great bulk of party members and officials in a period. dllring which 
intense pressure was exerted on the movement. The year 1952 proved especia.lly 
arduous in vie« of tile presidential, Reichst'i5 am Lanata.g elections, which 
tested the strength of the whole party. The intense propagand.."l. effort which 
accompanied the campaigns, the financial sacrifices which th~ involved at a 
time of severe economic crisis, and the increasing violence which accompanied 
the poli tical struggle, ultimately cllused exhaustion. The fact that the 
desired victory appeared to elude the NSDAP eroded the optimism of the rank 
and fi~e, as well as the party leaders at all levels. This in tum produced 
increaSing tension Yd. thin the party. Towards the end of the yeaI' '!he elector.>.l 
setback of the Reiohstag election of November, undermined the cawiction of 
SUccess and the inevitability of a Nazi seizure of power which had sust1'lined 
the movement in 1931 and. 1932. 
The Appeal to the 'Norker: the NSBO. 
The establishment of a Nazi 'trade union', the NSBO, on I January 1931 
was a belated attempt by the Nazis to extend their influence into '!he ranks 
of organised labour, entrenched in the socialist, Communist Md Christian 
trade union movements. The attempts of -the nineteen-twenties, which involved 
cn ticism of labour leaders, the subversion of existing unions by Nazi sup-
porters, and attempts to instil nationalist feelings among the workine class 
by substituting National Socialism for Marxism, had not been successful. Even 
in Westphalia, where the party secured considerable SJpport fran the working 
class, most workers continued to be the party's most active and bitter oppo-
nents. Given the totalitarian nature of the NSDAP, which could. not countenance 
the idea of an important sooial grouping remaining outside its influence, it 
is surprising that an officially recognised, national labour organisation did 
not make its appearance in the NSDAP until Janu~ 1931. The major reason 
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was Hitler's opposition to the form~tion of a Nazi union movement. It was 
pressure from -the party rank and fUe which caused him to reconsider his 
attitude. The realisation by ihe party leaders in general, after the septem-
ber election of 1930 had seen -the decimation of the bourgeois parties by the 
NSDAP, that further success lay chiefly in winning voters organised by the 
left-wing parties, also helped to cause the change of policy. 
The initiative in organising the industrial worker came from ~ Berlin, 
where a quasi-union organisation appeared in "the sUIIUIler of 1928. 82) The 
factory cells which emerged numbered Bome 50 by the end of 1928 and were 
controlled by a central organisation called. NSBO. In the course of 1929 and. 
19.30 other G-aue followed the Berlin example and the NSBO gradually developed 
into the Reichs1eltung, producing a new department, the R.B.A. The official 
status conferred on the organisation stimulated 1 ts expandon under the direc-
tion of Muchow. At the ~ level regional NSBO departments appellred which 
directed branch organisations. Along with tile SA, the !ISBO proved itself one 
of the most successfUl specialist organisations and. grew rapidly, especial~ 
in 1932: 
end. of 1931 
May 1932 
August 1932 
January 1933 
43,000 members 
106,000 " 
170,000 " 
c.300,000 " 
Before 1931 developments in Westphalia lagged far behind those in the 
progressive Berlin~. Although the first cells were established as early 
as Janu~ 1929 at Mengede, little effort was made to develop the cell system. 
By 1930 a number of factory cells also existed in Hattingen, Dortmund, Reck-
linghausen and Bochum. 84) These cells were established by local initiative 
and acted independently of each other. The fo:nnation of a ~ NSBO department 
and centralised control over lo~l cells started only in 1931. 85) It was 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
82) 
83) 
84) 
85) 
For 'lhefollowing see Kele, Ope cit., pp.149 ff.; aho Schumann, OPe cit., 
pp.34 ff •• 
Kele, OPe cit., p.170. 
POlice report, Bochum, 4 April 1930: SA.\{ vn - 67 Bd. 1; report by the 
Landrat, Arnsberg, 28 November 1929: HA 86/1612. 
Beck, OPe cit., pp.158-159. 
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the of'f'icial party recognition of' the NSBO which triggered off a major effort 
in both Westphalian~. The incentive to create a. strong movement 80S 
quickly as possible was provided by -the determination of the G3.ulei tung to 
contest the f'actory council elections due in the spring of' 1931. Success in 
these elections was imperative as far as the Ga.uleitun~ was concerned. District 
and par~ organisations were instructed to give maximum support to the nascent 
NSBO. 86) 
In the creation of' an ef'fective organisation the Westphalian NSBO suf-
fered from several handicap s. In the first place there was a lack of suitable 
leaders. The weakness of' "the newly established Gau organisations, the lack 
of' funds, and the limited support enjoyed by the Nazi s in the numerous indus-
trial concerns of the province, formed the NSBO leadership to limit "their 
efforts to 'those concerns which already employed a coo.siderable number of 
Nazi party menbers. The Gau NSBO leaders feared a debacle if the NSBO were 
to contest all the seats a.t stake in Westphalian industry. 87) That "this 
fear was not unjustified is indicated by the poor performance of the NSBO in 
the elections. In tile province as a whole the organisation failed to make a 
wide impact. The perfonnance was patchy despite the fact that lists were only 
put up in those factories in which SOlle success could be expected. 88) In 
some areas tile NSBO did startlingly well, especially in the iron-ore mining 
areas of' the Siegerland. 89) In the 19 Westphalian coal mines in which they 
pu t up their own lists the NSBO secured 13.2 per cent of the vote. In the 
Westphalian cetal industry only 16 concerns had Nazi lists and the NSBO obtained 
a return r£ 11.3 per cent. 90) Even presented in this way, the percentages 
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86) 
87) 
88) 
90) 
"An alle OG und Bezirke des Gaues W-S der NSDAP", Bochum, 13 February 
1931 - copy in SAl'{ VI! Bd. 2. 
POlice report, Boolum, 18 February 1931: SAM VII - 67 Bd. 2. 
Details of -the results in "Erf'olge der NS Betrlebsrlitewahlen im Frllhjahr 
1931", in Arbeitertum, Sonderheft I - oopy in HA 15/283. These statistics 
are inconclusive and difficult to interpret. 
In one iron-ore mine in 'the Siogerland the NSBO seoured all six seats; in 
another it seoured four of' "the six 8eatSj cf. Arbeitertum, Sonderheft I, 
p.24- - copy in HA 15/283. 
Beck, OPe cit., p.161 
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secured were barely respectable. But they are misleading. Thus the 13.2 per 
cent of the poll in the coal-mining incbstry is reduced to 2.5 per cent when 
the Nazi vote is calculated as a percenta.ge of the total vote cast - a pathe-
tic performance. How these returns compare to results secured in the factory 
el ection s of 1930 is impossible to say since the Nazis contested only a sm'l.ll 
number of seats in a few concerns. 91) There are, of course, no figures for 
1932 since no factory elections were held as a result of a ban imposed by 
BrUning in December 1931. 
The factory elections took place at a time when ti1e NSBO was still in 
its fonnative stage and. restricted by organisational problems. Another set 
of statistics, perhaps more meaningful, with which to measure the strength 
of the Westphalian NSBO ccncern the growth of' its membership. The figures 
available for 1931 indicate the continued weakness of -the organisa.tion and 
demonstrate how thinly it was !Sprea.d in the province. By the end of June 1931 
~ Westphalia.-North had 190 members organised in 16 NSBO cells; ~ Westph!llia_ 
92) 
South had 762 members distributed in 47 cells. By October the figures 
were 226 and 1,649 respectively. 93) The situation of the NSBO improved in 
1932, when it penetrated both ~ more effectively. By January 1933 the 
NSBO had secured 5,276 members in Westphalia-North, and was particularly strong 
in the Bielefeld region. 94) An equivalent figJre for ~ Westphalia.-South is 
la.cking, though here, going by past figJres, membership must have been appre-
Ciably higher; by February 1932 southern Westphalia had an extensive network 
of cells, wi th high membership numbers in the mining and metal industries. 
Two cells in Hagen alone had 800 members. 95) 
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91) 
92) 
93) 
94) 
95) 
The re sul ts secured in a. few factories are very low - see th e report by 
the Police President, Bochum, 4 April 1930: SAM VIr - 67 Bd. 1. In some 
parts of Germany the NSBO did worse in 1931 than it had done in 1930; 
cf. the examples given by Sch~n, op. cit., pp.168-169. . 
"R.B.A. Lagebericht Nr. 4", (covers 16.5.-30.6.1931): BAK NS 1/258. 
"R.B.A. Lagebericht Nr. 5", (1.7.-15.10.1931): ibid.. 
Schreder, op. cit., p.343; cf. report on NSBO by police, Bielefeld, 
2 December 1932: a~D MI IP/612 Ed. 9. 
"Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellenorganisation in der Provinz Westfalen" _ 
report by police, Bochum, 2 February 1932: SAM VII - 67 Bd. 3; cf. "r{azi-
zellen in cen Vlestfllischen Betrieben lt , Dortmunder General-Anzeiger, 7 April 
1932. ' 
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Given the hundreds of thousB.nds of workers in the p:'Cvinco, ·~l.e c.ee;ree 
of s\.'l'port marst.alled by the NSBO was very small. The overtures to unionised 
industrial labour were a failure. A variety of factors account for ttl:>. 
In the first place the NSBO failed in its efforts -to attract members of rival 
unions to its meetings. A variety of tricks were used. to achieve this end. 
The favourite ploy was for the NSBO to announce meetings at which their own 
leaders und -those of other unions (usually of -the socialist Free Trele Union) 
would confront each other. The hope tha.t his would attract unionists to 511Ch 
'spectacles' was not misplaced., and the SPD press repeated~ warned its re~Jers 
against the tactic. 96) ~'lhere rival trade unionists did appe3.r at llS£O nect-
ings, the relative~ unschooled r~SBO lea.ders were often 3iven a thorou[;h ex,'l.:ni-
nation, while 'the rather primitive diatribes of the NSBO speakers were [;ene-
rally unable to influence Free Trade Union members'. 97) Other factors which 
worked. against the NS130 was its failure to s:> lve the probleJ3s noted e3.rlier. 
The shortage of suitable leaders remained, and so did the lack of funas. 99) 
In 1932 its work was also handicapped by the concentration of the NSDAP on t.'1e 
numerous elections of that year. Thi s deflected. party effort away from the 
NSBO. 93) The involvement of the NSBO in the election campaigns, moreover, 
aggravated. its alread.y weak financial situation. Anothe~ difficulty faced. by 
the NS30 was that, unlike its Communist and socialist riv'l.1s, it ~ad to attempt 
to rationalise the NSDAP's pro-capit':lllst right-wing out of existence, a ferlt 
which it \'V'as unable to achieve. The contradictions \'f Hhin the party progr'l.lIIrne 
were driven home to unionised labour by the trade union and left-wine press 
at every opportunitvr. Finally, and most fundamental in imporhnce, the n!lture 
of the or.ganisation proved. a great handicap. It was never designed. to be a 
union in the traditional sense, as is cleer frcm a statement of tl1e R.B.A.: 
'The NSBO is not a true economic organisation; it is not a National Socialist 
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96) 
97) 
98) 
99) 
E.g. the SPD's Volkswacht (Herford), 24 June 1932. 
Report by Poli oe Pre si dent, BocbJm, 2 February 1932: SA:'~ VII - 67 Bd. 3. 
"R.B.A. Rundschreiben Nr. 6", Berlin, 24- Augu at 1931: HA. 15/283. 
"R.B.A. Rundschreiben Nr. 8", Berlin, 21 November 1931: ibid... 
"R.B.A. Rundschreiben Nr. 11", Berlin, 20 June 1932: ibid.. 
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trade union. Its first and. priClaIY task is to win political pO'.ver.' 100) 
Despite the fa.ct that ultimately the NSBO did involve itself in economic 
matters (in 1932 it took part in a number of strikes), it continued to suffer 
from its ambiguous nature. In 1931 the adverse effect of the politic~l, rather 
than the economic, function it perfonned was realised only too cle:lrly by the 
R.B.A.: 'The NSBO has always emphasized that it i 8 not Rn economic association 
or a "National Socialist trade union", but a purely political fifjhtin,'j orga-
nisation of the party in the factories. But the undeniably materialistic 
attitude of the worker makes him wa.nt to "see" sanething, that is he w.'tnts to 
have material advantnees in the form of trade union finnncis.l support (in 
event of strikes) after he has joined the NSBO. Since this cannot be guarFln-
teed to him he remains outside the organisation.' 101) 
It would. be a mistake to conclude from the poor perfonnFlUce of the West-
phalian .t.'SBO that the Nazi appea.1 to labour in eeneral failed to elicit any 
significant response. Both ~ organisations projected a working class im~ee 
and took great care not to offend the sensibilities of the woxY..ers in the p:lrty. 
Wagner, for example, made sure that branch leaders in thtil industrial to-.'ms 
were drawn from the ranks of the working class and he oCM.siomlly removed 
branch 1eadel·s whom he ccnsidered too 'bourgeois' (barf/erUch). 102) Meyer 
too was aware of the need of the party to retain a working class profile. One 
can see his ccncern on this point in his reaction to the removal of a. miner, 
SA-leader Stangier, fran 'the list of parliamentary candidates for 'the electoral 
district ',Vestphalia-North by the Perscnalamt in 1932. Me~re!' was appalldd. by 
th e Munich decision. :'Tri ting. to the Persona.1'!.mt on the ma.tter, he stR.ted that 
the deCision wOlldhave to be reversed, for othexwise 'it walld do great damage 
to the cause'. Three major reasons were put forward by Maye!' to justify his 
---------------------------------------------------------------------_._--
lOOl "R.B.A. Rundschreiben Nr. 5", Berlin, 8 August 1931: l~ 15/283. 
101 "R.B.A. Lagebericht Nr. 4", (16.5.-30.6.1931): BAK NS ~258. 
102 E.g. the case of Thei:Ie r, OGL of Hagen, removed by Wagner for this 
'offence' - see Wagner to RL Abtei1ung I, Boclllm, 16 MR.Y 1931: BAle US 
22/1076. 
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demand. Firstly, he pointed. out that his ~ contained hundreds of thousa.nd.s 
of miners and industrial warl~ers. In view of this fact A,lone the ct,lndidature 
of a worker was an absolute necessity~ Seooodly, Meyer reminded the Per!'lon'lll1~t 
that 'in my ~ the bulk of -the party membership is drawn from ranks of workers 
of the fist (Arbeiter der Faust).' The great majori~ of party members, in his 
opinion, would not be able 'tx:l understand w~ a 'worker of the fist' was not 
placed high on the party list. Finally, Meyer argued that St3.n~ier' s candi-
dature 'would be proof to the population of -the ~ that we take our socialism 
seriously and that the party was not averse to furthering a worker'. 103) 
The effort made to attract working class !'Iupport was reflected in the 
propaganda pu t out by the Westphalian Nazis in the early nineteen-thirties, 
the language and fom of which was often impossible tp differentiate from that 
used by the KPD. The 'left-wing slant' of the party's propaganda, which became 
especially pronounced in the course of 19.32, was strongly criticised by pro-Na.zi 
indu strialists in the Ruhr region. The major complaint was a.bout 'its pure 
marxist character', with its emphasis on socialisation, .Illpport for socialist 
wage theories, and the view' that in industry the terms 'employer and exploiter 
were synonymous'. What concerned the industrialists particularly was the 
Nazis' attempts to set 'one social group against another'. The incitement to 
class-hatred was strongly condemned, a.s was the 'perscnal defamation' of loca.l 
industrialists in Nazi pamphlets, which echoed Communist pUblications in eve~ 
respect. 104) 
A news-sheet produced by the NSBO in Wanm-Eickel, the BetriebMrbeiter 
und Hakenkreuz (a fortnightly publicntion), is illustrative of the 1;ype of 
anti-capitalist attack used by the Nazis to attract working class support. 
In an article, which appeared in November 1931, the Nazis took streng objection 
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103) GL Meyer to Loeper, Personalamt, Gelsenkirchen, 20 Febru~ 1932: NS 
22/1075~ 
1(4) The views of pro-Nazi indlstrialists of the Ruhr were pa.ssed on to Munich 
headquarters - see the letter by A. Heinrichsbauer to G. strasser, Essen. 
20 September 19.32: NA 7/1/11441. 
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to the announcement of redundancies and the proposed wage cuts in the mining 
industry. The measures were interpreted as 'exposing the ugly face of' capi t3.l' 
and were condemned. as an in suI t to 'national and. socialist thinking Germany'. 
They indicated the defects of a political and economic system which allowed 
private economic interests to determine arbitrarily the fate of hundreds of 
thcusands of working people. 'These plans', 'the article went on 'mean that a. 
whole inrustrial province will be Slbjected to hunger to further the interests 
of the big industrialists and their finance-capitalist ba.ckers.' Needless to 
say, the NSDAP and NSBO strmgly opposed the meaSures. The article went on to 
assure the reader that in a Nazi GermanY' under' the leadership of 'the worker 
(sic) Adolf Hitler' such action wruld not be tolerated, for Nazi economic 
thinking held that 'the economy is not to be used for profiteering, but for 
sustaining the German~'. The article ended with -the slogan 'The common 
interest before self-interest', as enshrined in point 24 of the NSDAP's pro-
gramm e. 105) 
The response of the working class to Nazi overtures in Westphalia cannot 
be measured simply by the perfonnance of the NSBO, which shows primarily the 
failure of the party to appeal successfully to unionised labour. By the early 
nineteen-thirties a sizeable section of the working population was unemployed, 
and there was exceptionally high unemployment in towns such as Bochurn, Dortmund, 
Gelsenkirchen, Hagen, Herne and Schwelm. 106) It was the unemployed worker, 
especially the younger one, who was particularly prone to listen to the appeal 
of radicalism, and both the KPD and the NSDAP benefited fran their distress. 
Wi thin the NSDAP la.rge numbers of the unemployed were to be found in the SA., 
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105) 
106) 
Extracts taken fran :setriebsarbeiter und Hakenkreuz, 21 November 1931 _ 
copy in SAM VII - 67 Bd. 3. 
Bennecke, op. cit., p.16)j cf. the report "Zur wirtl5chaftlichen Lage", 
Bochum, 25 January 1932 in W,VA K2!689; also the numerous statistios con-
tained in the repcrts by the president of tile Landesarbei tse.mt 'lfestfalcn, 
in W,"{A K2/4.10. 
107) in which young unemployed workers predominated. 
One statistical source which can be used to provide an accurute assess-
ment of the extent of working class support acquired by the Westphalian NSDAP 
relates to the social canposition of its membership. As is shoMl elsewhere 
in "this study, the Westphalian NSDAP by 19.30 already had a not inconsiderable 
number of working class members. 108) Between September 19.30 and Jal'l.lary 1933 
the percentage of tile "worker" category rose fran 32.4- to 37.6 per cent in the 
case of ~ Westphalia-North, and fran 35.3 to 4-3.8 per cent in the case of 
~ Westphalia-South. 109) If one adds the categoIY of "Angestellte", which 
accoonted for 21.1 per cent of the membership in ~ Westphalia-North and 24-.1 
per cent in ~ Westphalia-South, then the percentages of the members which 
" . 
can be classified as workers in the broad sense of the word increase to 58.7 
and "67.9 per cent respectively. 110) These figures are considerab~ higher 
than those for tile NSDAP as a whole and indicate that in iVestphalia, e!pecially 
in ~ Westphalia-Sou 'til, the NSDAP was not a predominantly Mittelstand party. 
Another indication of' the amount of working class Slpport enjoyed by the 
NaZis in Westphalia is provided by an analysis of the HSDAP's electoral returns. 
In comparison with the vote secured in the Reichsta,g election of M3.Y 1928, the 
NSDAP increased its support Qy 741,000 votes in the Ju~ election of 1932. 111) 
This huge increase came from two main sources: firstly, fran an increase of 
4-92,000 in the total vote; secondly, from the j38,000 votes lost by the various 
bourgeOis parties. One mB3 aSSUlle that the 1::ulk of the votes lost by the 
bourgeois parties went to the Nazis, though the Centre Party, '!him ao,:!uired 
a further 106,000 in this period, probably took a share. Of the 492,000 new 
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107) Carsten, Fascism ••• , Ope cit., pp.139-140. Cf. Bennecke's statistics 
relating to tile NSDAP and the SA in Gau Saohsen in 1931 show that 44 per 
oent of the SA were unemployed; in sane branches and. SA Stt1nne the figure 
was as high as 80 to 90 per oent - Benneoke, op. cit., pp.56-57. 
108) See chapter 8, pp.297 ff •• 
109) PArteistatistik, op. cit., p.l48. For 'the NSDAP as a whole the January 
1933 percentage was 32.5 - Sch!fer, Ope cit., p.l9. 
110) "Angestellte" accounted for 20.6 per cent of the part.y's national member-
ship by 1933 - Schafer, op. cit., p.19. 
Ill) This figure, and those which follow, are 03.1culated from those given in 
Dittmann, OPe cit." The fi~res are to the neare8t thousand. 
votes, the Nazis gained approximately twcrthirds. This 09.1culation allows 
for "the increase in the vote of the Centre Party, as well as the gains recoI'-
ded by the KPD. 112) Given the social composition of the Westphalian popula-
tion, the major element among the new voter category must have been working 
class. It folloos therefore that 'the N3DAP acquired a ccnsiderable number 
of working class votes. 
This view 1s reinforced by ihe progress made by tile NSDAP in the many 
electoral areas of Westphalia which had.. an overwhelming working class popula-
tion, especially those in the Ruhr region. In the ReichstA,g election of July 
1932 the NSDAP secured a relative majori1;y' in a number of constituencies in 
which either the SPD or the KPD had been -tne prenier pa.rty in the earlier 
elections, namely Altena, Bochum, Ennepe-Ruhrkreis, Hagen, IBerlohn, Lnden-
scheid and Unna. 113) Although a more equal division of the votes of the two 
left-wing parties allowed.. tile NSDAP to secure relative majorities in these 
areas, the good Nazi perfonnance can only be explained by a strong working 
class support. 
The Elections of 1932. 
The year 1932 was to prove a taxing one, both for the voter and for the 
political parties. Within the space of nine months there were two presidential 
elections (in March and.. April), two Reichstal$ elections (in July and November), 
and.. the Prussian Landtag election (also in April). The electionB were to test 
the financial and. phYBical resources of the parties and.. 1P lend.. to a gradual 
exhaustion of the voter. 
i) !h~ Er.!!s.!.d~!i!.l_Ele2.ti0E.s_o! .Ma!,c,h ~~ !P!:il1912.,!. 
Since the Reichstag election of 1930 the Nazis had.. not been able to demon_ 
strate the extent of "their support on a national level, as is indicated in a 
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112) The KPD gained 299,000 votes between 1928 and 1932, mainlY at the expense 
of ihe SPD, which 10 st 183,000 voters in -tni s pe riod. 
113) M1latz, OPe cit., appendix - .... ps d ine 1930 and 1932 Reichstag elections. 
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number of Landtag elections held in 1931. 114) Throu~out 1931 the aotivism 
of the party had been impressive. In G-au Westphalia-North alone between March 
and November 1931 the NSDAP had held 909 publio meet:ings. 115) This exo1udes 
all the membership meetings, 'G-erman Evenings' and 'G-erman Days', SA demonstra-
tions and propaganda marches which were also a staple element in Nazi propa-
ganda, of which there were about 1,000. 116) 
By 1932 the party machine was thus well tuned tp eIV;l;age in the effiCiency 
test represented by the presidential election, whioh took place in Maroh. In 
this eleotion the broad strategy of the NSDAP oampaign was orchestrated by 
Goebbels, mo set tile propaganda maohine in motion in February 1932, before 
Hitler's candidature had been announoed. Goebbels' attack was aimed at the 
destruotion r£ the 'system in farce sinoe 1918', and this becrune tile dominant 
theme of the Nazi propaganda effort. 'End it now' wa.s the punch line 'to be 
hammere8. home'. 117) Following the announoement of Hitler's oondidature the 
ambitions of the party reached new heights: a Hitler victory. This ambitious 
objeotive plaoed great strains on the party for failure to reach it, as Goebbel:s 
himself stated in a ciroular to tile Ga.u propaganda leaders, 'WOuld deal the 
118) party a heavy blow'. 
The Naz is were placed in a diffioul!; position in the Westphalian region. 
They faced not only tile strong Centre Party/SPD 'alliance' backing Hindenburg, 
bu t also a formidable Communist campaign for Th!l.lmnnn. The Centre Party was 
particularly active on Hindenburg's behalf. Its extensive campaign was sup-
ported by the appearance of Br(1ning in Dortmund on 9 March. His emotional 
appeal, calling for Hindenburg's re-olection, was widely publioised in the 
regioM.l Catholio press. 119) The SPD projected. Hinr1erburg as the only' guardian 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
114-) 
115) 
116) 
117) 
118) 
119) 
Impreuive results were seoured above all in Oldenburg (37.2 per cent) 
and Hesse (37 per cent). 
Schreder, op. cit., p~.30~ ff •• 
In Ootober 1931 ~ Westphalia-North had. held 112 public meetings and an 
ad.ditional 120 other functions: SchrBder, OPe cit., p.56. 
"Sonderrunaschreiben an aUe Gaue und GaupropagandAlei tungen", Berlin, 
20 Febru~ry 1932: HA 15/287. 
"Rundschrei ben d.er RPL" .. Berlin, 20 P'cbru~ry 1932: H..O\ 15/287. 
E.g. Tre:noni.a, 10 March 1932. 
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of the Constitution' and condemned the ambitions ~nd objectives of both 
Th~L'U:mn and. Hitler. 120) The SPD was anbarrassed by the position it found 
itself in and both the Communists and Naz is rid.i culed its !lUPl:O rt for Hindcn-
burg. The Hazis di stributed the SPD's anti-Hindenburg pamphlets of 1925, [(1Ione 
121) 
'marxist' circles during the last d!'tys of the c$~mp:1ien. 
The result of -the lA'arch poll was .'1, great di8::l.ppoin tmant to the NSDt,P. 
Although Hindenburg's re-election ViaS prevented (by a mere 0.4 PQr cent), the 
national vote for Hitler (30.1 per cent) placed him in a hopeless posHion in 
the necessary second poll in April. In Westphalia. the ,{SDAP fared relatively 
badJ;y, though in relation to the 1930 Reichst~e election it increase~ its poll 
by so:ne 50 per cent. Hindenburg secured an absolute majority in both 'Vest-
phalian electoral districts: 
Hindenburg Duesterberg Hitler Thll.lmann 
i7-N 60.4- 5.2 22.1 12.1 
W-S 52.7 4.3 24.2 18.7 
Reich 49.6 6.B 30.1 13.2 122) 
In the second presidential election the NSDAP faced formidable obst'tclcs 
if the ambition to secure a Hitler victory was to be realised. The hope for 
Victory in the first run had been rudelY shattered. The failure led to wide-
spread disappointment within the party. 123) The degree of optimism current 
in the party before -the election can be measured by tile fact tha t in Westpha.lia 
the SA was prepared on the eve of the poll for an anticipated Nazi seizure of 
pO\,er. 124) After the election the Nazis were pu t in a.n alvk.vard situa.tion. 
It was clear that Hitler ha.d little c~nce of success. This fact could not be 
a.dmi tted, hOl'lever, and the campaign had to be conducted in the be lief tha. t 
Victory was possible. New instructions to the G;-'1.ue from Goebbe1s' Reichsw<thl-
-------------------------------------_._---------------------------------
120) 
121) 
122) 
123) 
124) 
See especially ta, issues of the ';1estf!1Hsch~ Ulgemeine Volks-7.eitune 
from 3 Murch 19)2. onwards. 
"Rundschreiben der RPL", Berlin, 5 March 1932: HA 15/287. 
Figures taken fran Ml1atz, 'Das Ende der Partcien im Spiegel der Wahlen 
1930-1933', in Das Ende derParteien, op. cit., p.762. 
Cf. Hom, op. cit., p.348. 
"Anordnung fUr die S.\ Untergruppe iV-N" , Ge1senkirchen, 8 Murch 1932: 
copy in SAD MI IP/611. 
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lei tung ou tlineu. the tactics to be adopted to secure victory. 125) Although 
~oebbels acknowledged that, in view 'of the short time available', the part,v 
had little hope of' penetrating the Centre Party and SPD vote, his hopes were 
pinned on attnctjng tile bourgeois vote which had ba.cked. Hindenburg in the 
first run. His instructions were framed wi th this in mind. Every ~ was to 
determine 'which baker, butcher, shopkeeper, publican etc., had voted for 
Hindenbu rg and why'. Once the Hindenburg voter was identified, personal efforts 
were to be made to win him over. Greater car~ was also to be given to the 
distribution. of propaganda material, for, as Goebbels pointed out, 'it is 
pointless to press a pamphlet designed for the peasantry into the hands of 
the \'forker and vice versa'. The female voters were to be cultivated more 
assiduously and to be 'enlightenecl' concerning the NSDAP's attit.lde toward5 
w'omen. Old Age Pensioners too were singled out for special attention. Finally 
Goebbela denanded a more effective u ee ot 'the Nazi press, especially during 
the Easter period during which ihree times the normal editim was to be printed 
to compensate for fue government's ban on electioneering dlring 'the holida.ys • 
. In Westphalia preparations for the seoond presidential election were set 
in motion almost immediate~ after the first result had been nnnouncecl. In 
~ W'estphalia-South a number of 'instruotions' were sent to the branches, 
which were called upon to secure an extra 100,000 votes for Hitler: 
'1. 
2. 
3. 
4.. 
5. 
6. 
Every party member must fulfil his duty and try to win over two 
to three Hindenbu rg voters in the caning weeks. 
House to house canvassing must be furthered with all 'the means 
available. 
Our meetings mu st be organised in such a fashion thA.t Uindenburg 
voters are attracted to them. 
Our NSF members must do all in tht3ir power to influe.1ce other women. 
Branches are to hold special lOOetings for the unemployed. No 
entrance charge is to be made. 
Agi ta tion in the rural areas is to be stepped up. ' 126) 
These guidelines anticipated ihose laid down by 'the Reichsvm,hlleitunr. on 23 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
125) For the following see "An alle Gaue", Reichswahlleitung der NSDAP, 
Berlin, 23 March 1932: HA 1~288. 
126) "Rundschreiben Nr. 3", Bochum~ 14 March 1932: COllY in SAl4 VU - 67 Bd.3. 
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March, which were also passed on to the branches for implementation. 127) 
'l'he instructions, by standa.rdizing the methods (and propaganda content 
to acme degree) to be employed by the party, robbed the 10CXll1ties of the 
freedom 'they had previously enjoyed in the conduct of their ca.mpa.igns. On the 
need for uniformit,y in the campaign further ~ instructions, issued duri~g 
128) 
the election perioa. were adamant. Style, format and. content of the 
Nazi message were rigidly prescribed. The theme of all meetmgs was to be 
'A~ywith the Hindenburg-Front - "Kith Adolf Hitler we will secure German 
Freedom'. Each speech was initially to deal with the diversity of the 
'Rindenburg election-community' and the 'chief characteristics' of those par-
ties backing his candidature. The SPDwas to be blamed with 'marxism, nation!\._ 
lisation, treas en, atheism, pacifism', and vilified as 'a. guarantor of Versailles 
and an enemy of the Churches'. The Centre Party was accused of 'misuse of 
religion, the pulpit and the confessional', as well as being an enemy of our 
Wehrmacht and walking arm in arm with atheists'. The st~o.tspartei (the fonner 
DDP) was to be Slmmarily dismissed as being little mON than a 'representative 
of Jewish money sacks'. After thi s broadside each speech had to emphasize 
the stature of Hitler and the positive nature of the party programme. Those 
points on which the NSDAP had been attacked in the earlier campaign were to 
be dealt with vigorously. Thu s the sp ee.k.ers were instructed to project the 
NSDAP's favourable attitude towards the Churches, the anti-inflation policies 
the party would pursue if Hitler were elected, and the VolkscemeinschFtft for 
which it stood. Some further points were to be dealt with briefly, namely 
the position of "anen, the sanctity of property, the rights of the worker to 
social securi~ and union representation. In conclusion, a few major points 
of Nazi foreign policy were to be underlined: the NSDA.P's oppoa.Hion to repa-
rations, Versailles and the Young Plan. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
127) "Rundschreiben Nr. 4", Bochum, 24 March 1932: copy in SAM VII - 67 Bd. 3. 
128) For the following see "Anordnung f'!1r den 2 Wahlgang und die kommende 
Preussenwahl", GL Wagner, BochuIn, n. do: copy in SAM VII - 67 Bd. 3. 
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Thi s mixture in the format outlined above was tranBmi tted by the Nazi 
speakers to all corners of Westphalia. 129) The Nazis were even more active 
than usual and. 'no other party cruld keep pace with the NSDAP' 8 election propa-
ganda'. 130) The financial and physical strain of -the campaign soon began to 
tell and signs of discontent rapidly appeared. wi thin the party. These were 
dealt with energetically by the ~auleiter, who threatened recalcitrant branch 
leaders with dismissal. wagner, as usual, was to -the fere. He obviously anti-
cipated trouble for his Rundschreiben of 24- March ended with 'the warning that 
'those district and branch leaders ".,no feel that they either cannot or will not 
foll~ my orders should do the decent thing and resign so that I, as Gauleiter, 
. . U~ 
will not be troubled by removl.ng them fran thel.r posts'. Despi te this 
threat 'Wagner was faced with a howl of protests, as is indicated by his sub-
sequent instructions: 'Branches are protesting that they are not in the position 
to pursue the election oampaign. For a National Socialist nothing is impossible. 
The branch leaders and their assistants can only call themselves leaders if 
they prove that they can find the way and means to au !mount difficul ties. As 
GaUlei ter I expect that no responsible individual in Westphaliar-South will Use 
the expression: "That is impossible".' 132) 
The second presidential election in westphalia saw an increase in support 
for both Hindenburg and Hitler, while the third candidate, Thlilmann, slipped 
further behind: 
Hindenburg Hitler Thlilmann 
W-N 63.9 27.2 8.9 
w-s 57.7 29.0 13.3 
Reich 53.0 36.8 10.2 1.33) 
The Hindenbu rg canbination, prlrnarily Catholio and SPD voters, proved too 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
129) 
130) 
131) 
132) 
133) 
Cf. the report on a Nazi meeting in the small village of Hamberge - the 
con ten t of "!he speech followed the format laid down by the Gaulei tung 
verbatim; report qy Hdrgermeister des Amtes Hausberge, 11 April 1932: 
SAD MI IP/610 Bd. 7. 
Report qy Police President, Bochlm, 13 May 1932: SAM VII - 67 Bd. 3. 
"Rundschreiben Nr. 4-", Bochum, 24- March 1932: copy in S~4 VII - 67 Bd. 3. 
"Rundschreiben Nr. 5", BOchum, 1 Aprl1 1932: ibid •• 
Milatz, in nas Ende derParteien, OPe cit., p.762. 
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fonnidable and the Nazis' gigantio propaganda. effort failed to make an impres-
sion on it. The eli sappearance of the DNVP oandidate probably beneri ted both 
Hitler and Hindenburg. Hitler -aay also h3.ve picked up a few Communist votes. 
In 45 of the 53 urban and rural districts of '\Vestphalia lIindenburg secured 50 
per cent or more of the vote. In the 18 predomin3.ntly Catholic districts he 
gained over 70 per cent of the poll. 134) The Nazis could point to only a few 
successes. Only 3 rura.l crunties gave Hi tIer an absolute majority J those of 
'Nlttgensteln, Halle a.nd LUbbecke. The latter provided by far the best result: 
61.3 per cent. 135) 
The proximity of the Prussian Landta.G, election, held on 24 April, of'orcl3d 
the parties to oontinue their campaigns, but in the traditional style of all 
against all. The NSDAP oampaign was partially handioapped by the ban on the 
SA and 55 on 13 April. This closed the numerou s SA-Homes, which were often 
of vital importance to the smaller branches, and Which were used for the pro-
duotion of propaganda material and for the 'politioal instruotion' of Nazi 
supporters and. spe3.kers. In several instances their loss was sorely felt. 136) 
The NSDAP's Landtag returns were similar to those secured by the party in the 
presidential election. In Westphalia-South it gained 28.9 per cent of the 
vote (Prussia a.s a whole gave the party 36.3 per oent), whi en plaoed it ahead 
of the seoond strongest party, the centre, which polled 24.3 per cent. In 
Westphali3.-North the situation was reversed, the Centre Party retaining its 
traditional daninanoe with 35.2 per cent, well ahead of the N3DAP' 8 24.3 per 
cent. 137) 
Five weeks after the Prussian Lr-t.ndtng election the poli tical situation 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
134) 
135) 
136) 
137) 
Milatz, OPe ci. t., appendix - amp of the seoond presidential election 
results of 10 April 1932. 
Schreder, OPe cit., p.S3. 
E.g •.. the canplaint by the O(;'L of Hexter to the t:>wn authorities, Hexter, 
4 May 1932; also a.pplication by the Herford branch for permission to use 
the closed SA-home far a Rednerscbule: SAD MI IP/610 Bd. 7. 
Percentages 03.1culated from figures given in the Ieerlohner Kreisanzeig~r 
und Zei t.mg, 27 April 1932. 
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in the Weimar Republic became more fluid as a consequence of the fall of 
Brtining. 138) The new government was headed by the comparatively unknown 
Franz von Papen, a representative of -tile anti-republican, monarchical estab-
lishment. Unlike BrIlning, who had attempted to construct a dam against Nazi 
radicalism, von Papen pursued a more flexible policy tONards the Nazis. He 
hoped, at the very least, to secure their toleration. The dissolution of the 
Reichst9.G on 4 June (for which the Nazis had been agitating in the first half 
of the year) and the lifting of the SA/55 ban in mid-June were designed to 
bring about Nazi cooperation. The destruction at republioan Prussia on 20 
July was another development favourably viewed by the NSDAP leadership. 
For the westphalian NSDAP the neutral stance adopted towards von Papen 
by the party on the national level was a very real handicap in the election 
campaign which followed the dissolution of the Reichstae. The regional left-
wing press, which equated the Papen government with the 'system of the Nazis' 
undermined the effeotiveness of the NS~\P's campaign. 139) The harm done by 
these attacks waS noted by ,G"Iulei ter Wagner in an aMl3"s1s of -tile regional 
election campaign sent to strasser in August 1932: 'Our whole propaganda in 
this campaign has suffered because of its lack of olarity, cohesion and the 
absence of our old revolutioo,9.ry &~. The neutral stance vis-~-vis the Pap en 
Cabinet ••• gave our opponents the chance to pursue a primitive, but psycho-
140) 
logioally astute and effective propa€J'l.nda against us.' The proclamation 
of new emergency decrees on 14 June, which reduced social welfare payments to 
a pittance, was especially damaging to the Nazi cause. It allowed the Left 
to denounce the Nazis as 'Supporters of the Emergen~ Decrees' and 'Protectors 
of the Rich and Exploiters of the Poor'. The Nazi attempt to refute the idea 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
138) For the backgroond of this event see W. Conze, 'Die pol1tischen Ent-
scheicilngen in Deutsohland 1929-1933', in Die StMts- und Wirlsch,..fts-
krise d.es deutschen Reichel! 1 2 ,op. cit., pp.236 ff.; also Bracher, 
Aufl sung ••• , op. cit., pp.511 ff •• 
139) WestflHische Allgemeine Volks-~eitunej, especially t~ issues of 7 June, 
14 June and 28 July 1932. 
140) Wagner to strasser, Bochum, 4 Au~ust 1932: BAK NS 22/1076. 
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that t they tolerated Papen' came too late to c ronter left-wing proP:lgsnda. 11.1) 
The identification of tile NSDAP with the Papen government (reflected. in a 
common term of abuse: Pauenkreuzler) affected the Westphalian moveillent par-
ticularly since the 'active struggle of our movement', as Wagner phrase~. it, 
'is led almost cCJ!lpletely by young workers, students and such people most 
dramaticallY hit by these measures'. 142) 
The defensive posture the party was forced to adopt in the cal1paign was 
a new experience for the movement. .An addi tionf1.l problesn, albe1 t shR.red by 
other parties, was tile increasing weariness of the voter. 'For the ;;ST)A1', 
depen1ent on new voters and reoent converts to the party, the need to stimu-
.. late and interest the popuL~oe in its activities was import~nt ir the party 
was to continue its expanflion. The Parteilci tu~ advised more variety in the 
par~'s propaganda as a means of overooming election fatigue. 143) Instruo-
ti,ons to fue ~ propaganda depart:nents anphasized above all the effectiveness 
of 'ne.v technical etpipment' to further interest - t~ better use of micro-
phones, loudspeakers, sound films and gramophone reoords of speeches by Hitler, 
G-oebbels Md other well-known p"I.rty leaders. The centrA.l c'lirectives led. to 
a switch in the Westphali9n movement's electioneering tactics. Greater e:nph"l._ 
sis fell on canvassing, in i'lhioh the SA and S3 were particub.rly pro,ninent, 
and less was placed on the traditional method of holding eleotion meetinGs 
l44) 
and mass rallies. In the Ruhr region the Nazis encountered much greater 
left-wing opposition. AlthOUGh the communists oontinued to conccntr~te their 
major effort on tile 'social fascism' of the SPD, both left-wing parties at 
grassroots level were prepared to cooperate in meeting Nazi violenoe with 
violence. The result of this more aeeressive atti 1llde WA.S that the Nazis 
were unable 'in marv area.s to :pursue a reasonable propaganda, either il1 the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
:141) 
11!2) 
143) 
144) 
"An alle Gaue, PropagllIld.'l- und Pressestellen del' Partei", lU"L 1.:unioh, 
23 July 1932: HA 15/289. 
Wagner to strasser, Bochum, 4 August 1932: BAK NS 22/1076. 
"Denkschrift der RPL zur Reichstagswahl 1932": HA 15/289. 
"lnderung in der 'Nerbearbei t del' HSDAP", police repOrt, Bocburn, 1':" June 
1932: SAM VII - 67 Bd. 3. 
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form of meetings, di. sou ssion evenings (Sprechabenile) or distribu tion (f pn.m-
phlets'. 145) l.:oreovcr the SPD especially cramped. the style of tile HSDAP by 
utilising some of its techniques, thus provia.ine a far more so-:;>histicated and 
146) 
effective opposition. 
For the NSDAP the result of -the election in Westphalia was not very 
encoura.ging. In both Gaue the NSDAP vote was lower than th.'it which it had 
secured in the second presidential election. In the case of ~ "j'(est-:;>hal "l'l-
South the party also lost votes in compa.rison with those secured in the Landtq r.; 
election of April: 
Reichstag (July) 2nd Presidential (April) 
·,V-N 
W-s 
Reich 
25.7 
27.2 
37.3 
Lanatag (April) 
24-.3 
28.9 
14-7) 
Compared to the NSDAP's national performance the Westpht'l.lian Galle again secured 
two of the worst returns. The best results were achieved in those arens where 
the NSDAP had broken through in 1930: the Protesta.nt IUra1 counties of north-
eastern and southern 7festphalia, in which the Nazis c onsolido.ted their position: 
Wittgenstein 
Lnbbecke 
Siegen 
Halle 
Herford 
Minden 
63.8 
60.7 
52.0 
50.0 
4-1.8 
41.1 
Encouraging for the Nazis was their significant success in certain industria-
lised urban and county areas, especially in the Ruhr area. of ~ '.V'estphalia-
South~ In a number of these the NSDAP beca.me the premier party: 
Altena 
Iser10hn 
Ennepe-Ruhr 
39.6 
35.6 
33.9 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
ill~ 
147) 
14-8) 
71agner to strasser, 
See the al1B.1ysilJ of 
pp.63-65. 
4- August 1932: :aAK US 22/1076. 
the SPD's campaign in Dortmund in Klotzbach, op. cit. t 
Percentages for the July election taken from Milatz, 01" cit., p.112. 
Calculated from statistics given in ed. Statistisches Reichsamt, Haunt-
er ebnisse der 'Wa.hlen zum ~ei chst!l.p' 1 Juli 1 2, Berlin, 1932, pp:23:'24.. 
The percentages which follow in this paragraph are also hken from this 
source.) 
Hagen 
Unna 
LtHenscheid 
Eo chum 
32.1 
31.0 
29.5 
29.4 
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In the Reichsbg election of 1930 the SPD had been the 1ea1ine; party in Bochurn, 
Hagen, A1tena., Iser1ohn, and Lnaenscheid, 11hile the XPD had led. in Ennepe-Ruhr, 
and the Centre Party in Unna. The Nazis also secured creditable returns in a 
number of other industrial centres, Slch as Eielefeld (31.7), 'Nanne-Bickel 
(27.5), ReckUnghausen (23.8), G-elsenkirchen (22.9) and Herne (22.6). It WAS 
in the Catholic urban and rural districts that the NSDAP fuiled to record any 
significant ga.ins. In the 18 Catholic cwnties the Centre Party continued to 
enj~ overwhelming support. 
The July results marked the end of the rapid growth of Na.zi support in 
Westphalia.. But in comparis an with the Reichstee, election of 1930 the HSDAP 
had more than doubled 1 ts vote in both Westphalian electoral districts. The 
1932 elections had seen the Nazis attra.cted support from two major sources: 
the votes ta.ken from the bourgeois parties and fran new voters. A comparison 
of the July result with the September 1930 returns reflects this clea.rly: 
Westphalia-North ','{ estpha 11 a.-South 
Increase Deorease Increase Decrease 
Total vote 89,000 78,000 
NSDAP 197,000 209,000 
DNVP 2,000 l5,0()O 
DVP 47,000 70,000 
'-Vi rt s chaft spartei 50,000 50,000 
Centre 47,000 39,000 
Staatspartei 23,000 30,000 
SPD 8,000 22,000 
KPD 34,000 67,000 
Others (CSVD, 
Landvolk etc.) 73,000 81,000 149) 
Wi th the exception of the DNVP, which inoreased its vote marginally, the 
bourgeois parties were reduced to insignificance in the Ju~ election. The 
bulk of the losses sustained by the bourgeois parties went to the NSDAP. The 
party also benefited from 'the higher "turn-out. The KPD, one may assume, 
aoquired the votes lost by the SPD, and took a sizeable share of the higher 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
149) Figures taken from D1 ttmann, op. cit.; the figures are rounded off to 
the nearest thousand. 
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turn-out. The increase in tile number of votes also provided more support for 
the Centre Party. 
iii) !h~ Reichs1A.~ ~1~c.!i.£n_ol.§.l!o.!e.E!b~r_l.231. 
G8uleiterWagner drew little comfort from the July election results. i\.t 
most they had shown 'the stability of the movement in four Slccessive electoral 
struggles'. What concerned him in particular was 'the increased support secured 
by the Centre Party and. the KPD. 150) At the national level the success of 
the NSDAP, now the strongest political force, did not bring the expected rewarns 
of office. The doubts about which course the party should take increased in 
early August after the failure of Hitler to secure the chancellorship. 151) 
The latter's 'all or nothing' attimde, reflected in his refusal of the vice-
chancellorship offered to him by Hindenburg in an 1ntervie'iV on 13 August, 
heightened the restlessness within the party. In ~estphalia Hitlcr's action 
'demoralised. many party c anrades, vmo be lieved. that the FtlhTer would neVer 
secure power legally. The alarmists within the party had. a field-day. If the 
NSDAP frond. itself in a crisis at the time then it was thi 8 section of the 
party, which questioned. the FUhrer's decisions, Which was alone responsible. 
Many of them were weary of being led. from one election to another and saw the 
end of the movement approaching ••• ' 152) The position of the ~estphalian 
NSDAP was also threatened by the increasing antagonism between the party and 
important industrial interests which became disenchanted with the Nazi t s 
behaviour in the summer and. autumn of 1932. An insight into this trouble 
(some of their cexnplaints were shared by other sections of Nazi support in 
the region) is provided by a report of a meeting between Nazi representatives 
and members ot industry who were pro-Nazi, held in September 1932. 'Regretted 
above all was the parliamentary level to which the party had Slnk', as seen 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
l50j Wagner to Strasser, 4 August 1932: BA.K NS 22/1076. 
151 For 'the background see Bracher, AuflBsunl5, ... , op. cit., pp.6l5 ff .. 
152 Thus Schreder on the mood of the Westphalian party in 'the autumn of 1932 _ 
Schr~der, op. cit., p.22. See also liom, op. cit., pp.357 ff.; on the 
situation in other regions see Noakes, op. cit., pp.233 ff.; Prioham, 
op. cit., pp.285 ff •• 
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in 'the discu ssions with fue centre Party, in the extensive practical abandon-
ment of the a ufuoritarian ideal, and tile constant joint action with the Com-
munists on practical questions'. 153) These tendencies were rejected not on~ 
by tho se industrialists present at the meetL"1g, rut by Nazis in tile Rhineland 
and Westphalia in general, 'especially by the younger party members and idea-
lists, since the parliamentary nature of the party is in stark contrast to the 
views expressed., for example, in Hi tIer's wonderful book Mei.n Kampf'. Very 
damaging too 'was 'the effect of the discussions with the Centre Party, which 
in the Protestant-Prussian north is taken far more seriouslY than in the Cntholic 
south, where such activities are regarded as being tactically necessary'. In 
the Ruhr 'the mere holding of fue talks had. undermined faith in National 
Socialism'. Another criticism concerned the NSDAP's attacks on the DNVP. 
These were disliked by the industrialists because, in their eyes, the D:Ll'VP 
was also 'a representative of the national idea'. Finally, the trend towards 
'marxist propaganda' by the regional NSDAP, and the attacks on industrialists 
in general, were viewed. with misgivings. 
The disillusionment wi thin the party did. not augur well for yet another 
election campaign, set in motion by '!he dissolution of parliament on 12 Sep-
tember. Once again 'the parties plunged into the fr~ with their by now familiar 
slognns and id.eas. The KPD pursued. its 'unity front' (Einheitsfront) policy, 
deSigned to brine both socialist parties together on '!he 1000.1 level. This was 
strongly opposed. by 'the SPD, canmitted. once more 1P countering the challenge 
154) 
of the radical Left and the radical Right. The Centre Party concentrated 
primnrily on von Papen and the 'Obrigkeitsstaat' tendencies of his government, 
in place of Which '!he Centre advocated the idea of 'a.n authoritarian demo-
cracy' (sic). 155) The NSDAP pursued a. campaign directed chiefly a.gainst the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
153) 
154) 
155) 
For the following see A. Heinrichsbauer to G. Strasser, Essen, 20 Sep-
tember 1932: NA 7/~11436-1l445. 
The Einhei tsfrcnt was 'the major 'theme pursued in the regional ComlllUnist 
paper Der KAmpfer (previously Westf!lischer Kfunpfer), issues for October. 
For the SPD's attitude see westfRlische Allgemeine Volks-Zeitun5, 21 and 
22 October 1932; the October issues also show the SPD' 8 anti-Papen and 
anU-Hit1er line. 
Tremonia, 29 and 30 October 1932; also 1 November 1932. 
Papen government, and attacks on 'marxism' were relegated to a seconda~ 
position. 156) 
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The election campaign was much more muted than 1;.'1ose which had taken place 
earlier in the year. Lack of finance restricted the efforts of all the parties. 
The lack of interest of the voter matched the lethargy of the party propag~nda 
machine s. 157) In consequence there was a slight decline in turn-out. 
In Westphalia the results of 6 November saw little change in the strength 
of the major parties in comparison with the Ju~ returns: 
W-!l 
W-S 
Rei en 
NSDAP 
22.3 
24.8 
33.1 
DNVP 
7.1 
6.2 
8.3 
Centre 
31.9 
23.1 
11.9 
SPD 
17.0 
16.6 
20.4 
KPD 
15.8 
23.2 
16.9 158) 
The slight decline of the Nazi vote was glossed over in the reeional Nazi press 
and transformed into a healthy development. It was projected as a 'necessary 
cleansing process', which had removed the weaker element 1.1 from the party. Tho se 
voters who had remained true to the movement were deemed' the poli tical elite 
of the nation'. 159) A few electoral gains in seme of the Westphalian counties 
were celebrated as 'victories', even though thel.le involved on~ increases of 
160) 
a hundred or so votes. The o~ rea.l success came in the Nazi Btronghold 
of Coun~ Wittgenstein, where the Nazis increased their share of the vote from 
64.3 to 76.0 per cent. 161) Elsewhere in the province the decline in the NaZi 
share of the poll was spread fairly evenly. 
Towards the Third Reich. 
The results of the November Reichst~g election heightened the frustrations 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- . 
156) Rote' Erde, October il.lsues, 1932. 
157) E.g. the editorial on the campaign in the Iserlohner Kreis~nzei8er und 
ZeitunG, 4 November 1932. 
158) Dittmann, Ope cit •• 
159) Rote Erde, 7 and 8 November 1932. 
160) Cf. VB, 22 November 1932 - "Our electoral victoIY in the Centre Farty 
strongholds of M{inster am the Mftnsterland". The ~:1ns involved a mere 
90 votes in Mftnster and 265 votes in county Mftnster. 
161) VB, 18 November 1932. 
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and resentments which had grC7>Yn in the NSDAP in the summer and autumn of 1932. 
The party hierarchy attempted to cover up the differences of opinion concerning 
the future COll'se of the NSDAP through declarations of 'unshaken loyalty to 
the Fahrer'. 162) The gloom within the westphalian movement was increased by 
the re signation of strasser in December and the 'decline of the N3DAP's vote 
in the local elections in Thuringia, which gave renewed. impetus to the discon-
tent of members. 163) The party was financially at a low ebb and weary of the 
incessant election struggles which had. brought no tangible rewards. Yet des-
pite the many problems and difficulties facing the Nazis, the November to 
JanuaIY period showed that 'the party framework was still strong. The party 
remained. intact and held on to its membership. 
Of major importance in the period of crisis was 'the retention of the 
momentum of the party, the necessity for which Goebbels realised. l6~) In 
Westphalia the problem was largely solved by a fortuitous event which stimu-
lated above all the organisation of ~ Westphalia-North: the Lippe Landtag 
election which fell in mid-January 1933. As part of ~ Vlestpha.l1a-North, the 
tiqy ~ of Lippe was albjected to an intensive propaganda campaign designed 
to secure a victo~ and thus restore Nazi prestige. The rural backwater became 
the focus for the attention of the party's best speakers and most able propa-
ganda specialists. 165) Hitler himself spearheaded the campaign from 4 Janua~. 
A number of well-known part.y figure~including Goebbels, Rosenberg, Darri, 
Frick and G5ring, addressed meetings. The result of t~ N3DAP's gigantic effort 
was a moderate increase in its vote in comparison with the November 1932 Rp.ichs_ 
tae election, from 3~.7 to 39.5 per cent. Psycboloeica1~ the result did much 
to boost the NSDAP's flagging morale. After half a year of successive electoral 
----------------------------------------------------------------------,---
162) "Declaration", signed by Frick, Gering, R5hm and strasser, Berlin, 23 
November 1932: NA 7/1/11233. 
163) Schreder, Ope cit., p.2~. 
l6~) Noakes, op. cit., p.241. 
_ 165) On the campaign see SchrMer's description in SchrMer, op. cit., pp.24-
49. A more detailed account i& also given by him in A. Schreder, Hitler 
eeht auf aie D5rfer. Der Auftakt zur n~tional1!ozi'll~stisc_hen Re.!.ol~ltion. 
}~rlebnisM un:) Bilder von 0er entscheinennen ,Tanu'lT'IVt:!hl 1933 in Li.;"l"e, 
Detmold, 1953. 
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setbacks the party could proclaim 0"1C6 more a victo:ry. This was excessively 
celebrated, both in the regional ~d l'k"l.tional Han press. 
Just over a fortnight later Hitler beC':llll0 c]nncellor. The party fortunes 
were cramatical1y tnmsformed. The move towards the NSD-W can be seen in the 
flooi of !'l0:nbership applications in the first half of 19.33. 3etvleen Janu'1ry 
and May the party membership trebled in Q!2. '!;estphalia-South and q'JarlrJpled 
in ~ i'Testphalia-:Iorth to re'l.ch totals of 82,041 and 72,157 respectively. 166) 
The streneth of the NSDA...t":) was reinforced. by its success in the Reichst'1~ a.nd 
Prussian L~mdtag elections held. on 5 March 19.33. The ca!l'lpai[;n was condncteo 
in a less free atmosphere than the earlier ones. 167) The greater scope eiv~n 
to the SA to indulge in fueir brand of intimidation (in Prussia the SA were 
used as auxiliary police by order of Gerlng, t.l)e ne,v Pruss:L:m Minister of the 
Interior), the series of bans placed on the left-wing and Catholic press, and 
the attacks on the KPD after the Reichstag fire, all aBed the :'Jazi M!npilisn. 
As a government party, the NSQ~ could also avail itself of the state-controlled 
radio, which was used. extensively to catty Hi tIer's speeches. Important too 
was fue removal of the finnncial difficulties which had hindered the party's 
activities in the latter half of 1932. Suocess at national level led to a 
renewed flow of funds fran industrialfsts. 
Given all the ~dvantages enjoyed by the NSDAP, the Rei.chstag result of 
5 March (~3.9 per cent of the national vote) was disappointing. In ~estphalia 
the NSDAP returns cootinued to be among the party's worst: 33.8 per cent in 
'.Vestphalia-South and 34-.9 per cent in 'Nestphalia.-North. Only the electoral 
districts of' Cologne-Aachen ard Berlin returned. lower percent,~e:e5 for the NaZis. 
Once again the Centre Party vote remained intact. The resilience of the left-
wing vote, despite the pressure exeroised. espeoially on the KPD, also limited 
the NSDAP's performance: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
166) Parteistatistik, Ope cit., p.26. 
167) Cf. Klotzbach's analysi s of' the election campaign in Dortmund, Klotzbach, 
op. ci t., pp.93 ff •• 
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NS~ Centre 3PD I\PD 
W-N 34.9 28.7 15.6 10.7 
",7-S 33.8 22.5 16.6 16.8 
Reich 43.9 13.9 18.3 12.3 163) 
The major increase of the NSDA? poll in 1Vestphalia came frC1'\ ne.v voters cmd. 
from further losses sustained by the smaller bourgeois parties. For the first 
time, however, the NSDAP a.lso secured a sizeable share of foxmer Y.PD voters: 
Increase in voters 
Electoral districts We3tphalia-~rorth and -South 
265,000 
Losses by KPD 115,0';)0 
small bour-
geois parties 59,000 
Increase in votes NSD.~P 392,000 
DNVP 17,000 
Centre 15,000 
SPD 22,000 169) 
The gain of 392,000 votes allowed the NSDAP to expand above all in the 
Ruhr region, where the party secured a relative majority in all but the 
Ll1d.inghausen electoral district. 170) The Nazis were mudl more Slccessful 
in attracting working class support fran their totalitarian rival, the KPD. 
The Centre Party, however, retained its support and blocked Nazi progress in 
19 electoral districts, \vith an absolute majority in 13. Unlike their 00-
religionists in southern Germany, the Westphalian Ca.tholics continued to 
171) 
remain immune to the Nazi appeal. 
The lack of success of the party in the Catholio arens in particular 
created problems in the first years of the Third~. The ba.n imposed on 
new membership in Ma.y 1933 left the NSDAP with a relatively low membership 
in compari son with othe1" ~, and both regional movements lacked. suitable 
members to fill the marv party posts 'within the province. 172) ~ Westphalia-
North was particularly poorly placed in 'this respect. Numerous eonmunities 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
168) Returns taken from Dittmann, Ope cit •• 
169) Ibid •• 
170) Cf. Milatz, Ope cit., appendix - map of the Reichstagswahl 5 Murch 1933. 
171) Cf. Pridham, Ope oit., pp.305-306. 
172) Parteistatistik, Ope cit., p.35 - Gaue Westphalia-North and -South were 
placed 32nd and 29th in the 11 st of 32 Gaue into 1'lhich the party was divi-
ded in terms of the percentage of HaZi members in relation to the popula-
tion of the Galle. 
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were without any party member at all, especially in the Catholic rllr"tl areas. 
Of the 411-,000 party functionaries (AmtsI1alter) active in the ~ by 1935 only 
4,000 were party members. 173) 
The relative failure of -the NSDAP in Westphalia is anphasized. not only 
by these figures but by the low electoral returns secured. by the party in the 
last phase of the Weimar Republic. The socio-religious canposition of the 
province proved. to be a major obstacle, i-bich the !;SDAP was unable to surmount 
in the pre-1933 period. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
173) G-auschatzmeister Gau 7{-N to Reichsorgtmisa tions1ei ter, MUnster, 11 l&l.rch 
1935: Samm1ung Schumacher 209. 
Conclusion 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
This study of the liSDA? in 7:est?halia has atte::l~)t0d to o:;:c,;Jino tl~e 
i.il)act of ~;ation<!ol socialis:n on a ~rodo,nina.'1tly industrialis0cl, ur:)[l~lisocl 
re.;:ion. A l'o.:;ion wi tIL a co:nnarable econo'uic stl'Ucture h/:;s not '!:icon 0::0.-
inined before. ~'he soCiO-eCOllO,-uic factors at ,fork in ','!ostphc,lia :orc";ontod 
difficulties for the I{azis. The stron;..;": tradition of '\'iorl:in.; clrlGC '00li~icG 
was a for .. lidable handica:;> throu.:;J::out the \7ei~r ;:eriod. 'l'ho n:tk,ch:lOnt of 
the laroSe Catholic pODulation to the Centre Party >7D,S n rU.rthcr di~c,(;\·c.n­
tnt.:;e to the Kazis. J)es~Jite the rSD.Apt s n.tte,apt to e.dant itself to loed 
cO:'lditio:C1S, its electoral returns and ,-:lO:nbcrshi!) in '.7eshhalia. lr~od uc-
hind those of the nationD..l -rarty a.iter I9213. In t:l0 fL:al c;,alysis tl'e 
socio-reliGious stru.ctUl'e of the province proved an irwu')orftJ1e ohctc,clo. 
The ;:>roble~Js facin...; the ';;est:)halinn r:.:tzis tad €'. stro;:!~ effect 0:1 
tl1Cir activities and eX"91ain vihy tho pl'.rty' s clcvclo:::::II:m't '1'"."0,:::: in SOlO rcc'~ccts 
diffe.J.'cnt fro.:1 that observed in Davarie., recse, 10\701' S[1.;:o;::~' t'.llJ. Schle::;';7i~,;-
I:olstein. One funda:::tental difference in the Y~ostnllD.lin..'1 rSI:AP \.~G its 
stren.;:;th in the urbo.n centres. AlthOUGh E'.ftor 1;30 the l)ect elcctoI'11.1 re-
sults 'were secured in a nU::lOOr of a.,;rc.riDll counties, tJJC nU':lbeJ.' of voto::; 
involved VIas co,1)arative1y (;;11.'3.11. The llk'ljority of t;,e n:::rW?'s votoc Ct'~:,l10 
fro:u tho tic; cities, 08:,)ocially fro,:l thoce in tile l\,uI1r comtrhn tion. ':'11i::; 
feature is very noticeable in ~ l'Iost'1l:alie,-South, ,:1101'0 t::o :,~~·ty Doem'cd 
on ave:t's,.::;e t,lo-thirds of its vote in the tOVll1S situ(l.l;od in t:;c 'hlo~orl ('.uel 
, ou tel" ilullr. 
l.1elatod to the "urban nn:turo' of tho r:e st)hnlirUl E~::;A.'? ,;r:c, i tn consis-
tent at 1;0ill)ts to securo the su,l~ort of the ,'.'orld.llC clru:;s, Y;:'dcl, brOt;:)l t 
SO:JC success. 'rhoiluh tilO 1'o..;iol1a1 I:llzi 'Y10VQ :1Cl1t :l:o;)iliccd eO.18idol'[!,blo 
SUi
'
poJ.'t 1'1'0.;1 the potit-bour...,ooisie, it o.h:c-YG hlld 0. 1'0C0cctc..blc nU.1i_,er of 
\7orL:ers in its 1'an1;:s • .;J\Grl i~l its early yo<'.rs, V,';lOll the :~:::DA? \":as little 
more than a vl}U:i:::ch s01inter ';';l'OU), there Vlere a nu 1bo!' of 1)1'1'.l1c;:os, 0[;;""0-
dally in the l:linin~ CO.llLU1i tiee, ill which workers for-:lcd the l1.'ljori ty of 
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the :,'xl.ri;;y i:le:::ibershi;:J. After the re-i'or::k'ltiol1 of tilo nQrt/ in L?; 1;:10 
e.:l)hasis on 'socio.lis,:}' beco.:Je a funclf'.nentA.l foc.turo of :~azi ')ro )<~,.)"ll('n. 
In ~Qrt t1:is e;niiasis was ·~['.ctical, in ~D~'t it reflected t;lO 'sociclist' 
convictions of t~le re-.;ional ~a,rty leQdorshi;). Al t:lOuGh t1:o strCl1 .... ;t}, 0:: t::o 
SPD, [,lld laten' of tIle LPD, lL:lited t~le '.lull c::crted on the wor;:il1:'; cl'lDG 
b./ tho ric-zis, success did not elude then entirely. 1:1 t:\(; ocono.lic cl'ir:.is 
af'!;e;r' 1329 the 111101.1)loyed e.nd. tlee younceI' TIor1,or woro Gtt::'Qc-Gcd '!.J.y t:o 
l~azi a?proach, TIhicll, eS',)ecially in its ~)hraseoloc:;y, i.li-[;c.tc~~ 'Lnt 0:: t::.c 
LPD. As a consequcnce tfJ.t; viorki11V class base of t:·w rc~;ionQl ~)'1,rty 0~:")o..:1-
cled. Ll sou·thel.~11 'r:est~)halia the percent~e of v:orl:ers to l:o fOUl~d ill ·t:;c 
rc.nl-:s of the I:SDAP was uXlequallod by c,::lY othor l:azi :-;cn. GiYcn tl~c rob.-
ti VG succe ss of the ~'iest,?halian. :i8DAP' s atJ~e~mts to D.ttr~.ct r;or::in:.; cln.s8 
su?~)ort, ti.10 YD.:l:.'ty's claim to be rot il1tc,~rativo fOl<~, a '.'oll.G. '0 ~('bGc.1,r' . .ft, 
has SO.:1C validity. In the case of Ee sse tho sizcnble i:ltluctrial tror:d:1.. .. : 
class re::k.'1.inod co:n::,aratively ii;uune to the 1:llzi a-::noo,l. 1il !'"ez::c, (,.l'ld o·.-en 
mOl'e so in 3avaria, Low'er Saxon.;,' end. Schles';;ic-Eols'~ei:l, tho s:.1all tOVTil 
8.l1d a..:.;ro.rirol voto (a reflection of the econonic struch'..l'C of theso r.rer>.c) 
lar..:.;el;; ex]lains tho stron:;th of :1azisra • 
. T:.1c success of tho l:S:9AP in Ilttro.cti~ wori~in~ cln.ss Cln1'!Ort in ';'cct-
)halia \7aS any thin • .:; but cO:.l:ileto. Givon tho concentrQtion of t;li::; ::;ocio.l 
.;rou=, in the province, the vlorl:er vms still undcr-rc"re SO;1 tod. For t':o 'flD.-
jori ty of the ',70rl:ors tho S:!?D rold LPD re:.1[tincd tho auto'1I:1.tio l',oli tiot',l 
choice. :Doth left-;iL'1~, yllr'l;ies :]ot tll0 cl;o.llen.;.;e of l~azi::;:l vi.::;orou;;;l;y, 
thou, .. ;h tho split of J~he Loft durin,;; the l'ovolu,tion of 19I8-I::;I:), a:1d t2,e 
hostility beti70en t210 socialists D.l1.d co::uullists, d8stro~'od the emity of tho 
worldn.:.; cle.5s end i:IO.de a united front ~ninst l~l'~~dc:n i·;'l"locsiblo. TllO c.ivi-
sion of tho world-n,-; clllSs vote allorrcd the :illzio to cJCr.:.:;o o.~ o. ~i;.}llficl' .. l1t 
:iolitical force in a nu.:;lber of industrial centres by the enxly nlnotcen-
thirtie s. l'L.e co.11bined lc i't-.;-in:::; voto con:!;inucd to ovorchl1do'.1 thnt ooourod 
by tho l;SDll..P; the .l~azis attractod youn.::; i70rkers and ulliol1iGod, oEer Yiol.·i~crs 
continU3d to su~)port tho SPD or LPD. :L'Lere v:ere no If.'xcc cc::-.lo (;o8crtiol1o 
30·1· 
by SPD or 1l'D voters to the ~~SDAP, at least not until 1933, \7:~e~1 '[;:,0 I,~'t) 
lost [\ sizeable sedio:l of its su-:,'!ort to the ITazis. 
The \7or::i:n,:; cln.ss uHi:1.':.tely proved less recilicnt in tl,C fo,ct) 0; :~azi 
2)reszure thtln tIle Ca'liholic Do~)Ulatiol1. The influence of tLe confessio11:,),::' 
in deter :uninc the relative failure of lTllzis::1 eonfir:18 oJccrval;iol1cJr,uo in 
other re.;ional studie s. li1:e Ca'~holics in Ee SGe and Lonor $1"',::;-011.:;, t::OGO in 
y;est)halia tencled to re::lain faithful to the Centre Party tU1til it <:i8['T)0['.-
red in 1933. Si.;,11ificn::.lt Catholic sU:,:>Tlort, like thd enjoyod by tile :~sr;:J' 
in :3avc.ria by 1933, did not occur in central ar:d nortllcrn Ger:lO.ny; ;;01'0, 
exce;Jt 1.1 the i.lhineland, Catholicic:n fn-ced Protestant l'v'.,jorities, which led 
Catholics to cohere better tha.'1 they did in the predo::1innntly CO.tholic 
south. In ';:est]halia a nU:-ilber of fs.ctors eo.rrbinecl to 1':0e1') 'naUtical '::0.-
tholicis:n' a fOl',udnble force. The ex:>erieuce of t1,c Yultur1:r,1"f, bittc.::ly 
fou..;;ht iIl tte province, had a 101lv-tcr:1 influence. III tho rcvolution of 
I;iIB-I)19 the hostility of the Left in the province to',70.rds reli,:.;lol1 locI to 
a resurGence of Catholic sU)1,?ort for the Centre l'c.rty. In the lato :1.i:lotec:l-
t'\mnties, and f!lOre particub.rly aftor 1930, the ro,:;io110.1 Cnt:-;.olic hiero.rchy 
and :~)ress reacted vi.:;orously a~ainst the e~Jer..:;in.:::: ~~SDAP. The rnzi ~.'C'lt~11-
schl".uun::: \ias inter:n'eted as a direct threat to the interests of t,:e CD,t!101ic 
Church. BY toldn..; a fir;n stand a . ;ainst the t),t:1eistic tendencies or;~o.zis:1, 
t:le Catholic Church was successful in ltee)il1~; tLe fnitilful f1'0:1 j::>i'.1il1-':; tllO 
KSDAP. As a consequence the Catholic voter rC::JI.li11e<i virtu,~lly Llr-tl1C to tLc 
Kazi ap)eal, a.'1d in the rural and urban Ca.,tholic cowltios the fA,ziG ':-k~.de 
hardly rury pro..;re ss • 
The sitU~.tiOll in tile predo ;linnlltly Protestant rul'o.l cowltie:::; 'V:r:,.s rr,(~i­
cally different. [ere the confessional factor workod for, i'nther tl!C)l 
8""ainst, the rSD1J'. In Y;estpiH'l.lia, as is also true of l'rc.l1conia, !:ccse, 
Lo\,'or Saxony and Schlesvri,:.:;-rolstein, IT3.zisn-rositivoly flouri:::hcC: in rural, 
Protestant cllviron;Jents 1.'1 tIle latter years of tLe ~'.'oL1I:tr period. An !),clzli-
tional factor favoi.trin.:::: the 175DAP was tho ri".:ht-vrin.::; trndition n:lon.:; the 
pO:Julatioll in the Protestant rural counties, 06)">00io.11;;' the sunnort enjoyed 
by 8,nti-Se,:li tic iJOve:lcnts i:1 sout!lern and north-eastern ';:0 st ,:,Ctlic.. '-'J~e 
Cowlties of ;'(itt:;enstein, Siecen, Ealle, Ltt'Jbocke pnd. '!in(~0n, cembrc::; or 
8.llti-Se::ri. tis:n in the I':ilhelninian era, were to boco,1G ':'k'Jjor strOJ10holcls of 
I;uzis,:lo Schon, in his study of Eesse, has notod an idclltical dcvelo"'lont 
in the ~)rovil1ce of I::e sLe~~;aSso.a, where the cen tros of tho anti-'::e u tic 
BUckel ;,love.J.ent of the l)re-.. m.r pel'iod also becD.l1.G ;[J,~jor t!":?zi ~ro:.'itll ['.rci's. 
Tho history of the part,) or.:;an.isation in \";est'lholin. sl:0'.'78 rou,}:ly d-
nilar clevolo:.:nent to t:m t observed elsow~lore, tLou-:;h there are C\ for," ... ·.').ri[',-
tions. 'Ihe cOl1structioH of the vertical 'lc,rty systeC1 based on tLo r~i".l -
district - branch divisioH "l7as pas!led throuc~, by von '2fcffer in I~?5 .n:1::. 
thus antici~)ated natiollH,l develop.:1ents. 'L'ho ::lnterial D.,,-t".ilr,blc 0'" 1;1:0 :~S-:"A"r)'" 
Ll tho re-for,Jt.1,tiol1 ,eriod sheds adJitionnl li,,):t on t}10 nature of n:::,rty 
ol'..:;a,nisation in tLe ;;lid-'l;r:entiec. ':lhc rcln.tiv01y ri..:;icl ccntro.li:.:;c.tion of 
~hc party, based On the Ftt'lrcr"'rinzi"l, continued to be subJected to "orio-
dic challen.:;es by 1017er pc..rty Officials ri.:.;ht U':'l to th(~ ti:1C or t~~o 'ccizllro 
of 90i1cr'. The ,'"'8.l't.Y proL'p.";8J.1.da of the '.':estdln.liml l:SDAJ" (,hoy;s one .1D:ior 
variation on the l)attern obsorved elsewhere, nO/101y tlw stron:::; e:1~"I},asic on 
'socialis.'l', a l1lajol~ the,ne throuJlou'/;, es"ccia11y in t1,o c~rly niucteen-
thirties. In ',:estnhalia tlJO liazis fou.j1t for tho wori;irl.,,; clr'.cs voto; tho 
::ittelst['].l:l, under tLc ;lrecsur'e of tho eco11o:11c crisis nftcr 1>'':1), noo(;.ed 
little encoura.;eJ.el1t to join the party. 
In cOilclusion it ;!IUSt be notocl 011CO ,]lore tb:'.t in t~"c contcyt of 7.'ost-
phalian ::"loli tics as a whole the ::SDAP never acquh'cd tl.o do ,1in.'1l1~ "'oBi tio11 
it secured Ll hlOS·t othel' :)I"'..l'ts of Cer,.J..'1.ny by 1~33. 'l'11e confoo:::.10::0,1 ntto.ch-
:nont of the C<:diholic po)ulation to the Ccntro P~rty i':n.c not 11roJ;o11. ':.'ho 
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